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# THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV

## PART 7

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### CONSULTATIONS WITH

MR. GUIVY ZALDASTANI

MR. GEORGE NAKASHIDSE

MR. DIMITAR K. PETKOFF

MRS. CATHERINE BOYAN CHOUKANOFF

### COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

*June 3, 1960*



JANUARY 8, 1960  
(INCLUDING INDEX)

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COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

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PUBLIC LAW 601, 79TH CONGRESS

The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American Activities operates is Public Law 601, 79th Congress [1946], chapter 753, 2d session, which provides:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, \* \* \**

PART 2—RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

RULE X

SEC. 121. STANDING COMMITTEES

\* \* \* \* \*  
17. Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

\* \* \* \* \*  
(g) (1) Committee on Un-American Activities.  
(A) Un-American activities.

(2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

\* \* \* \* \*

RULE XII

LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT BY STANDING COMMITTEES

SEC. 136. To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 86TH CONGRESS

House Resolution 7, January 7, 1959

\* \* \* \* \*

RULE X

STANDING COMMITTEES

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress.

\* \* \* \* \*

(q) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

\* \* \* \* \*

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

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\* \* \* \* \*

26. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

We declare that what has been modified by war cannot  
be modified again without war.

Nikita Khrushchev  
Moscow, February 8, 1960

# THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV

## SYNOPSIS

Khrushchev's bloody suppression of the people of the nation of Georgia in their efforts to gain their freedom, the forced deportations of Georgians into other parts of the Soviet Union, his suppression of liberty of the subject people of Georgia, and the starvation and inhumanities which Khrushchev's terror mechanism is currently inflicting on the people of Bulgaria are related in the accompanying consultations with the Committee on Un-American Activities.

Guivy Zaldastani, vice president of the Georgian National Alliance, and George Nakashidse described the merciless reign of terror existing in the former nation of Georgia, their native land now under control of Khrushchev's international Communist apparatus. Describing a peaceful assembly of students in the capital of Georgia in March of 1956, Mr. Zaldastani stated they—

gathered in the center of Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. They appeared before the Government House on Rust'haveli Street. They were soon joined there by factory workers and several thousand other citizens. They shouted for individual liberties and demanded the dismissal of Khrushchev.

\* \* \* \* \*

Russian troops were ordered out of their garrisons, and tanks and machine guns surrounded the city.

\* \* \* \* \*

The tanks moved in. In one section along the river, the enclosing tanks cut off all means of escape as the citizens tried to seek cover. They were flanked on one side by closed buildings, and on the other by sheer cliffs, dropping to rocks and the swift currents of the River Kura, which was running through the center of the town. This obvious death jump was the only chance of escape. The casualties were reported to exceed 600.

The heroes of the day were two boys and a girl, who had set up a transmitter to the free world, which was apparently heard in Turkey, refusing to surrender to the Russian troops. The door of the building was forced open then, and all three were bayoneted and thrown into the street.

The bodies of those killed in the fighting were not returned to the families of the victims. The wounded were ordered to remain in their homes until fully recovered, so that the number of casualties in the city would not become known.

What started as a peaceful demonstration of distrust to the Soviet rulers had been turned into a bloody uprising. The only arms used by the demonstrators were small pocket guns. The only chance for success was to make this demon-

stration for freedom a peaceful one, counting on human conscience to recognize Georgia's rights as a nation. A civilized government would have understood and very likely would have accepted discussion on these rights. For Khrushchev, the only answer, however, was death to those who challenged his authority. The right to assemble and petition could certainly not be given by Khrushchev to those who destroyed his picture and asked for his dismissal.

Commenting on suppression of religion in his native Georgia, Mr. Zaldastani continued:

It is a challenge to the regime to attend church services. Ministers do not have the right to make sermons because of the danger of expressing anticommunistic thoughts.

In regard to certain press accounts that the Communists under Khrushchev no longer operate slave labor camps within the Soviet empire, Mr. Zaldastani observed:

It is a change of name. It is not a change of the nature. It is a Communist strategy to change names as evil is discovered.

For instance, the Soviet Secret Police, which was originally known as the Cheka, later became known as the GPU. Then it became known as the MVD, and is now known by some other name. I don't know what they call it now.

In the same way the slave labor camps, which have existed in the Soviet Union since its conception, still exist, but under different names. They are being called now "correction camps," "labor camps," et cetera.

"In the terrible epoch of Yezhov, in 1937-38, when the bloody purges reached their summit in the whole union, the name of 'Khrushchev, the hangman of the Ukraine,' was often mentioned at our Promethean reunions," Mr. Nakashidse stated. He continued:

Hundreds of thousands of party members, professors, students, journalists, writers, artists, workers, engineers, peasants, and clergy were executed by him, or banished to Siberia.

\* \* \* \* \*

As a member of the "almighty" Politburo since 1939, Khrushchev is one of the instigators and executors of the barbarous massacres of the Ukrainian Vinnitsa, of the Polish Katyn, of the cruel, merciless expulsion of the Caucasian nations—Chechen-Ingushes, Karachay-Balkars, Crimean Tartars and Kalmyks—from their native countries to Siberia and Central Asia.

His really bloodthirsty nature was revealed at the time of the Hungarian uprising. Surprised and terrified by the worldwide significance of the national movement, he and his government issued, on October 30, 1956, a declaration where they solemnly pledged to fulfill the Hungarian nation's de-

mand, and to withdraw the Russian troops from Budapest and Hungary. This declaration contains such gems as:

"The countries of the Socialist nations, joined together by their great friendship, can build their relations only on the principles of the whole equality, on the respect of territorial integrity, on the recognizing of the state's independence and sovereignty, on the nonintervention in the inner affairs of the other nation \* \* \*"

According to this official declaration, the Hungarian revolutionary government and her freedom-fighting military forces were invited to negotiate with Russia to bring about the realization of their proposal.

The whole world knows what happened then, how Khrushchev "fulfilled" this promise that he had made public.

Mr. Nakashidse related details of the exploitation by the Communists of Soviet Georgia, the destruction of its cultural life, and the deprivation by Khrushchev's terror mechanism of all basic freedoms. This regime maintains itself in power "by terror, by force, by intrigue, under the bayonets of Moscow," he concluded.

Dimitar K. Petkoff, of the Bulgarian National Committee, and Mrs. Catherine Boyan Choukanoff testified respecting Communist suppression of the people of their native country, Bulgaria.

Mr. Petkoff stated:

An example of the exploitation of Bulgaria by the Soviet Union is the deportation of the youth into the Soviet Union. They were said to be "volunteers," but in fact there was no opportunity for them to refuse to go. There was unemployment in Bulgaria, and any young man who was called by the party and told, "You must go to the Soviet Union," could not answer "I don't want to go." The Communists would say, "You are not willing to work and are sabotaging the Soviet national economy, and you are a traitor and an enemy." In fact, there were no volunteers at all. It was a deportation to the Soviet Union. The youths were sent to different places, even in Siberia, but mainly in Kazakhstan.

The Bulgarian Prime Minister, Anton Yugov, revealed in an interview with a foreign correspondent, which was published in the Bulgarian newspapers on July 30, 1957, that the total amount of deported was 10,000 young men. From that time those deportations have continued, so they are much more.

Commenting on Khrushchev's description of himself and other Communists as "humanitarians," Mr. Petkoff said:

My people regard it as a sacrilege to suggest that either Khrushchev or his Communist apparatus could be humanitarian. They are under the whiplash. They have seen their sons deported to far lands. They have had their property seized. They have had friends and relatives literally destroyed by this awful mechanism which is the enemy of their own freedom, both as a nation and in their individual lives. It is cynical to suggest that either Khrushchev or his regime could be humanitarian.

Let me give you a few illustrations of what I am talking about:

About the humanitarianism of Khrushchev, I can say that all the elected members of the National Assembly (Parliament) of 1947—the only one in which there was a democratic opposition—were arrested. Some of the leaders were killed and some went into exile, like Dr. Dimitrov here. The elected representatives of the people were imprisoned and many are still in prison under this regime of Khrushchev's, with his smile of humanitarianism.

Here are some of the members of the National Assembly who are known to have died in prison or have been sent to their homes to die under the regime of Khrushchev:

Raicho Daskalov, Dr. Diniu Gotchev, and Trifon Kunev of the Agrarian Party; Ivan Slavov, Hristo Punev, and Petko Tarpanov of the Social Democratic Party.

Aleksandur Girginov, a former minister and democratic leader, also died in a Communist jail.

There are other prominent national leaders still under arrest: Ivan Kostov, Angel Darjanski, Konstantin Muraviev, and Dimiter Gichev, all of the Agrarian Party; Kosta Lultchev, Petar Bratkov, and D. R. Dertliev, these of the Social Democratic Party.

And there are many unknown.

Gentlemen, these are not just statistics. I am giving you the names of human beings who were destroyed and imprisoned, and by Khrushchev.

Regarding prison camps in Bulgaria, Mr. Petkoff stated:

Tens of thousands of people are now in prisons and camps in Bulgaria. For those crimes, and in general for the present enslavement of the Bulgarian nation, the Soviet dictator, Nikita Khrushchev, is responsible.

Mrs. Choukanoff read to the committee excerpts from messages from the Bulgarian people suffering "in the Red Hell":

We can hardly procure anything here, either to eat or to wear. Misery is everywhere, thanks to the Communists. They are the lowest and the worst, and there are no greater crooks than them.

\* \* \* \* \*

We hardly get enough to eat. If you would decide to send me something, please don't bother to send clothes—the duty is much more than I can pay, but you can send me some food. It will be good if it can reach in time for the holidays which are approaching. Otherwise I guess I'll have to part with that rooster I've been keeping in the yard for some years now. But the poor thing is so old already that I wonder if it will ever get cooked.

Mrs. Choukanoff stated:

It is probably true that there is an apparently abundant supply of consumer goods, of food and of all kinds of deli-

cacies in the stores. But in reality, the supply is quite limited, and, besides, everything is so highly priced that it is beyond the reach of the common people. Those things can be afforded only by the members of the so-called new class, by a few privileged collaborators, by the diplomatic corps and by such visitors from abroad that the regime allows in the country.

As to whether there has been any improvement in the situation in Bulgaria since Khrushchev ascended the pinnacle in the Communist regime, she said:

If there is any evidence to that effect, it must have escaped my attention. On the contrary, all indications are that the Communist regime in Bulgaria is tightening, rather than relaxing, controls over the different phases of national life.

Concluding her testimony, Mrs. Choukanoff observed that—

the fact remains that the Communist regime has reduced Bulgaria to a state of obedient subordination to the will of the Kremlin bosses. And this appears to be as true in the fields of art, literature, education, and culture generally as it is in those of police control, the economy, and foreign affairs.

Having succeeded in transplanting Soviet police methods on Bulgarian soil, in merging the nation's economy with that of the U.S.S.R. and in abandoning even the pretense to a foreign policy of its own, the same regime has been trying as hard to stifle any intellectual independence and to regiment all artistic and creative efforts. It is here, however, in what might be called the spiritual sector, that it has encountered some of its most serious frustrations.



# THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV

(Part 7)

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FRIDAY, JANUARY 8, 1960

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Washington, D.C.*

## CONSULTATIONS

The following consultations with Messrs. Guivy Zaldastani and George Nakashidse were held at 10:20 a.m., in room 226, Old House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Francis E. Walter, Chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Francis E. Walter, of Pennsylvania, and Gordon H. Scherer, of Ohio.

Staff members present: Richard Arens, staff director, and Fulton Lewis III, research analyst.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, and the first witness will be sworn.

Do you, Mr. Zaldastani, solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. I do.

## STATEMENT OF GUIVY ZALDASTANI

Mr. ARENS. Please identify yourself by name, residence, and occupation.

Mr. ZALDASTANI. My name is Guivy Zaldastani. I live at 55 Atherton Street, Milton, Mass. I am a manager-buyer in a Boston department store and I am also vice president of the Georgian National Alliance.

Mr. ARENS. Give us a word, please, about the Georgian National Alliance.

Mr. ZALDASTANI. The Georgian National Alliance is an American organization dedicated to oppose Communist imperialism and whose purpose is to contribute to the reestablishment of an independent Georgian nation.

The organization has two printed organs: "The Voice of Free Georgia," a quarterly publication in English, which has been temporarily discontinued because of lack of funds; and "Georgian Opinion," a monthly publication in Georgian, of which I am a member of the editorial board.

Mr. ARENS. Please give us for the record, Mr. Zaldastani, a word about that area of the Soviet Union known as Georgia.

Mr. ZALDASTANI. Georgia is one of the oldest nations in the Christian world with a history which can be traced back to the Hittite and Assyrian civilizations. In ancient times Georgia was composed of two areas: Colchis (a name familiar through the legend of the *Golden Fleece*) and Iberia.

Georgia's colorful past, highly developed culture, Christian ideals, advanced forms of government, geographic wealth, pleasant climate and scenic landscape have made her the provocation and envy of her neighbors—Greeks, Romans, Persians, Moslems, Turks, and presently Russians. Yet with numerous invasions and the continuing threat of losing her national identity, she has emerged repeatedly, holding fast to her culture, religion and unique language.

In the 12th century, Georgia reached an apex in her political and cultural achievement. Her literature, art and architecture brought about a flourishing "golden age." In government the concept of individual freedoms and equality of the sexes were firmly established, but the culmination of this era of enlightenment came under the reign of Queen Tamar, who set up a reform program, whereby legislative and executive powers were entrusted to a parliament, leaving the monarch only the rights of veto and confirmation.

This humanitarian and democratic doctrine preceded similar movements in Western Europe by almost a century.

Georgia has no cultural, social, racial, ethnic, or linguistic ties with Russia. Her high degree of literacy, historical and religious background are forms of national pride, and she cannot imagine herself as part of the organized perversity that the Soviet Union represents.

Mr. ARENS. Where is it located geographically?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. Georgia is situated in the Caucasus between the Black and Caspian Seas. Primarily an agricultural country her wine, tea, fruit, and tobacco products are important exports. Silk has been a national industry since the fifth century A.D. Mineral deposits are considerable. She possesses the largest and finest manganese mines in the world, as well as coal, iron, oil and uranium. Good transportation networks of railroads, highways, and airways connect her capital Tbilisi to both Moscow and the Middle East.

Mr. ARENS. Could you give us just a rough estimate of its physical size?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. Its area is a little smaller than Hungary—just about the size of the State of Virginia.

Mr. ARENS. Please, sir, tell us about the population of this area known as Georgia, in the Soviet Union.

Mr. ZALDASTANI. The population, just over 4 million, is basically rural; however, in Tbilisi alone there are over 600,000 inhabitants. To help me describe the chief characteristics of the Georgian people I happen to have a copy of a book, *The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy 1658-1832*, by David Marshall Lang,<sup>1</sup> from which I would like to read a few lines.

Mr. ARENS. Please go ahead, Mr. Zaldastani.

Mr. ZALDASTANI (reading):

Generalizations about peoples are always dangerous, and the Georgians are no exception to this rule. But most observers would agree that, along with a high level of intel-

<sup>1</sup> David Marshall Lang, *The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy 1658-1832*, Columbia University Press New York, 1957; published in Great Britain, Canada, India, and Pakistan by the Oxford University Press

lectual ability, they are quick-witted and prone to volatility and change of mood. They are gifted in dance, song, and poetry, and Georgian folklore is an inexhaustible mine of invention. They tend to take an optimistic view of life, are generous in hospitality \* \* \* .

Mr. ARENS. Would you kindly give us a word about your personal background?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. Well, I was born in 1919 in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia.

At the time of my birth Georgia was an independent republic. In 1921 Soviet Russia invaded that country, and after a very fierce fight, which lasted 6 to 7 weeks, the Georgian Army was defeated by the Soviet forces. At that time the Georgian government left Georgia and found asylum in Paris.

Up to 1924 my family stayed in Georgia. My father was hiding from the Soviet authorities and took a leading part in the organization of the national insurrection of 1924. After the failure of that insurrection my father escaped to Paris, and our family joined him a year later.

I grew up in France, where I attended L'Ecole des Sciences Politiques and graduated from the University of Paris Law School. During the war I served in the French Marine Corps. In 1948 I came to this country.

I graduated from Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration and since then I have been working in Boston.

Mr. ARENS. Are you a citizen of the United States?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. Yes, sir, I am.

Mr. ARENS. When were you naturalized?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. I was naturalized in 1954.

Mr. ARENS. Mr. Zaldastani, do you have evidence of crimes by Khrushchev in your native country of Georgia?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. Yes, sir.

Mr. ARENS. Can you characterize, first of all, the sources of your information?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. The information which I am prepared to submit to the Committee on Un-American Activities stems from documentary material which I have in my possession, as well as from confidential sources of information stemming from Georgia, which I obviously cannot reveal at the present time because it would jeopardize the lives of people who are presently there transmitting the information.

Mr. ARENS. Will you kindly, Mr. Zaldastani, proceed at your own pace to present your information respecting the crimes of Khrushchev in your native land?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. To present the proper evidence of Khrushchev's crimes in Georgia I would like to quote Webster's definition of a crime: "A gross violation of human laws."

Being an American citizen and testifying before the representatives of the United States Congress, the only laws which would be natural to apply here are contained in our own Constitution.

However, the events we are about to report which incriminate Khrushchev do not only violate our own concept of human rights, but also the Charter of the United Nations as well as the very laws of the Soviet Union.

The first amendment to our Constitution outlines our individual freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to assemble and petition. These laws were ignored and violently repudiated by Khrushchev in Tbilisi, Georgia, in March 1956.

In 1956, as before, Muscovite imperialism was challenged by the Georgian masses who were seeking individual liberties and liberation from the Muscovite yoke.

What happened in 1956 in Tbilisi was a natural continuation of Georgia's fight for survival. It was normal for Khrushchev to expect trouble. He was afraid that at that time—in 1956—a strong uprising in Georgia, if not controlled at once, could spread throughout the Soviet Union.

Early in that year he had elevated Vasili P. Mzhavanadze, an old comrade of his Ukrainian bloody purges, and first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, to the Central Committee of the Soviet Party, placing him under his direct command.

He sent 15,000 party agitators to Tbilisi, which is roughly about one agitator for every 15 men, to control the city and to indoctrinate the population.

Mr. ARENS. What do you mean by an "agitator"?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. The word "agitator" was used in the report given by Tass. I assume they meant it to be used in the common sense of the word—one who excites public discussion in order to prepare and educate the public for an idea. However, I think we should assume that they were trusted Communists sent to stir up and prime the population in the ways of Russian communism.

As I said, the purpose was to control the city and to indoctrinate the population.

At the time, the military tribunal—officers and soldiers—stationed in Georgia were made up entirely of Russians, as the Georgians could not be depended upon.

Since the fall of Beria the secret police had been reorganized and was in the hands of trusted men. There was no room left for surprises. Yet, in spite of all this organization, in spite of this control on every man, woman, and child living in the city, some people came out proclaiming hatred of their Soviet overlords and made a futile attempt to contact the free world.

Mr. ARENS. Has anything of that sort happened before in Georgia, to your knowledge?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. Actually it has. In fact, at times historical analogies help to understand current events.

To understand what happened in March of 1956 in Tbilisi, Georgia—a few years after the death of Stalin—I should like to go back to 1924, just a few months after the death of Lenin.

Georgia at that time had been overwhelmed by the Soviet Army, after a brief but bloody war. The whole population resented the establishment of the Soviet puppet government, which effected daily executions by the secret police, deportation of the intellectuals to Siberia, the closing of the churches, and the constant indoctrination of communism.

To uphold their principles in view of death was far better than living under the existing conditions; yet, one had to wait for the right moment to insurge in order to have some chance of success.

After the death of Lenin, which happened in January of 1924, the struggle for a successor commenced. Georgia felt the time had come.

In August of that year a general insurrection broke out, but without the help of any foreign power, its destiny was inevitable: thousands of men died, more were deported. The fervor of these brave Georgians was never to be forgotten by Moscow.

In 1956, just as in 1924, Georgians saw hope for a successful stand against their evil dictator.

Mr. ARENS. Who was the evil dictator to whom you allude?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. Well, by March of 1956, Khrushchev already had established himself as the primary leader of the Soviet Union. Just a few months before March he had denounced Stalin, thus wiping out the existing Stalinist hierarchy, who had up to that time threatened his dream as supreme "monarch." There was no more triumvirate at that time. He was the sole ruler of the Communist Party as well as of the Soviet Union.

Mr. ARENS. Was Khrushchev directly responsible for the bloody suppression of the efforts of the Georgian people to gain their freedom?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. There is no question about it, Mr. Arens.

Continuing with the analogy: After Stalin's death in 1953—just as after Lenin's death—the struggle for succession had commenced. Malenkov, Bulganin, and Beria, had tried to consolidate their positions, but failed. In 1953, Khrushchev—just as Stalin did in 1924—seized the general secretariat of the Communist Party; and from that position, Khrushchev's influence grew. The Georgians realized that before Khrushchev established himself as a head of the Soviet Union, they must put their dreams of independence into action. The time was running short.

In February of 1956 Khrushchev denounced Stalin and exposed the crimes of the Stalin era. A wave of shock and confusion spread throughout the Communist world. The time for "speaking out" against the regime was ripe. The facade was Stalin—the hope was the spread of revolt throughout the Soviet Union against the Communist tyrants.

Mr. ARENS. What actually happened then, in March of 1956?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. In previous years the anniversary of Stalin's death had been celebrated by solemn ceremonies, meetings, and speeches of praise. But no such glory was accorded Stalin on March 5, 1956. The officials meant that day to be like any other. Yet, 2 days later, a body of students gathered in the center of Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. They appeared before the Government House on Rust'haveli Street. They were soon joined there by factory workers and several thousand other citizens. They shouted for individual liberties and demanded the dismissal of Khrushchev.

Then the first party secretary, Vasili Mzhavanadze—a right-hand man of Khrushchev in Georgia—came out to appease the crowd. But the crowd answered by shouting, "Get out! Get out!"

Eventually the demonstrators dispersed.

The next morning all communications with Georgia ceased. The visiting French President, Vincent Auriol, was flown out of Tbilisi. Prime Minister Hansen of Denmark, scheduled to land in Tbilisi that day, was rerouted to Stalingrad at the last minute—the reason given: bad weather. Six U.S. physicians scheduled to visit Tbilisi

for a few days "agreed" to drop the Georgian capital from their itinerary, at the suggestion of the Soviet officials.

Russian troops were ordered out of their garrisons, and tanks and machine guns surrounded the city.

Marshal Voroshilov was sent in from Moscow.

Mr. ARENS. Who is he?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. Marshal Voroshilov was, at the time, a member of the Politburo, and the nominal President of the Soviet Union.

Apparently the troops received the order to fire at the crowd. Some demonstrators took over some buildings of the Communist Party, the post office, a newspaper building, hoping to cut off the directives of the Communist Party, and to get in touch with the outside world.

As the shots were fired, the demonstrators tried to organize street barricades by overturning trollies and blocking streets.

The tanks moved in. In one section along the river, the enclosing tanks cut off all means of escape as the citizens tried to seek cover. They were flanked on one side by closed buildings, and on the other by sheer cliffs, dropping to rocks and the swift currents of the River Kura, which was running through the center of the town. This obvious death jump was the only chance of escape. The casualties were reported to exceed 600.

The heroes of the day were two boys and a girl, who had set up a transmitter to the free world, which was apparently heard in Turkey, refusing to surrender to the Russian troops. The door of the building was forced open then, and all three were bayoneted and thrown into the street.

The bodies of those killed in the fighting were not returned to the families of the victims. The wounded were ordered to remain in their homes until fully recovered, so that the number of casualties in the city would not become known.

What started as a peaceful demonstration of distrust to the Soviet rulers had been turned into a bloody uprising. The only arms used by the demonstrators were small pocket guns. The only chance for success was to make this demonstration for freedom a peaceful one, counting on human conscience to recognize Georgia's rights as a nation. A civilized government would have understood and very likely would have accepted discussion on these rights. For Khrushchev, the only answer, however, was death to those who challenged his authority. The right to assemble and petition could certainly not be given by Khrushchev to those who destroyed his picture and asked for his dismissal.

Mr. ARENS. Were these demonstrations pro-Stalin?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. None whatsoever. In fact, there is no evidence which substantiates that there were any pro-Stalin demonstrations. Western journalists, looking for an interpretation of the few facts given by Reuters, connected the uprising with the anniversary of Stalin's death, and the earlier denunciation of Stalin.

Obviously pleased with that false interpretation, Mikoyan himself, while touring in India, tried to reinforce it, and on March 27, 1956—which actually is about 19 days later—he made the statement that "even though there were no disturbances in Georgia, some people took the reevaluation of Stalin a bit hard." Actually the downgrading of Stalin was just an occasion for the national uprising to start.

As a matter of fact, the Georgian Communist Party meeting right after the uprising, on March 19 and 20, will substantiate my statement. This meeting took the following resolutions:

1. The Chief of Police—the MVD—demanded that every citizen deliver a rebuff to all those trying to resurrect the survival of bourgeois nationalism.

2. Mr. Sergei Dzhorberadze, the Communist Party leader of the University of Tbilisi, was denounced and ousted, for “failing to suppress elements of nationalism among the Georgian student body.”

Later, on March 24, the newspaper “Zarya Vostoka” (Dawn of the East) complained that Georgian students were putting too much emphasis on ancient Georgian history when Georgia was an independent kingdom with a strongly developed sense of nationalism. The party organ said that university party leaders should have been more diligent in suppressing elements of nationalism among the students. Later, in an interview, Viktor Koupradze, the rector of the University of Tbilisi, himself said that “during the disturbances some demonstrators shouted forbidden and illegal nationalistic slogans.”

Mr. ARENS. Specifically what was Khrushchev’s responsibility in these crimes which you have just recounted?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. Khrushchev’s part in these crimes is revealed through his close collaboration with the man who was directly responsible for the suppression of the revolt: Mr. V. P. Mzhavanadze.

Remember, at the time of these crimes, Khrushchev was, as he is now, the all-powerful head of the Communist apparatus in the Soviet Union. The crime which I have related could not have occurred without his acquiescence and approval.

Khrushchev, for many years, was a close collaborator of Mr. Mzhavanadze, who was his henchman in Georgia.

In February 1956, Khrushchev made Mzhavanadze a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and as a reward to Mzhavanadze for his conduct during the uprising, Khrushchev sponsored him for nomination to the Presidium of the Communist Party in June of 1957.

Mr. ARENS. Is there freedom of religion in Soviet Georgia?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. Georgia is one of the oldest Christian countries on earth. She was the second state which adopted Christianity as a state religion.

During the fifth century she was one of the first ones to translate the Bible, and this translation is presently used as a historical source.

Yet, in a country with such a background, religion is not being taught to the children today. It is a challenge to the regime to attend church services. Ministers do not have the right to make sermons because of the danger of expressing anticommunistic thoughts.

In 1922, Katholikos Ambrosius, head of the Georgian Church, was saddened by the fact that there were only 1,500 churches left in Georgia. Before his death in prison, Katholikos Ambrosius spoke these last words at his trial:

My soul belongs to God, my heart to my country: you, my executioners, do what you will with my body.

In 1951, Harrison E. Salisbury of the New York Times, while visiting Tbilisi, talked to Katholikos Callistratus who mentioned that there were only 100 churches left in Georgia. Katholikos Callistratus was also arrested, put to torture, and died in prison.

There is no freedom of religion in Georgia.

Mr. ARENS. Do you have information respecting forced deportations of Georgians to other areas of the Soviet empire?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. The facts of forced deportations of Georgians into other parts of Soviet Russia, especially to the Arctic Circle and Siberia, are innumerable, and thousands of instances could be cited. However, just one example: After the rioting in Tbilisi that was mentioned before, 27 full trainloads of Georgians, mostly students, were sent to forced labor camps in Central Asia. This fact has been proven without any doubt whatsoever by many foreign observers and journalists, and is confirmed without question by my own sources of information.

Mr. ARENS. We have read in the recent past where the Communist regime denies the existence of slave labor camps within the Soviet empire.

What observations would you care to make on that?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. It is a change of name. It is not a change of the nature. It is a Communist strategy to change names as evil is discovered.

For instance, the Soviet Secret Police, which was originally known as the Cheka, later became known as the GPU. Then it became known as the MVD, and is now known by some other name. I don't know what they call it now.

In the same way the slave labor camps, which have existed in the Soviet Union since its conception, still exist, but under different names. They are being called now "correction camps," "labor camps," et cetera.

Mr. ARENS. Can the free world trust Khrushchev in these impending international conferences?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. To my mind there is not the slightest doubt that Khrushchev, as any other Communist leader, cannot be trusted.

Let us not forget that the end always justifies the means for a Communist, and to ignore a treaty, or a signature, is just part of the strategy toward supremacy of world communism.

Mr. ARENS. Can we believe Khrushchev's professions of peaceful intent?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. We can only believe that he is at war against Western civilization.

Mr. ARENS. And there will be peace in his eyes only when he has completed the conquest of the world by international communism?

Mr. ZALDASTANI. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Zaldastani.

Mr. ARENS. The next witness will be Mr. Nakashidse.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you, Mr. Nakashidse, solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. I do.

## STATEMENT OF GEORGE NAKASHIDSE

Mr. ARENS. Please identify yourself by name, residence, and occupation.

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. My name is George Nakashidse. I live at 22 East 89th Street, New York 28, N.Y.

I attended Georgian State University in Tiflis from 1918 to 1922. While preparing for my final examinations, I was arrested, with many other students, by the Bolshevik government, which was installed in Georgia by the Russian bolshevik military forces in 1921.

After 11 months of imprisonment I was exiled. I first studied law abroad, at Heidelberg University in Germany. I then went to Prague, Czechoslovakia, where I received my doctorate of law at the Ukrainian University in 1927, and my Ph. D. from Charles University in 1929.

In 1930 I went to Poland, where I was invited by the Orient Institute and by Warsaw University to lecture on Georgian language and literature.

In 1945, when the Russian Army occupied the whole of Poland, I went to Germany as a political refugee, and stayed there until 1948, at which time I emigrated to Argentina.

I arrived in the United States 3½ months ago as an immigrant.

I have always participated in anti-Communist organizations. For instance, I was the leader of the Anti-Bolshevik Georgian Student Movement in Tiflis in 1921-22. In Prague I was president of the International Anti-Bolshevik Student Organization. In Poland I was the vice president of the well-known anti-Communist organization; the Promethean Movement, created by the representatives of the subjugated nations. In Germany I was a member and also the rotative president of the International Central Committee of Political Emigrants and Refugees. In Argentina I was the vice president of the anti-Communist international organization, "Liberation Europea."

Mr. ARENS. When did you come to the United States?

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. I came to the United States on the 26th of September 1959.

Mr. ARENS. Do you have current sources of information respecting the situation in your native country of Soviet Georgia?

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. Yes, sir. As I have explained to you already, I am a participant in a number of anti-Communist movements operating in various areas of the world, and am the direct recipient of information from sources which cannot be publicly revealed without jeopardizing innocent lives.

Mr. ARENS. Mr. Nakashidse, the Committee on Un-American Activities, as you know, is developing information respecting the crimes of Khrushchev.

Based upon your own background as a one-time resident of Soviet Georgia, and your continuous interest in the operations of the Communist conspiracy in Soviet Georgia, do you have information bearing on this subject of the crimes of Khrushchev?

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. The first time I heard the name of Khrushchev was when he became a member of the central committee in 1934. The Ukrainians, the Polish consulate members in Kharkov, Moscow, and Kiev, had characterized Khrushchev as a "fanatical and implacable Communist."

In the terrible epoch of Yezhov, in 1937-38, when the bloody purges reached their summit in the whole union, the name of "Khrushchev, the hangman of the Ukraine," was often mentioned at our Promethean reunions.

Hundreds of thousands of party members, professors, students, journalists, writers, artists, workers, engineers, peasants, and clergy were executed by him, or banished to Siberia.

In 1937-38, the Promethean League, at public meetings, international conferences, and by publications in various languages, denounced before the civilized world the atrocities performed by Yezhov, Beria, Khrushchev, and other hangmen of Stalin in the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkestan, Northern Caucasus, Georgia, and other subjugated countries.

As a member of the "almighty" Politburo since 1939, Khrushchev is one of the instigators and executors of the barbarous massacres of the Ukrainian Vinnitsa, of the Polish Katyn, of the cruel, merciless expulsion of the Caucasian nations—Chechen-Ingushes, Karachay-Balkars, Crimean Tartars and Kalmyks—from their native countries to Siberia and Central Asia.

His really bloodthirsty nature was revealed at the time of the Hungarian uprising. Surprised and terrified by the worldwide significance of the national movement, he and his government issued, on October 30, 1956, a declaration where they solemnly pledged to fulfill the Hungarian nation's demand, and to withdraw the Russian troops from Budapest and Hungary. This declaration contains such gems as:

The countries of the Socialist nations, joined together by their great friendship, can build their relations only on the principles of the whole equality, on the respect of territorial integrity, on the recognizing of the state's independence and sovereignty, on the nonintervention in the inner affairs of the other nation \* \* \*.

According to this official declaration, the Hungarian revolutionary government and her freedom-fighting military forces were invited to negotiate with Russia to bring about the realization of their proposal.

The whole world knows what happened then, how Khrushchev "fulfilled" this promise that he had made public.

Before the congress of the Hungarian Communist Party, and also before the factory workers last December, Khrushchev boasted that he, against the fear and opposition of some government members, had ordered the Russian tank divisions against the freedom-loving people.

And this man, when he spoke before the United Nations, before Senators, and others, without ever blushing, played the role of fervent defender of the sovereignty of every nation.

If we all pledge to respect the principle of nonintervention in the other states' inner affairs—which means the recognizing of every nation's right to elect its own state's form, its own system, its own order which pleases it—the peace in the world will be secured, and we want nothing more.

In pronouncing these and many such phrases, had Khrushchev forgotten about Poland, about Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, the Baltic States, Albania? And had he forgotten about

almost 40 years of uninterrupted struggle for national freedom by the Ukraine, Turkestan, Northern Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and others?

We know the Communist regime was forcibly introduced in Poland, Hungary, the Ukraine, Georgia, and other countries, which were treacherously occupied by the Russians. Were not the puppet governments created long before, for every one of these nations by the Russians, completely disregarding the wishes of the nations?

We will only cite here some words from the declaration of the leader and ideologist of the Georgian Communist Party, Philip Makharadze, to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, on December 6, 1921:

The arrival of the Red Army and the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia had the outward appearance of a foreign occupation, because in the country itself there was nobody who was ready to take part in a rebellion or a revolution. And at the time of the proclamation of the Soviet regime, there was in the whole of Georgia not a single Communist member capable of organizing action or providing leadership, and this task had been accomplished mainly by doubtful, or sometimes even criminal elements.

And such was the situation in every other country that the Russian bolsheviks forcibly occupied.

Khrushchev knows it very well, because all his vertiginous career he owes to his merciless fight with millions of Ukrainians and others who struggled bitterly for the restoration of independence of their enslaved nations. He knows that. But notwithstanding, he speaks about the sacred rights of nations, nonintervention, respect of the national freedom, because he knows very well that nobody will bother him with inappropriate questions, and that the Western democracies prefer to hear and be delighted by great words about lofty ideals than to see sorrowful, tragic facts, such as they are.

Mr. ARENS. Has anything changed in the policy of Russian Communists since the death of Stalin?

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. No. The "collective leadership" was only a repetition of the triumvirate of Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, which was created after the death of Lenin as a consequence of their struggle with Trotsky for heritage. Soon Stalin outmaneuvered his allies and became the almighty dictator of the Soviet Union.

Has Khrushchev acted otherwise, in spite of his assertions about the unwavering fidelity to the principle of collective leadership?

Even the degrading of Stalin by Khrushchev in the 20th congress was nothing new. Stalin used to do it almost systematically when he wanted his and his Communist Party errors passed over to his potential rivals, and often to completely innocent people.

It is enough to mention here these processes with every kind of absurd accusation, against Trotsky, against Kamenev, Zinoviev, Radek, Piatakov, against Rykov, Bukharin, Tukhachevsky, just to name only some of the more familiar names, and not worrying your ears with the thousands of similar processes in the cities and provinces of the whole Soviet Union. The difference was only that Stalin accused and degraded the living, and Khrushchev did it with the dead.

Mr. ARENS. Was this resolution of the 20th congress to rehabilitate unjustly condemned party members anything new?

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. No. Almost in every congress which followed the terrific purges there were similar resolutions. For instance, on the 26th of January, 1938, we have the resolution under such a title as "Rehabilitate the Unjustly Purged and Severely Castigate the Calumniators." It served usually to the slackening, the relaxation, of the overstrained explosive situation. Khrushchev only repeated a known and tried precept.

Khrushchev's era brought no relief to the peoples of the Soviet Union.

Mr. ARENS. Were there any liberal policies previously carried on in the U.S.S.R.?

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. Yes. From 1922 to 1929, under Lenin himself, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced for the purpose of saving the country from complete ruin and destruction. NEP gave economic and national freedom. The peasants could own as much land as they were able to cultivate, only they were obliged to turn in a certain portion of their produce to the central government. National freedom was so unlimited that almost all of the Communist parties and governments in the Soviet Union demanded from the central government full freedom in their respective States.

Mr. ARENS. Do you have information respecting economic exploitation of Soviet Georgia?

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. Yes, I do.

The colonial policy of the exploitation of Georgia's rich natural resources exclusively for Moscow's aims is continued.

The mining industry—manganese, iron, copper, lead, zinc, barytes—has been even more expanded. Metallurgical works, iron and steel plants, machine building, the automobile industry, the chemical industry, find markets for their products only in Russia. The same is true of agriculture. The Georgian tea, citrus and other fruits, tobacco, and wine you can find almost everywhere in the Soviet Union. But it is difficult to buy even 1 pound in any Georgian city.

According to the 21st congress, in Georgia as everywhere in the Soviet Union, measures are taken to reduce drastically the private plots of the collective farmers, depriving them of a unique source of additional income, so badly necessary for their existence. That this decree has evoked general discontent among the population is easy to understand.

Mr. ARENS. Is there an exploitation in the cultural life in Soviet Georgia?

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. The answer is yes.

On the cultural front, after the enthronement of Khrushchev, the forced "Russification" of the Georgian youth stepped in and became a nightmare for both teachers and the alumni. In an article entitled, "Measures Necessary to Improve the Teaching of the Russian Language and Literature in the Schools of the Georgian Republic," *Communisti* N3 1954, such shortcomings are enumerated: "Notwithstanding, a whole series of measures such, for instance, as the introduction of an 11-year period of study of Russian, the foundation in Tbilisi of a Russian pedagogical institute, the state of teaching the Russian language and literature in the schools of Georgia is unsatisfactory." "Too many students and pupils fail in Russian examinations." "Georgian schools seldom arrange meetings devoted to Russian literature." "They do not hold conferences in Russian."

"No Pioneer meetings in Russian." "Not a sufficient number of textbooks in Russian." And so on.

The top Georgian Communist leaders demand steadily from the Georgians to cultivate the feeling of love and friendship toward a great Russian nation, to stress—the enormous progressive significance of the unification of Georgia with Russia as a political, economic, and cultural development for the Georgian people.

They scorned severely the works of the known Georgian historians who dared express just an opposite opinion. Recently the State University of Tbilisi published the fifth volume of the history of the Georgian people, by academician I. Dzhavakhishvili. The leaders of the University committed a rude political mistake by publishing this book. It was published without regard to contemporary Soviet historical achievement, without a critical preface or commentary. And yet the materials and sketches of the fifth volume contain mistakes of a national character, since facts telling of the relationship between Georgia and Russia in the 17th and 18th centuries appear in a distorted form. The book ignores the enormous progressive significance of the unification of Georgia with Russia.

In the *History of Georgia*, published in 1950, the centuries old ties between the Georgian and Russian peoples are not fully elucidated. Moreover, despite the historical truth the authors assert that the alliance with Russia was of little use to Georgia and did not justify the hopes of King Irakli and his followers. This bourgeois nationalist point of view was expressed with even more frankness in the book of Sh. K. Shkhetia, Tbilisi, in which the consequences of joining Georgia to Russia were described in the darkest colors.

Professor Kultadze, on the basis of certain compiled facts, has tried to prove that the orientation of Georgian leaders toward union with Russia was a mistake, adversely affecting the fate of Georgia.

The whole history of the Georgian people, especially concerning the relations with Russia, is completely distorted. Every time, and everywhere, the great Russia appears to be the disinterested "protector" of the Georgian people.

It is impossible to enumerate all the examples of the falsification of the historical facts.

But to make it more clear to the Americans how history is written in the Soviet Union, I cite here some sentences from the Georgian daily "Communisti" for August 15, 1959:

The Popular-Democratic Republic of Korea had suffered great hardships. She held out in Korean history unprecedented war, and went out victoriously. Sixteen imperialistic powers under the leadership of the United States attacked her in 1950, and for more than three years, using the most barbarous means, had conducted the bloody and disastrous war.

That is how the Russians described a historical event of some years ago. So there is no wonder that our history and literature are so distorted that no Georgian can recognize his past and present, and discern the truth from the absurd falsifications.

The trials for "nationalist-patriotic deviations" go on as before. The executions and deportations continue. The colonization of Georgia by Russian elements is even accelerated.

Mr. ARENS. Do the people of Soviet Georgia have freedom as we know it here in the West?

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. The economic exploitation has persisted so that, just as in the Soviet Union, there is no right of free election, no free speech, no free press, no free assembly, and there is no right to strike. Some naive American and European tourists assert that Georgians and others must love their government. Why they should think that is something quite bewildering to me.

Mr. ARENS. What is the attitude of the people of Soviet Georgia toward Khrushchev and his Communist regime?

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. There is almost universal hatred of Khrushchev and the Communist regime which holds the people of my native state in subjugation.

Yesterday it was Stalin and his terror. Today it is Khrushchev and his brutality. Tomorrow it will perhaps be some other Communist. May I comment that the change in name or in leadership will in no sense lessen the terror mechanism so long as the Communist regime is in power.

As we see from the speech of Khrushchev in the 20th congress, Stalin was hated by the people, and even by his most faithful disciples and collaborators. Whether Khrushchev has more luck, I cannot say. But why enslaved nations must love Khrushchev and his government is for us completely unnatural.

Have any oppressed people ever loved their oppressor?

The United States has never experienced occupation by a foreign nation. But such nations as Denmark, Luxembourg, Belgium, Holland, Norway, France, only have recently been freed from foreign domination. As far as I can tell, all these people had hated not only Hitler, but even each German at the time of the occupation of their countries.

We know that European powers had given liberty to India, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Tunis, Syria, Morocco, Ghana, Guinea; and many others are fulfilling the desire of peoples to be free and independent. Why should the Western statesmen think that the satellites and other oppressed nations love their oppressors and have no desire to re-establish their lost sovereignty? Is the feeling of national dignity the privilege only of the Americans, the Europeans, and some Asian and African peoples? Or are they convinced of the superiority of the Soviet Union's regime where everyone is content and happy?

Had not the Second World War clearly demonstrated the true feeling of the Soviet peoples toward the Communist regime, when even the Nazi conquerors were enthusiastically greeted everywhere and millions of soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the enemy?

Is it any different today, after the tragic events in Georgia in March and May of 1956, after Poznan, after responding to the petitions of the concentration camp prisoners in Karaganda, Kengir, Norilsk, Vorkuta, and others, with machineguns and heavy tanks, after treacherously crushing the heroic Hungarian nation under the wheels of tank divisions?

Mr. ARENS. After the experience of Soviet Georgia is it possible to peacefully coexist with the Communist regime?

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. One of the top Communists in Soviet Russia, Pospelov writes in Pravda for July 30, 1953, as follows:

The Party and the government go out from Lenin's directive about the possibility of long-time coexistence and peaceful competition between two systems.

But we know from the speeches and writings of Lenin that he advised his followers to do all that could cause conflicts and disorders in the capitalistic world.

Stalin, the staunch coexistentialist, always preached the taking advantage of the international conflicts for expanding communism.

It is necessary to benefit every opposition and conflicts among the capitalistic groups and governments in order to bring in the capitalistic world the putrefaction. (This is from volume 5 of Stalin's works.)

At the same time, Stalin's aim to build socialism in one country was founded on the principle of coexistence. He gave concessions to foreign financiers, he made trade contracts with many foreign capitalists, he preached peace, and subscribed, almost with every state, the pact of nonaggression. His government in 1936 entered pompously in the League of Nations, pledging solemnly to fulfill the noble principles of the League. Everyone knows what really happened. They all know what happened during World War II, and after the Soviet Government signed the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations Convention, and many others. How it fulfilled its obligations before the democratic world is very well known. What guarantee has the free world that today will be otherwise? Is the Communist Party today more democratic, more peaceful, and less totalitarian?

Mr. ARENS. Have the Communists abandoned their goal of world conquest?

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. All you have to do is to read the Communist press to prove the fallacy of this naive hope.

Mr. ARENS. Is Khrushchev really a humanitarian man, one who can achieve wonders and give the world peace and happiness?

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. This is Khrushchev: the man who made his career by the massacre of millions of Ukrainians and other peoples, who was the most faithful and beloved servant of his master, who proved to be such a hypocrite that he fooled Stalin, Beria, Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Zhukov, Malenkov, and others, who after the funeral of his deified boss and infallible leader, slandered him and ascribed to him all the basest qualities, who treacherously shot, without a trial, his friend Beria, and ousted from the collective leadership and government his loyal collaborators such as Kaganovich, Malenkov, Bulganin, and others. Will he respect any treaty with the democratic world?

Only gullible and incorrigible idealists can believe and confide in such a wonder.

For 40 years we, the Georgians, observed the policy and methods used by the Russian Communists: They recognize without any reserve the independence of any state and conclude with it the pact of nonaggression and friendship, then, in the suitable moment, attack and occupy the very same country. This is the way they conquered

the previously recognized countries of Ukraine, Turkestan, Armenia, Northern Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Baltic States, eastern Poland, et cetera.

For instance, Georgia was recognized *de jure* by the great Entente—England, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium—in January 27, 1921. At an official banquet to celebrate that event the representative of the Soviet Union expressed his satisfaction that finally the capitalistic Entente had followed the example of the socialistic Soviet Union and recognized Georgia *de jure*. While delivering the most sincere greetings from Lenin and Trotsky, and assuming everlasting friendship between the U.S.S.R and the Republic of Georgia, Soviet troops were gathering at the Georgian border.

Informed about it, Lord Curzon, then the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, sent a telegram of protest to Moscow. This is what Chicherin, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, replied:

Russia has recognized the independence of Georgia. Russian policy supports the principle of self-determination of small nations. We have made no demands on Georgia. Soviet Russia has not committed, and will not commit in the future, any hostile acts against the Republic of Georgia.

On February 11 the Russian Red Army attacked Georgia from five directions. The result is known.

That almost 40 years ago we, the small nations, were fooled by the Russian bolsheviks, is no wonder. But why, having such experience regarding how Moscow respected its obligations before and after World War II, the democratic world hopes that the Communists will ever renounce from using lies, provocation, treason and force in achieving its ends, that is for us really incomprehensible.

That Western democracies do not wish war is known to everyone in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev knows perfectly well that Americans have always had, and have today, peaceful intentions.

From a military standpoint you were the mightiest state in 1945. With your allies you could have forced Russia to fulfill all her obligations toward the satellites and toward the Soviet nations. But you trusted Stalin and hoped that he would honestly fulfill all his interior and exterior obligations.

Will you repeat this mistake with Khrushchev only because he assures you of his peaceful intentions?

He knows, in spite of his boastings and menaces, that the democratic world even today is more powerful than that of the Communists. The only aim which he pursues is to lull you, to disarm you morally and materially, in order to attack you unexpectedly, as is their tried and ever-successful custom, and achieve their dream of world domination.

Mr. ARENS. What percentage of the people of Soviet Georgia are members of the Communist Party?

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. Based upon current sources of information which I have described to you, I am confident that not more than 5 or 6 percent of the people of my native Soviet Georgia are members of the Communist Party. And may I say, too, that even of this 5 or 6 percent, many are members of the party only because of opportunism. If tomorrow Georgia had the chance to enjoy free election, there is no doubt she would vote for a democratic government,

freeing herself from Russian imperialism which is expressed today in world communism.

Mr. ARENS. Mr. Nakashidse, how then does the regime maintain itself in power, if only 5 or 6 percent are members of the Communist Party?

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. By terror, by force, by intrigue, under the bayonets of Moscow.

As a good illustration, I may as well note that the commander in chief of the Russian occupation armies in Georgia is automatically a member of the cabinet of the so-called Georgian Socialistic Republic. And at the yearly meeting of the cabinet he makes the speech which is equivalent to the State of the Union Speech of the President of the United States.

Mr. ARENS. Can you give us further illustrations of this?

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. Yes. At the present time, as in the past, people of my native Georgia are not accorded even the semblance of trial for any trespass which they may allegedly commit against the state. In times of unrest they are tried by military tribunals which are sent in by Moscow and composed entirely of Russians.

Mr. ARENS. What is the reaction of the people in Soviet Georgia to the new look on the international scene, of sweetness and light, and the entertaining and international conferences held by the free world with Khrushchev?

Mr. NAKASHIDSE. All the evidence which is available to us, all the reports of foreign tourists and journalists who have lately been traveling in Georgia in increased numbers, point to the fact that the Georgians are extremely amazed, resentful, and astounded by the friendly treatment which has been accorded to Khrushchev in his visits to the countries of the Western democracies.

Usually, the Georgians show extreme friendship and good will towards America, and the only criticism that the visitors to Georgia ever hear about America are two: One is the efforts to have friendly relations with Khrushchev and his like; and second, the fact that the Hungarians in the revolution were not aided by the United States.

It seems to be inconceivable to Georgians that a man like Khrushchev, who has quite definitely been responsible for some of the most atrocious crimes committed in the Soviet Union, is being treated as an equal by the best representatives of Western democracy.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we thank you for the splendid contribution which you have made in this series.

#### AFTERNOON SESSION, FRIDAY, JANUARY 8, 1960

The following consultations with Mr. Dimitar K. Petkoff, of the Bulgarian National Committee, and Mrs. Catherine Boyan Choukanoff, were held at 2:15 p.m., in room 226, Old House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Francis E. Walter, of Pennsylvania, Chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Francis E. Walter (chairman) and Gordon H. Scherer, of Ohio.

Staff members present: Richard Arens, staff director, and Raymond T. Collins, staff investigator.

Also present: Dr. G. M. Dimitrov, chairman of the Bulgarian National Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, and the first witness will be sworn.

Do you, Mr. Petkoff, solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. PETKOFF. I do.

#### STATEMENT OF DIMITAR K. PETKOFF

Mr. ARENS. Please identify yourself by name, residence, and occupation.

Mr. PETKOFF. My name is Dimitar K. Petkoff. My residence is 304 West 92d Street, New York City. I am working as a member of the executive committee of the Bulgarian National Committee and I am a vice chairman of the legal committee of the Assembly of Captive European Nations.

Mr. ARENS. Give us just a word about the Bulgarian National Committee.

Mr. PETKOFF. It is an organization whose members are exiles who left the Iron Curtain. We are not American citizens, even though we have been here a long time, because we represent the people who are in Bulgaria and are against the Communist government.

Mr. ARENS. Kindly tell us just a word about your own personal life, including where you were born, and a word about your education and your life in Bulgaria.

Mr. PETKOFF. I was born in London, England. My father was there working in the Bulgarian Embassy at that time. My grandfather, Dimitar Petkoff, had been Prime Minister of Bulgaria and my uncle, Nikola Petkoff, who was hanged by the Communists in 1947, was the leader of the parliamentary opposition. I was educated in Bulgaria and France. I am a graduate of law, a lawyer, and I was in the foreign service, mainly in the capital, Sofia. In 1945 I worked 1 year as a diplomat in the Bulgarian Embassy in Bucharest, Rumania.

Mr. ARENS. When did you leave Bulgaria?

Mr. PETKOFF. I left Bulgaria in 1948. In October I escaped illegally by the frontier. I was in a Communist jail in Yugoslavia, and after they let me go to Trieste, Italy, I was in Europe for several years and I came to United States in 1954.

Mr. ARENS. Mr. Petkoff, you have described to this committee off the record the various sources of your information respecting the present situation in Bulgaria; is that correct?

Mr. PETKOFF. Yes.

Mr. ARENS. And those sources of information cannot be revealed on this record publicly because it would jeopardize lives; is that correct?

Mr. PETKOFF. Yes.

Mr. ARENS. Mr. Petkoff, would you tell us first of all where Bulgaria is located within central Europe?

Mr. PETKOFF. Bulgaria is located in the middle of the Balkans, in the southeast of Europe, and is a country of 8 million inhabitants, with neighbors at the south, Greece and Turkey. On the west and the north are Communist countries. On the west is Yugoslavia, and on the north is Rumania.

Mr. ARENS. So that this record will now reflect some of the elemental historical facts with reference to Bulgaria, would you kindly recount on the record the political facts regarding Bulgaria and its history, say in the last two or three decades, or perhaps since World War I?

Mr. PETKOFF. Bulgaria for several centuries was under the Turks, part of the Turkish Empire, and it became an independent state in 1878, after a war between Russia and Turkey.

Bulgaria took part in the First World War on the side of Germany, and was defeated.

After that war there was a democratic government in Bulgaria.

In 1923 there was a military coup. Later, before the Second World War, the democratic constitution was suspended under the personal authority of the king.

Bulgaria was again on the side of Germany, and it was a satellite. It was occupied by the German Army, and at the end of the Second World War the Russian Army came on the River Danube and occupied Bulgaria.

The government was changed, and there was an effort to change the foreign policy, but the Russians, without agreement of the British or the Americans, declared war on Bulgaria and invaded the country.

In fact, there were no military operations between Bulgaria and the Soviet Army. Then, in September 1944, a coalition government was established in Bulgaria.

Immediately there was very strong pressure from the Soviet Army. The Communists started to kill thousands of people.

There was continual interference by the Soviets in the Bulgarian political life, especially in the army.

Mr. ARENS. Mr. Petkoff, as you know, the Committee on Un-American Activities is assembling factual information respecting the crimes of Khrushchev and his regime.

Would you kindly proceed at your own pace to present to the committee the information that you have bearing on that subject, insofar as it relates to your native land of Bulgaria?

Mr. PETKOFF. In a very short time, because of the continual interference of the Soviet Army, the Communists became the rulers of the country. The other parties, which were democratic parties—the Peasant Party and the Socialist Party—were obliged to leave the government.

From May 1945 the Communists were already the masters.

Because of the international situation and Bulgaria being a former satellite of Germany, and since no peace treaty was concluded, during the following 2 years the Communists did not establish a total dictatorship in Bulgaria.

They even allowed some legal existence to democratic parties like the Agrarian Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Democratic Party.

But after the peace treaty, which was signed in February 1947, they found themselves able to sovietize Bulgaria without intervention from the other allies, United States and England, and they started to establish a total dictatorship.

They elected a parliament in 1946 in which the Communists won the majority, thanks to the Communist terror and the presence of the Soviet Army, but they still tolerated an opposition.

There were 100 men elected from the opposition parties. But feeling themselves very strong in 1947, after the peace treaty, they held a mock trial for conspiracy against Nikola Petkoff, who was the leader of the parliamentary opposition, and condemned him to death in August 1947 and hanged him in September. This was the occasion used to destroy, to outlaw, the opposition parties, who were accused of being conspiratory parties.

I think from that time on, 1947 and 1948, the full sovietization of Bulgaria began.

In 1948 they started to make mass forced collectivization after they had destroyed the legal opposition, and it was the first step to the total communization of our country.

Mr. ARENS. What is the situation in Bulgaria today under Khrushchev's Communist regime?

Mr. PETKOFF. Bulgaria today is a fully communized and sovietized country.

This sovietization is continuing and even growing. For that reason we and the whole Bulgarian people consider Khrushchev, the present ruler of the Soviet Union, as responsible for this crime, namely, the suppression of the national independence of Bulgaria.

Mr. ARENS. What information do you have respecting the laws in Bulgaria?

Mr. PETKOFF. The laws in Bulgaria are in fact an imitation, a copy, of the Soviet laws. There is almost no difference, or a very insignificant difference, between the Soviet and Bulgarian laws: The laws concerning, for instance, property and labor; concerning the trial rules in justice for the civilian laws and for the penal laws.

They were completely changed, and they are today almost the same as in the Soviet Union.

Mr. ARENS. What is the situation in the army?

Mr. PETKOFF. In the Bulgarian Army the Communists changed the graduation, and the grads are exactly the same as in the Soviet Army. The method of instruction is also exactly the same as in the Soviet Red Army. The arms are of Soviet origin, and the Bulgarian commanders are, in fact, Communists who have spent all their life in the Soviet Union and were, the most of them, officers in the Soviet Army during World War II. They are today commanding in Bulgaria, and the Bulgarian staff is still directly subordinated to the Soviet staff of the army.

Mr. ARENS. What is the situation concerning the economy in Bulgaria?

Mr. PETKOFF. The Bulgarian economy is wholly dependent on the Soviet Union. It was all the time coordinated with the Soviet economy—but they begin now to make a full economic integration in Eastern Europe. For that purpose there was from the 10th to the 14th of December, in Sofia, a meeting of what they call the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—known as COMECON in the West—under the direction of Aleksei Kosygin, Vice Premier of the Soviet Union, first alternate of Khrushchev, and chairman of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. He came personally to direct those meetings.

Another thing about this COMECON. In the Saturday Evening Post of November 28, 1959, an American reporter, Fred Warner Neal, gave an interesting report on Bulgaria. In a meeting with the Soviet

Ambassador in Sofia, the Soviet Ambassador, according to Mr. Neal, overtly inferred that the center of activities of the COMECON in Bulgaria was the Soviet Embassy. You can read that in the Saturday Evening Post. It is just a confirmation by an American journalist of a well-known fact from all the information we have from inside.

Mr. ARENS. Do you have a word about the social structure in Bulgaria?

Mr. PETKOFF. The social structure in Bulgaria is exactly the same as in the Soviet Union. The industry was fully nationalized, which means that it is in the hands of the state. The trade—internal and external—is also in the hands of the state. The banks are owned by the state, and now the whole agriculture is collectivized.

Mr. ARENS. What about the cultural life.

Mr. PETKOFF. There were hundreds of Soviet books translated into the Bulgarian language which were published in our country, and their total is in millions of copies.

The Russian language is obligatory in the schools and is learned to the same extent as the Bulgarian language.

Mr. ARENS. Do you have information respecting collectivization in Bulgaria?

Mr. PETKOFF. We have information, and it is coming from the whole Bulgarian people. I will show the period from 1955 until today, which is the Khrushchev period. The agriculture was collectivized; according to official Bulgarian Communist statistics, 60 percent in 1955 and 75 percent in 1956. This was told by the First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Todor Zhivkov. The collectivization was raised to more than 90 percent in 1958. This was told by Anton Yugov, the Chief of the Bulgarian Government, the Prime Minister, at the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party, June 1958. It means that during the Khrushchev period the collectivization raised from 60 percent to more than 90 percent.

This result was obtained by mass terror, by persecution of peasants. They were killed and they were threatened, and only by such mass terror this collectivization was achieved. For that reason we consider it is a crime of Khrushchev.

Mr. ARENS. Have there been forced deportations of Bulgarians during Khrushchev's regime?

Mr. PETKOFF. Yes. An example of the exploitation of Bulgaria by the Soviet Union is the deportation of the youth into the Soviet Union. They were said to be "volunteers," but in fact there was no opportunity for them to refuse to go. There was unemployment in Bulgaria, and any young man who was called by the party and told, "You must go to the Soviet Union," could not answer "I don't want to go." The Communists would say, "You are not willing to work and are sabotaging the Soviet national economy, and you are a traitor and an enemy." In fact, there were no volunteers at all. It was a deportation to the Soviet Union. The youths were sent to different places, even in Siberia, but mainly in Kazakhstan.

The Bulgarian Prime Minister, Anton Yugov, revealed in an interview with a foreign correspondent, which was published in the Bulgarian newspapers on July 30, 1957, that the total amount of deported was 10,000 young men. From that time those deportations have continued, so they are much more.

Mr. ARENS. What percentage of the people of Bulgaria are members of the Communist Party?

Mr. PETKOFF. I cannot tell you, but it is a minority of the Bulgarian population. The Communists pretend that there are half a million. Anyhow the most of them are not really Communists, because before the Communist regime there was an insignificant minority, and many people went into the Communist Party in order to save themselves from persecution.

Mr. ARENS. If most of the people in Bulgaria are not Communists, how does the Communist regime maintain itself in power?

Mr. PETKOFF. Only by dictatorship and terror, by force and brutality. The Communists were brought into power by the Soviet Army, and they are kept now by the Communist police, which is in fact an army, and this is recognized by themselves. The Bulgarian Prime Ministers have said that they would not rule Bulgaria if the Soviet Union had not helped them.

On the other side the "dictatorship of the proletariat"—which means Communist dictatorship by brute force—is their principle.

Mr. ARENS. What is the attitude of the people in Bulgaria who are enslaved by the Communist regime toward the sweetness and light that we are now seeing on the international scene, part of which involved the invitation of Khrushchev to the United States on his recent visit?

Mr. PETKOFF. The people feel very sad and disappointed, because the population is against the Communist tyranny, and their hope was in the Western Powers, and especially the United States of America. They looked at those countries and their rulers as the symbols and the champions of liberty in the world, and they feel very disappointed and sad when they see them sitting together with their oppressor.

Mr. ARENS. During his recent visit to the United States, Khrushchev described himself and the Communists as "humanitarians."

What is the reaction of the people of Bulgaria to this characterization?

Mr. PETKOFF. My people regard it as a sacrilege to suggest that either Khrushchev or his Communist apparatus could be humanitarian. They are under the whiplash. They have seen their sons deported to far lands. They have had their property seized. They have had friends and relatives literally destroyed by this awful mechanism which is the enemy of their own freedom, both as a nation and in their individual lives. It is cynical to suggest that either Khrushchev or his regime could be humanitarian.

Let me give you a few illustrations of what I am talking about:

About the humanitarianism of Khrushchev, I can say that all the elected members of the National Assembly (Parliament) of 1947—the only one in which there was a democratic opposition—were arrested. Some of the leaders were killed and some went into exile, like Dr. Dimitrov here. The elected representatives of the people were imprisoned and many are still in prison under this regime of Khrushchev's, with his smile of humanitarianism.

Here are some of the members of the National Assembly who are known to have died in prison or have been sent to their homes to die under the regime of Khrushchev:

Raicho Daskalov, Dr. Diniu Gotchev, and Trifon Kunev of the Agrarian Party; Ivan Slavov, Hristo Pudev, and Petko Tarpanov of the Social Democratic Party.

Aleksandur Girginov, a former minister and democratic leader, also died in a Communist jail.

There are other prominent national leaders still under arrest: Ivan Kostov, Angel Darjanski, Konstantin Muraviev, and Dimiter Gichev, all of the Agrarian Party; Kosta Lultchev, Petar Bratkov, and D. R. Dertliev, these of the Social Democratic Party.

And there are many unknown.

Gentlemen, these are not just statistics. I am giving you the names of human beings who were destroyed and imprisoned, and by Khrushchev.

Mr. ARENS. Now, resuming your comments respecting the Communist Party of Bulgaria, to what extent is it an instrument or arm of the Kremlin?

Mr. PETKOFF. The Bulgarian Communist Party is wholly subordinated to the Soviet Communist Party.

As a fact, we can show personal interventions of Khrushchev. For instance, in 1956 there were some local Communists, like Georgi Chankov, who was Vice Premier, Dobri Terpeshef, and General Boris Kopchef and Colonel Yanko Panoff. Those were representatives of the local Communists in Bulgaria and were maybe a little more independent from Moscow. The resolution for their elimination was made by, and is an interference of, Khrushchev in order to give the whole power to those absolutely subordinated to Moscow.

A second interference of Khrushchev: He came himself, he was the main speaker, the main organizer of the Congress of the Communist Party in June 1958.

Mr. ARENS. In Bulgaria?

Mr. PETKOFF. In Bulgaria, in Sofia. Khrushchev personally came. He directed everything which was done in this Congress, and he dismissed the Bulgarian Minister of War, Panchevski. He did it because even the Communist army was dissatisfied with the regime.

This was a personal interference of Khrushchev in the political situation in Bulgaria and the government of the country.

Mr. ARENS. To what extent are the policies of Khrushchev, announced in the Soviet Union, copied within Bulgaria?

Mr. PETKOFF. In Bulgaria, in January 1959, a change was announced in the administrative system, and this was made law in March 1959. This administrative law is a copy of the Khrushchev "decentralization" in the Soviet Union in December 1957. It was an imitation of the Soviet law in this way: As in the Soviet law, some ministries were suppressed, mainly the economic ministries of heavy industry, light industry, food, and so on, and there were created administrative regions which are ruled by "People's Soviets," and those "People's Soviets," have in their hands the whole administrative and economical power. It is just the same reform as in the Soviet Union, only the number of regions is different because Bulgaria is a small country. This is a Khrushchev change, absolutely copied and brought here.

A change in the educational system also was announced by the First Secretary of the Communist Party in April 1958. It was made a law in July 1959. This law is a copy of the Khrushchev educational law of December 1958.

The same change of the whole educational system was made by the law adopted in July 1959 by the Bulgarian National Assembly,

as in the U.S.S.R. The motivation was exactly the same. They tried—so they said—to “bring the education nearer to life.” In fact, the two main purposes of this law were to oblige the youth, the pupils and the students, to give up a big part of their time of education in order to work in the factories and the kolkhozes. In this way the Communists extracted millions of working hours from the youth. This was done in Bulgaria exactly as in the Soviet Union.

The second aim was to try to create a wholly communized youth and to inspire hate of the enemies of the Communist regime: This, it is said, is in the report of the secretary of the party. And they extended very much the teachings of Marxism and Leninism.

Mr. ARENS. Do you think the Communist dictatorship and the Soviet exploitation have diminished in Bulgaria as of now?

Mr. PETKOFF. No. In October 1950, there was a decision, inspired by Khrushchev, to implement the 5-year plan in 4 years. This brought a terrible perturbation in the whole economic system and a very great misery, a lack of food in the towns and the villages. This enterprise was a complete failure. It brought also an opposition from the whole nation, which was translated in passive resistance and in mass sabotage, and was accompanied by a very big terror of the Communist police against the people. Tens of thousands of people are now in prisons and camps in Bulgaria. For those crimes, and in general for the present enslavement of the Bulgarian nation, the Soviet dictator, Nikita Khrushchev, is responsible.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Petkoff.

Mr. ARENS. The next witness will be Mrs. Choukanoff.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you, Mrs. Choukanoff, solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. CHOUKANOFF. I do.

#### STATEMENT OF MRS. CATHERINE BOYAN CHOUKANOFF

Mr. ARENS. Please identify yourself by name, residence, and occupation.

Mrs. CHOUKANOFF. My name is Catherine B. Choukanoff. I was born and educated in Bulgaria, and I am now residing at 303 North Fulton Avenue, Mount Vernon, N.Y.

Mr. ARENS. And your occupation, please?

Mrs. CHOUKANOFF. I am currently employed as a map drafter. I also do some writing on the side.

Mr. ARENS. Give us, please, a word on your personal background.

Mrs. CHOUKANOFF. I was born in Bulgaria. After completing my secondary education, I went through the Free University of Sofia, majoring in political science. While there, I worked chiefly as secretary in the government service, was personnel director for the Department of Supplies during World War II and, for a while after that, a reporter for the Ministry of Information.

In the latter capacity, I had the opportunity to cover the so-called people's trials, conducted chiefly by Communists after my country had been invaded by the Red Army in September 1944. That experience gave me the first foretaste of Communist justice, Soviet style. Charged as war criminals and Nazi collaborators, some 2,700 men—including the regents, practically all wartime cabinet ministers

and most members of parliament, many high government officials, Army officers, leading members of the police force, et cetera—were tried, sentenced to death without the right to appeal, and executed within 24 hours after sentence was pronounced. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of other people—minor officials, Western sympathizers, liberals of all shades, anti-Communists and just plain folks—were being liquidated by the Communist-directed police, without the benefit of a public trial, without any publicity, without any explanation whatever. They were just disappearing—day and night—and were never heard of again.

There was a pattern to this terror, whether it was carried out in the open by the people's courts or secretly by the police. On the surface, it looked like an understandable attempt to punish and render harmless those responsible for allowing Bulgaria to drift into the Nazi-Fascist camp. In actuality, however, it was a concerted and far-fetched effort to eliminate all actual and potential opposition to whatever plans the Communists, respectively Moscow, had for the country, and to cow the rest of the people into submission.

Needless to say, the Bulgarian Communists proper—those who had stayed home before and during the war—could never have done that by themselves; they were too few and, for all I know, they didn't have such intentions. The most they were hoping for at the time was to be included in a broad coalition government of democratic parties that would break away from the imposed alliance with the Axis and align Bulgaria with the united nations fighting Hitler. In fact, during the weeks and months preceding the Soviet invasion, they were carrying on extensive negotiations to that effect with both Ivan Bagrianoff who, as Prime Minister between June 1 and September 1, attempted to restore Bulgaria's neutrality, and his successor, Konstantin Muraviev, who declared war on Nazi Germany in the early days of September. Bagrianoff, incidentally, was subsequently executed as a "war criminal," as were most of his fellow ministers, and Muraviev, so far as I know, is still in jail, as are his own fellow ministers, except those who have since died, also in jail.

But to come back to the Red terror which started September 9, 1944, and which has not yet abated. It was the work chiefly of the Bulgarian expatriates who had been living in the Soviet Union since the twenties, and who were brought back to Bulgaria by the invading Red Army. Of course, they couldn't have carried out that terror all by themselves either. They, too, were too few for that—much fewer, in fact, than the local Communists. But they, apparently, were willing and properly coached and, besides, they had all the help that the armed and police forces of the Soviet Union could give them.

Ironically, though the Soviets had declared war on Bulgaria without any provocation, without any warning and, as Mr. Petkoff has just pointed out, "behind the back of their allies," they said at the time that they were entering the country as "friends and liberators" of the Bulgarian people. That was rather perplexing for at least two reasons. In the first place, the Bagrianoff government had managed to persuade the Germans to withdraw most of their troops from Bulgaria, and whatever German soldiers were still on Bulgarian territory in early September were being disarmed by the Muraviev government. Under the circumstances, and with the Germans retreating on all other fronts, Bulgaria was no longer in need of liberation. In the second

place, it was hardly an act of friendship on the part of the Soviet Union to declare war on a country which had been doing its best to maintain friendly relations with it, and which had already decided to fight Germany—a fact well known at the time in Moscow.

Yet, most Bulgarians tried to believe—they wanted to believe—that the Soviets, that is the Russians, must have some justifiable reason for acting that way; that, whatever the appearances of their act, they meant no harm and were really coming to Bulgaria as friends. After all, their forefathers had come there once before, back in the time of Alexander II—“the King Liberator”—and the result of that visit was the emergence of a free, independent and sovereign Bulgaria after five centuries of bondage. The memory of that visit had developed through the years into the kind of gratitude and affection for Russia, which made it possible for King Boris to reject the repeated demands of Hitler for Bulgarian divisions on the eastern front. Understandably, my fellow countrymen were hopeful that the Soviet Union would appreciate all this; that it would even reciprocate in some way or other. Such hopes were, moreover, openly encouraged by the Soviet minister in Sofia, who remained there throughout the war, and who was in constant and friendly contact with representatives of both the Government and the opposition in the country.

The entry of Soviet troops in Bulgaria on September 8, 1944, and the events that followed smothered all these hopes and, along with them, the age-long friendship between the Bulgarian people and Russia.

Mr. ARENS. When did you leave Bulgaria?

Mrs. CHOUKANOFF. I left Bulgaria in 1946, less than 2 years after the Soviet Army entered Bulgaria.

Mr. ARENS. How long have you been a resident of the United States?

Mrs. CHOUKANOFF. Since March 1946.

Mr. ARENS. Are you a citizen?

Mrs. CHOUKANOFF. Yes, I am a citizen.

Mr. ARENS. Do you have sources of information respecting the situation currently in Bulgaria?

Mrs. CHOUKANOFF. Yes. I have sources of information which I have discussed with you off the record.

Mr. ARENS. Kindly proceed at your own pace, Mrs. Choukanoff, and address yourself to the subject under consideration by the committee, namely the crimes of Khrushchev, specifically in reference to your native land of Bulgaria.

Mrs. CHOUKANOFF. Well, one can hardly put a finger on any concrete crimes of Mr. Khrushchev in relation to the people of Bulgaria in the sense in which he could be accused of crimes against the peoples of the Ukraine, Hungary, and even Poland. He is, nevertheless, definitely guilty of a sort of “negative” or “passive” crime against the Bulgarian people, too.

Having, as he does, all the power to exert every kind of influence over the regime of the Communists in Bulgaria, there is to date no evidence that he has used that power to influence the same regime for the better. On the contrary, the latter continues to act very much the way it acted when it was first set up with the help of the Red Army and under the auspices of Stalin. If, therefore, that Soviet

satellite regime in Bulgaria—established, furthermore, in utter disregard for international morality and in violation of interallied agreements—is one of the crimes of Stalin, then it is obvious that Khrushchev has not lifted a finger to correct that crime of what he has himself described as a “paranoid tyrant.” And therein, perhaps, lies his own greatest crime in relation to the people of Bulgaria.

Needless to say, Mr. Khrushchev would be the first to deny that he could—or would—exert controlling influence over the government of supposedly “free, independent, and sovereign” Bulgaria.

As head of the ruling party and the government in the Soviet Union, he undoubtedly has controlling influence over the armed, police, and administrative forces in his own country. All the indications are that without the active or readily available support of these Soviet forces, the Communist regime in Bulgaria could not survive a week, perhaps not even a day. According to public admissions of leading Bulgarian Communists, it could not have even hoped to gain a foothold without the benevolent—and armed—intercession of the Soviet Union. The same Communists have also admitted that, at the time this intercession started in September 1944, their party did not have more than 4,000 to 5,000 members. Even some of these soon dropped out of the party voluntarily, were expelled or even liquidated, when they balked at blindly following the new Moscow line, brought to them by the handful of Bulgarian expatriates from the Soviet Union. Traycho Tostov, first secretary of the party prior to the return of the expatriates, was one of a number of lifelong local Communists who were executed or otherwise liquidated in the struggle that ensued between local and expatriate Communists before the latter could get the upper hand and impose the will of Stalin, respectively Moscow, on Bulgaria. The expatriates are still having the upper hand, and Moscow’s will is still the supreme law in Bulgaria, though Stalin has long since died.

It is true that under the guidance of the expatriates the Bulgarian Communist Party soon boosted its membership to over half a million, and that it became, as they say, a “mass party.” It would be quite misleading, however, to take this membership figure as an indication of mass support, or that over half a million adult Bulgarians have really embraced the Communist gospel. The mass membership of the Bulgarian Communist Party can more truly be explained, first, by the fact that it would allow no other political parties, unless they are properly infiltrated and controlled by splinter parties; secondly, by the fact that, as a result of the people’s trials, of the countless “unofficial” executions, and of the scores of overfilled prisons and concentration camps, practically all actual and potential opposition leaders have been eliminated and the population has been generally cowed into submission, and, finally, by the fact that, for over a decade and a half now, the Communist Party has been proving to be the only—though, perhaps, temporary and not very secure—refuge in Bulgaria for all kinds of job seekers, collaborators, opportunists, and other unsavory characters.

This latter fact has been confirmed time and again by the repeated party purges, sometimes affecting scores of thousands of members.

Whatever the party membership at this time, it does not seem to be either solidly united behind the ruling clique, or very reliable. An

old Bulgarian immigrant in this country who recently visited Bulgaria told me:

Before going there, I figured that perhaps 10 percent of the population are supporting the regime, and that the remaining 90 percent are more or less opposed to it. After staying there for several weeks, I was convinced that 999 out of every 1,000 Bulgarians are definitely in opposition, and that that is true of many party members, too.

I recently spoke with two ladies—also Bulgarian immigrants in this country—who had gone back to Bulgaria last summer to visit relatives. What they had to say corresponds roughly with the above impression. Among other things, they told me that at the time of the Hungarian revolution, the Communist regime in Bulgaria had become so panicky that many of its police organs were discarding their uniforms and trying to conceal themselves in localities where their connection with the regime was unknown. The people on the other hand were jubilant and, apparently, ready to follow the Hungarian example and throw out their own rulers. What happened to the Hungarians, however, soon discouraged them. The authorities, in turn, regained confidence and tightened again their grip on the people. The two ladies also told me that, though they had regular Bulgarian visas and were not themselves bothered by the authorities, most people they spoke with were visibly afraid to be seen with them, and that was true even of their own relatives.

All three recent visitors to Bulgaria agree that the main, if not the only support the Communist regime there can rely on, is the abundance of Soviet agents in the country and the easy availability of those Soviet armed and police forces, over which Mr. Khrushchev has, no doubt, controlling influence. The conclusion is unavoidable that Mr. Khrushchev is as much a guardian-angel of that regime now, as Stalin was before him, and as responsible for its crimes.

What are these crimes?

Apart from the terror that continues and the total subjugation of the Bulgarian people to the will and the whims of a foreign power, the crimes of the Sofia regime, respectively of its Kremlin boss, are both numerous and varied. They affect every single facet of the nation's life—political, economic, cultural.

If the impressions just cited are open to the criticism that they may be superficial and second hand, being the impressions of temporary and perhaps prejudiced visitors, I have some letters here which are anything but superficial or second hand. They are from people who have lived always in Bulgaria, and whose idea of conditions there could not possibly be distorted by any foreign experience. One of these letters is from a sick, simple, and almost illiterate Bulgarian peasant whom I do not know personally. He had asked for—and received—some medicines from the United States, and is writing back to express his gratitude and, apparently, to give his unknown friend a piece of his mind. I will try to translate this letter for you in full, except for some words and expressions which are, if I may say so, a little too rough for the record. It was written in mid-December 1957 and, appropriately, opens with greetings for the New Year:

May it be happy for all [the Bulgarian peasant writes] both for you and for us—the oppressed ones in the Red

Hell. As for you out there, pray to God that nothing of the kind happen to you \* \* \* for nobody then could help you. Guard your freedom.

We here are so lost that even those who wanted it (communism) before are now begging God to help them, to deliver them from themselves, just as the tuberculosis patients are begging for Rimifon and other such drugs.

In our little Bulgaria we have hospitals, and pharmacies too, but no medicines, and tuberculosis, as well as cancer, is clearly spreading, especially after 1945. So keep on sending us medicines, and please don't try to make profit from us sick people. All of us who are still alive are looking to the West and to the good that is there.

We can hardly procure anything here, either to eat or to wear. Misery is everywhere, thanks to the Communists. They are the lowest and the worst, and there are no greater crooks than them. The black marketeering that is going on here could perhaps be stopped, if it should be stopped, but not communism. If you let yourselves be fooled by their false propaganda, then the rest of the world—honest and noble—would also perish, and only these lazy bums, who have no feeling and respect for anybody or anything but the party, will alone survive. (May they burn!) \* \* \* I don't know what you think about them. Inasmuch as you have not eaten their soup, you may, perhaps, think that it is something good to eat. You better ask us unfortunates, who are dying here. I believe you will understand \* \* \* but if, by any chance, you have confidence in and sympathy for the Red Thief, then may the Lord have mercy on you, and better kill yourselves than wait. But I hope that your noble nature cannot be fooled so easily.

Hoping that you will understand me, I wish you the best of everything and urge you again to send medicines to everyone who would ask you for such \* \* \*

Sincerely,

B.

Here is another letter—from an old lady. I'll read just one passage from it:

We hardly get enough to eat. If you would decide to send me something, please don't bother to send clothes—the duty is much more than I can pay, but you can send me some food. It will be good if it can reach in time for the holidays which are approaching. Otherwise I guess I'll have to part with that rooster I've been keeping in the yard for some years now. But the poor thing is so old already that I wonder if it will ever get cooked.

One of the most striking features of the Communist regime in Bulgaria during Stalin's time was that the country was almost hermetically closed for travelers—both incoming and outgoing. With very few exceptions, only diplomats and party officials could travel in either direction.

Since Khrushchev took over the rule of the Soviet empire, this ban on travel has been somewhat relaxed. Besides diplomats, more Western newsmen and quite a few foreign tourists are now allowed to enter Bulgaria. Quite a few Bulgarian citizens are also allowed to leave the country temporarily. But such travel is limited almost entirely to sick persons in need of unavailable medical care, and to people in their late sixties or older without any marked political preferences. Even they may be refused exit visas several times before they are finally given one.

This is no doubt an improvement. But the fact remains that, 15 years after the war, the huge majority of Bulgarians, old and young alike, are still denied the right of foreign travel, even for the purpose of visiting their own children, parents or other relatives living abroad, whom they haven't seen for many years and whom they may never have a chance to see again.

Mr. ARENS. We have read in certain publications recently articles to the effect that there is a bountiful supply of consumer goods in Bulgaria in the stores.

Mrs. CHOUKANOFF. It is probably true that there is an apparently abundant supply of consumer goods, of food and of all kinds of delicacies in the stores. But in reality, the supply is quite limited, and, besides, everything is so highly priced that it is beyond the reach of the common people. Those things can be afforded only by the members of the so-called new class, by a few privileged collaborators, by the diplomatic corps and by such visitors from abroad that the regime allows in the country.

A good example of the discrepancy between the prices of available goods and services, on the one hand, and the purchasing power of the bulk of the people, on the other, was provided by one of the Bulgarian ladies already referred to. During her visit to Bulgaria last summer she spent 3 weeks at a Black Sea resort hotel. Her bill amounted to about \$500, which does not seem to be much, even though the food, as she said, was not on a par with the luxurious hotel. But, converted into Bulgarian currency, the same \$500 would amount to 3,400, or 5,000, or 12,500 levas, depending on whether it is converted at the official rate of exchange, at the tourist or the black market rate. Inasmuch as the average monthly income in Bulgaria today is about 500 levas, to afford 3 weeks at a Black Sea resort hotel, an ordinary Bulgarian citizen must work from about 7 to 25 months, and save every penny he makes.

The lack, especially, of food in Bulgaria today, 15 years after the war, is strange indeed. Primarily an agricultural country, with about 80 percent of the population engaged in farming, Bulgaria has always had enough food for herself and some to spare—for export. Although until recently farming methods there were quite primitive, her prewar export of food and other agricultural products exceeded by far all her other exports. Since the Communists took over, over 90 percent of the countless tiny and primitive old farms have been collectivized into large and supposedly far more efficient agricultural units which, furthermore, have been mechanized to a degree never before attained even by the few model private farms in the past. Yet, most of the Bulgarian people do not have enough to eat today. Why?

Needless to say, one of the reasons for that is that Bulgaria is still exporting considerable quantities of food—chiefly to the Soviet

Union and other countries of the Communist bloc. But these quantities are hardly greater, if indeed as great, as her prewar food exports to Germany and elsewhere on the Continent. Why, then, the present-day mechanized and "far more efficient" collective farms cannot do as much in filling the local needs as did the small and quasi-primitive private farms of the past?

The obvious answers are: First, that whatever the theory behind them, the collective farms are not anywhere as efficient as they are supposed to be, and secondly, that the collectivized farmers are not—or do not want to be—anywhere as productive as the private farmers were. Added to this is the fact that even young peasants, who have never known what it means to own a piece of land, are running away in droves from the collectives and trying to find elsewhere any kind of jobs for more or less stable wages, rather than depending on "sharing" the profits of "their own," but state-controlled, collective farms.

Mr. ARENS. Has there been any improvement in the situation in your country since Khrushchev ascended the pinnacle in the Communist regime?

Mrs. CHOUKANOFF. If there is any evidence to that effect, it must have escaped my attention. On the contrary, all indications are that the Communist regime in Bulgaria is tightening, rather than relaxing, controls over the different phases of national life. Apparently it fears that any Soviet-American agreement for lessening of world tensions might only tend to weaken its hold on an unwilling nation.

Such tightening of controls is perhaps more pronounced in some of the other satellite countries, such as Poland and Hungary, where there had been some relaxation following the revolts during the latter part of 1956. There had been no such relaxation in Bulgaria at the time and, consequently, the regime there does not seem to feel as great a need to "de-relax."

However, according to a recent dispatch by M. S. Handler from Vienna (New York Times, January 4, 1960), Communist leaders throughout Eastern Europe seem to be taking extra precautions against any domestic dissidence that might be stimulated by an eventual agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union:

The first official indication that precautionary measures would be taken by the Communists in preparation for the coming East-West summit conferences [Handler notes] was furnished by the Hungarian Communist Party Congress in Budapest, November 30 to December 5. Gyula Kallai, a member of the party Politburo, warned that opponents of the regime must not expect any softening of attitudes by the Communist party to accompany a relaxation of East-West tensions. Mr. Kallai said the Communist party, on the contrary, would sharpen the class struggle against its enemies.

Handler adds:

Premier Khrushchev, who attended the Hungarian meeting, alluded to the need for more precaution when he said that the time had come to "strengthen the world Socialist camp in every way" and that "we must, figuratively speaking, synchronize our watches." The Communist leaders in Eastern Europe evidently feel that a period of peaceful co-

existence can help the realization of their domestic economic policies. But they have no intention of letting dissident elements challenge their authority in consequence, as happened in somewhat similar circumstances in 1956.

After pointing to different domestic policies that most satellite regimes have adopted in order "to convince the people that no compromise with the class enemy is possible and that there will be no relaxation of the effort to achieve complete socialization," Handler has this to say in regard to Bulgaria (and Rumania):

These states will continue their policy of almost complete isolation from the West. Opposition to the Communist regimes in both countries has been eliminated to a degree not yet achieved in the other East European countries and, therefore, Bulgaria and Rumania have little need for new measures to deal with an East-West relaxation of tensions.

If this ascertainment about Bulgaria by the New York Times correspondent is correct, and I have no reason to doubt it, it only shows once again that a minority party—or, rather, a Moscow-oriented clique within that minority party—continues to rule supreme over the nation by whatever means it has at its disposal. And these means are, basically, the borrowed power that the Soviet Union is as readily lending it under Khrushchev, as it did under Stalin.

In other words, the minority Communist regime in Bulgaria, which succeeded in eliminating all organized opposition by murder, imprisonment and overall oppression during the time of Stalin, continues along the same line now, during the time of Khrushchev, and there is no evidence that the latter is annoyed by that, much less that he contemplates withholding Soviet aid to the regime in question.

This regime, furthermore, is basically the same now as it was during Stalin's time. It is true that Vulko Chervenkov, who symbolized the Stalinist control over Bulgaria, was removed as prime minister and as party secretary on the "recommendation" of Khrushchev during the so-called de-Stalinization period. But Chervenkov remained in the government as deputy premier, his influence continued to be pronounced, and seems again to be on the increase. What's more, the man who replaced Chervenkov as prime minister is none other than the same Anton Yugov who, as Minister of the Interior in the early postwar cabinets, was personally in charge of the mass liquidations that eliminated all organized opposition to a Moscow-controlled Communist regime in the country.

Needless to say, the power of Yugov today, like the power of Chervenkov yesterday, is not rooted in the will of the Bulgarian people; it springs from Moscow. And just as the origin of and the inspiration for Chervenkov's crimes could be traced to Stalin, so the origin of and the inspiration for Yugov's crimes *can* be traced to Stalin—and Khrushchev. The continued exercise of that power in Bulgaria by either Yugov, Chervenkov, or anyone else of their Communist clique is, therefore, the greatest crime of the present Soviet premier in relation to the Bulgarian people.

I would like to call your attention to an article in the Saturday Evening Post (November 28, 1959) by a recent American visitor to Bulgaria. Prof. Fred Warner Neal, who had spent a good deal of time behind the Iron Curtain in the past, first as a U.S. naval officer

in Russia and later as a diplomat in Eastern Europe, was eager to see for himself, as he puts it, "What the alleged 'relaxation' of totalitarianism really amounted to." He decided that Bulgaria would be the ideal place for the purpose, inasmuch as the picturesque Balkan country had in the meantime become "the vacation mecca for the New Class from all over the Soviet Empire."

And indeed, Professor Neal writes after having made his observations there:

If you want to watch the Communist big shots of Eastern Europe at play, lolling in luxury amid a poverty-stricken peasantry, the place to go is Bulgaria, the most backward, most tightly controlled, most Russianized of the Soviet satellites—and at the same time the main tourist resort behind the Iron Curtain \* \* \*. The Bulgarian resorts are filled to capacity with, if not quite "everybody," at least those trusted enough to be allowed to travel. By plane, train, and bus, the Communist elite streams into the country. \* \* \*

But Bulgaria, I soon found [continues Neal] is not only a place where commissars cavort at plush resorts. The "most satellite" of the satellite states, it also is the "most policed" of the police states. Not one block of its quiet, clean capital city of Sofia is without an armed policeman, and at night they carry submachine guns. Plainclothes police, keeping a watchful eye on foreigners, are so ubiquitous as to be obvious. And one does not have to travel far from Sofia to see forced-labor battalions marching to work with military discipline. Even fun, like everything else, is planned here by the state. The country's role as the official playground of the New Class is part of Moscow's new scheme for economic specialization among its satellites. \* \* \*

Political and sociological aspects of Iron Curtain tourism are even better illustrated at Varna (on the Black Sea coast) the destination of most of the vacationing Communists. Here, with units of the Soviet Black Sea fleet maneuvering offshore, one sees members of the New Class from all the Soviet-bloc countries luxuriating on the so-called Golden Sands of this Red Riviera. The tourists invariably include selected groups of Russians, Czechs, Hungarians, Rumanians and East Germans, a few Poles and very, very few Bulgars.

Although at places like Varna there are a few special rest homes for certain key groups of workers such as miners, workers generally never associate with the New Class of either rank, nor, of course, do the peasants, who constitute the bulk of the population of Eastern Europe.

The New Class also has some interesting social distinctions based on nationality. The Russians are at the top. Two of the best hotels are reserved for them exclusively, and any Russian tourist, regardless of position, always receives special treatment. After this come the Czechs, primarily because they usually have more money, are better educated and better dressed.

Professor Neal goes on to note that—

There is marked contrast between Varna, bubbling with animation and gaiety, and other parts of Bulgaria. Sofia, for example, with broad boulevards, shiny marble buildings, and lovely, old Orthodox churches, is the prettiest city in the Balkans. But there is no activity—no cars, few horses and not many people on the streets. It is clean and well kept, but it is probably the quietest city of its size—643,700—in Europe. Everywhere there are militiamen and soldiers, all dressed exactly like those in the Soviet Union. This grim atmosphere, together with the vast, mausoleumlike buildings in its center gives Sofia the air of something akin to a military cemetery. \* \* \*

Having tried during his sojourn to find the real center of authority in the country, Neal notes:

In Bulgaria today there may be some doubt about whether the No. 1 man really is Party First Secretary Todor Zhivkov, Premier Anton Yugov, or Deputy Premier Vulko Chervenkov, sometimes referred to as Little Stalin. However, there is no doubt that the No. 1 Bulgarian, whoever he is, takes his orders from the Soviet Embassy in Sofia. The embassy is the real center of power in Bulgaria. The present Ambassador, Yuri K. Prikhodov, a large, forceful man, looks and acts the part of a proconsul. I telephoned him \* \* \* and, doubtless because any American in town was such a curiosity, he invited me to call. \* \* \* By and large, Ambassador Prikhodov talked frankly about Bulgarian politics, but he insisted that he never interfered in internal Bulgarian affairs. However, he quickly added, "Our advice is sometimes sought." In the beginning, he said, when the Bulgarians were just learning how to operate a Communist state, it was different, but now "these people can do a fine job themselves."

Referring to some samples of this "fine job," Professor Neal writes:

Bulgarian officials like to point to their "progress in agriculture." It is progress of a very special type, however. Some 95 percent of Bulgarian agriculture is collectivized, and now the government is striving to make it 100 percent. Although the plight of the peasants has improved in the last 2 years, Bulgarian agriculture still has the lowest productivity in Europe \* \* \*.

Poverty and resentment against the regime may be more widespread among the peasants, but is by no means confined to them. Not only are wages low and prices high but also unemployment—never supposed to occur in Communist countries—is widespread. Paradoxically there also is a shortage of certain kinds of labor \* \* \*.

Government efforts to cope with both unemployment and labor shortage are drastic. Thousands of Bulgarian young people are shipped off annually to the Soviet Union to help relieve unemployment, but at the same time labor battalions, made up not only of young men of military age but also

white-collar workers and civil servants, are used to ease the pressure on the labor market. Government propaganda insists that the labor battalions and the "excursions" to the U.S.S.R. are voluntary, but this brings reactions varying from wry smiles to bitter laughter. \* \* \*

Both economic pressure on the population and the widespread dissatisfaction are evident in the constant flow of harsh government decrees. Many of them involve the death penalty, not only for such offenses as trying to flee the country but also for theft. Theft of "people's property," which covers just about everything in Bulgaria, is an ever-increasing worry to the regime.

As for Ambassador Prikhodov's insistence that he "never interfered in internal Bulgarian affairs," the following passage of the Saturday Evening Post article is quite revealing. Neal writes:

When I was finally ready to leave the country, I ran into one last "Bulgarian situation." I had surrendered my passport to the police on arrival, and they still had it. Several times on the day of departure I had demanded the passport from the Balkantouriste office in the hotel. Always the same answer: "You will have it right away." Finally at 5 p.m. the tourist official said it was impossible to get the passport until morning because the police were all away at a soccer match. At this I protested so loudly that the hotel manager and one of the several secret policemen always hanging around the lobby came over. They would fix it, they said. A half hour later they were back. The passport office *was* closed, they announced. I would have to delay leaving until the next day.

When I had left the Soviet embassy several days earlier, the ambassador had told me, "If there is anything I can do for you here, just call me."

Now I was furious and panicky. My visa expired that evening. So I reached for the telephone and shouted, "Very well, I'll call my friend, the Soviet ambassador."

Immediately people came running from all over, and several of them told me all at once, "No, no, don't do that."

"All right," I said, "then get my passport."

Again the hotel manager and the policeman left, this time accompanied by the tourist official. In thirteen and a half minutes by my watch they were back. This time they had the passport. I was glad too. I had suddenly remembered that the Soviet ambassador was out of town.

Mr. ARENS. Do you have information respecting literature and art in Bulgaria?

Mrs. CHOUKANOFF. Whether because of fear from or affection for Ambassador Prikhodov, respectively the Soviet Union, the fact remains that the Communist regime has reduced Bulgaria to a state of obedient subordination to the will of the Kremlin bosses. And this appears to be as true in the fields of art, literature, education, and culture generally as it is in those of police control, the economy, and foreign affairs.

Having succeeded in transplanting Soviet police methods on Bulgarian soil, in merging the nation's economy with that of the U.S.S.R. and in abandoning even the pretense to a foreign policy of its own, the same regime has been trying as hard to stifle any intellectual independence and to regiment all artistic and creative efforts. It is here, however, in what might be called the spiritual sector, that it has encountered some of its most serious frustrations.

Education, for example, like all other aspects of cultural, political, and economic life in the country, is also modeled on the Soviet pattern, with the entire school system serving as a tool for indoctrination in the Communist ideology. All educational institutions are under full control of the Communist Party, and conducted in the "Communist spirit." Even the nurseries are designed to "lay the foundations of Communist education" among the children attending them. The Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, the supreme scientific and scholastic institute in the country, is no exception to the rule. Article 15 of the law regulating this institute provides that persons "who have manifested or manifest Fascist or other activity against the people cannot be members of the B.A. of S." In actual practice, this means that scientists or scholars with any independence of thought have no place in it, to say nothing of outright anti-Communists.

An educational reform decreed in July 1957 supplanted a previous Communist reform on the grounds—among other things—that "certain questions on education were decided hastily" and that "the transplantation of the Soviet school experience was done mechanically." The new decree tended to shift the emphasis in education to vocational, rather than scholastic training, and to reduce the number of graduates who "neither desired nor were accustomed to manual work."

Only a year later, however, as soon as Khrushchev's theses on "Strengthening the Ties between School and Life" were published, the 1957 decree was criticized by Party Secretary Zhivkov as "inadequate." The result was still another reform, finally passed in July 1959, which very closely followed the new Soviet law in tying of education with experience in the production processes. A striking feature of the new reform was the almost complete abandonment of the liberal arts and humanities—fields which tend to breed intellectual independence.

While this reform, with its emphasis on the need of technologists and technically skilled workers for all levels of industry, agriculture, and trade has, no doubt, a good deal to recommend it, it obviously has some other aims which are not so commendable. As Zhivkov had rightly pointed out in this connection, it is far more difficult to "socialize" the minds of the people than it is to socialize industry and agriculture. The other aims of the reform are, undoubtedly, to overcome this difficulty—by breaking down whatever remnants there still are of the old spirit of inquiry, to "socialize" and sovietize the mentality of the nation.

The function of literature and the arts in the Communist scheme of things is to further this educational and "socializing" process out of school. As Zhivkov had put it before the 7th party congress in Sofia (June 1958), their main purpose is "to help the Party in the Communist and esthetic education of the masses."

Judging by reports in official Communist publications, the party has been having—and still has—considerable difficulties in persuading all literary and artistic workers to concentrate their efforts on this particular purpose, much less to follow blindly the party's specific directives to that end.

It is, no doubt, true that most Communist writers and artists—and a few non-Communists too—have been readily following the party line in their work. It is likewise true that a number of others have been trying hard to acquiesce in the same line, as the most likely way to survive and make a living. As for the rest, who may well be in the majority, they have long since abandoned their literary and artistic pursuits and switched to less "spiritual" endeavors, such as translating, clerical work, or plain manual labor; under the circumstances, the latter group is outside the scope of this review.

Even among the working writers and artists, however, it has not always been easy going for the party line. As everywhere else behind the Iron Curtain, there has been simmering discontent below the Bulgarian cultural scene ever since the Communists took over. This discontent reached the boiling point as soon as Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin became known. In Bulgaria proper, it broke out in the open immediately after the party plenum in Sofia of April 1956, which could not have overlooked same revelations.

Encouraged by developments at and after this plenum, especially by the withdrawal of Chervenkov from the premiership, Bulgarian dissident intellectuals, many of them lifelong Communists, found the atmosphere propitious at last to speak out and say what they really had on their minds. Some of them soon came out with works which, though not openly anti-Communist, were obviously meant to show that the Communist spirit in Bulgaria had been distorted and the Communist regime corrupted to the point of bankruptcy. At their meetings, meanwhile, dissidents not only criticized the regime, but went as far as to renounce "socialist realism" and deny the party's right to control culture. Although little of what went on at these meetings reached the press, judging by the reaction of the regime, it couldn't have differed much from what was happening in Poland and Hungary. Bulgaria was obviously a part of the "revisionist" trend that was sweeping all of Eastern Europe at the time.

Indeed, for a while in 1956 and early 1957, Bulgarian dissidents had something of a field day. Not only did their unorthodox works pass the censor, they were not even subjected to official criticism. But that did not last long. With the suppression of the Hungarian revolution by Comrade Khrushchev, the East European regimes soon regained confidence and, as could be expected, they did not wait long to put the screws on the dissidents who had caused them so much trouble.

In Bulgaria, the job was entrusted to none other than the man who, at the height of his power, had done his best to put all intellectuals in the straitjacket they were trying so hard to break away from. Appointed Minister of Education and Culture, Chervenkov hunted down every trace of dissent, deviation, or Western tendencies in the arts, literature, and journalism, and by June 1958 he could claim that order and quiet had been restored on the Bulgarian cultural scene.

Before Chervenkov could make this claim, many things had happened, at least some of which can be documented. For example:

At a Writers' Union meeting on "revisionism" in July 1957, a number of writers were denounced for misrepresenting the errors caused by the cult of personality, for misquoting Lenin in support of literary freedom and "under the guise of the struggle against dogmatism, refuting socialist realism in a most dogmatic manner." (As reported in the Union's organ, *Literaturen Front*, of July 18, 1957.)

Although Khrushchev's reassertion of party authority over Soviet writers at the time tended to facilitate the same job of Chervenkov in Bulgaria, the latter was meeting serious difficulties. Like their Hungarian colleagues, Bulgarian writers responded to his efforts by a "silence strike," for which they were severely criticized in *Otechestven Front* (the organ of the so-called Fatherland Front Coalition) of October 17.

The same issue of *Otechestven Front* contained an attack on Communist writers Todor Genov and Emil Manov for trying to play the part of "martyrs." Genov's play "Fear" and Manov's novel "An Unauthentic Case" had already been the targets of severe criticism in the regime press for their unfavorable references to Communist reality. The *Otechestven Front* significantly reminded these two and other Communist writers that "everybody is free to write and say what he pleases. \* \* \* However, every free union of people, including the Party, is free to expel Party members who use the Party label to preach anti-Party views."

Manov's attempt to defend himself served only to intensify the counterattacks of the regime press against him, against Genov and a number of others, including the poet Lamar (*Vecherni Novini*, October 29, 1957).

At a meeting of the party organization within the Writers' Union, held between November 29 and December 1, Party Secretary Andrei Gulyashki named 10 leading writers within the party organization, who had opposed the party line. He added that these dissidents had support among the younger intellectuals, and deplored the passivity of nondissident Communist writers who had not struck back for the party line against the rebels. Gulyashki also said it was known that some of their fellow members approved of the Polish and Hungarian revolts, while others opposed the forced collectivization of agriculture (*Literaturen Front*, December 26, 1957).

Gulyashki's remarks, however pointed, were perhaps meliorated somewhat by the fact that he himself, as chief editor of "Plamuk," was not beyond reproach. This periodical had been a major outlet for much of the "revisionist" writing, and six members of its editorial board were to be purged shortly. Early in 1958 the purge of dissidents from positions of responsibility was extended to other publications, including *Otechestven Front*, whose editor in chief, Stefan Stanchev, and chief editorial writer, Vladimir Topencharoff, were dismissed. The latter, a former Deputy Minister of

Foreign Affairs, was also dismissed from the presidency of the Union of Bulgarian Journalists.

Party organ *Rabotnichesko Delo* turned its guns (February 16, 1958) on educators and scholars. It attacked a number of prominent Communist personalities in the Academy of Sciences and in the Karl Marx Institute of Economics. These were also accused of "revisionism," as well as of "an un-Marxist approach" to current scientific and political problems. The entire editorial board of *Filosofska Misul* (Philosophical Thought) were reproached about the same time for complacency in the face of alleged manifestations of "bourgeois ideology."

In April 1958, the board and secretariat of the Writers' Union were purged of all "unreliable" officers, who were replaced by such who had invariably toed the party line.

During the discussions accompanying these developments, writers were generally criticized for avoiding "the noble themes of the present day," such as collective farming, factory life, and the building of socialism, and for concentrating on "digging up the past," i.e., historical novels; also for allowing themselves to be influenced by Western writers, particularly by "the impressionist Hemingway." The "pre-dominance and universality" of socialist realism was monotonously expounded instead. But while all speakers supported the party line, some qualified their support in terms which were somewhat disturbing. Thus, a young Communist poet, Georgi Djagaroff, had the temerity to observe that "the comrades seem to have the impression that socialist realism is like the tablets of Moses' Ten Commandments—everlasting and unchangeable. But this is not true. \* \* \*"

Despite such mild manifestations of independence, however, it seemed by June 1958, when Chervenkov made his claim, that he had really done what he had set out to do—that he had rooted out all signs of deviation and nonconformity, and that the party was again in full control of the cultural situation. But, as further developments soon came to prove, Chervenkov had merely succeeded in sweeping the problem under the rug. Less than a year after "order and quiet" had allegedly been restored on the cultural scene, new cracks began to appear in it. It soon became evident that it was far easier to stop writers from writing what was forbidden, than to get them to write what was prescribed.

In the year since then: Todor Genov, who had subjected himself to "self-criticism" and had tried his best to write what the regime wanted, has been criticized that the tenor of his latest play, "Monument," amounted to "insulting condescension."

The party press has continued to lament the writers' susceptibility to Western influence, and party spokesmen continue to complain that the creative artists, though paying lip service to the party, just keep on bypassing its specific directives.

But not only has writers' resistance been of a negative and passive nature; Orlin Vasilev, one of the foremost Communist writers in the country, has brought out a new play, "The Buried Sun," for which he was accused by *Rabotnichesko Delo* of distorting the picture of the Bulgarian Bolshevik, and of presenting socialist reality as "foggy, lacking faith, with no outlet in a helpless situation." In this play,

the party organ added, "the author tries to show how people put into leading posts, having rich and pure revolutionary past, have turned now into petty bourgeois, spiritually and morally impoverished souls."

While Vasilev's "The Buried Sun" was still being criticized, there appeared Dragomir Asenov's novel "The Roads Bypass One Another," which was immediately attacked for "degrading the ideal, the image of Communist manhood." *Literaturen Front* complained that Asenov is arguing that "a good Communist could be just as much of a rogue as anyone else." The "lifeblood of the novel," it concluded sadly, was that "Communism had lost its value."

These are only some of the signs which show that the whole series of problems on the "spiritual sector," so thoroughly swept under the rug by Chervenkov less than 2 years ago, are again breaking out in the open. It may be doubted that the revival of these problems will again assume the dimensions of the 1956-57 dissension and ferment. The external causes for that seem to be missing now, and, besides, Bulgarian intellectuals have again learned the bitter lesson that any deviation from the party line is just about as unhealthy now, when Khrushchev is pulling the strings in Moscow, as it was under Stalin. However that may be, recent developments on the cultural front in Bulgaria have proved once again that literature and the arts continue to be among the most uncontrollable factors, even in a Communist society.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank you very much for your splendid contribution to the committee's efforts.

(Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., January 8, 1960, the consultations were concluded.)

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
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