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U.S. Congress. House. Committee on

Un-American Activities

THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV

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PART 1 - 2

CONSULTATION WITH
Mr. EUGENE LYONS

SEPTEMBER 4, 1959

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION



(INCLUDING INDEX)

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COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

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Oct. 22, 1959

PUBLIC LAW 601, 79TH CONGRESS

The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American Activities operates is Public Law 601, 79th Congress [1946], chapter 753, 2d session, which provides:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, * * **

PART 2—RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

RULE X

SEC. 121. STANDING COMMITTEES

* * * * *
18. Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *
(a) (1) Committee on Un-American Activities.

(A) Un-American activities.

(2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

* * * * *

RULE XII

LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT BY STANDING COMMITTEES

SEC. 136. To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 86TH CONGRESS

House Resolution 7, January 7, 1959

* * * * *

RULE X

STANDING COMMITTEES

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress,

* * * * *

(q) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

* * * * *

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *

18. Committee on Un-American Activities.

(a) Un-American activities.

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* * * * *

26. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

We must realize that we cannot coexist eternally, for a long time. One of us must go to his grave. We do not want to go to the grave. They [meaning Americans and the westerners] do not want to go to their grave, either. So what can be done? We must push them to their grave.

Statement by Nikita S. Khrushchev
in Warsaw, Poland, April 1955.

(See p. 12.)

THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV

SYNOPSIS

Khrushchev—

as the No. 1 Communist official in the Moscow area * * * sent thousands to their death, scores of thousands to hideous slave-labor camps;

was sent in 1937 as Stalin's trusted killer [to the Ukraine]. His first move was to summon a conference of the entire Ukrainian Government, staged as a social occasion. The gathering was surrounded by the secret police, arrested en masse, and most of his "guests" died in the cellars of the Kiev and Moscow secret police. When his two-year Ukrainian purge was over, an estimated 400,000 had been killed and terror gripped the whole population;

assumed [in 1943] the task of punishing the Ukrainian people for their welcome to the Germans. This second or post-war purge, again under Khrushchev's command, was if anything more bloody and more horrifying than the first. Those liquidated, by exile or death, ran into hundreds of thousands;

[made] the final decision [as No. 1 in the Kremlin in 1956] to unleash the Red tanks that crushed Hungary's freedom and Hungary's freedom fighters. Our ambassador in Moscow at the time asked Khrushchev what he would do to stop the blood flowing in Hungary. To which the master of the Kremlin replied: "We will put in more troops and more troops and more troops until we have finished them.";

[issued the] order that trapped the top freedom fighter, General Malet, who was summoned to a fake conference under a flag of truce, then arrested, and in due time killed;

[issued the] order that lured Nagy, head of the short-lived anti-Communist government, out of the Yugoslav Embassy where he had found asylum. Though he had been assured immunity, Nagy was arrested and eventually executed.

So testified Mr. Eugene Lyons, a senior editor of *The Reader's Digest*, former press correspondent stationed in Soviet Russia, student of international communism and biographer of Khrushchev, in the accompanying consultation with the Committee on Un-American Activities.

Commenting on the "peaceful intentions" which Khrushchev professes toward the free world, Mr. Lyons stated:

They are worth no more than those of Hitler or Stalin. All three talked peace while making war. For a man like Khrushchev, made in the image of Leninist cynicism, "peace" does not mean what it does to normal people. It

means at most the absence of major military operations, while he uses all other methods of offensive short of shooting—blackmail, subversion, infiltration, civil disorder, guerilla operations—to conquer “the enemy,” meaning us.

Of course he doesn't want a nuclear showdown. He's not mad. He is supremely confident of achieving his purposes by other means. But he continually rattles his missiles, exploiting our pacifism, our fears, our loss of nerve. The Kremlin, let us never forget, won its greatest victories without war, at a time when the free nations had overwhelming military superiority and a monopoly of nuclear power. Their real advantages are not military but political and psychological.

Mr. Lyons emphasized the duality of the Kremlin's role as follows:

* * * the Kremlin and Khrushchev, as its current leader, at the same time represent a conventional government and a world revolutionary movement. What they do as a government is not binding on world communism. Every agreement with them, even if it were kept, is consequently a snare and a delusion.

World communism, in fact, often uses such an agreement as a cover for stepped-up activity. When Khrushchev visits a foreign country or meets with our statesmen at summit meetings, he plays the role of a head of government. But he ignores—and we naively allow him to ignore—his more important role as the head of a global revolutionary organization.

He couldn't call off that organization even if he wished to do so, which he decidedly doesn't. World communism, with its open and underground Communist Parties, its network of false-front organizations, its infiltrated unions and governments, its para-military formations in many countries—the whole colossal machine of power—is too vast and too dynamic to be stopped in mid-course.

If ever we recognize the meaning of this duality, we will also recognize the futility of trying “to call off” the cold war and will begin to fight it in earnest, on a scale and with the resources for victory.

The invitation to Khrushchev to come to the United States “amounts to a terrific victory for communism,” Mr. Lyons stated:

It amounts to an acknowledgment by the world's leading democracy of the Kremlin's power and permanence. Therefore it adds dimensions of prestige to every Communist group in every country.

Being master propagandists, the Communists understand the value of symbols. That invitation will be taken by Communists, their fellow-travelers, their victims, as a symbol of our weakness. More, of our capitulation to Moscow threats.

For years Khrushchev has maneuvered for just such an invitation. There were times when he would have paid a high price for it. Now we have given it to him gratis, be-

cause he has an ultimatum-gun pointed at our heads in Berlin. Even for that 1955 summit meeting, Moscow paid a price: the withdrawal from Austria. This time it is so cocky that, far from restraining its hordes, it allowed them to undertake aggressions even while the invitation was being negotiated and before Khrushchev came to our country.

I am referring to the aggressions against Laos and India; to the stepped-up Communist activities in our own backyard, in the Caribbean; to the enlarged terror in Tibet; to the continuing pressures in the Middle East and in Berlin. While we kid ourselves with wishful thinking about "thaws" and "relaxed tensions", the Communists everywhere are intensifying their activities.

* * * * *

It amounts to a body blow to the morale of the resistance in the Communist world. It's a betrayal of the hopes of the enemies of communism within that world, and their numbers can be counted by the hundred million.

The announcement of the invitation was a day of gloom and despair for nearly the whole population of every satellite country and for tens of millions inside Russia itself. What has been under way in the Red orbit, ever since 1917, is a permanent civil war between the rulers and the ruled. Our duty and our opportunity—in both of which we have failed—is to take the side of the people against their oppressors. We have not merely been neutral in that civil war, but we have constantly by our policies sided with the Kremlin against its victims.

In response to the contention that Khrushchev's visit to the United States might cause him to slow down or abandon his designs for world conquest, Mr. Lyons observed:

It's a childish fairy tale. The Communists in high places are perfectly well informed about our material prosperity and political freedom. Khrushchev is not coming here to confirm his knowledge of our strengths, but to feel out our weaknesses. The notion that he will be impressed by our wealth and liberty to the point of curbing Communist ambitions is political innocence carried to extremes.

What disturbs me, and many other students of the Communist realities, is that such fairy tales reflect a dangerous ignorance of the nature of communism and its objectives. The premise of such nonsense is that the struggle between the two worlds is not really serious—just a misunderstanding that can be cleared up if we get the right people to meet in the right place and say the right words. It assumes that the cancer can be treated with mustard-plasters of good will.

Mr. Lyons summarizes his conclusions as follows:

In the first place, the new Soviet boss, despite his homespun exterior, is one of the bloodiest tyrants extant. He has come to power over mountains of corpses. Those of us who roll out red carpets for him will soon have red faces.

In the second place, the exchange of visits between the heads of the two governments, even if it brings a few seemingly positive results on the margins of the struggle, must prove deeply harmful to the core of that struggle. It comes close to an acknowledgment of the permanence of the Communist grab and undermines the spirit of resistance inside the Communist world.

In the third place, and perhaps most importantly, the great expectations aroused by the exchange reveal the tragic failure of Western statesmen to recognize the character and the magnitude of the Communist challenge

THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV

(Part 1)

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1959

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

CONSULTATION

The following consultation with Mr. Eugene Lyons, of Pleasantville, New York, a senior editor of *The Reader's Digest*, was held at 1:30 p.m. in Room 226, Old House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Francis E. Walter of Pennsylvania, Chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, presiding.

Staff member present: Richard Arens, staff director.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you, Mr. Lyons, solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. LYONS. I do.

STATEMENT OF EUGENE LYONS

Mr. ARENS. Kindly identify yourself by name, residence, and occupation.

Mr. LYONS. My name is Eugene Lyons. I live at 71 Bedford Road, Pleasantville, New York. I am a senior editor of *The Reader's Digest*.

Mr. ARENS. Mr. Lyons, would you kindly give us a brief sketch of your personal background, perhaps a word of your education and some highlights of your career?

Mr. LYONS. I was brought up in New York City, went to City College and then to Columbia University for one year each. Like so many youngsters at the time, just after World War I, I was caught up in the radical movement. While I never joined the Communist Party, I got pretty close to it. By the middle of the 1920's I was working for the New York bureau of Tass, the official Soviet news agency.

At the end of 1927 I went to Moscow as United Press correspondent, arriving there early in 1928. I remained for six years. That Soviet sojourn cured me very thoroughly of my imported pro-Soviet sentiments. I subsequently told the story of my Soviet years in a book, *Assignment in Utopia*, published at the end of 1937.

Back home, I did various types of journalistic work, and ended up by editing the *American Mercury* during the war years. After that I launched and edited a magazine, which is still going, *Pageant*. Then, around 1946, I joined the editorial staff of *The Reader's Digest*, with which I am still connected.

That, more or less, is the outline of my professional career.

Mr. ARENS. Now may I inquire respecting the study which you have made of Soviet Russia and international communism?

Mr. LYONS. I had, of course, been deeply interested in communism and Russia before I went to Moscow. There I learned enough Russian to help me in continuing study of the subject when I returned to the United States.

I have written a number of books on Soviet Russia and communism. Before *Assignment in Utopia*, I had published *Moscow Carrousel*. Subsequently I wrote a biography of Stalin under the title, *Stalin: Czar of all the Russias*; then a history of the American Communist movement, *The Red Decade*, which carried that story to the time of publication in mid-1941. My most recent book was *Our Secret Allies: The Peoples of Russia*.

In addition, of course, I have written literally hundreds of articles in this subject area and made a great many speeches and lectures on the subject. Insofar as one can do it while working for a living, I have tried to keep myself abreast of developments in this field.

Mr. ARENS. May I inquire now, have you made a study of the life and activities of Nikita Khrushchev?

Mr. LYONS. Yes. About the time when he was emerging as a possible successor to Stalin, I began to gather information about his personality and career, against my background of general knowledge of the Soviet scene.

One of the products of this fairly intensive study was a biographical article about the man which appeared in the September 1957 issue of *The Reader's Digest*. The title, which was intended to be literal, not just rhetoric, was: Khrushchev, The Killer in the Kremlin. Last month I published another in *The Digest*, of an interpretive nature: *The Many Faces of Nikita Khrushchev*.

Mr. ARENS. As a point of departure in our consultation today, would you kindly give us briefly an outline of Khrushchev's personal and political career?

Mr. LYONS. Khrushchev was born into a peasant-worker family 65 years ago, in the province of Kursk, in the village of Kalinovka, close to the Ukraine. He had virtually no schooling as a child, and began very early to shift for himself, as a shepherd and, when he got a little older, in various jobs in the mines and factories of the Donbas region.

There is no indication that he was in any sense a revolutionary. But in 1918, the first year of the Soviet regime, he joined the Communist Party and took part in the civil war then under way. He was 24 years old.

Like so many half-literate young workers in that period, he was caught up in a movement he did not and could not as yet understand. He did not become a Communist through study or soul-searching. It was an overnight, emotional conversion. His communism has remained primitive and unsophisticated ever since.

When the civil war was over, he went back to factory work but joined the classes of a Rab-Fak, or workers' school, where he got his first real schooling. When he graduated, around 1925, he had the equivalent of an elementary education.

But from the beginning he showed a talent for getting ahead in the new ruling group. He became the party secretary in the school and

before long he was holding similar posts in several districts, finally in a district in the capital of the Ukraine, Kiev. Here he caught the eye of the old Bolshevik who was then Moscow's proconsul in the Ukraine, Lazar Kaganovich. It was, in fact, through the patronage of Kaganovich that he began to move ahead fast as an "apparatchik," a job-holder in the party apparatus.

Mr. ARENS. When did he get to the center of power, that is, Moscow?

Mr. LYONS. That was in 1929. For a couple of years he attended a technical school. Meanwhile Kaganovich had returned to Moscow as secretary of the Moscow province. By 1932 Khrushchev was his second secretary or chief assistant; and in 1934, Kaganovich having become Commissar of Railroads, Khrushchev succeeded him as head of the Moscow city and soon thereafter the Moscow Province Party.

That meant he was really on the high-road to power—from a nobody in a technical school to boss of the most important province in the country in about three years! Stalin himself was watching Khrushchev with interest and approval. In 1934 Khrushchev became a member of the central committee of the party, which is to say one of the 70 most important Communists in the country; and four years later he was made an alternate member of the all-powerful Politburo.

Mr. ARENS. Were those the years which came to be known as the blood purges?

Mr. LYONS. They were, indeed. And we should never forget that as the No. 1 Communist official in the Moscow area Khrushchev of necessity was neck-deep in the blood-letting. He was responsible for the political "purity" of some 400,000 Communists and in direct charge of their purging. His was the task of liquidating the unworthy, which meant that he sent thousands to their death, scores of thousands to hideous slave-labor camps.

Moreover, his voice was among the loudest in justifying the blood-letting and in glorifying Stalin. In a speech after one of the major purge trials, he exclaimed, referring to the slaughtered victims:

By lifting their hand against Comrade Stalin, they lifted it against the best humanity possesses. For Stalin is our hope. He is the beacon which guides all progressive mankind. Stalin is our banner! Stalin is our will! Stalin is our victory!

It was as reward for his murderous zeal as a purger that in 1939 he was made a full member of the Politburo.

The bloodiest and cruelest of all the blood purges took place in the Ukraine, and here the "credit" goes to Khrushchev personally. He was sent there in 1937 as Stalin's trusted killer. His first move was to summon a conference of the entire Ukrainian Government, staged as a social occasion. The gathering was surrounded by the secret police, arrested en masse, and most of his "guests" died in the cellars of the Kiev and Moscow secret police.

When his two-year Ukrainian purge was over, an estimated 400,000 had been killed and terror gripped the whole population. Khrushchev had been made secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, but in the popular mind he won a more enduring title, the Hangman of the Ukraine.

Then, in 1941, came the war. The Soviet peoples, as is by now generally known, for the most part welcomed the German invaders as liberators. But nowhere was their reception more universal and more joyous than in the Ukraine, as a reaction to the horrors its people had suffered at Khrushchev's hands.

When the Germans retreated, in 1943, Khrushchev returned to Kiev. He now assumed the task of punishing the Ukrainian people for their welcome to the Germans. This second or post-war purge, again under Khrushchev's command, was if anything more bloody and more horrifying than the first. Those liquidated, by exile or death, ran into hundreds of thousands.

In 1949 he was recalled to Moscow and resumed his old job as secretary or party-boss of the province. However, as a member of the Politburo he had a hand in all phases of government and policy. He was by this time one of the men closest to, and most trusted by, Stalin. It should be remembered, whatever Khrushchev may say now, that only the true-and-tried Stalinists, those who had no trace of squeamishness about mass murder, could have survived in a place of power. Khrushchev remained alive and prospered when nearly all others around him were being mowed down by terror.

In 1953, when Stalin died—or was murdered by his comrades—Khrushchev was in the small group that made up the so-called "collective leadership." Under that beguiling phrase, of course, there immediately developed a fratricidal struggle for power.

The older men in the group, like Molotov and Kaganovich, could be discounted. The real contenders were Beria, the head of the secret police, Malenkov and Khrushchev. The entire collective leadership ganged up on the man they feared most, Beria. They killed him, and several dozen of his henchmen, within months after Stalin died.

With Beria eliminated, Khrushchev assumed the post of first secretary, which had been held by Stalin. In 1957, at one fell swoop, he succeeded in expelling Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and others from all positions of influence. To do this he needed, and got, the help of Marshal Georgi Zhukov, the head of the armed forces. A year later he rid himself of Zhukov as well. To all intents and purposes Soviet Russia was again under a one-man dictatorship.

It might be appropriate to note, now that we're about to receive this dictator as an honored guest of our President, that in his hunger for power Khrushchev did not spare the older man who had been his patron and protector for some 20 years, that is to say, Lazar Kaganovich. Gratitude has no place in the Communist code of conduct.

Nor did the fact that his long-time patron had been a Jew curb Khrushchev's notorious anti-Semitism. A German socialist who a year or two ago interviewed Khrushchev—Karl Schmid, vice-president of the West German Reichstag—has told how the Soviet boss ridiculed Kaganovich in shocking anti-Semitic language.

Mr. ARENS. How does Khrushchev compare as a person and as a leader with Stalin?

Mr. LYONS. Probably history has never seen two successive despots so different in their outward personalities. Stalin was wholly the introvert: reticent, inaccessible, shy with strangers, a man who worked unseen and ruled from the dark fastnesses of the Kremlin.

Khrushchev is a lusty extrovert, gregarious and garrulous, a mixer and a fixer. He likes crowds and basks in the spotlight. He is a

consummate actor and sometimes plays the buffoon. He travels a lot. In the last two years he has received more foreign politicians, journalists, and just important tourists than Stalin had received in his whole lifetime.

But that contrast is entirely external and should not mislead us as to the Khrushchev under the surface. That basic Khrushchev has a genius for intrigue, betrayal, and mass homicide as large as Stalin's. He is a fanatic Communist, with a tightly closed mind on anything affecting Communist doctrine.

Mr. ARENS. How, then, do you account for his so-called secret speech in February 1956, in which he exposed Stalin's crimes and blunders?

Mr. LYONS. That speech, which incidentally is still secret inside the Soviet Union, is an extraordinary episode in Soviet history. Personally, I am convinced that it was forced upon the new bosses by the knowledge that Stalin and his deeds were deeply hated by the population. It was an attempt to divest themselves, so far as they could, of responsibility for the major crimes of the man they had long served and deified.

Even more, it was an attempt to reassure their own followers that their lives, at least, were safe—that murder would not be used as a political tool against top-echelon Communists.

Whatever the motivations, it had an unfortunate effect abroad, including our own country, in that it threw a false aura of moderation, almost of liberalism, around Khrushchev.

Mr. ARENS. You say "a false aura," but isn't Khrushchev more moderate than Stalin was?

Mr. LYONS. Only outwardly. Under the ebullient surface he is every bit as blood-thirsty and dictatorial as his dead master. Stalin, too, didn't begin to kill his closest associates until he had been in absolute power for seven or eight years. Should the need to kill arise, Khrushchev's hand, to use his own phrase in the matter, "will not tremble."

In that celebrated speech, bear in mind, he did not denounce terror as such, but only what he considered an unwise use of terror by Stalin—its use, that is, against "good" Communists. Khrushchev never mentioned, and thus condoned by silence, Stalin's larger crimes against the entire people, the horrors of enforced collectivization, the genocide visited upon captive peoples. He actually approved the slaughter of Trotskyites and other deviationists from the party-line.

Far from ruling out terror, Khrushchev in that speech reaffirmed its use—quoting Lenin to that effect—"when necessary." In the process of exposing Stalin he thus accepted the essence of Stalinism, which is inhumanity, deception, the readiness to kill and kill "when necessary."

Mr. ARENS. What is your judgment of Khrushchev's intellectual capacity and political ability?

Mr. LYONS. Khrushchev is only half-educated. Aside from party literature, he probably has never read a serious book. He has made no secret of his contempt for intellectuals. He rates the doer above the thinker, the practitioner above the theorist.

But that should not mislead us into underrating his intelligence. Khrushchev has a peasant-like shrewdness, a quick and sharp wit and is, in my opinion, more than a match for our Western statesmen in the

give-and-take of argument or negotiation. In a way he enjoys the advantage of ignorance, in that he can make the most outrageous statements without being self-conscious about it.

As for his political abilities, his career provides the obvious answer. He survived, and in the Stalin era that took consummate skill. Then he eliminated all competitors, though most of them had believed him lacking in the stature for the dictator's role.

Mr. ARENS. Is Khrushchev a dedicated Communist or an opportunist?

Mr. LYONS. It is hard to tell in any successful politician where self-interest ends and dedication begins, or vice versa. Obviously he is a great careerist and opportunist. From the day he joined the ruling party he labored resolutely to advance his own power, until finally he reached the top.

At the same time, however, he is a dedicated, know-nothing, fanatic Communist. He has no doubt that he and his cause are riding the wave of the future, that capitalism and all other non-Soviet ways of life are doomed to defeat and extinction. Though flexible enough on other things, his mind closes completely when these fundamentals of his ideology are involved.

Mr. ARENS. You have recounted Khrushchev's role in the Stalin purges, before and after the war. What part did he play in the crushing of the Hungarian revolution?

Mr. LYONS. By the fall of 1956, when the people of Hungary overthrew their hated puppet regime, Khrushchev was already No. 1 in the Kremlin. What happened must therefore be blamed on him. His was the final decision to unleash the Red tanks that crushed Hungary's freedom and Hungary's freedom fighters.

Our ambassador in Moscow at the time asked Khrushchev what he would do to stop the blood flowing in Hungary. To which the master of the Kremlin replied: "We will put in more troops and more troops and more troops until we have finished them."

A key figure in the Hungarian horrors was the Russian who carried out the punitive, secret-police phase. That was General Ivan Serov, a 100 percent Khrushchev man. For nearly two decades he had been Khrushchev's instrument of terror, the sadist who carried out the Ukrainian slaughters, then succeeded Beria as number one executioner. Serov it was who kidnapped thousands of Hungarian freedom fighters who, if they are still alive, are even now in Russian slave colonies.

It was Khrushchev's order that trapped the top freedom fighter, General Maleter, who was summoned to a fake conference under a flag of truce, then arrested, and in due time killed. It was Khrushchev's order that lured Nagy, head of the short-lived anti-Communist government, out of the Yugoslav Embassy where he had found asylum. Though he had been assured immunity, Nagy was arrested and eventually executed.

So let's have it clear for ourselves and for history: Major guilt for the Hungarian horrors must unquestionably be placed on Khrushchev's shoulders.

Mr. ARENS. What is your appraisal of the "peaceful intentions" which Khrushchev professes toward the free world?

Mr. LYONS. They are worth no more than those of Hitler or Stalin. All three talked peace while making war. For a man like Khrushchev,

made in the image of Leninist cynicism, "peace" does not mean what it does to normal people. It means at most the absence of major military operations, while he uses all other methods of offensive short of shooting—blackmail, subversion, infiltration, civil disorder, guerilla operations—to conquer "the enemy," meaning us.

Of course he doesn't want a nuclear showdown. He's not mad. He is supremely confident of achieving his purposes by other means. But he continually rattles his missiles, exploiting our pacifism, our fears, our loss of nerve. The Kremlin, let us never forget, won its greatest victories without war, at a time when the free nations had overwhelming military superiority and a monopoly of nuclear power. Their real advantages are not military but political and psychological.

Mr. ARENS. How was it possible for them to win so consistently despite our vastly greater strength?

Mr. LYONS. It was possible—and remains possible—because the non-Soviet world refuses to understand the nature of communism and its long-term strategy. The Communists are engaged in what Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé of Pennsylvania University, who borrowed the phrase from Mao Tse-tung, has called "protracted conflict." It's the title of his new book on the Red master-plan.

Protracted conflict—what Lenin and Trotsky called "permanent revolution"—means relentless struggle, by any and all means, year after year. The weapons used may change, the tactics may change, but the objective, total victory for communism throughout the world, remains unchanging.

Under this concept there is no difference, except in the matter of weapons, between hot and cold wars. They are part of the same master-plan. The concept rules out genuine truce or genuine coexistence. Every so-called crisis and every episode of negotiation is a battle in the over-all war. Every beguiling slogan and promise is a tactic of deception or deployment.

Once we understand this, we will cease to delude ourselves with hopes of some magic formula or agreement that will, as we say, "end the cold war." We will realize that the cold war can't be "ended"—it can only be won or lost. The self-delusion reflected in double-talk about relaxing tensions, breaking the ice, and so forth, has enabled the Communists, even in times of their greatest weakness, to gain vast victories. Today that self-delusion is infinitely more dangerous than ever before. It gives Moscow the initiative and amounts to a guarantee of our defeat by default.

Mr. ARENS. Can the free world deal with Khrushchev as it might deal with the leader of a free society?

Mr. LYONS. Of course not. In dealing with Khrushchev we face a "firm Bolshevik," who by definition despises truth and morals, who rejects our code of ethics. He does not consider himself bound by his word to non-Soviet nations, because they are "the enemy," and it is merely good tactics to mislead, confuse, and lie to an enemy.

Mr. ARENS. That helps explain why Moscow has violated virtually every treaty or agreement it has ever entered into.

Mr. LYONS. We have before us the pertinent example of the summit conference in Geneva four years ago. The several important agreements reached there and solemnly announced to the world were repudiated by Moscow within months.

More than that. Even while Khrushchev and President Eisenhower were being photographed in chummy poses at Geneva, Communist agents were cooking up an arms deal with Egypt's Nasser that has been calamitous for mankind.

Mr. ARENS. Is peaceful coexistence with the Kremlin a realistic idea?

Mr. LYONS. Mr. Arens and gentlemen of the committee, no more cynical phrase has ever been coined. To *us* it means a true cessation of hostilities. To *them* it means a convenient method of disarming us psychologically, the better to pursue the protracted conflict.

Seweryn Bialer, a Polish Communist leader who defected to the West, testified before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee¹ to having heard Khrushchev say, in Warsaw in April 1955: “* * * we must realize that we cannot coexist eternally, for a long time. One of us must go to his grave. We do not want to go to the grave. They [meaning Americans and the westerners] do not want to go to their grave, either. So what can be done? We must push them to their grave.”

If we allow ourselves to be trapped by the poison-bait of coexistence, they can “push us” more easily. We will drop our guard, while they intensify their depredations. Our memories are unhappily too short. We have forgotten that Stalin in the middle '30s gave us a period of peaceful existence, under the flag of united fronts and peoples fronts. But it was in those very years that Moscow industriously deployed its forces against our world.

Mr. ARENS. In something of yours that I've read you describe what you call the duality of the Kremlin's role. Would you care to explain it?

Mr. LYONS. I meant that the Kremlin and Khrushchev, as its current leader, at the same time represent a conventional government and a world revolutionary movement. What they do as a government is not binding on world communism. Every agreement with them, even if it were kept, is consequently a snare and a delusion.

World communism, in fact, often uses such an agreement as a cover for stepped-up activity. When Khrushchev visits a foreign country or meets with our statesmen at summit meetings, he plays the role of a head of government. But he ignores—and we naively allow him to ignore—his more important role as the head of a global revolutionary organization.

He couldn't call off that organization even if he wished to do so, which he decidedly doesn't. World communism, with its open and underground Communist Parties, its network of false-front organizations, its infiltrated unions and governments, its para-military formations in many countries—the whole colossal machine of power—is too vast and too dynamic to be stopped in mid-course.

If ever we recognize the meaning of this duality, we will also recognize the futility of trying “to call off” the cold war and will begin to fight it in earnest, on a scale and with the resources for victory.

Mr. ARENS. In the course of the next weeks Khrushchev will be on American soil at the invitation of our President. Based on your background and experience as a student of communism, please express yourself with respect to the impact that visit will have on the Communist drive for world domination.

¹ See hearings entitled “Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States—Part 29”, June 8, 1956.

Mr. LYONS. The mere invitation, Mr. Arens, amounts to a terrific victory for communism. It amounts to an acknowledgment by the world's leading democracy of the Kremlin's power and permanence. Therefore it adds dimensions of prestige to every Communist group in every country.

Being master propagandists, the Communists understand the value of symbols. That invitation will be taken by Communists, their fellow-travelers, their victims, as a symbol of our weakness. More, of our capitulation to Moscow threats.

For years Khrushchev has maneuvered for just such an invitation. There were times when he would have paid a high price for it. Now we have given it to him gratis, because he has an ultimatum-gun pointed at our heads in Berlin. Even for that 1955 summit meeting, Moscow paid a price: the withdrawal from Austria. This time it is so cocky that, far from restraining its hordes, it allowed them to undertake aggressions even while the invitation was being negotiated and before Khrushchev came to our country.

I am referring to the aggressions against Laos and India; to the stepped-up Communist activities in our own backyard, in the Caribbean; to the enlarged terror in Tibet; to the continuing pressures in the Middle East and in Berlin. While we kid ourselves with wishful thinking about "thaws" and "relaxed tensions," the Communists everywhere are intensifying their activities.

Mr. ARENS. What will be the effect of Khrushchev's visit on the subjugated peoples behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains?

Mr. LYONS. It amounts to a body blow to the morale of the resistance in the Communist world. It's a betrayal of the hopes of the enemies of communism within that world, and their numbers can be counted by the hundred million.

The announcement of the invitation was a day of gloom and despair for nearly the whole population of every satellite country and for tens of millions inside Russia itself. What has been under way in the Red orbit, ever since 1917, is a permanent civil war between the rulers and the ruled. Our duty and our opportunity—in both of which we have failed—is to take the side of the people against their oppressors. We have not merely been neutral in that civil war, but we have constantly by our policies sided with the Kremlin against its victims.

A future historian will face a strange paradox when he comes to the year 1959: in July, he will note, our Congress and President called upon the American people to pray for the captive nations; in September those people were called upon to do honor to the head of the mob that holds those nations in captivity!

Try to see the Khrushchev visit through the eyes of Hungarians or Poles or East Germans or through the eyes of our secret allies inside Russia proper. To them, I repeat, it must look like a bewildering betrayal by the country to which their hopes are tied.

Mr. ARENS. Well now, Mr. Lyons, it is contended that when Khrushchev, after being dined and wined in the White House and elsewhere, sees our material wealth and industrial plants, he will change his mind and abandon designs for world conquest, or at least slow them down. What is your reaction to that contention?

Mr. LYONS. It's a childish fairy tale. The Communists in high places are perfectly well informed about our material prosperity and

political freedom. Khrushchev is not coming here to confirm his knowledge of our strengths, but to feel out our weaknesses. The notion that he will be impressed by our wealth and liberty to the point of curbing Communist ambitions is political innocence carried to extremes.

What disturbs me, and many other students of the Communist realities, is that such fairy tales reflect a dangerous ignorance of the nature of communism and its objectives. The premise of such nonsense is that the struggle between the two worlds is not really serious—just a misunderstanding that can be cleared up if we get the right people to meet in the right place and say the right words. It assumes that the cancer can be treated with mustard-plasters of good will.

But it happens, Mr. Arens and gentlemen of the committee, that the struggle is real, the issues too profound to yield to pleasant talk. Should some trifling Soviet gesture come from the visit, the kind of thing we will eagerly label as a concession, the results can be even more disastrous. In our great joy and relief, we will drop vigilance and open all roads to easy Communist conquests.

Mr. ARENS. I gather that you consider the invitation a mistake?

Mr. LYONS. It begins as a mistake. But if the American people turn Khrushchev's visit into a triumphal march across our continent, the mistake will become a catastrophe. For one thing, it would be a signal for all the neutralists so-called, for all the fence-sitters and doubters, to join the Communist side. For them and for millions of others, it will confirm the wave-of-the-future view of communism.

Moreover, even for our friends in the free world, it will seem to be proof of our political immaturity. They will see in it our failure to grasp the historical process of our times, our pathetic anxiety to find an easy answer and an alibi for inaction.

The Soviet empire—900 million strong, subjugated and led by some 33 million Communists—is totally and irrevocably committed to one Communist world. They are engaged in a war, whether there is shooting and bombing or not, which they could not abandon without ceasing to be Communists. A momentary retreat for purely tactical reasons is conceivable. But it would be utterly meaningless, since it would leave the larger struggle unresolved. In the final analysis it would boomerang against us by lulling us into a false sense of safety.

Mr. ARENS. What is your estimate of the phrase we hear so much these days, "reducing tensions"?

Mr. LYONS. The Communists don't want to reduce them. Since every one of those tensions is of their own manufacture, they could reduce or eliminate them at will. On the contrary, they need those tensions—that's why they create them in the first place.

And from our own angle, the illusion of reduced tensions could be fatal. What we need is a greater awareness of those tensions and their implications, to the point where we will have no alternative but to acknowledge them and to deal with them courageously. One can lessen pain by taking a sedative, but it leaves the disease itself untouched. Our present eagerness to find sedatives condemns us to suffering the unchecked ravages of the disease of world communism.

Mr. ARENS. Would you care to express yourself with respect to the other side of the coin, namely, the visits of free-world leaders to the Kremlin?

Mr. LYONS. My view is implicit in what I have said about the permanent civil war between the rulers and the ruled in the Communist world. The fact that a President of the United States or a Prime Minister of Great Britain makes the journey to Moscow can bring only heartbreak and despair to those who dream of freedom.

The spectacle of top leaders of the free world in the role of guests of despots and killers must shake the faith of our secret friends and allies in our professions of freedom and justice. In the present case, the very fact that the President has so long avoided this type of exchange, despite Moscow's urging, has placed a higher value on it. The fact that he has finally consented, despite the arrogance and intransigence of Khrushchev, gives it every appearance of an act of despair, of a capitulation.

Mr. ARENS. Based on your background and experience as a student of international communism, tell this committee, Mr. Lyons, how late it is now on the Communist timetable for world domination.

Mr. LYONS. Later, much later, than most people think. I recall talking to audiences before the last war. When I said that the Communists are aiming to dominate the world, I am sure my listeners thought I was exaggerating, indulging in rhetoric. Yet here we are, so soon after as history runs, with one-third of the human race already in the Communist straitjacket! With extensions of Communist power, through its parties and false-fronts and undergrounds, deep in the flesh of every other nation, whether free or neutral or uncommitted!

Only the blind can fail to see how fast Asia and Africa are being subverted, where they cannot be taken by frontal assault. Only the deluded can fail to see the contagion spreading in Latin America, in the Near East, in Indonesia, and nearly everywhere else.

Timetable? I doubt that the Kremlin has one in any literal sense. All that it is doing, however, was clearly planned and publicly announced in Communist documents these 40 years and more. They dared to make their plans public because they counted on our refusal to believe them. Even yet we kid ourselves with fantasies about live-and-let-live agreements, though our doom is clearly spelled out in Communist resolutions.

The Communists do not need physically to take over the world in order to control and exploit it. They merely need to isolate their main opponent, the United States, to the point where we have to take orders from Moscow—or else. They prefer to take over the industrial complex developed in freedom by free men *intact*, rather than in a heap of nuclear rubble.

Mr. ARENS. Mr. Lyons, you have, in my humble judgment, diagnosed the disease and revealed our fallacies in our attempts to treat the disease. What remedy do you suggest?

Mr. LYONS. I wish I had an easy remedy to prescribe. Those I see are the opposite of easy. They call for a complete revision of our thinking on the subject and, then, a readiness for sacrifice and risk.

There can, as I view it, be no hope of saving our world until we have a clear-headed understanding of the character and the permanence of the Communist challenge. Then we will grasp that the struggle is not subject to compromise—that the Communists are right when they insist that one or the other of the contending worlds must be totally

defeated and, as Khrushchev put it, "buried." Only on the basis of such understanding can we begin to develop a strategy for protracted conflict of our own.

We will then cease to regard every new crisis as a separate challenge, but will deal with it as a part of the all-embracing struggle. What's more, we will confront *the enemy* with crises instead of waiting inertly until the next threat comes. We will carry the cold war to the Communist orbit and not, as now, limit it always to our side of the curtains.

Above all, we will then renounce the consolations of wishful thinking and patent-medicine cures. We will know at last that the contest between freedom and slavery is too big to be resolved with a little good will, some exchanges of visits, settlements that settle nothing because they leave the underlying struggle unaffected.

Mr. ARENS. Perhaps some other leader, coming after Khrushchev, will find what has been called a *modus vivendi*?

Mr. LYONS. I have never joined in the journalistic parlor game of musical chairs in the Kremlin, or "who will succeed whom?" The differences between Comrade X or Comrade Y may affect the trimmings of the permanent conflict but not its historical essence.

I believe that we would be essentially in the same position if Malenkov, Beria, or Molotov were dictator instead of Khrushchev. The Communist machine is by this time too strong to depend on the personality of its operator.

Our strange preoccupation with personalities has tended to obscure the reality of the continuing menace. It reflects a desperate hope of some miracle that will relieve us of the unpleasant necessity of facing up to the challenge. That soporific hope, indeed, explains our repeated orgies of illogical optimism.

We indulged in such an orgy in the middle 1930's. It takes an effort of memory to recall that nearly everyone then believed that Stalin was a moderate man, concerned only with industrializing his own country. He was through, we said, with the nonsense of world revolution. We gave that as our excuse for providing the machines and the know-how and the trained manpower without which the first Five-Year Plans would never have taken off the ground.

Mr. ARENS. And we had another such orgy, didn't we, in the war years, when Soviet Russia was listed among the freedom-loving and peace-loving nations?

Mr. LYONS. Quite so. It was on that assumption that, having saved the Soviets from defeat at Hitler's hands, we proceeded to turn over to Stalin all of Eastern Europe and large slices of Asia. Hadn't he joined the United Nations? Hadn't he gone along with our rhetoric of Four Freedoms? As compensation to Russia for remaining a good member of the family of nations, we handed over to Communist slavery more than a hundred million East Europeans, including some who had been our gallant allies.

After the death of Stalin there was another major orgy of optimism. Who can recall without blushing our excitement and joy over the supposed New Look and Smiling Diplomacy?

Today, alas, we are once more riding a tide of self-induced optimism. And now, as then, the only certainties are disappointment, frustration, defeat by default.

Mr. ARENS. You, I take it, are not among the optimists?

Mr. LYONS. I have said nothing today that I have not, in one form or another, said before or written in books and articles. In the nature of the case I have been branded a pessimist, lacking faith in our country and civilization. I suppose that the doctor who diagnoses cancer instead of calling it a pimple is likewise regarded as a pessimist.

But consider the facts. When I began, in my humble way, to try to alert my countrymen to the menace of communism about a quarter of a century ago, there were 170 million people under the iron heel of communism. Today there are close to a billion. I would say, in all conscience, that my pessimism has not been entirely unjustified.

Mr. ARENS. Are there not, Mr. Lyons, any encouraging elements in the otherwise gloomy picture?

Mr. LYONS. I believe there are.

Mr. ARENS. What, for instance?

Mr. LYONS. One, in my judgment, is that the American people do instinctively recognize the nature of the Communist threat. I have had occasion in the past year to address audiences in several parts of the country, people fairly close to the grassroots of their communities. They seemed to understand the Communist challenge more clearly, with less self-delusion, than those in positions of power in our own country and other free nations.

I believe, therefore, that if we are fortunate enough to find leaders with the courage and clear-headedness necessary to deal with the Communist challenge, the people will follow them.

Mr. ARENS. I, too, have met such audiences and agree with your judgment. What other element of hope do you see?

Mr. LYONS. The primary fact, if only we acknowledged it and used it, is that after 40 years of absolute power, during which the Soviet regime applied unlimited physical and mental terror, it has failed to achieve what the political scientists call "legitimacy." The regime, that is to say, cannot, like normal governments, count on the automatic allegiance and obedience of its subjects.

Those of our countrymen who announce, after a two- or four-week tour of Russia, that its people are firmly behind its dictatorship, have yet to explain why the Kremlin continues to depend on force and incessant propaganda, rather than on the free consent of the people. Why, if the people support the regime, is there need for maintaining history's largest and most ruthless secret-police establishment? Why does the Kremlin continue to make it a capital crime for its supposedly loyal citizens to try to leave the country without permission? Why, if the people are already sold on it, does the regime continue to train and support literally hundreds of thousands of full-time "agitators" to sell the system?

Even a totalitarian government does not assign major portions of its budget, manpower, brains, and energy to internal security unless it feels itself seriously insecure. One can judge an ailment from the medicine; and in Soviet Russia the medicine, in this the forty-second year of Soviet dictatorship, is still terror, intimidation, and unlimited thought control.

Mr. ARENS. Do I detect in what you've said some skepticism about the reports on Russia being brought home by American tourists to that country?

Mr. LYONS. Skepticism is a mild word for how I feel about it. Now and then, of course, the tourist does bring back some fragments

of truth, especially in relation to his own field of competence. But these morsels are few and far between. Besides, the home folks can hardly be expected to separate the rare grains of truth from the mountain of chaff.

In the forthcoming October issue of *The Reader's Digest* I have an article entitled "One Trip to Russia Doesn't Make an Expert." I express my judgment that the new surge of tourist traffic to the U.S.S.R. is confusing, rather than clarifying, our image of that country. The most mischievous of the findings of these quickie experts, as I see it, is to the effect that the Soviet peoples have come to love their chains.

Even if the finding were true, a few days or weeks in Russia would hardly suffice to prove it. I venture to say that the same people, had they visited Hungary and Poland in the year or two before the uprisings in those countries, would not have become aware of the coming events. In a police state the explosive stuff of popular discontent is always deep under the surface. I can testify from close-up experience that it takes years of living among the Kremlin's helpless subjects to begin to sense how they really feel.

Mr. ARENS. Would you sum up briefly your judgment of Khrushchev and his impending visit?

Mr. LYONS. I'll try. In the first place, the new Soviet boss, despite his homespun exterior, is one of the bloodiest tyrants extant. He has come to power over mountains of corpses. Those of us who roll out red carpets for him will soon have red faces.

In the second place, the exchange of visits between the heads of the two governments, even if it brings a few seemingly positive results on the margins of the struggle, must prove deeply harmful to the core of that struggle. It comes close to an acknowledgment of the permanence of the Communist grabs and undermines the spirit of resistance inside the Communist world.

In the third place, and perhaps most importantly, the great expectations aroused by the exchange reveal the tragic failure of Western statesmen to recognize the character and the magnitude of the Communist challenge.

Mr. WALTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Lyons.

(Thereupon, at 3:05 p.m., Friday, September 4, 1959, the consultation was concluded.)

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