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Trygve Lie

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*IN
THE
CAUSE
OF
PEACE*

Seven Years with the United Nations

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - NEW YORK

1954

right in his basic appraisal of the situation, that strength was necessary for successful dealings with the Soviet Union and Western Europe could not be restored to military and economic strength without massive aid from America—a reversal of the process of withdrawal and pellmell demobilization that was then under way. But I wished that he might have coupled his appeal for Western unity and strength with a more positive and conciliatory approach to the Soviet Union, seeking common ground upon which the U.S.S.R. might be persuaded to return to its wartime policy of collaboration and to join with the West in the United Nations in a genuine effort to build a common system of security. There was nothing incompatible, I felt, between such an effort and a policy of rebuilding Western strength, either then or later. The development and strengthening of the United Nations could not and should not wait upon the rejuvenation of Western Europe. They should go hand in hand. It was to this end that I resolved to devote all my influence as Secretary-General in the months that lay ahead.

CHAPTER III

THE SECRETARIAT: OUTPOST IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE

The role of the Secretary-General.—Great powers agree on allocation of Assistant Secretaryships-General.—The problem of guarding a geographical balance.—Recruiting a crew for a ship already on her course.

NOTWITHSTANDING concern with the developing political situation on the world scene, most of my time in the hectic weeks in London following my election was occupied by the preliminary shaping of my views as to the role the Secretary-General should play, and with the first steps in the creation of the Secretariat. Both grave considerations of high principle and policy, and practical political realities of a somewhat less elevated but very human kind, had to be taken into account.

Article 99 of the Charter states:

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

This Article confers upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations world political responsibilities which no individual, no representative of a single nation, ever had before. Furthermore from it derived further rights that were soon to be written into the rules of procedure of the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council. The Secretary-General was to be empowered to propose items for the

going concern which had to be serviced continuously, and with no delay whatever. It had been different in Geneva. Not a meeting of importance was held during the first eighteen months of the League's existence, when the world was far too busy implementing the peace treaties which—fortunately for the League—had already been concluded. Sir Eric could take the necessary time. I could not.

The Preparatory Commission and the Assembly had agreed that the Secretariat should be organized in eight departments, each under an Assistant Secretary-General. Four of the departments corresponded to the main fields of activity of the United Nations. They were:

The Department of Security Council Affairs, to serve also the General Assembly in all political questions and the Atomic Energy, the Disarmament, and other commissions.

The Department of Economic Affairs, to serve the Economic and Social Council and its commissions as well as the General Assembly in all economic questions.

The Department of Social Affairs, to perform a like task on all social questions considered by the United Nations, including human rights.

The Department of Trusteeship and Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, to serve the Trusteeship Council, and the Assembly in its consideration of problems of non-self-governing territories not included in the Trusteeship system.

Then there was *the Legal Department*, to advise the organs of the United Nations and the Secretary-General on legal and constitutional matters and the drafting of international agreements, and to be responsible for the registration of treaties.

A sixth, *the Department of Public Information*, had the role of helping to promote an informed public understanding of the aims and activities of the United Nations without which, the First Assembly recognized in a unanimous resolution, "the United Nations cannot achieve the purposes for which it has been created."

The Department of Administrative and Financial Services combined administration of the Organization's finances with central responsibility for personnel.

The Department of Conference and General Services provided such services to the Assembly and the Councils as interpretation,

translation, and official records, and the "housekeeping" services required for the organization.

The choice of the Assistant Secretaries-General, who would constitute my "cabinet," was, of course, my first concern. It soon appeared that it was equally the concern of some of the great, and a number of the lesser, powers.

Mr. Vyshinsky did not delay his approach. He was the first to inform me of an understanding which the Big Five had reached in London on the appointment of a Soviet national as Assistant Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs. Mr. Vyshinsky simply spoke of an "agreement"—he said nothing of its binding quality, of the right of the Big Five to arrive at it, or of the length of time it was meant to apply. Now, by the terms of the Charter, the Secretary-General has full authority in the disposition of the Assistant Secretary-Generalships, with respect both to their nationality and to their personality. The authority, in fact, was the point of a hard-won decision at San Francisco which rejected an attempt to prescribe that there should be four Deputy Secretaries-General, appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council in the same manner as the Secretary-General. Strictly speaking, therefore, the Big Five had no right to arrive at any understanding regarding the distribution of the offices of Assistant Secretary-General which was binding upon the Secretary-General.

This is not to say, however, that it would have been politic of me to resist the great-power accord. Moreover, I welcomed the understanding as a sign of good will and confidence between East and West. That the Soviet Union wanted one of its nationals to fulfill the premier Assistant Secretaryship could be taken as another indication of serious Soviet interest in the United Nations, and that the United States was willing to agree to accord this key post to a national of the U.S.S.R. was evidence of an American desire to encourage this interest for the sake of world peace.

Mr. Stettinius confirmed to me that he had agreed with the Soviet Delegation in the matter. In fact, the Big Five had agreed among themselves to ask me to appoint a national of each of them as an Assistant Secretary-General. But both Mr. Stettinius and the French stressed that their agreement to the Soviet post was a limited one,

Item 125-A-4
AC 1/1: 9102
P.C. card 62-60658

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
PUBLICATION 14
Released February 1963

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C. - Price 35 cents



Second Annual Report to Congress
January 1, 1962-December 31, 1962

the board" approach, by preserving the existing relative balance in present military establishments between nuclear and conventional striking power during the whole disarmament process, is a fair approach which protects the security interests of all nations.

The U.S. plan also provides for the reduction of forces of the United States and the Soviet Union to 2.1 million in Stage I and 1.05 million in Stage II, with corresponding reductions by other nations. Stage I of the U.S. plan contains essential measures to meet the nuclear threat, especially by a cutoff of the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons purposes. Further measures to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons remaining in national arsenals would be carried out in Stages II and III of the U.S. program after the completion of international expert studies. The United States proposes completion of Stages I and II in 3 years each and Stage III as soon as possible.

Provision is also made for appropriate inspection and verification at all stages. Adequate assurance must be provided not only as to arms destroyed, but also as to permitted levels of retained arms. It is not anticipated that verification would have to be excessive to be effective but its intensity would be commensurate with the specific disarmament measure under consideration. The United States has suggested a progressive zonal system of inspection as a possible way of assuring observance of the treaty.

The U.S. plan further proposes the establishment of an International Disarmament Organization within the U.N. framework. It also contains specific provisions for a prohibition against placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space, the institution of measures aimed at reducing the risk of war which could be initiated prior to the conclusion of an overall disarmament treaty, and the strengthening of peacekeeping arrangements through improved procedures for peaceful settlements of disputes and the eventual establishment of an international peace force.


In contrast, the Soviet plan places emphasis on reducing selected categories of armaments in each of its three stages. Accordingly, the Soviet draft treaty initially sought a 100 percent reduction in nuclear delivery vehicles in Stage I although the nuclear weapons themselves would not be eliminated until Stage II. The Soviet Union thus rejects the United States across-the-board approach and advocates a method which would radically alter the existing relative balance at the very beginning of the disarmament process. The Soviet draft treaty was later revised to make provision for the United States and the Soviet Union to retain a limited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, anti-missile missiles, and surface-to-air missiles dur-

ing Stages I and II. However, the overall Soviet approach remains substantially the same in that, even in the light of this shift, it is inadequate in terms of preserving the existing relative military balance. This remains a subject for further exploration. The Soviet Union later agreed, however, to a percentage reduction of conventional armaments. Coupled with the almost complete elimination of delivery means in Stage I, it also insists on the abolition of all foreign military bases and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from abroad.

On the matter of force levels, the Soviet Union originally proposed Stage I levels of 1.7 million for the United States and the Soviet Union and Stage II levels of 1 million although later expressing a willingness to accept a level of 1.9 million for Stage I. The Soviet position on verification calls only for arrangements to verify the destruction of agreed numbers of armaments. It makes no provision for a check of remaining levels to determine, for example, whether weapons have been secretly hidden.

According to the initial Soviet plan, all three stages were to occur over a 4-year period, with Stage I being carried out in 21 months; the overall time period was subsequently extended to 5 years, with Stage I extended to 2 years. Although the Soviet plan also advocates reliance upon a strengthened United Nations to maintain peace during

U.S. THREE-STAGE DISARMAMENT PLAN



UNITED STATES
ARMS CONTROL and
DISARMAMENT AGENCY

STAFF: 150

BUDGET: \$6,500,000

MISSION: DISARMAMENT

- POLICY
- NEGOTIATIONS
- RESEARCH

Advisory Committee; the Review Panel; the Agency's Research Council and its Intelligence Committee; and in cooperation with the Department of State, to the Committee of Principals chaired by the Secretary of State.

A key task involved backstopping the U.S. delegation to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee meetings in Geneva, beginning in March 1962, including detail of Secretariat personnel to the U.S. delegation secretariat, communications and documentation to and from Geneva, and liaison with the Department of State's Office of International Conferences on administrative and personnel arrangements for the delegation.

The Secretariat also edited and published a monthly ACDA Activities Report and daily and weekly classified summaries of policy developments in the disarmament field. These reports are designed to insure that other interested organizations within government have available to them a continuing flow of information on developing disarmament policies.

Other important normal activities included directing and controlling the prompt and orderly flow of information documents, maintaining followup on action papers and communications to insure completion on schedule, and review of cables, memorandums, letters, and

position papers to insure accordance with or to reflect authorized changes in established national policy.

Reference Research Staff

The Reference Research Staff provides research and reference services in support of the activities of the Agency, including the conduct of the research program, the formulation of policy, and the carrying on of international negotiations. The research undertaken by the Staff is frequently short term, often performed on request from the other bureaus and offices of ACDA. It is generally background in character, and is the kind of research that is heavily dependent on documentary collections and other library source materials. The reports of the Reference Research Staff cover a wide variety of topics. Typical subjects include surveys and analyses of other countries' proposals or policies on disarmament and arms control, comparisons between the disarmament proposals or policies of the United States and other countries, historical reviews of positions taken by governments on specific issues in disarmament negotiations, or compilations of statements by officials or of statistical data.

At times, extended in-house research projects are undertaken. One such project was the preparation of the Agency publication entitled *International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1961-September 1962*. This historical and documentary survey supplements an earlier "white paper" released by the Department of State in 1961 which reviewed and analyzed the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. The Reference Staff also edits the annual volume of *Documents on Disarmament*, a selection of significant official documents issued by governments and various international organizations. In addition, this Office has cognizance over certain historical projects in the Agency's contract research program, including studies of past arms limitation negotiations and arrangements. The Staff also services the U.S. delegation to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva carrying out diverse research assignments, including the preparation of a detailed analytical index of the official proceedings of the Conference.

Another prominent activity of this Staff arises from Executive Order No. 11044 on "Interagency Coordination of Arms Control and Disarmament Matters." (See Appendix I.) Under this order, the Director of ACDA is responsible for planning and developing a program of government research and studies on arms control and disarmament policy. The order enjoins him to maintain a "continuing inventory" of government research activities and to submit to the

Parties to the Treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied. Stage III would begin when all states possessing armed forces and armaments had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied. Disarmament, verification, and measures for keeping the peace would proceed progressively and proportionately beginning with the entry into force of the Treaty.

STAGE I

Stage I would begin upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would be completed within three years from that date.

During Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To reduce their armaments and armed forces and to carry out other agreed measures in the manner outlined below;
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3. To strengthen arr
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EARLIER

1. Reduction of Armaments

a. Specified Parties to the Treaty and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, would reduce by thirty per cent the armaments in each category listed in subparagraph b. below. Each type of armament in the categories listed in subparagraph b. would be reduced by thirty per cent of the inventory existing at an agreed date.

b. All types of armaments within agreed categories would be subject to reduction in Stage I (the following list of categories, and of types within categories, is illustrative):

(1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000 kilograms or greater; missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometres or greater, together with their related fixed launching pads; and submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles having a range of 300 kilometres or greater.

(Within this category, the United States, for example, would declare as types of armaments: the B-52 aircraft; Atlas missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Titan missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Polaris missiles; Hound Dog missiles; and each new type of armament, such as Minuteman missiles, which came within the category description, together with, where applicable, their related fixed launching pads. The de-

clared inventory of types within the category by other Parties to the Treaty would be similarly detailed.)

(2) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 15,000 kilograms and 40,000 kilograms and those missiles not included in category (1) having a range between 300 kilometres and 5,000 kilometres, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(3) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 2,500 and 15,000 kilograms. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(4) Surface-to-surface (including submarine-launched missiles) and air-to-surface aerodynamic and ballistic missiles and free rockets having a range of between 10 kilometres and 300 kilometres, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(5) Anti-missile missile systems, together with related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(6) Surface-to-air missiles other than anti-missile missile systems, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(7) Tanks. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(8) Armoured cars and armoured personnel carriers. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(9) All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of 100 mm. or greater. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(10) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater of the following classes: Aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyer types and submarines. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

2. Method of Reduction

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the reduction of armaments would submit to the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration respecting inventories of their armaments existing at the agreed date.

b. The reduction would be accomplished in three steps, each consisting of one year. One-third of the reduction to be made during Stage I would be carried out during each step.

c. During the first part of each step, one-third of the armaments to be eliminated during Stage I would be placed in depots under supervision of the International Disarmament Organization. Dur-

ing the second part of each step, the deposited armaments would be destroyed or, where appropriate, converted to peaceful uses. The number and location of such depots and arrangements respecting their establishment and operation would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

d. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in a Treaty annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing reduction and would provide assurance that retained armaments did not exceed agreed levels.

3. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

a. Production of all armaments listed in subparagraph b of paragraph 1 above would be limited to agreed allowances during Stage I and, by the beginning of Stage II, would be halted except for production within agreed limits of parts for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments.

b. The allowances would permit limited production of each type of armament listed in subparagraph b of paragraph 1 above. In all instances during the process of eliminating production of armaments, any armament produced within a type would be compensated for by an additional armament destroyed within that type to the end that the ten per cent reduction in numbers in each type in each step, and the resulting thirty per cent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved.

c. The testing and production of new types of armaments would be prohibited.

d. The expansion of facilities for the production of existing types of armaments and the construction or equipping of facilities for the production of new types of armaments would be prohibited.

e. The flight testing of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.

f. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the international disarmament organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

4. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine unresolved questions relating to means of accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. In light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

B. ARMED FORCES

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

Force levels for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to 2.1 million each and for other specified Parties to the Treaty to agreed levels not exceeding 2.1 million each. All other Parties to the Treaty would, with agreed exceptions, reduce their force levels to 100,000 or one per cent of their population, whichever were higher, provided that in no case would the force levels of such other Parties to the Treaty exceed levels in existence upon the entry into force of the Treaty.

2. Armed Forces Subject to Reduction

Agreed force levels would include all full-time, uniformed personnel maintained by national governments in the following categories:

a. Career personnel of active armed forces and other personnel serving in the active armed forces on fixed engagements or contracts.

b. Conscripts performing their required period of full-time active duty as fixed by national law.

c. Personnel of militarily organized security forces and of other forces or organizations equipped and organized to perform a military mission.

3. Method of Reduction of Armed Forces

The reduction of force levels would be carried out in the following manner:

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing reductions would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating their force levels at the agreed date.

b. Force level reductions would be accomplished in three steps, each having a duration of one year. During each step force levels would be reduced by one-third of the difference between force levels existing at the agreed date and the levels to be reached at the end of Stage I.

c. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the reduction of force levels and provide assurance that retained forces did not exceed agreed levels.

4. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing reductions would agree upon appropriate arrangements, including procedures for consultation, in order to ensure that civilian employment by military establishments would be in accordance with the objectives of the obligations respecting force levels.

- a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage I had been carried out.
- b. All preparations required for Stage II had been made; and
- c. All militarily significant states had become parties to the treaty.

2. Transition from Stage I to Stage II would take place at the end of Stage I or at the end of any periods of extension of Stage I, upon a determination, in the light of specified criteria, by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the foregoing circumstances existed.

3. If, at the end of Stage I, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of Stage I would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

4. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would again consider whether the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist and would vote upon transition in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.

STAGE II

Stage II would begin upon the transition from Stage I and would be completed within three years from that date.

During Stage II, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

- 1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stage I;
- 2. To reduce further the armaments and armed forces reduced during Stage I and to carry out additional measures of disarmament in the manner outlined below;
- 3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage II; and
- 4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace through the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force and through the additional measures outlined below.

A. ARMAMENTS

1. Reduction of Armaments

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had during Stage I reduced their armaments in agreed categories by thirty per cent would during Stage II further reduce each type of armaments in the categories listed in Section A, subparagraph 1.b of Stage I by fifty per cent of the inventory existing at the end of Stage I.

b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures for the reduction of armaments during Stage I would submit to the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration respecting the inventories by types, within the categories listed in Stage I of their armaments existing at the beginning of Stage II. Such Parties to the Treaty would during Stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by sixty-five per cent in order that such Parties would accomplish the same total percentage of reduction by the end of Stage II as would be accomplished by those Parties to the Treaty which had reduced their armaments by thirty per cent in Stage I.

2. Additional Armaments Subject to Reduction

a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration respecting their inventories existing at the beginning of Stage II of the additional types of armaments in the categories listed in subparagraph b. below, and would during Stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by fifty per cent.

b. All types of armaments within further agreed categories would be subject to reduction in Stage II (the following list of categories is illustrative):

- (1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of up to 2,500 kilograms (declarations by types).
- (2) Specified types of unarmed military aircraft (declarations by types).
- (3) Missiles and free rockets having a range of less than 10 kilometers (declarations by types).
- (4) Mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of less than 100 mm. (declarations by types).
- (5) Specified types of unarmoured personnel carriers and transport vehicles (declarations by types).
- (6) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater which had not been included among the armaments listed in Stage I, and combatant ships with standard displacement of less than 400 tons (declarations by types).
- (7) Specified types of non-combatant naval vessels (declarations by types).
- (8) Specified types of small arms (declarations by types).

c. Specified categories of ammunition for armaments listed in Stage I, Section A, subparagraph 1.b., and subparagraph b. above would be reduced to levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage II.

ment. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of procedures whereby rules recommended by the subsidiary body and approved by the Control Council would be circulated to all Parties to the Treaty and would become effective three months thereafter unless a majority of the Parties to the Treaty signified their disapproval, and whereby the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by rules which had become effective in this way unless, within a period of one year from the effective date, they formally notified the International Disarmament Organization that they did not consider themselves so bound. Using such procedures, the Parties to the Treaty would adopt such rules of international conduct related to disarmament as might be necessary to begin Stage III.

b. In the light of the study of indirect aggression and subversion conducted in Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements necessary to assure states against indirect aggression and subversion.

3. *United Nations Peace Force*

The United Nations Peace Force to be established as the result of the agreement reached during Stage I would come into being within the first year of Stage II and would be progressively strengthened during Stage II.

4. *United Nations Peace Observation Corps*

The Parties to the Treaty would conclude arrangement for the expansion of the activities of the United Nations Peace Observation Corps.

5. *National Legislation*

Those Parties to the Treaty which had not already done so would, in accordance with their constitutional processes, enact national legislation in support of the Treaty imposing legal obligations on individuals and organizations under their jurisdiction and providing appropriate penalties for noncompliance.

II. TRANSITION

1. During the last three months of Stage II, the Control Council would review the situation respecting the following listed circumstances with a view to determining, in the light of specified criteria, whether these circumstances existed at the end of Stage II:

a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage II had been carried out.

b. All preparations required for Stage III had been made; and

c. All states possessing armed forces and armaments had become parties to the treaty.

2. Transition from Stage II to Stage III would take place at the end of Stage II or at the end of any periods of extension of Stage II, upon a determination, in the light of specified criteria, by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the foregoing circumstances existed.

3. If, at the end of Stage II, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of Stage II would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

4. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would again consider whether the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist and would vote upon transition in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.

STAGE III

Stage III would begin upon the transition from Stage II and would be completed within an agreed period of time as promptly as possible.

During Stage III, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stages I and II;

2. To complete the process of general and complete disarmament in the manner outlined below;

3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage III and of continuing verification subsequent to the completion of Stage III; and

4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace during and following the achievement of general and complete disarmament through the additional measures outlined below.

A. ARMAMENTS

1. *Reduction of Armaments*

Subject to agreed requirements for non-nuclear armaments of agreed types for national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all armaments remaining at their disposal at the end of Stage II.

2. *Method of Reduction*

a. The foregoing measure would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements that would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

2. This determination would be made by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. If an affirmative determination were made, Stage III would be deemed completed.

3. In the event that one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that such undertakings had not been carried out, the agreed period of Stage III would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended for a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of completing any uncompleted undertakings. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would again consider whether such undertakings had been carried out and would vote upon the question in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.

4. After the completion of Stage III, the obligations undertaken in Stages I, II and III would continue.

GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL STAGES

1. *Subsequent Modifications or Amendments of the Treaty*

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to specific procedures for considering amendments or modifications of the Treaty which were believed desirable by any Party to the Treaty in the light of experience in the early period of implementation of the Treaty. Such procedures would include provision for a conference on revision of the Treaty after a specified period of time.

2. *Interim Agreement*

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such specific arrangements, including the establishment of a Preparatory Commission, as were necessary between the signing and entry into force of the Treaty to ensure the initiation of Stage I immediately upon the entry into force of the Treaty, and to provide an interim forum for the exchange of views and information on topics relating to the Treaty and to the achievement of a permanent stage of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

3. *Parties to the Treaty, Ratification, Accession and Entry Into Force of the Treaty*

a. The Treaty would be open to signature and ratification, or accession by all members of the United Nations or its specialized agencies.

b. Any other state which desired to become a Party to the Treaty could accede to the Treaty with the approval of the Conference on recommendation of the Control Council.

c. The Treaty would come into force when it had been ratified by _____ states, including the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and an agreed number of the following states: _____.

d. In order to assure the achievement of the fundamental purpose of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the Treaty would specify that the accession of certain militarily significant states would be essential for the continued effectiveness of the Treaty or for the coming into force of particular measures or stages.

e. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to exert every effort to induce other states or authorities to accede to the Treaty.

f. The Treaty would be subject to ratification or acceptance in accordance with constitutional processes.

g. A Depository Government would be agreed upon which would have all of the duties normally incumbent upon a Depository. Alternatively, the United Nations would be the Depository.

4. *Finance*

a. In order to meet the financial obligations of the International Disarmament Organization, the Parties to the Treaty would bear the International Disarmament Organization's expenses as provided in the budget approved by the General Conference and in accordance with a scale of apportionment approved by the General Conference.

b. The General Conference would exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the International Disarmament Organization.

5. *Authentic Texts*

The text of the Treaty would consist of equally authentic versions in English, French, Russian, Chinese and Spanish.