

MAJOR SPEECHES AND DEBATES

OR

SENATOR JOE MCCARTHY

DELIVERED IN THE

UNITED STATES SENATE

1950-1951

UNABRIDGED REPRINT FROM  
THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

# Congressional Record

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*Reprint From The Congressional Record*

In this book the publishers have selected from the Congressional Record major speeches and statements made by Senator Joe McCarthy to the United States Senate in the first two years of his campaign to expose and remove from office Communists and pro-Communists in the Government.

This collection of selected speeches does not even remotely constitute the Senator's entire case. Additional information can be obtained from testimony before Senate committees and other published sources.

The speeches herein reproduced are reprinted from the Congressional Record.

United States Government Printing Office  
Washington, D. C.

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## INTRODUCTION

### Insertion in Congressional Record of June 24, 1952, by Congressman Timothy P. Sheehan, of an Article Entitled "Senator McCarthy," by Kenneth Colegrove, Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University

Mr. SHEEHAN. Mr. Speaker, as a graduate of Northwestern University, I have noted with great interest that Kenneth Colegrove, professor of political science at Northwestern, has completed a study on Senator JOSEPH McCARTHY, of Wisconsin.

Professor Colegrove's reputation as a man and as a scholar is above reproach, and his many years of study in the art of political science have earned for him an enviable position in that field. The thoughts he has put forth in his study of Senator McCARTHY are, therefore, the considered views of a seasoned political scientist.

In writing this article for Freedom Clubs, which organization believes that the issues of the day are too important to resolve at the level of name calling, especially the art of character assassination as it is being widely practiced today, Professor Colegrove has attempted a scholarly and competent investigation of what has been one of the most vicious smear campaigns of our times. The most spectacular example of the use of this device to avoid facing the real issues is to be found in the personal attacks upon Senator JOSEPH McCARTHY, of Wisconsin. Professor Colegrove evaluates Senator McCARTHY's speeches in the United States Senate and attempts to appraise in an objective way the issue of "McCarthyism."

Professor Colegrove's analysis of the charges of "McCarthyism" is as follows:

#### SENATOR McCARTHY

Twenty-three hundred years ago, an eloquent Athenian citizen gave voice to a series of devastating orations against Phillip of Macedon. It is doubtful whether Demosthenes could have documented all the charges uttered in his celebrated Philippics. His indictment of King Phillip advanced far beyond the evidence at his command. Nevertheless, history has recorded him as a patriotic citizen who rendered a memorable service to the Athenian city-state by his powerful denunciation of the enemy of Greek democracy.

I do not intend to infer that Senator McCARTHY is an American Demosthenes. So far as I know, he does not pretend to Hellenic eloquence. But I do intend to offer the thesis that in time of national crisis, when all the evidence is unavailable, but when considerable evidence exists to show that the national security is endangered, guardians of public welfare are justified in raising charges that will lead to the investigation of the actions of persons and groups which are under serious suspicion as a menace to democratic government. To put it more bluntly, in the words of the Roman proverb, "the welfare of the people is the highest law."

#### TO OVERCOME OBSTACLES

Without question, the charge of harboring Communists which Senator McCARTHY brought against the State Department in his Wheeling address in February 1950 was a hard blow. But his sledge-hammer blows were a natural reaction to the hostility of a corrupt administration toward any adequate investigation of communism in the executive branch of Government. In conformity with the instincts of Fendergast machine politics, seeking to hide any malfeasance in office, President Truman had denounced honest efforts to search out subversives in the Federal Government. He had branded the probe of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives into Communist spying in the Federal Government as a "red herring." He accused Congressional investigation of subversives in Government as an effort to promote public hysteria. Dean Acheson, his Secretary of State, even after the conviction of a former high-ranking officer for perjury in connection with charges of spying had declared that he would not turn his back on Alger Hiss. The corrupt Democratic Government had thrown every obstacle in the way of an effective investigation of Communist influences in the Federal Government.

#### BLUNT TALK

The brutal charges of Senator McCARTHY were thus a natural reaction to the pugnacious refusal of the Truman administration to assist congressional investigation of the loyalty of Federal employees. The need for investigation was obvious to honest and alert citizens. The western democracies were engaged in a cold war with the most dangerous dictatorship in modern history. By means of new techniques of infiltration and

subversion, the Moscow-directed Communist Party, was engaged in undermining constitutional government in every democratic country in the world. Even the Republican Party, both in and out of Congress, had proved to be lethargic and leaderless when confronted with the problem of subversive influences in Federal Government.

In the meanwhile, under the advice of pro-Communists, the State Department had abandoned the faithful ally of America, Chiang Kai-shek, and the Nationalist Government in China, and had directly and indirectly promoted the victory of the Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-tung. The Department had assisted a Red dictatorship, known to be in alliance with Soviet Russia, to win control over 400,000,000 Chinese people. Finally, after the debacle of the open-door policy in China in 1949, the Department had the effrontery to give the American people a patently false explanation in the White Paper on China. Even then, the Department was secretly planning to abandon Formosa and to give full recognition to the Chinese Reds.

#### ACCOMPLISHED FRUITFUL RESULTS

It was under these distressing circumstances that the smashing charges of the Wisconsin Senator awakened public opinion, prodded the Republican Members of Congress into action, and compelled Congress to inaugurate investigations that ultimately proved fruitful in exposing Communist operations to control American foreign policy.

All of this was not accomplished without an emotional convulsion. Senator McCarthy's sweeping charges against Owen Lattimore and Philip Jessup stirred a deep resentment in the breasts of millions of men and women who had no personal knowledge of these individuals but who thought that they saw a grave danger to freedom of speech and liberty by the utterance of such charges, especially on part of a Senator who could claim congressional immunity. Some liberals even went so far as to declare that legislative immunity should be removed from the Constitution. Second reflection, however, showed that democracy would greatly suffer if the representatives of the people were not left absolutely free to express their views on the floor of the legislature.

It cannot be denied that Senator McCarthy had deeply offended the innermost convictions of millions of American citizens. To some voters it appeared that he had trampled upon the American tradition that the accused is deemed innocent until convicted. To others it seemed that his broad charges, without complete supporting evidence, were unfair to the victims of the accusation and violated an American principle of fair play. To many soft liberals, who felt that freedom of speech required the absence of any restrictions upon the propaganda of Communists even when advocating the over-

throw of the American Constitution by force, Senator McCarthy appeared as a violent enemy of constitutional liberty.

#### BUT THE SPARKS FLEW

Smugness is not one of the besetting sins of the American people. Nevertheless, Senator McCarthy provoked one of the most curious displays of self-righteousness in American history. In June 1950, six liberal Republican Senators, at the behest of a lady Senator, signed a declaration of conscience bitterly condemning Senator McCarthy's "selfish political exploitation of fear, bigotry, ignorance, and intolerance." These Senators condemned the complacency of the Democratic administration toward communism, but they were obviously too nice-minded to attack the problem in the manner that William Lloyd Garrison attacked the evil of slavery. Within a short time, at least one of the masculine signers apologized for his lapse into political smugness. Doubtless, in due time, others of the six will regret an act of affectation.

If Senator McCarthy found consolation in reflection on classical history, he could recall that Demosthenes was savagely attacked by the Macedonian party in Athens because of his blunt charges against King Philip. Of course, it was uncomfortable to reflect in the year 1950 that the Macedonian party in the year 351 B. C. was bent on subjecting Athens to a foreign power. But the protection of Communists in the American Government ran in the same direction. Those who would preserve American liberty by permitting Communists to undermine American liberty, were wittingly or unwittingly offering the conquest of their country to a foreign power, in the same manner as the Macedonian party in Athens invited Philip to take over the city-state. It would be erroneous to brand President Truman and the Democrats who protected communism in Federal Government as traitors to their country. On the other hand, history will not award them the distinction of stalwart guardians of national security.

#### WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION

A frequent charge made against Senator McCarthy by President Truman, the State Department, and Democratic Congressmen was the allegation that he was engaged in the spread of public hysteria. The facts do not justify this accusation, for an examination of the record shows that most of the hysteria was found, not in the ranks of the pro-Americans and anti-Communists, but rather among the enemies of Senator McCarthy. Defenders of the State Department invented the word "McCarthyism" for propaganda effect. Into this symbol, the soft liberals poured all their opprobrium, venom, and contempt. Thousands of persons who were otherwise possessed of emotional stability became off balance as they delivered their sentiments on McCarthyism. Refined countenances turned to bitterness

and unpleasant sneers as lips spit out the contemptuous word. Even well-poised former Oxford scholars, both inside and outside the Senate, lost their aplomb when discoursing on the theme "McCarthyism."

The hysteria invaded the halls of Congress. Seldom has the United States Senate witnessed a more passionate, vindictive, and disagreeable debate than occurred on July 20, 1950, when Senator Millard E. Tydings, reported the findings of the subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations regarding the McCarthy charges. Senator Tydings' address was an amazing tissue of arrogance and deceit. As to lack of dignity it was only exceeded by the amazing performance of Senator DENNIS CHAVEZ who, on May 12, 1950, made a scurrilous attack on Prof. Louis F. Budenz as a result of his testimony that Owen Lattimore was considered by the editor of the Daily Worker as a concealed member of a Communist cell in the Institute of Pacific Relations. In extenuation of this disgraceful episode, it would be comforting to believe that the address was prepared by an interested party other than the Senator and read by him when not wholly aware of his actions.

A comparison of the addresses of Senator McCarthy and those of his traducers will show on what side the hysteria is to be found. Compared to the speeches of Tydings, Chavez, and Benton, and the press releases of the State Department, the addresses of JOSEPH MCCARTHY are almost models of propriety. He accused certain officials as being Communists or subversive agents, as well as being guilty of perjury. But even these accusations were presented in an impersonal manner. On the other hand, his opponents, including even Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, injected emotional attacks on Senator McCarthy's character that had no proper place in the debate.

#### AND THERE WAS WHITEWASHING

A low ebb in congressional investigation was reached by the Tydings subcommittee. No committee or subcommittee, in the entire history of Congress, ever violated more egregiously its mandate for investigation than did the Tydings subcommittee. The Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate was equally at fault for allowing the dishonest report of its subcommittee to come before the Senate.

The subcommittee had been appointed to investigate the charges of Senator McCarthy against Owen Lattimore and other alleged Communist agents. But instead of investigating Lattimore, the subcommittee investigated McCarthy. Minority counsel was denied the right to participate in the examination of witnesses. The examination of

State Department loyalty files proved to be a farce. The final report was a deceptive whitewash of persons accused as Communist agents and of the State Department which had patently followed pro-Communist advice. At the same time, the efforts of the two minority members of the subcommittee on behalf of a genuine investigation had been little more than feeble. One of them appeared almost indifferent; the other, Senator LOUG, figuratively slapped the wrist of the guilty chairman in a few polite little speeches.

#### BUT MCCARTHY WAS VINDICATED

The episode led to a well-deserved defeat of Senator Tydings for reelection by the voters of Maryland. It also led to a decision of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to inaugurate a forthright investigation of Communist agencies in the Federal Government. A combination of Republican and anti-Truman Senators, in December 1950, insured the adoption of a resolution authorizing the Committee on the Judiciary to investigate subversive activities in the United States as well as the Federal internal security laws. As a result, this committee, under the chairmanship of Senator PAT MCCARRAN, of Nevada, inaugurated a genuine investigation, following the best procedures of American legal science. Its hearings have already substantiated a large part of the charges of Senator McCarthy, and well may lead to proof of all these charges.

Undoubtedly, the McCarthy episode has made a permanent impression upon American morals and manners. Many of the persons who talked loudest about "McCarthyism" have not studied either the speeches of the Wisconsin Senator or the evidence of the Committee on the Judiciary. In the interest of good government, we may well pray that in the future we will have more light and less heat on this controversial issue.

#### AS THE PUBLIC WELFARE IS SERVED

In closing, I will revert to my opening thesis: Salus populi suprema est lex. (The public welfare is the highest law.) There may be severe hardships inflicted upon citizens who may be named as proper objects of investigation by Members of Congress, particularly in case the accused persons are innocent of the accusation. On the other hand, if the actions of the accused have given justifiable grounds for suspicion of subversive activities, there is no good reason why, in the name of the people, such persons should not be brought under legislative investigation. The freedoms of the Bill of Rights are indeed very precious liberties. But good citizens will conduct themselves in a manner to deserve the protection of these freedoms.

FEBRUARY 20, 1950

## First Speech Delivered in Senate by Senator Joe McCarthy on Communists in Government; Wheeling Speech

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I wish to discuss a subject tonight which concerns me more than does any other subject I have ever discussed before this body, and perhaps more than any other subject I shall ever have the good fortune to discuss in the future. It not only concerns me, but it disturbs and frightens me.

About 10 days ago, at Wheeling, W. Va., in making a Lincoln Day speech, I made the statement that there are presently in the State Department a very sizable group of active Communists. I made the further statement, Mr. President, that of one small group which had been screened by the President's own security agency, the State Department refused to discharge approximately 200 of those individuals.

The Secretary of State promptly denied my statement and said there was not a single Communist in the State Department. I thereafter sent a telegram to the President, which I should like to read at this time:

President HARRY S. TRUMAN,  
*White House, Washington, D. C.:*

In the Lincoln Day speech at Wheeling Thursday night I stated that the State Department harbors a nest of Communists and Communist sympathizers who are helping to shape our foreign policy. I further stated that I have in my possession the names of 57 Communists who are in the State Department at present. A State Department spokesman promptly denied this, claiming that there is not a single Communist in the Department. You can convince yourself of the falsity of the State Department claim very easily. You will recall that you personally appointed a board to screen State Department employees for the purpose of weeding out fellow travelers—men whom the board considered dangerous to the security of this Nation. Your board did a palmtaking job, and named hundreds which had been listed as dangerous to the security of the Nation, because of communistic connections.

While the records are not available to me, I know absolutely of one group of approximately 300 certified to the Secretary for discharge because of communism. He actually only discharged approximately 80. I understand that this was done after lengthy con-

sultation with the now-convicted traitor, Alger Hiss. I would suggest, therefore, Mr. President, that you simply pick up your phone and ask Mr. Acheson how many of those whom your board had labeled as dangerous Communists he failed to discharge. The day the House Un-American Activities Committee exposed Alger Hiss as an important link in an international Communist spy ring you signed an order forbidding the State Department's giving any information in regard to the disloyalty or the communistic connections of anyone in that Department to the Congress.

Despite this State Department blackout, we have been able to compile a list of 57 Communists in the State Department. This list is available to you but you can get a much longer list by ordering Secretary Acheson to give you a list of those whom your own board listed as being disloyal and who are still working in the State Department. I believe the following is the minimum which can be expected of you in this case.

1. That you demand that Acheson give you and the proper congressional committee the names and a complete report on all of those who were placed in the Department by Alger Hiss, and all of those still working in the State Department who were listed by your board as bad security risks because of their communistic connections.

2. That you promptly revoke the order in which you provided under no circumstances could a congressional committee obtain any information or help in exposing Communists.

Failure on your part will label the Democratic Party of being the bedfellow of international communism. Certainly this label is not deserved by the hundreds of thousands of loyal American Democrats throughout the Nation, and by the sizable number of able loyal Democrats in both the Senate and the House.

Mr. President, the only answer I have received to this telegram was the statement by the President at his press conference to the effect that there was not a word of truth in the telegram.

Subsequently, the Democratic leader of the Senate—at least, the alleged leader—made a speech in Chicago in which he repeated substantially what the President said, except that he went one step further and stated:

If I had said the nasty things that McCARTHY has about the State Department, I would be ashamed all my life.

He also said there was not a word of truth in my charge. I think it is unfortunate, not because I am concerned with what the senior Senator from Illinois happens to think, but because he occupies such an important position. I believe, if we are going to root out the fifth column in the State Department, we should have the wholehearted cooperation of both Democrats and Republicans—

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. Wait until I finish. If the Senator will stay with me for the next few hours he will learn a great many facts. I have never refused to yield to any Senator, and I do not intend to refuse. The Senator from Illinois will have full time in which to answer any question he wishes to ask, but let me first finish my sentence.

I started to say that I think it is especially bad because it indicates a preconceived decision not to work with us in attempting to ferret out Communists. I do not feel that the Democratic Party has control of the executive branch of the Government any more. If it had, with the very able Members on the other side of the aisle, we would not find the picture which I intend to disclose. I think a group of twisted-thinking intellectuals have taken over the Democrat Party.

I shall be glad now to yield to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I should like to say to the Senator that there is no one in the Senate or in the country who is any more opposed to Communist domination of any nation or Communist infiltration into any country than is the Senator from Illinois. What I am asking the Senator to do—and I hope he will do it, and the country wants him to do it—is to follow through with the speech which he made in Wheeling, W. Va., in which he stated more than 200 persons working in the State Department were known to the Secretary of State to be members of the Communist Party. If the Senator made that statement—and that is what has been reported—I want him to name those Communists. If there are card-carrying Communists in the State Department, the Senator from Illinois will go along with the Senator from Wisconsin in any way possible to remove those Communists from the rolls.

The Senator does not have to do as he did in Salt Lake City and say, "I am not charging these four people with being Communists." The Senator is privileged to name them all in the Senate, and if those people are not Communists he will be protected. That is all I want the Senator to do. If the Senator names those 205 card-carrying Communists, and he proves to be right, the Senator from Illinois will apologize for anything he has said about the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. McCARTHY. I wish to thank the distinguished Senator from Illinois for his views, but I should like to assure him that I will not say anything on the Senate floor which I will not say off the floor. On the day when I take advantage of the security we have on the Senate floor, on that day I will resign from the Senate. Anything I say on the floor of the Senate at any time will be repeated off the floor.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. Not until I have finished answering the question of the Senator from Illinois. The Senator called my attention to something, and I am glad he did; otherwise I might have overlooked it. Incidentally, the speech in Reno, Nev., and that in Wheeling, W. Va., were recorded, so there is no question about what I said. I do not believe I mentioned the figure 205. I believe I said "over 200." The President said, "It is just a lie. There is nothing to it."

I have before me a letter which was reproduced in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on August 1, 1946, at page A4892. It is a letter from James F. Byrnes, former Secretary of State. It deals with the screening of the first group, of about 3,000. There were a great number of subsequent screenings. This was the beginning.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. Please let me finish. The Senator will have all the time in the world to ask questions, and I shall be very glad to yield to the Senator for that purpose, and he can even make short speeches and take all the time he wants.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, the Senator from Illinois—

Mr. McCARTHY. I do not yield at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin declines to yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. The letter deals with the first group of 3,000 which was screened. The President—and I think wisely so—set up a board to screen the employees who were coming to the State Department from the various war agencies of the War Department. There were thousands of unusual characters in some of those war agencies. Former Secretary Byrnes in his letter, which is reproduced in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, says this:

Pursuant to Executive order, approximately 4,000 employees have been transferred to the Department of State from various war agencies such as the OSS, FEA, OWI, OIAA, and so forth. Of these 4,000 employees, the case histories of approximately 3,000 have been subjected to a preliminary examination, as a result of which a recommendation against permanent employment has been made in 285 cases by the screening committee to which you refer in your letter.

In other words, former Secretary Byrnes said that 285 of those men are unsafe risks. He goes on to say that of this number only 79 have been removed. Of the 57 I mentioned some are from this group of 205, and some are from subsequent groups which have been screened but not discharged.

I might say in that connection that the investigative agency of the State Department has done an excellent job. The files show that they went into great detail in labeling Communists as such. The only trouble is that after the investigative agency had properly labeled these men as Communists the State Department refused to discharge them. I shall give detailed cases.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President—

Mr. McCARTHY. As to the 57 whose names the Senator is demanding, if he will be patient and sit down—

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, in view of the statements made, the Senator should yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. I shall yield at this time only for a question. I shall not yield for any lengthy speeches by the Senator from Illinois. If he wishes to ask a question, I shall be glad to answer it.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, did the Senator say at Wheeling, W. Va., last Thursday night that 205 persons working for the State Department were known by the Secretary of State to be members of the Communist Party, or words to that effect? Did he call the attention of the country to the fact that 205 men in the

State Department were card-carrying Communists? Did the Senator say that? That is what I should like to know.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent at this time to insert in the RECORD a copy of the speech which I made at Wheeling, W. Va.

Mr. LUCAS. Cannot the Senator answer "Yes" or "No"?

Mr. McCARTHY. I will ask the Senator please not to interrupt me. I will yield to him later. I will give him all the chance in the world.

Mr. LUCAS. I asked the Senator a very simple question.

Mr. McCARTHY. I ask at this time unanimous consent to be allowed to insert in the RECORD a copy of the speech which I made at Wheeling, W. Va., and at Reno, Nev. It was the same speech.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I object.

Mr. McCARTHY. In that case I shall read the speech into the RECORD.

Mr. LUCAS. We want to hear it.

Mr. McCARTHY. The speech reads:

Ladies and gentlemen, tonight as we celebrate the one hundred and forty-first birthday of one of the greatest men in American history, I would like to be able to talk about what a glorious day today is in the history of the world. As we celebrate the birth of this man who with his whole heart and soul hated war, I would like to be able to speak of peace in our time, of war being outlawed, and of world-wide disarmament. These would be truly appropriate things to be able to mention as we celebrate the birthday of Abraham Lincoln.

I hope the Senator from Illinois will stay for this.

Mr. LUCAS. I shall be right here. I am coming over to the Republican side of the aisle so that I will not miss anything.

Mr. McCARTHY. I am sure the Senator will not miss anything.

The speech proceeded:

Five years after a world war has been won, men's hearts should anticipate a long peace, and men's minds should be free from the heavy weight that comes with war. But this is not such a period—for this is not a period of peace. This is a time of the "cold war." This is a time when all the world is split into two vast, increasingly hostile armed camps—a time of a great armaments race.

Today we can almost physically hear the mutterings and rumblings of an invigorated god of war. You can see it, feel it, and hear it all the way from the hills of Indochina, from the shores of Formosa, right over into the very heart of Europe itself.

The one encouraging thing is that the "mad moment" has not yet arrived for the firing of the gun or the exploding of the bomb

which will set civilization about the final task of destroying itself. There is still a hope for peace if we finally decide that no longer can we safely blind our eyes and close our ears to those facts which are shaping up more and more clearly. And that is that we are now engaged in a show-down fight—not the usual war between nations for land areas or other material gains, but a war between two diametrically opposed ideologies.

The great difference between our western Christian world and the atheistic Communist world is not political, ladies and gentlemen, it is moral. There are other differences, of course, but those could be reconciled. For instance, the Marxian idea of confiscating the land and factories and running the entire economy as a single enterprise is momentous. Likewise, Lenin's invention of the one-party police state as a way to make Marx's idea work is hardly less momentous.

Stalin's resolute putting across of these two ideas, of course, did much to divide the world. With only those differences, however, the East and the West could most certainly still live in peace.

The real, basic difference, however, lies in the religion of immoralism—invented by Marx, preached feverishly by Lenin, and carried to unimaginable extremes by Stalin. This religion of immoralism, if the Red half of the world wins—and well it may—this religion of immoralism will more deeply wound and damage mankind than any conceivable economic or political system.

Karl Marx dismissed God as a hoax, and Lenin and Stalin have added in clear-cut, unmistakable language their resolve that no nation, no people who believe in a God, can exist side by side with their communistic state.

Karl Marx, for example, expelled people from his Communist Party for mentioning such things as justice, humanity, or morality. He called this soulful ravings and sloppily sentimentality.

While Lincoln was a relatively young man in his late thirties, Karl Marx boasted that the Communist specter was haunting Europe. Since that time, hundreds of millions of people and vast areas of the world have fallen under Communist domination. Today, less than 100 years after Lincoln's death, Stalin brags that this Communist specter is not only haunting the world, but is about to completely subjugate it.

Today we are engaged in a final, all-out battle between communistic atheism and Christianity. The modern champions of communism have selected this as the time. And, ladies and gentlemen, the chips are down—they are truly down.

I might say for the benefit of the Senator from Illinois that what I am reading was taken from a recording of the speech. I did not use a written speech that night. I continue the reading:

Lest there be any doubt that the time has been chosen, let us go directly to the leader of communism today—Joseph Stalin. Here is what he said—not back in 1928, not before the war, not during the war—but 2 years after the last war was ended: "To think that the Communist revolution can be carried out peacefully, within the framework of a Christian democracy, means one has either gone out of one's mind and lost all normal understanding, or has grossly and openly repudiated the Communist revolution."

And this is what was said by Lenin in 1919, which was also quoted with approval by Stalin in 1947:

"We are living," said Lenin, "not merely in a state, but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with Christian states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable."

Ladies and gentlemen, can there be anyone here tonight who is so blind as to say that the war is not on? Can there be anyone who fails to realize that the Communist world has said, "The time is now"—that this is the time for the show-down between the democratic Christian world and the Communist atheistic world?

Unless we face this fact, we shall pay the price that must be paid by those who wait too long.

Six years ago, at the time of the first conference to map out the peace—Dumbarton Oaks—there was within the Soviet orbit 180,000,000 people. Lined up on the antitotalitarian side there were in the world at that time roughly 1,625,000,000 people. Today, only 6 years later, there are 800,000,000 people under the absolute domination of Soviet Russia—an increase of over 400 percent. On our side, the figure has shrunk to around 500,000,000. In other words, in less than 6 years the odds have changed from 9 to 1 in our favor to 8 to 5 against us. This indicates the swiftness of the tempo of Communist victories and American defeats in the cold war. As one of our outstanding historical figures once said, "When a great democracy is destroyed, it will not be because of enemies from without, but rather because of enemies from within."

The truth of this statement is becoming terrifyingly clear as we see this country each day losing on every front.

At war's end we were physically the strongest nation on earth and, at least potentially, the most powerful intellectually and morally. Ours could have been the honor of being a beacon in the desert of destruction, a shining living proof that civilization was not yet ready to destroy itself. Unfortunately, we have failed miserably and tragically to arise to the opportunity.

The reason why we find ourselves in a position of impotency is not because our only powerful potential enemy has sent men to invade our shores, but rather because of the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so well by this Nation. It has not been the less fortunate or members of minority groups who have been selling this Nation out, but rather those who have had all the benefits that the wealthiest nation on earth has had to offer—the finest homes, the finest college education, and the finest jobs in Government we can give.

This is glaringly true in the State Department. There the bright young men who are born with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who have been worst.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. LODGE. I should like to say to the Senator from Wisconsin that I am interested in what he is saying, both as a Senator and as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. When the Senator casts doubt on the personnel of the State Department that, of course, is something which interests me very especially. I not only feel that there should be no Communists in the State Department, but that there should be nobody in the State Department who is not affirmatively, enthusiastically loyal to the United States and what it stands for. Therefore I say to the Senator from Wisconsin now that so far as the junior Senator from Massachusetts is concerned, he will at the earliest appropriate opportunity make a motion to have a subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee take up every single one of the accusations which the Senator from Wisconsin makes.

Mr. McCARTHY. I was hoping the Senator would.

Mr. LODGE. I make that statement at this point, when the Senator from Wisconsin is beginning to speak about the State Department, because I think that I for one have a special responsibility in that field.

Mr. McCARTHY. In case the Senator from Massachusetts is not able to remain and listen to all of my remarks—

Mr. LODGE. I cannot remain and listen to the whole of the Senator's speech, because I have another engagement, but I shall read it all in the morning with the utmost care.

Mr. McCARTHY. In case the Senator must leave—and I say it will take me a long time to conclude, if I continue to have the interruptions I have previously

had—I should like to call attention to three of the cases which I intend to cite: Case No. 1, case No. 2, and case No. 81. Those, I think, represent the big three. While there are vast numbers of other Communists with whom we must be concerned, if we can get rid of those big three we will have done something to break the back of the espionage ring within the State Department.

I might say also, in case the Senator will not be present to hear me, that in giving the records I have been very careful about doing two things: No. 1, not to cite anything which has not been confirmed by the intelligence agencies which have been investigating these men; and No. 2—and this I think is very important—I have tried, and I hope successfully, to red-pencil anything that might be embarrassing to any investigating agency. I know it is easy to call for files, and when I call for a loyalty file I do not mean that I am calling for the source of information. I do not think any intelligence agency can work and do a good job if the Senate or the House, or any other body is entitled to make public the source of the information. The files which I have here show the source of the information. I contacted one of the Federal intelligence agencies, one of the investigative units. I asked them if they would care to go over what I planned to say before I said it, and red-pencil anything which they thought might in any way divulge the source of information, that would in any way inform the Communist spy ring of the information they have. The answer was, "Well, you have gotten all of it from the State Department files, and the Communists within the Department can see those files, and I will show you which Commies have the top-secret clearance, so if they have seen it, it does not do much damage for the Senate to see them."

Mr. LODGE. Let me say to the Senator from Wisconsin that I am not undertaking to say whether he is right or wrong. I have no way of knowing that. What I say is that the matter he is discussing is of such vital importance that I think it ought to be investigated by a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I say with my whole heart, I hope I am wrong. There is nothing as disturbing as is this picture. But if I am wrong, I

shall be very happy indeed to know that I am.

Mr. LODGE. I say to the Senator that I shall do all I can to leave no stone unturned to get to the bottom of the matter.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I cannot yield any further.

Mr. LUCAS. Perhaps I can save some time. The Senator from Wisconsin in his discussion with the Senator from Massachusetts said that he had a long speech and had to read it. If the Senator will answer my question, perhaps we can save some time.

Mr. McCARTHY. I cannot yield at this time for the Senator's question. I cannot yield for that purpose until I complete the speech.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the Senator from Nebraska if I do not lose the floor thereby.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator may yield to me without losing the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I do not want to interrupt the proceedings. I am perfectly willing to cooperate with the majority leader in every way. But when I look around the Senate Chamber I see only two or three Senators on the other side of the aisle, and half a dozen on this side of the aisle. The matter seems to me to be of such importance—

Mr. LUCAS. The Senator from Nebraska and I are present.

Mr. WHERRY. Yes; but I believe more Senators should be present. I believe more Senators should be on the floor to hear this statement. I do not want to interfere with the majority leader's program, but I ask him if we cannot take a recess at this time, or, if necessary, have a quorum call to bring Senators back to the Senate Chamber so they can hear the speech being made by the Senator from Wisconsin. It seems to me the only sensible thing to do at this time is to take a recess or have a quorum call.

Mr. LUCAS. As I look around the Senate Chamber I see about as many Senators present as I usually see present when a speech is being made. Last Friday we discussed the creation of a Small-Busi-

ness Committee all afternoon, and at times only 3 Senators were present. The resolution then before the Senate was a very important one. I believe there are perhaps 25 or 30 Senators now present. That is as many as would remain after we have a quorum call.

Mr. WHERRY. Very well, if the Senator from Illinois feels that way.

Mr. LUCAS. I am perfectly satisfied to sit here and listen.

Mr. WHERRY. Perhaps the majority leader is, but I say that a very important speech is being made. Terrific challenges are being hurled. I am perfectly willing to stay until 9 o'clock, but I submit to the majority leader that I feel more Senators ought to be on the floor if the Senator from Wisconsin is going to proceed with his speech.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for the purpose of suggesting the absence of a quorum?

Mr. McCARTHY. If that is done I do not think we will obtain a quorum, and I will be obliged to discontinue. I should like to read some more of my speech.

Mr. President, at this time I ask unanimous consent that we proceed until 7 o'clock without having a quorum call, and at that time the Senate adjourn until 11 o'clock tomorrow, and that then I may have the floor.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, let me say that what has now been suggested is what is often suggested under similar circumstances. Let me remind the Senate that on the request of certain Democratic and Republican Members I made the announcement that there would be no vote tonight on the important measure which is now pending, the cotton-potato measure. Consequently many Senators have gone home. Now the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY], the minority leader, and others, do not want the Senator from Wisconsin to continue. They want a quorum call. The Senator from Wisconsin now asks that he be allowed to quit at 7 o'clock. If the speech is one which is going to electrify the Nation, I should think the Senator from Wisconsin would desire to get it off his chest as fast as he possibly can, and not wait until tomorrow, because tomorrow the Senator will have no larger audience than he has at the present time. I should like to say to the Senator from Wisconsin that if the statement he is about to make is as important as he says

it is, and if he can prove what he says he is going to prove, he will find the Senator from Illinois making the same demand that the Senator from Massachusetts made, which is a thorough and complete investigation with respect to all the Communists he is going to name. I want to remain here until he names them. That is what I am interested in. The newspaper reporters and the people of the country generally are demanding to know who these 207 or 201 Communists are.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I will not yield any further.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield in order to straighten out the record respecting the program for tomorrow?

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I call the Senator's attention to the fact that we already have a special order that the Senate will meet at 11 o'clock tomorrow morning under a unanimous-consent agreement, with the time for a vote having been set. Therefore it would not be possible for the Senator to continue his speech as of 11 o'clock tomorrow.

Mr. McCARTHY. Very well. I will withhold yielding for a call of a quorum for the time being, if the Senator does not mind.

Mr. President, I continue to read from my speech:

Now I know it is very easy for anyone to condemn a particular bureau or department in general terms. Therefore, I would like to cite one rather unusual case—the case of a man who has done much to shape our foreign policy.

When Chiang Kai-shek was fighting our war, the State Department had in China a young man named John S. Service. His task, obviously, was not to work for the communization of China. Strangely, however, he sent official reports back to the State Department urging that we torpedo our ally Chiang Kai-shek and stating, in effect, that communism was the best hope for China.

Later, this man—John Service—was picked up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for turning over to the Communists secret State Department information. Strangely, however, he was never prosecuted. However, Joseph Grew, the Under Secretary of State, who insisted on his prosecution, was forced to resign. Two days after Grew's successor, Dean Acheson, took over as Under Secretary of State, this man—John Service—who had been picked up by the FBI and who had previously urged that communism was the best hope of China, was not only reinstated in the State Department but pro-

moted. And finally, under Acheson, placed in charge of all placements and promotions.

Today, ladies and gentlemen, this man Service is on his way to represent the State Department and Acheson in Calcutta—by far and away the most important listening post in the Far East.

Now, let's see what happens when individuals with Communist connections are forced out of the State Department. Gustavo Duran, who was labeled as (I quote) "a notorious international Communist," was made assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin American affairs. He was taken into the State Department from his job as a lieutenant colonel in the Communist International Brigade. Finally, after intense congressional pressure and criticism, he resigned in 1946 from the State Department—and, ladies and gentlemen, where do you think he is now? He took over a high-salaried job as Chief of Cultural Activities Section in the office of the Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations.

Mr. President, I call the attention of the Senator from Illinois to the fact—especially in view of the comment he recently made—that I did not list John Service as one of the 57. Perhaps I could have, but I have listed only persons whose files were available to me. For some unknown reason, John Service's file has disappeared in the State Department. I have tried to find where it is, and I have been told that it is in the office—quoting the individual over there—"of the top brass." So I have not listed Service, and that is the sole reason why I have not. I have listed only individuals whose records have been confirmed by the President's own investigative agency.

The Senator from Illinois will also note that I have not named any of the 57. I have named or will name four individuals, and I have given or will give their records. One is John Service. I have shown what influence he has had in the Far East. I have not reached the second one yet; but I am now discussing what happens when those with communistic connections are forced out of the State Department, and in a short time I shall reach the fourth one.

I read further from my speech:

Then there was a Mrs. Mary Jane Kenny, from the Board of Economic Warfare in the State Department, who was named in an FBI report and in a House committee report as a courier for the Communist Party while working for the Government. And where do you think Mrs. Kenny is—she is now an editor in the United Nations Document Bureau. Another interesting case was that of Julian H. Wadleigh, economist in the Trade Agree-

ments Section of the State Department for 11 years and was sent to Turkey and Italy and other countries as United States representative. After the statute of limitations had run so he could not be prosecuted for treason, he openly and brazenly not only admitted but proclaimed that he had been a member of the Communist Party, that while working for the State Department he stole a vast number of secret documents, and furnished these documents to the Russian spy ring of which he was a part.

You will recall last spring there was held in New York what was known as the World Peace Conference—a conference which was labeled by the State Department and Mr. Truman as the sounding board for Communist propaganda and a front for Russia. Dr. Harlow Shapley was the chairman of that conference. Interestingly enough, according to the new release put out by the Department in July, the Secretary of State appointed Shapley on a commission which acts as liaison between UNESCO and the State Department.

That is the man who headed the conference which the Secretary of State said was a tool of Communist Russia, a sounding board of Communist propaganda. Again, that man was not named as one of the 57, but he might well have been.

I read further:

This, ladies and gentlemen, gives you somewhat of a picture of the type of individuals who have been helping to shape our foreign policy. In my opinion the State Department, which is one of the most important government departments, is thoroughly infested with Communists.

I have in my hand 57 cases of individuals who would appear to be either card carrying members or certainly loyal to the Communist Party, but who nevertheless are still helping to shape our foreign policy.

One thing to remember in discussing the Communists in our Government is that we are not dealing with spies who get 30 pieces of silver to steal the blueprints of a new weapon. We are dealing with a far more sinister type of activity because it permits the enemy to guide and shape our policy.

In that connection, I would like to read to you very briefly from the testimony of Larry E. Kerley, a man who was with the counter espionage section of the FBI for 8 years. And keep in mind as I read this to you that at the time he is speaking, there was in the State Department Alger Hiss, the convicted Alger Hiss; John Service, the man whom the FBI picked up for espionage—

And for turning over secret documents—

Julian Wadleigh, who brazenly admitted he was a spy and wrote newspaper articles in regard thereto, plus hundreds of other bad security risks.

The FBI, I may add, has done an outstanding job, as all persons in Washington, Democrats and Republicans alike, agree. If J. Edgar Hoover had a free hand, we would not be plagued by Hisses and Wadleighs in high positions of power in the State Department. The FBI has only power to investigate.

Here is what the FBI man said.

Mr. President, let me point out solely for the Record something which I know Senators are well aware of, but something which causes confusion in the minds of many persons throughout the United States, namely, that the FBI has no power other than to investigate. People often write to Senators, and say in their letters, "With a man like J. Edgar Hoover at the head of the FBI, how is it that this situation exists?" For their benefit I think it should be stated that the FBI has no power whatever except to dig up facts and report them to the Department of Justice or other executive agencies.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. On that point, let me inquire whether it is also true that the Secretary of State has the sole power to discharge, without trial, anyone in the State Department whom he thinks might be disloyal.

Mr. McCARTHY. I so understand—under the McCarran amendment.

Mr. FERGUSON. Yes, under the McCarran Act.

Mr. McCARTHY. I so understand; and I understand that it applies both to employees of the State Department and to civil-service employees.

Mr. FERGUSON. So it is not necessary for a trial to be held in such cases, but the Secretary of State has full power to discharge, and that power was given to him in 1946; was it not?

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes; and I intend to call attention to it.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at this point?

Mr. McCARTHY. Not until I finish reading this statement. I shall be glad, when I finish reading it, to yield to the Senator.

I read further from the statement, reading what was said by the FBI man:

In accordance with instructions of the State Department to the FBI, the FBI was not even permitted to open an espionage case against any Russia suspect without State Department approval.

Incidentally, Mr. President, this was testimony given at a hearing of a Senate subcommittee, headed by the Senator from Maryland [Mr. O'Conor].

I read further:

Mr. ARENS. Did the State Department ever withhold from the Justice Department the right to intern suspects?

Mr. KERLEY. They withheld the right to get out process for them which, in effect, kept them from being arrested, as in the case of Schevchenko and others.

Mr. ARENS. In how many instances did the State Department decline to permit process to be served on Soviet agents?

Mr. KERLEY. Do you mean how many Soviet agents were affected?

Mr. ARENS. Yes.

Mr. KERLEY. That would be difficult to say because there were so many people connected in one espionage ring, whether or not they were directly conspiring with the ring.

Mr. ARENS. Was that order applicable to all persons?

Mr. KERLEY. Yes; all persons in the Soviet-espionage organization.

Mr. ARENS. What did you say the order was as you understood it or as it came to you?

Mr. KERLEY. That no arrests of any suspects in the Russian-espionage activities in the United States were to be made without the prior approval of the State Department.

That means the prior approval of the Alger Hisses and the Wadleighs in the State Department.

I read further:

Now the reason for the State Department's opposition to arresting any of this spy ring is made rather clear in the next question and answer.

"Senator O'Conor. Did you understand that that was to include also American participants?"

"Mr. KERLEY. Yes; because if they were arrested that would disclose the whole apparatus, you see."

Meaning the whole apparatus both inside and outside the State Department.

I read further:

In other words they could not afford to let the whole ring which extended into the State Department be exposed.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. Not at this time. The Senator has insisted that I read this statement, and I shall read all of it before I yield.

I now read further:

This brings us down to the case of one Alger Hiss who is important not as an individual any more, but rather because he is so representative of a group in the State

Department. It is unnecessary to go over the sordid events showing how he sold out the Nation which had given him so much. Those are rather fresh in all of our minds.

However, it should be remembered that the facts in regard to his connection with this international Communist spy ring were made known to the then Under Secretary of State Berle 3 days after Hitler and Stalin signed the Russo-German alliance pact. At that time one Whittaker Chambers—who was also part of the spy ring—apparently decided that with Russia on Hitler's side, he could no longer betray our Nation to Russia. He gave Under Secretary of State Berle—and this is all a matter of record—practically all, if not more, of the facts upon which Hiss' conviction was based.

Under Secretary Berle promptly contacted Dean Acheson and received word in return that Acheson (and I quote) "could vouch for Hiss absolutely"—at which time the matter was dropped. And this, you understand, was at a time when Russia was an ally of Germany. This condition existed while Russia and Germany were invading and dismembering Poland, and while the Communist groups here were screaming "war monger" at the United States for their support of the allied nations.

Again in 1943, the FBI had occasion to investigate the facts surrounding Hiss' contacts with the Russian spy ring. But even after that FBI report was submitted, nothing was done.

Then late in 1948—on August 5—when the Un-American Activities Committee called Alger Hiss to give an accounting, President Truman at once issued a Presidential directive ordering all Government agencies to refuse to turn over any information whatsoever in regard to the Communist activities of any Government employee to a congressional committee.

Incidentally, even after Hiss was convicted—

The statement should have been "even after Hiss was indicted"—

it is interesting to note that the President still labeled the exposé of Hiss as a "red herring."

If time permitted, it might be well to go into detail about the fact that Hiss was Roosevelt's chief adviser at Yalta when Roosevelt was admittedly in ill health and tired physically and mentally, and when, according to the Secretary of State, Hiss and Gromyko drafted the report on the conference.

That is not entirely correct; actually the report on the conference was drafted by Hiss, Gromyko, and an Englishman whose name I cannot now recall.

Mr. MUNDT. It was Gladwyn Jebb.  
Mr. McCARTHY. That is what I understood the Senator to say previously.

I read further:

According to the then Secretary of State Stettinius, here are some of the things that Hiss helped to decide at Yalta. (1) The establishment of a European High Commission; (2) the treatment of Germany—this you will recall was the conference at which it was decided that we would occupy Berlin with Russia occupying an area completely circling the city, which, as you know, resulted in the Berlin airlift which cost 31 American lives; (3) the Polish question; (4) the relationship between UNRRA and the Soviet; (5) the rights of Americans on control commissions of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary; (6) Iran; (7) China—here's where we gave away Manchuria; (8) Turkish Straits question; (9) international trusteeships; (10) Korea.

Of the results of this conference, Arthur Bliss Lane of the State Department had this to say: "As I glanced over the document, I could not believe my eyes. To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."

As you hear this story of high treason, I know that you are saying to yourself, "Well, why doesn't the Congress do something about it?" Actually, ladies and gentlemen, one of the important reasons for the graft, the corruption, the dishonesty, the disloyalty, the treason in high Government positions—one of the most important reasons why this continues is a lack of moral uprising on the part of the 140,000,000 American people. In the light of history, however, this is not hard to explain.

It is the result of an emotional hang-over and a temporary moral lapse which follows every war. It is the apathy to evil which people who have been subjected to the tremendous evils of war feel. As the people of the world see mass murder, the destruction of defenseless and innocent people, and all of the crime and lack of morals which go with war, they become numb and apathetic. It has always been thus after war.

However, the morals of our people have not been destroyed. They still exist. This cloak of numbness and apathy has only needed a spark to rekindle them. Happily, this spark has finally been supplied.

As you know, very recently the Secretary of State proclaimed his loyalty to a man guilty of what has always been considered as the most abominable of all crimes—of being a traitor to the people who gave him a position of great trust. The Secretary of State in attempting to justify his continued devotion to the man who sold out the Christian world to the atheistic world, referred to Christ's Sermon on the Mount as a justification and reason therefor, and the reaction of the American people to this would have made the heart of Abraham Lincoln happy.

When this pompous diplomat in striped pants, with a phony British accent, proclaimed to the American people that Christ on the Mount endorsed communism, high

treason, and betrayal of a sacred trust, the blasphemy was so great that it awakened the dormant indignation of the American people.

He has lighted the spark which is resulting in a moral uprising and will end only when the whole sorry mess of twisted, warped thinkers are swept from the national scene so that we may have a new birth of national honesty and decency in Government.

Mr. President, that answers the question of the Senator from Illinois as to the number of Communists I stated were in the State Department. I have stated I have the names of 57. Let me make it clear that I do not claim to know all the Communists in the State Department. I do not have any counter-espionage group that can go there and ferret out all the information. I have also pointed out that the State Department refused to discharge—and so stated in a press conference—205 individuals who, its own security agency said, were unsafe risks. If the Senator has any further questions, I shall be glad to yield.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. LUCAS. I now repeat the same question I asked the able Senator in the beginning: Did the Senator from Wisconsin, in a speech at Wheeling, W. Va., Thursday, February 9, declare that he had a list of 205 persons working for the State Department, who were known by the Secretary of State to be members of the Communist Party?

Mr. McCARTHY. I may say, if the Senator is going to make a farce of this, I will not yield to him.

Mr. LUCAS. No.

Mr. McCARTHY. I told him three times. I read the speech to him. I told him I said there were 57 Communists in the State Department. I told him there were in the State Department 205, who, according to the President's own Security Board, are unsafe risks. They said, "Mr. Secretary, fire these men. Discharge them." He refused to do it. I quoted Secretary Byrnes' letter, telling him to do that. I shall not answer any more silly questions of the Senator. This is too important, too serious a matter for that. I am trying to get down to the point of showing the Senate cases, facts, and dates, so that the President will admit that he was wrong, and I hope the Senator from Illinois will admit that he went off half-cocked in Illinois the other day when he said, as the President said,

this is all lies, and tried to prejudge the case.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I will be glad to yield for a question.

Mr. LUCAS. This is pretty serious to the Senator from Illinois, and it is serious to the Senate, and it is serious to the country. The only thing I am asking the able Senator is whether the newspapers misquoted him. The newspapers quoted him, and there is an editorial in the Washington Post, which is libelous if not true, in which the Senator is quoted in his speech at Wheeling, W. Va., as saying that he had a list of 205 persons working for the State Department who were carrying Communist cards. What I want to know is merely one simple thing. I did not find anything in the speech to bear out what the newspaper reported to be true. The Senator keeps talking about 57; the newspaper says the Senator said there were 205. That represents quite a difference, and it is of importance, whether the Senator from Wisconsin made the statement or did not make it. He can answer yes or no to that. He may say that in his speech he did not make that statement; he may have made it in a conference of some kind. But it was carried all over the country, through the Washington newspapers, the New York newspapers, and the Chicago newspapers, that the Senator said he could name the 205 who were carrying Communist cards. It may be a silly question in the eyes of the Senator from Wisconsin, and that, as he said, I am trying to make a farce out of this thing, but it is a serious charge; the Senate and the country are entitled to know the facts.

Mr. McCARTHY. May I answer the Senator's question?

Mr. LUCAS. It is serious to me.

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me answer the Senator's question, for the third time. I will tell the Senator, and I am now repeating it, if the Senator will sit down and give me the time to do it, that there are at least 57 Communists in the State Department. I think, without any trouble at all, with sufficient investigation, we can find the 205 for the Senator. As to what the Washington Post says, I do not know, and I frankly do not care. I think that is clear. I will not answer the Senator a fourth time. I said that I made speeches. I have said there were 57

Communists in the State Department. I wired the President to that effect.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am not yielding to the Senator now. I have wired the President to that effect, and I told him those names were available to him. I am now going to give the Senate of the United States the facts, and I refuse to go further into the question raised by the Senator from Illinois. Let me tell him now, so there may be no question in his mind, I said 57 Communists were in the State Department. I said there were 205 in the State Department whom the Secretary of State refused to discharge, although his loyalty board said, "Discharge those men." Now, is that clear to the Senator?

Mr. LUCAS. If that is what the Senator is saying, I can understand; but what I am trying to find out is whether newspapers have deliberately distorted what the able Senator said in his speech.

Mr. McCARTHY. I refuse to yield further to the Senator.

Mr. LUCAS. I want to find out.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McCARTHY. For a question, certainly.

Mr. LEHMAN. Do I correctly understand the Senator to claim he has submitted the names of the 57 cases to which he refers and the 205 names which are referred to, not only in the Washington Post but in a number of other newspapers, to the State Department? Does he claim he has submitted the names of 57 and 205, or any substantial number?

Mr. McCARTHY. The answer to the Senator is, "No." The answer is "No."

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. Does not the Senator believe that, interested as he is in combatting communism, and we are all interested in combatting communism, that it is his duty both as a Senator of the United States and as an American to submit those names to the State Department or to the Senate, in executive session?

Mr. McCARTHY. If the Senator will but sit down and let me make my report to the Senate, he will have all the information he wants. The Senator from Wisconsin does not need any advice on his duty as a Senator, in this respect.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one question?

Mr. McCARTHY. No, not now; not until I give some of the information the Senator is asking for, I will not yield for another 15 or 20 minutes, until I can get down to the information which I am trying to give the Senate. I will not yield any further.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I demand the regular order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin will proceed.

Mr. LUCAS. I beg the Senator's pardon.

Mr. McCARTHY. I shall be glad to yield later to the Senator.

Mr. President, I am going to have difficulty talking, while the Senators are chatting.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Let there be order in the Chamber.

Mr. McCARTHY. I shall be glad to yield for 5 or 10 minutes to let the Senators carry on their conversation.

Mr. President, I have before me information from the State Department files, information which the President says the Senate did not have. Having this information, it is a serious question as to what should be done with it. I originally thought possibly we could hope for some cooperation from the State Department and the President. However, in going over the material and finding that all of it, of course, has been available to the State Department, for it is all from their files, it seemed that nothing would be gained by calling it to their attention again. The President, I felt, had demonstrated his lack of interest quite thoroughly during all the Hiss investigation. Then, when I sent him a telegram and said, "Mr. President, I have the 57 names; they are yours if you want them"; and when he answered by calling me a liar, I felt I could get no cooperation from the President.

Then, when the majority leader, without even discussing the matter with me, though he knew I had stated that I had the information, made a speech in Illinois and prejudged the case without hearing the evidence, and said, "The Senator from Wisconsin is a liar," I felt I could get no cooperation from the majority leader. It was then suggested that I ask the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments to go into the matter and that I submit the names to that committee. I talked to some of the

members of the committee. They thought perhaps the Committee on the Judiciary or the Committee on Foreign Relations, or both committees jointly might have jurisdiction, and they thought it should be discussed with them.

I discussed it with a number of the individuals who have been interested in the subject, digging up this information. They felt that under the present circumstances the committee could do very little, because, if we gave the committee the names and the information, and the President said, "You cannot get any information from the State Department files," they would be hamstrung. It was suggested that I draft a resolution providing that the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, or some other committee, should have the right to subpoena the secret State Department files. That sounds all right on the face of it, Mr. President, but it is dangerous to go that far.

As is well known, during the Coplon trial the judge ordered the FBI to submit all its secret files, including the sources of information. That information was made public, and a number of men in the FBI have stated that it set the FBI back 10 years. It endangered the security of some of their best men.

I finally arrived at the conclusion that the only way to clean out the State Department, or any other Department which is infested with Communists, is not by the passage of any additional law. The only way it can be done is to secure the cooperation of the President. If we could get that, and he says that the information will be made available so that trusted staff members could go over the files, and we can be sure that the sources of information shall not be disclosed, we can clean house. I frankly think that is the only way. In line with that, I decided to submit to the Senate the detailed cases. Originally I was disturbed that I might give out information which would embarrass the investigative agencies by indirectly disclosing some of their sources of information, but I was told, "With so many commies over here having top positions, you need not fear giving the information to the Senate."

I have gone over it. Let me say, before starting, that I shall submit quite a large number of names. I think they are of importance. They all worked for the State Department at one time or an-

other. Some are not there at the present time. Many of them have gone into work which is connected closely with the Department, for example, foreign trade, and some branches of the Maritime Commission.

I shall not attempt to present a detailed case on each one, a case which would convince a jury. All I am doing is to develop sufficient evidence so that anyone who reads the RECORD will have a good idea of the number of Communists in the State Department.

While I consider them all important, there are three big Communists involved, and I cannot possibly conceive of any Secretary of State allowing those three big Communists, who are tremendously important and of great value to Russia, to remain in the State Department. I do not believe President Truman knows about them. I cannot help but feel that he is merely the prisoner of a bunch of twisted intellectuals who tell him what they want him to know. To those who say, "Why do you not tell the State Department; why do you not give the names to the State Department?" I say that everything I have here is from the State Department's own files. I felt, when the State Department asked for the names, without being willing to cooperate or to work with us, it was saying, "Tip us off; let us know on whom you have the goods."

Case No. 1. The names are available. The Senators may have them if they care for them. I think however, it would be improper to make the names public until the appropriate Senate committee can meet in executive session and get them. I have approximately 81 cases. I do not claim to have any tremendous investigative agency to get the facts, but if I were to give all the names involved, it might leave a wrong impression. If we should label one man a Communist when he is not a Communist, I think it would be too bad. However, the names are here. I shall be glad to abide by the decision of the Senate after it hears the cases, but I think the sensible thing to do would be to have an executive session and have a proper committee go over the whole situation.

I was very happy to hear the Senator from Massachusetts say that he would move that the Foreign Relations Committee appoint a subcommittee to go into the cases.

The man involved in case No. 1 is employed in the office of an Assistant Secretary of State. The intelligence unit shadowed him and found him contacting members of an espionage group. A memorandum of December 13, 1946, indicates that he succeeded in having a well-known general intervene with an Assistant Secretary in behalf of one man who is an active Communist with a long record of Communist Party connections. There is another individual who is very closely tied up with a Soviet espionage agency. There is nothing in the file to indicate that the general referred to knew those two individuals were Communists.

That is a part of the usual modus operandi. If there is one Communist in the Department, he will get some other individual to recommend another Communist so that the breed can be increased.

This individual was successful in obtaining important positions for other Communists. They were finally ordered removed from the Department not later than November 15 of the following year. Subsequent to that time, however, both of them still had access to secret material.

A memorandum of November 2, 1946, pointed out that this individual and the previously mentioned Communists whom he succeeded in having placed were connected with an alleged Russian espionage agency. Nevertheless, this individual still occupies an important position in the State Department. I should like to point out at this time, however, that the security group, which was then operating in the State Department, was apparently doing a good job. It presented the entire picture to the Secretary of State. This individual who, the investigating agency of the State Department says, is a Communist, got a general innocently to bring two other Communists into the State Department, and he is today in the State Department and has access to the secret material. As I say, his name is certainly available to any Senate committee that wants it.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. LUCAS. Will the Senator tell us the name of the man for the RECORD? We are entitled to know who he is. I say this in all seriousness. The Senate

and the public are entitled to know who that man is, as a result of the charge made by my friend. If he is a Communist, the Senator from Wisconsin knows that the Senator from Illinois will go right along with the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator can come to my office as soon as I finish and receive the names. I intend to go through all the cases. If it is the judgment of the Senate that it wants the names exposed on the Senate floor, which would be a very unusual procedure, I shall be glad to expose them. The question is too important for either the Senator from Illinois or the Senator from Wisconsin to make the decision. If any Senate committee is actually interested in disclosing the names—

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. LANGER. The Committee on the Judiciary has been investigating communism more than half the year. I think the Senator from Wisconsin is entirely correct. We have never made a name public unless we had the consent of J. Edgar Hoover. I, for one, want to be recorded as absolutely agreeing with the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator from North Dakota.

The Senator from Illinois knows there is nothing secret about the names that he cannot have. I do not like this political byplay. If we continue as we have been going, the next war will be lost before we start. I heard a commentator last night say that Russia has 1,200 divisions, and he stated that there were 54,000 troops in Albania, indicating that Russia is about to start the fighting part of the next war.

It is tremendously important that we clean out the espionage ring in our State Department.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. No. I cannot yield at this time.

This is a case to which I particularly invite the Senate's attention. The files show two very interesting facts. A major portion of the file was removed. Papers refer to information in the file which is nonexistent. Upon contact with the keeper of the records, he stated that, to the best of his knowledge, the major portion of the file had been re-

moved. He did not mention any name, but he said, "He was put in some high-brass job about 2 years ago."

I am inclined to think that this individual's name may be known from the information which I shall give here.

The file shows two things. It shows first, that this individual had some of his clothing picked up, with unusual material in it, and, second—and this is important—it shows that the State Department and the President had prepared material which was to be sent to a foreign government. The file shows that before the material left the State Department it was in the hands of the Kremlin in Moscow. Do Senators follow me? The State Department's own investigative file shows that some secret material, which was being transmitted to another nation, before it even left this country for the other country, showed up in Moscow. So far, that is not too significant. However, the file shows that this particular individual, who has held one of the most important positions at one of the listening posts in Europe, was shadowed, that he was found to have contacted a Soviet agent, and that the Soviet agent was then followed to the Soviet Embassy, where the agent turned the material over to the Soviet Embassy. Do Senators follow me? This is what the secret State Department file shows: First, the papers get to Moscow in some mysterious manner, and, second, this individual, who is now one of our foreign ministers, contacts a Russian espionage agent, and that agent is followed to the Russian Embassy, where the material is handed over. This is no secret to the State Department.

Incidentally, I might say that I promised the press I would have copies of this material for their use. However, in view of the fact that I have nothing completely ready at this time, and must refer to the documents before me, which I cannot turn over to the press, I do not have anything to give them. I am sorry. I shall try, however, to give them now the material I have, and shall try to make the dates and places as clear as I can.

Case No. 3. This individual was born in Flushing, N. Y., in 1903. He was employed with OSS in 1942. In 1945 he was transferred to the State Department and assigned to Research and Intelligence. The State Department's file shows that he is a member of a number

of Communist-front organizations, and that his pals are known Communists. The file further shows that this fact is admitted by him. The original report in which this information is contained is dated July 3, 1942. The security report of April 18, 1946, indicates that numerous witnesses, including college professors and police officers in California, testified he was a radical and a fellow traveler. He was very friendly and sympathetic toward Harry Bridges, and strongly opposed any move to deport Bridges. The report also shows that he was also a close friend of Ralph Friedman, secretary of the Communist Party in California. Another security report, dated November 13, 1946, quotes his associates as saying that he favored the Chinese Communists in China and favored Russia in most respects.

The State Department officials themselves, according to this report, describe him as being overly sympathetic to Russia and the "Communist experiment." This is all a part of the report. Another Government official said the individual frequently blamed the capitalists for all the trouble in Russia, and constantly praised Russia as the ideal. So far as I know, everything in this individual's file indicates that he is actively working with and for the Communists.

Case No. 4. The individual came to the United States from Hungary in 1944. He was employed as a translator and script writer for OWI, and later by the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs. The report of January 3, 1947, indicates that he is an active member of a Communist front organization, and that he lost his former job because of his constant arguments in favor of communism. A former employer, according to the file, stated that this individual boasted of being a member of the Communist Party. A third informant also stated that this individual boasted of his Communist connections and argued that communism was superior to democracy. The fourth informant said that he constantly argued politics, and that communism was the ideal system for this country. Two of the references on his application for citizenship were members of at least one Communist-front organization and contributors to Communist periodicals. Another reference refused to recommend him, questioning his loyalty, and saying that he was a Communist. Another ref-

erence, of April 24, 1947, showed that this employee's supervisor in the State Department felt he was a fellow traveler. This individual has been contributing to the Hungarian Communist magazine, N. O. K.

Various memoranda and reports by the State Department security agency in the files indicate that no one was found to question this employee's communistic connection and beliefs.

Case No. 5. This case serves as a very good example of the failure on the part of the State Department to take any action even after conclusive evidence of a person's Communist activity was shown by the State Department's own security agency. He was born in North Carolina in 1900. He was employed by the Foreign Economic Administration from August 1942 to August 1945, and was then transferred to the State Department and placed on Research and Intelligence.

I should like to call attention, Mr. President, to the number of these individuals who succeeded in getting into Research and Intelligence. Research and Intelligence, the Voice of America, and Far Eastern Affairs seem to be the three prime targets.

The report dated May 4, 1946, in this man's file shows that eight persons, including six college professors at Harvard University and the University of California, agreed that this individual has strong communistic leanings, and that in their opinion he was either a member of the Communist Party or a fellow traveler. That is the opinion of six professors at Harvard University and the University of California. Some of the opinions expressed by his associates might well be read.

A professor at the University of California stated that he was acquainted with this individual since September 1937; that he did not trust him; he considered him in the class of Harry Bridges; that under no circumstances would he hire him, and also that there was something about him that aroused his intuition and caused him to be afraid of his outside connections, and under no circumstances would he recommend him to the Government.

A fellow student stated that he had known him since 1939 and that he knew him definitely as a Communist; that he felt that this individual was getting money from the Communist Party, and

the other students did also, because they would say that this individual was not preaching communism for his health, but that it was a business with him; that he would not recommend this individual to the Government because he feels that he is a Communist.

This individual was discharged from a Navy school during the war for bad grades and for Communist activities. A memorandum, dated May 15, 1946, from CSA to the Office of Controls, states that an "investigation discloses evidence of a material nature tending to affect adversely the loyalty to the United States and its institutions." This report reveals that this individual is unmistakably identified with communistic activities. While the records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel show that he was given a special-order discharge in March 27, 1942, under honorable conditions, evidence in his file, all of which is, of course, available to the Secretary of State, reveals that he was discharged because it was found that he was an ardent student of and advocate of communism.

A report dated March 25, 1947, indicates that this individual had been receiving mail from the Soviet Embassy, as well as communistic publications. An official of a Washington, D. C., university stated that he had hired this individual to conduct a class in Chinese, but later learned that he was closely connected with communistic groups on the west coast. Four members of the faculty at the University of California confirmed this individual's communistic leanings. All of the above information was brought to the attention of the top officials in the State Department in a memorandum summarizing the case in 1947, with the recommendation that he be immediately discharged. The State Department refused to discharge him because it was not proven that he had committed any overt act. Subsequent to this time, this individual argued often and heatedly in favor of a Communist regime in China. He admitted having been a subscriber to the Daily Worker.

Let me repeat for the benefit of the Senate, the State Department refused to discharge this individual because he had not been shown to have committed any overt act, despite the fact that the State Department's own security agency had in a report stated that he was unmistakably identified with communistic activities, despite the fact that he had been

discharged from a Navy school because he was an ardent student and advocate of communistic doctrine, despite the fact that he had been receiving mail from the Soviet Embassy, as well as being a subscriber to the Daily Worker; despite the fact that six professors at Harvard and the University of California agreed that he was a "party member or fellow traveler"; despite the fact that a fellow student who knew him well stated that he would not recommend him for a job in the Government because of his communistic activities. This man, the State Department says, must be kept on because he has committed no "overt" act.

The State Department's own Security Board then submitted four subsequent reports, the first one dated September 12, 1947, in an attempt to convince the Department that this man was dangerous and should be discharged. Subsequently this man's position was abolished. However, he was not discharged. Listen to this. His position was abolished, but what happened then? He was transferred to the Division of Research, replacing an employee who, so far as I can learn, had an excellent record, and whose loyalty was in no way questioned. This in spite of the fact that a State Department official who knew him and worked with him in China as well as in this country, said he was—and this is what a State Department official said about this man, whom the Department refused to discharge, whom they shifted over to another job where he bumped another worker—the State Department official said he was mediocre, dull, and incompetent. So his only qualification was his communistic connections. This same State Department official said, "This is the only man in the Government of whom I would speak unfavorably."

Keep in mind that under the McCarran bill, a very wise piece of legislation, the Secretary of State has the absolute unquestioned right to discharge a man of this kind. So the Secretary could have discharged him as first recommended. Four times bluntly they have said, "Get rid of this man." His superior officer says he is dull and incompetent, but for some reason or other he is still kept on.

Another State Department official said that he considered this individual extremely weak as to ability. I believe it is unnecessary to comment on the attitude of the State Department in this

case. Certainly it is an attitude which frightens me and bodes ill for the future of the United States.

Another one is case No. 6. This individual is with the Division of Central Services. A security report dated December 31, 1946, describes her as being "pink" and as advocating that we substitute conditions in Russia for those in the United States. She takes a very active part in the conferences of the UPWA, which has been kicked out by the CIO, actively opposed the President's loyalty order, but has been given top secret clearance. This individual has a right to see all the top secret documents.

Case No. 7. This individual was an associate business economist to August 1944; with FEA from August 1944 to August 1945, and then transferred to the State Department as an economist. This individual is a member of the Young Communist League. He was affiliated with four other organizations which are named by the Attorney General as having been Communist fronts. This individual admits membership in the Young Communists, and in the other Communist-front organizations, but claims to have changed his view since that time, and therefore was given top secret clearance by the State Department. I may say incidentally I am using the pronoun "he" in all these cases, although some of the individuals are not of the male sex.

Case No. 8. This individual was born in New York City in 1918. He was employed as an economist and analyst with the OSS in the State Department from June 1945. Previous to that time he worked for the War Production Board. He was assigned again to Research and Intelligence in the State Department. This man, according to the State Department files, was an active member of a number of Communist-front organizations, was a very close friend of several men who are under suspicion by the FBI of being connected with Russian espionage cases and has two brothers who have been openly working for the Communist Party.

I may say that I know that some of these individuals whose cases I am giving the Senate are no longer in the State Department. A sizable number of them are not. Some of them have transferred to other Government work, work allied with the State Department. Others have been transferred to the United Na-

tions. But I think the cases are important whenever we find that an individual, despite his Communist connections, has been given top-secret clearance. That gives an idea what is going on.

Here is one which I think the Senate will enjoy:

Case No. 9. This individual, after investigation, was not given security clearance by the State Department. After failing to obtain clearance by the State Department he secured a job in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. And where do Senators think that man is today? He is now a speech writer in the White House. That is case No. 9. I will secure a little more information on that case if I may.

So that there may be no question about this, we will refer directly to the investigative file. I think I am doing Mr. Truman a favor by telling him this. I do not think he knows it. I do not think he would have this individual there writing speeches for him if he knew it.

Both the individual referred to and his wife—this is in the file of the investigative agency—are members of Communist-front organizations. He has a relative who has a financial interest in the Daily Worker. But in any event the State Department used good judgment not to clear this individual.

Case No. 10. This individual is in the Biographical Information Division of the State Department. Her husband signed a Communist Party election petition, stating he was a member thereof. She is active in the UPWA. The mere fact that her husband was a Communist may not make her a Communist, but she also has been given top secret clearance.

Case No. 11. This individual was an analyst in OSS from July 1943 to August 1945, and was employed in the Division of Map Intelligence in the State Department after August 1945. He is a close pal of a known Communist and has stated it would be a good idea if the Communists would take over in this country. He is a regular reader of the Daily Worker. This individual is not in the State Department at this time, but has a job in the CIA as of today. Here is what we find. Such individuals use the State Department as a stepping stone to some other agency. This man, who pals around with Communists, who is satisfied, according to the files of the State Department, that Communists should

take over this country, is now in the Central Intelligence Agency.

Case No. 12. This individual started as a corresponding secretary at the White House. From there he moved over to the Soviet Embassy and obtained a job as assistant editor. From there he transferred to the State Department and, so far as I discover, transferred from there to a section of the Commerce Department, with which the State Department works, where he remained until several months ago. Where he is as of today I frankly do not know. I think this is a rather interesting shift, however, from White House to the Soviet Embassy, to the State Department, to the Commerce Department.

Case No. 13. This individual is a foreign reserve officer under the information and cultural program. He was appointed to this position in September 1947, and assigned to Milan, Italy, where he took part in the educational program. This individual spent time in Soviet Russia in 1927 as a member of the trade-unions delegation to Soviet Russia, which delegation was repudiated by William Green, president of the A. F. of L. He was the sponsor, organizer, and member, respectively, of various Communist-front organization. He has been cited by the Daily Worker a number of times for his work. The records of the industrial detail of the Chicago police department list him as a Communist as early as 1930. This man's file shows that members of the churches in Italy and high officials of the National Catholic Welfare Council objected to his being assigned to educational duties in Italy, basing this objection upon his communistic activities. Lt. Col. Gayre, of the British Army, who was this individual's supervisor in Italy, indicated that he was a "wild leftist theorist," who would veer entirely to the left if given the opportunity. This individual is described as a pedantic, tedious, conceited, impractical, pompous man, and this applies to so many of them, a man who would enjoy the pleasures of the right, but popularity with the left.

Case No. 14. This is a case of pressure from a high State Department official to obtain security clearance for an individual with a bad background from the standpoint of security. He was appointed in December 1945 as a translator in the State Department.

This is an interesting case showing the extent to which some of their superior officers will get when they find that some of these very unusual individuals are going to lose their jobs. He was appointed in December 1945 as a translator in the State Department. A report from another Government investigating agency under date of January 9, 1946, advised that the subject should be dismissed as a bad security risk because he was flagrantly homosexual. He had extremely close connections with other individuals with the same tendencies, and who were active members of Communist-front organizations, including the Young Communist League.

I think this is interesting, Mr. President. I asked one of our top intelligence men in Washington, one day, "Why do you find men who are so fanatically Communist? Is there something about the Communist philosophy that attracts them?"

He said, "Senator McCARTHY, if you had been in this work as long as we have been, you would realize that there is something wrong with each one of these individuals. You will find that practically every active Communist is twisted mentally in some way."

The State Department's own security agency recommended the discharge of this employee on January 22, 1946. On February 19, 1946, this individual's services were terminated with the State Department. Subsequently, on April 1, 1946, the action discharging this individual was rescinded and he was reinstated in his job in the State Department. In this case a CSA report of September 2, 1947, is replete with information covering the attempt of a high State Department official to induce several individuals who had signed affidavits reflecting adversely upon the employee to repudiate their affidavits. The file shows that that high State Department employee even went out and personally contacted the individuals who signed the affidavits and asked them, "Won't you repudiate them?"

This individual, according to the security files of the State Department, was a very close associate of active Soviet agents. As to whether he is in the State Department at this time or not, I frankly do not know, but in view of the fact that he was reinstated, I assume that he is.

A while ago the Senator from Nebraska asked whether I would yield while he

suggested the absence of a quorum. I shall be glad to do so now. However, if the Senator thinks it is not possible to obtain a quorum at this time—

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield to me at this time, let me say to the majority leader that I do not wish to disrupt the program. I wish to cooperate with the majority leader in carrying on the session.

I said then, and I say now, that these charges are very serious. If there is a desire to have a quorum call now, I shall be glad to have one.

Mr. McCARTHY. I may say that I have just received a note that the majority leader—I am not criticizing him for doing so—has informed all Senators on his side of the aisle that there will not be a vote tonight, and that there is no reason for Senators to remain here, and that there will be no quorum call. I assume he did not do that because he did not want Senators on his side of the aisle to hear the charges. I assume he merely wanted to give them an opportunity to go to dinner. However, I have no desire to present what I regard as important information before a half-empty Senate.

On the other hand, if the majority leader thinks there is not a possibility of obtaining a quorum, because of the advice given to Senators on his side of the aisle, I shall be glad to yield for a motion to take a recess until tomorrow.

In other words, I do not agree to having the majority dismissed by the majority leader.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield to me, I told Senators that there would not be a vote tonight upon the cotton bill which is the pending question. Had I known that there would have been any question about a quorum call, I certainly would have had Senators remain here, to be present to answer to a quorum call, if not to listen to the Senator's address.

We have now continued until 7:30 in the evening.

In view of the statement about having a night session and in view of the work that is before us, I had hoped that the Senator from Wisconsin would conclude his remarks tonight.

If he does not conclude his remarks tonight, but expects to resume them tomorrow, he certainly will not have any time then, because of the unanimous-consent agreement which has been en-

tered in regard to a vote at 3 o'clock on Senate bill 75.

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me inquire of the majority leader whether the information I have received is correct. Did the Senator advise Senators on his side of the aisle that there was no reason for them to remain, that he would assure them there would be no quorum call and no vote?

Mr. LUCAS. I did not assure them that there would be no quorum call.

All that Senators on this side of the aisle asked me was whether there would be a vote tonight. I said, "No," that the Senator from Wisconsin was going to take the floor, and probably would occupy the floor for 4 or 5 hours, as I had been informed; and I said, "I will stay here, and I hope everyone else who wants to hear the Senator will stay here as he discusses this very important question." But so far as a vote was concerned, I advised all Senators who asked me, and I advised the minority leader so that he could advise Senators on his side of the aisle, that there would be no vote on the pending question tonight.

But I certainly hope the Senator from Wisconsin will proceed, because he is making a very important address, and the country is interested in it, and what few Senators are here now are interested in it; and I doubt whether there will be more Senators here day after tomorrow than are present now.

At this time I see another Senator returning to the Chamber after having had his dinner. I know he is very much interested in the question the Senator from Wisconsin is discussing. The Senator from Oregon has just reentered the Chamber, and I know he is trying to swell the attendance of Senators here a little.

The Senator from Nebraska [Mr. BURLER] is also reentering the Chamber now, I observe.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, if the Senator from Wisconsin will yield once again, 10 or 12 Senators are in the Chamber at this time, several on the other side and some on this side, who are staying here to be helpful to the Senator from Wisconsin. But I appeal to the Senator in regard to what I regard as the only logical thing to do. I do not wish to be in the position of forcing the majority leader to call a quorum.

I do know that the majority leader has told Members on both sides of the aisle,

in my presence, that there would not be a vote tonight on the pending question. He did so with good intentions, namely, to state that there would not be a vote tonight on the potato issue.

But he knows, as I do, that when such statements are made, attendance in the Senate Chamber decreases, and it is very difficult to proceed with a night session under such circumstances.

I do not feel in a position to instruct the majority leader in view of the other announcement.

However, we are to have a vote tomorrow at 4 o'clock; and after that, of course, we can take up anything that it is desired to take up.

This is an important matter, and there might be a demand to learn all the facts.

I think the Senator from Wisconsin is presenting a serious challenge, and I think it desirable to have all Senators present, if possible, to hear his remarks.

I do not insist upon having a quorum call. I doubt very much whether we could obtain a quorum, and I do not want to take advantage of the parliamentary situation. But I say, in all fairness, that as soon as the Senator reaches a point where he can conveniently suspend his remarks until tomorrow—

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I shall not be as careful of the majority leader's feelings as the minority leader is. I shall suggest the absence of a quorum, unless the Senator wishes to move that the Senate take a recess until tomorrow.

I think it is very unusual, in view of the Senator's declaration of his interest in this subject, for the majority leader to dismiss Senators on his side of the aisle or encourage them to leave the Chamber.

I think the subject now under discussion is one in which the Democrats should be especially interested. As the Senator from Illinois knows, unless something is done to clean up the State Department, the Democratic Party is going to be identified with that group. I think that is wrong. I think there are too many fine Democrats in this country and too many fine Democrats in the Senate, on the Democratic side of the aisle, to permit the Democratic Party to be identified with the group I have been discussing. I think Democratic Senators should be as much interested as we on this side of the aisle are in cleaning up that situation.

But I do not like the information I have received, namely, that the Senator from Illinois has advised all Senators on his side of the aisle to leave. If the information I have received is not correct, I should like to know it.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. LUCAS. It is customary here, as the Senator from Wisconsin knows, that when Members of the Senate inquire whether there is to be a vote on the pending question at a certain time, if it is known that there is not to be a vote at that time, the reply is "No." Of course, immediately such Senators leave, as the Senator knows; and no doubt the Senator from Wisconsin himself has done that many times since he has been a Member of the Senate. Whenever the minority leader tells Senators on his side of the aisle that there is not going to be a vote on the pending question, they do not usually remain to hear the speech of the Senator from Wisconsin or the speech of the Senator from Illinois on any subject, regardless of how important it may be.

The Senator from Wisconsin should not think he has any monopoly on fighting communism in this country, and he cannot by implication or by innuendo attack the Senator from Illinois with respect to cleaning out the State Department. I have told the Senator before, and I repeat it now, that whenever the Senator names names and presents conclusive information before the proper committees, or if he will do it now before the Senate, if he desires, and if what he says is substantiated, I will go arm in arm with my good friend the Senator from Wisconsin in assisting in cleaning out any Communist nests in the State Department or in any other branch of the Government.

The Senator from Wisconsin knows me well enough to know that I was fighting communism long before the Senator from Wisconsin was, because I am several years older than he is. But the matter is so important that it seems to me we should have this entire story now. Let us get all the information and all the facts in the RECORD at this particular time; and the Senator can, by unanimous consent, offer and introduce into the RECORD anything he wishes to. Let him put all of it in, and then ask for a meeting, either before a special committee of

some kind or before the Foreign Relations Committee or the Judiciary Committee, and go thoroughly into the things the Senator is talking about.

I am all for that, I say to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator agree with me that in view of the facts that I have presented, it is absolutely necessary that we have a complete and thorough investigation of this matter by a Senate committee?

Mr. LUCAS. I am in favor of a complete and thorough investigation of what the Senator has said; and I hope the Foreign Relations Committee or some other committee will bring the Senator immediately before it and will interrogate him under oath with respect to what he has presented here. The Senator should name names before that committee because he has said—

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, the Senator yielded to me.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LUCAS. I will get a quorum, if that is the case.

Mr. McCARTHY. If the Senator feels that he will embarrass Senators on his side of the aisle by calling a quorum, I will yield while he moves that the Senate take a recess until tomorrow.

Let me say this, Mr. President, in view of the attitude of the Senator from Illinois, who last week, before he knew any of the evidence, went to Chicago, where he said, "Senator McCARTHY is lying; there is not a single Communist in the State Department."

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I—

Mr. McCARTHY. Wait a minute, let me finish. He said there was not a word of truth in what I said. He said if he had said what I said about there being 57 Communists in the State Department, he would be ashamed the rest of his life. He now seems to think this should be made a trial of the man who is digging out the Communists instead of the Communists. If we are to indulge in such tactics, I want the entire Senate present to hear it.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I will move to recess until tomorrow, if the Senate wishes that to be done.

Mr. DWORSHAK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. DWORSHAK. So far as the junior Senator from Idaho is concerned, he has been glad to remain on the floor to listen to these important revelations of the Senator from Wisconsin because the Senator from Wisconsin, in his remarks, has shed some light upon the possible reasons for the State Department's foreign policy in China during the past few years, which possibly justified the infiltration of communism within China, to such an extent that it may now be too late to present this very vital information to one of the committees of the Senate. It is too late now to counteract and nullify that insidious State Department influence, through scores and scores of Communists and fellow travelers who have been responsible, even under Secretaries of State like General Marshall. We realize that only recently J. Edgar Hoover made the public statement that in this country today there are 540,000 Communists and fellow travelers. So I think the American people are entitled to have a complete exposure of the forces within the State Department. If there is no truth or justification in what the junior Senator from Wisconsin has been telling this body this evening, then the American people should know the truth. But at a time when every American recognizes that we are at the mercy of sabotaging by those who have been placed on high levels in the State Department and other branches of the executive department, it behooves us not only to spend \$13,000,000,000 or \$14,000,000,000 annually on the national defense, but it is the duty, the obligation—I believe the American people join with me in making the statement that it is the obligation—of the President of the United States, who is alone responsible for the selection of these officials, through the Secretary of State, to make a housecleaning, so that we may proceed to build up the security and defenses of the country, to the end that we may be prepared, in case we should be the victims of Communist aggression in the months ahead.

I wish to compliment the junior Senator from Wisconsin on the revelations he is making at this time. Notwithstanding the fact that there are entirely too few Members of this body present, it is encouraging to note that so many members of the press and radio galleries are present. I believe they recognize that the American people want the facts,

though, even now, it may be too late to clean our house of the rats and saboteurs who are a constant menace to the safety of the Republic.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. No; I do not yield. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator declines to yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I have decided it may be well to complete the presentation of the case tonight, but I am not going to speak to an empty chamber. I am going to suggest the absence of a quorum, and then proceed to develop all the facts. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The secretary will call the roll.

The roll was called, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Alken	Hayden	McClellan
Anderson	Hendrickson	McFarland
Butler	Ives	Murray
Cordon	Johnson, Colo.	Robertson
Darby	Kerr	Smith, Maine
Donnell	Lehman	Sparkman
Dworshak	Lucas	Wherry
Eaton	McCarthy	Williams

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is not present. The clerk will call the names of the absent Senators.

The legislative clerk called the names of the absent Senators; and Mr. CAPENANT, Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. HOYE, Mr. HOLLAND, Mr. MOHR, Mr. RUSSELL, and Mr. SCHOEPEL answered to their names when called.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is not present.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, much as I dislike to do this, I presume that I shall be compelled to make a motion to adjourn. I have not made it yet—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will state that debate is not in order.

Mr. LUCAS. I shall not debate; I shall only make a statement.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, unless I can make a statement also, I shall call for the regular order. If the Senator from Illinois is going to make a statement, I want an opportunity to answer him.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I move that the Sergeant at Arms be directed to request the attendance of absent Senators.

The motion was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sergeant at Arms will execute the order of the Senate.

After a little delay, Mr. LANGER, Mr. CAIN, Mr. LONG, Mr. STENNIS, and Mr. KILGORE entered the Chamber and answered to their names.

Mr. LUCAS. I move that the Senate adjourn until 11 o'clock a. m. tomorrow.

Mr. CAIN and other Senators requested the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered; and the legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KILGORE. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. KILGORE. I find from reading the newspapers that the wet season is driving the pintails north.

Mr. IVES. Mr. President, what is the result?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, what is the result of the vote?

Mr. CORDON. Mr. President, how am I recorded as voting?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recorded as voting in the affirmative.

Mr. CORDON. I vote "nay."

Mr. IVES. What is the result, Mr. President?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk is still tallying.

Mr. LUCAS. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. GRAHAM], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. MYRES], the Senator from Florida [Mr. PEPPER], and the Senator from Maryland [Mr. TYDINGS] are absent on public business.

The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. THOMAS] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senators from Connecticut [Mr. BENTON and Mr. McMAHON], the Senators from Kentucky [Mr. CHAPMAN and Mr. WITHERS], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senators from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY and Mr. JOHNSON], the Senator from California [Mr. DOWNEY], the Senators from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND and Mr. STENNIS], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER], the Senator from Delaware [Mr. FREAR], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. GILLETTE], the Senators from Rhode

Island [Mr. GREEN and Mr. LEAHY], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], the Senators from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT and Mr. O'MAHONEY], the Senators from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSTON and Mr. MAYBANK], the Senators from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER and Mr. MCKELLAR], the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY], the Senator from Maryland [Mr. O'CONNOR], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. TAYLOR], and the Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS] are unavoidably detained.

Mr. WHERRY. I announce that the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES] and the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. YOUNG] are absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER] is absent on official business.

The Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is necessarily absent.

The Senator from Maine [Mr. BREWSTER], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. BUTLER], the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS], the Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND], the Senator from Nevada [Mr. MALONE], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. MARTIN], the Senator from Colorado [Mr. MILLIKIN], the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. THYE], and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY] are detained on official business.

The Senator from Michigan [Mr. FERGUSON], the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. GURNEY], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. JENNER], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. KEM], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY], and the Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS] are absent on public business.

The result was announced—yeas 16, nays 18, as follows:

YEAS—16		
Fulbright	Kilgore	Murray
Hayden	Lehman	Robertson
Hoye	Long	Russell
Holland	Lucas	Sparkman
Johnson, Colo.	McClellan	
Kerr	McFarland	
NAYS—16		
Alken	Cordon	Dworshak
Cain	Darby	Eaton
Capenhart	Donnell	Hendrickson

Ives	Morse	Taft
Langer	Schoeppel	Wherry
McCarthy	Smith, Maine	Williams

#### NOT VOTING—62

Anderson	Gurney	Mundt
Benton	Hickenlooper	Myers
Brewster	Hill	Neely
Bricker	Humphrey	O'Conor
Bridges	Hunt	O'Mahoney
Butler	Jenner	Pepper
Byrd	Johnson, Tex.	Saltonstall
Chapman	Johnston, S. C.	Smith, N. J.
Chavez	Kefauver	Stennis
Connally	Kem	Taylor
Douglas	Knowland	Thomas, Okla.
Downey	Leahy	Thomas, Utah
Eastland	Lodge	Thye
Ellender	McCarran	Tobey
Ferguson	McKellar	Tydings
Flanders	McMahon	Vandenberg
Frear	Magnuson	Watkins
George	Malone	Wiley
Gillette	Martin	Withers
Graham	Maybank	Young
Green	Millikin	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion to adjourn is rejected.

Mr. TAFT. A point of order, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. TAFT. If there is not a quorum present the vote is obviously invalid.

Mr. LUCAS. Not on this motion.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. May the Chair state that no quorum is needed on a motion to adjourn.

Mr. LUCAS. I move that the Sergeant at Arms be directed to compel the attendance of absent Senators.

The motion was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sergeant at Arms will execute the order of the Senate.

After a further delay, Mr. SALTONSTALL, Mr. MCKELLAR, Mr. BREWSTER, and Mr. ELLENDER entered the Chamber and answered to their names.

Later, Mr. BENTON, Mr. BRICKER, Mr. DOWNEY, Mr. EASTLAND, Mr. FERGUSON, Mr. FLANDERS, Mr. FREAR, Mr. GILLETTE, Mr. GREEN, Mr. HILL, Mr. HUNT, Mr. JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. KNOWLAND, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. MARTIN, Mr. McMAHON, Mr. MUNDT, Mr. NEELY, Mr. O'MAHONEY, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. TAYLOR, Mr. THOMAS of Utah, Mr. THYE, Mr. WATKINS, Mr. WILEY, and Mr. WITHERS also entered the Chamber and answered to their names.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, do I have the floor?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I believe I have the floor.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. LUCAS. Was there unanimous consent given to the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY] to occupy the floor?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There was no unanimous consent granted.

Mr. LUCAS. Then, Mr. President, I demand recognition.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. McCARTHY. Do I not have the floor?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will state that so long as a point of order is not made against the Senator from Wisconsin, he would be entitled to the floor.

Mr. LUCAS. I make the point of order, Mr. President, and I ask for recognition.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. McCARTHY. Is it not too late to make the point of order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The point of order is sustained, and the Senator from Illinois is recognized.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I appeal from the decision of the Chair.

Mr. MORSE, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, and other Senators asked for the yeas and nays.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I will withdraw the point of order if the Senator from Wisconsin wants the floor.

Mr. McCARTHY. I should be glad to yield to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. LUCAS. I shall speak on my own time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The point of order has been withdrawn. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, for the benefit of those Members of the Senate who were not present earlier in the evening, I have given detailed records of certain individuals in the State Department who have very definite communistic connections. I explained to the

Senate earlier in the evening that I would not take the time to make out a court case against each person referred to. I am pointing out facts so that there may be a convening of one of the appropriate committees to make a thorough investigation.

As I explained earlier, there is a serious question whether I should disclose names to the Senate. I frankly feel, in view of the number of cases—there are 81 cases—that it would be a mistake to publicly disclose the names on the floor. I shall be willing, happy, and eager to go before any committee and give the names and all the information available. I shall refuse to give the source of the information, however. I know the State Department is very eager to know how I have secured all this information. I know that the jobs of the men who helped me secure this material would be worth nothing if the names were given. If it were not for some good, loyal Americans in the State Department—and there are many of them—I should not have been able to present this picture to the Senate tonight. The vast majority of the employees of the State Department are loyal, and I think the President should see to it that their good names are not tarnished.

I told the Senate earlier this evening that I have what I call the Big Three, No. 1, No. 2, and No. 81. I feel that if those individuals are removed from the State Department we shall have gone a considerable distance in breaking the back of the espionage ring in the State Department.

I also told the Senate earlier that I have no way of knowing definitely which of these persons are still in the employ of the State Department. I know they have all been there at some time. A sizable number are still there.

Case No. 16. This individual's file is perhaps the largest, physically, of the files in the CSA. Among other things, the file reflects that this individual furnished material to known Soviet espionage agents and that he had constant contacts with a long list of Communists and suspected Soviet agents. On July 24, 1946, a recommendation of dismissal was made. Nothing was done. In September 1946 there was a request for further information, even though at that time the records showed that he was furnishing secret material to known Communist agents.

On July 24, the State Department's own security unit furnished detailed evidence showing that this man was furnishing secret material to known espionage agents. He had top-secret clearance.

In September further information was requested. As of October 15, 1947, nearly a year and a quarter later, there was nothing in the file to indicate whether the individual was with the Department or what the final action was in his case. I later learned that 6 months after the original recommendation of dismissal was made, he finally resigned. He was not discharged. He resigned on December 13, 1947. For what Federal agency he is working at this time, I frankly do not know. I have attempted to get that information from the Civil Service Commission. It has been very helpful, but there are so many individuals of the same name that the Commission has had difficulty in furnishing the information.

Case No. 17. This individual signed an affidavit saying that he was a member of the Communist Party. He did this on several occasions. This was not a non-Communist affidavit; it was a Communist affidavit. This file is rather significant, in that the reviewing officer in this case indicated that if this employee had testified to a change of heart, he would have received top-secret clearance. In other words, if this man had said, "I have now reformed," the security officer felt he was bound to give him top-secret clearance. This, of course, seems unusual to us, but a Communist, who has, of course, no respect for the oath, which consists of swearing before the Creator that he will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, is educated to the idea that there is no Supreme Being, so, obviously, an oath means nothing to him. I think the reviewing authority in the State Department should bear that fact in mind.

Case No. 18. This individual was thoroughly investigated before being hired on December 26, 1946. While the file indicates that this woman was a Communist, I am not too sure that she was not a psychopathic case. She was hired when the file showed a great deal of Communist activity on her part.

Case No. 19. This file is rather a lengthy one. It shows many Communist Party connections. The individual is working for the Government today. I have been able to secure that much in-

formation. Whether he is in the State Department, I frankly do not know.

Case No. 20. This individual's file shows close connections with a number of Communist-front organizations. The individual, his sister, and his father spent some time in mental institutions. The report, which is dated July 7, 1947, shows that his mental health is unstable. This man is still in the Department as of today.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. DONNELL. Does the Senator have any information as to the type of responsibility the last-named individual has in the State Department? In other words, does he do janitorial work, or supervisory work, or just what kind of work does he do?

Mr. McCARTHY. I do not know. The information was not in the file. I was curious about that particular question myself. I was told that he had top-secret clearance. That would indicate that he was handling rather important documents. Frankly, what he was doing, I do not know. Let me check on the actual case, if I may, so that we may have any information on it that may be available. He is in the Office of Information and Educational Exchange. What he is doing there, I do not know.

Cases Nos. 21 to 26 are rather typical of many of the employees in the New York office of OIE. That is the Voice of America broadcast. The picture in the seven cases is substantially the same. First, the character reference is from another known Communist. In other words, the file shows, in effect, that it is a case of "You recommend me; I'll recommend you." So it is a case of Commies, or persons with Communist connections, recommending each other. There is nothing in the file which indicates the employees' activities beyond a period several years prior to the employment.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. DONNELL. Does the Senator mean that he does not know what the activities are of these persons in the Department of State, or that he does not know their prior activities?

Mr. McCARTHY. I know that their activities in the Department were with the Voice of America in the New York branch.

Mr. DONNELL. I mean, in what type of work are they engaged?

Mr. McCARTHY. As to this particular case, I do not know. I shall come to one, case No. 81, but let me read that now for the benefit of the Senator.

Mr. DONNELL. I was wondering whether the Senator would permit me to ask another question.

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes.

Mr. DONNELL. Will the Senator be kind enough, if he thinks it advisable, to give us from time to time, as he goes through the cases, information as to the type of work or the type of responsibility with which the individual is charged?

Mr. McCARTHY. I can say to the Senator that it would be extremely difficult to do that, because all the records are completely secret except what I could get from loyal State Department employees. I can tell in a great number of cases what particular branch the individuals are working in, whether in Research and Intelligence, or in other activities. Incidentally, Research and Intelligence is a favorite office for fellow travelers to get into. A short time ago I cited the case of one individual who succeeded in going from Research and Intelligence to CIA. He is with CIA today.

One of the principal cases is case No. 81. It deals with one of the top officials in OIE, the Voice of America, and I shall reach that shortly. Referring again to the previous case, the individual is still either working in this branch of the State Department, or has succeeded in transferring to some other agency having to do with information. All these individuals try to get into some branch having to do with information or research.

Case No. 28. This individual has been with the State Department as a Foreign Service career officer since 1936. He is still holding a high salaried job with the Government, and to the best of my knowledge he is now stationed at Frankfurt, Germany. A report of June 23, 1947, indicates that he is a member of the Communist Party, that he attended the Youth International in Russia in 1935. While working in the State Department, the file indicates, he showed an intense interest in getting information on anything pertaining to Russia, including any figures and records, whether or not the information had any connection with his particular job. He had been discharged previously from

the AFL Federation of Government Employees, on the charge of communistic activity. Both he and his wife have been members of a number of Communist-front organizations, and he has been very closely associated with known Communist-front workers. The file discloses the interesting information that he is a member of the central group, whose task it is to spearhead an attack on J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI. Those fellows do not like J. Edgar Hoover. The man is a member of the central group which is the spearhead of such an attack. This is all in his file. He is still working for the Government.

Case No. 29. This individual, according to the State Department's own Security Division, is a known Communist member. A file dated April 13, 1947, shows that he is a member of an underground Communist group in Washington, D. C. Both he and his wife have been in close touch with a functionary of the Soviet espionage ring in Washington, D. C. I want to be sure about this. He is still working in Government work. Whether he is in the State Department or not I have not been able to find out, but I know he was in the State Department not too long ago, and he is still in the Government service. Let me repeat that for the benefit of the Senate. The intelligence agency's file shows that this man is a known Communist Party member, and another file, dated April 13, 1947, shows that he is a member of an underground Communist group in Washington, D. C. Both he and his wife have been in close touch with a functionary of the Soviet espionage ring in Washington. His brother, who either was or is in the State Department, was a member of the Jackson Heights, Long Island, N. Y., branch of the Communist Party. There was considerable additional material in the file of this individual which I cannot give to the Senate this time, because it is all tied up with the source of the information. The file indicates that this man is not only very active as a Communist, but is a very dangerous Communist.

Case No. 30. This man was a production supervisor of motion pictures for the OIE, that is, the Voice of America. He also had previously signed an affidavit to the effect that he was a member of the Communist Party. That is pretty much the picture of all that OIE crowd in New York.

I might say that there has been some cleaning out. As we get down to case 81, Senators will see that one of the top people was temporarily transferred, and while away something else happened, and there are some good loyal people in the office in New York. Otherwise, I would not be able to get the information I am giving the Senate.

Case No. 31. This individual has been in Government service since July 1942. He was stationed in the Office of Information and Education of the State Department. The information was not in the file, but the hearings before the Un-American Activities Committee showed that he had signed a petition in New York in 1940 to the effect that he was a member of the Communist Party.

Case No. 32. This individual has been with the Government since July 1942. He was stationed in the Office of Education and Information in the State Department. It will be noted as I go through that highest percentage of these individuals were stationed in some information branch of the Government. According to the Un-American Activities Committee, he had signed a petition in 1940 to the effect that he was a member of the Communist Party. The State Department took no action whatsoever upon this case, and so far as I know, the investigative unit there conducted no further investigation as to him, unless it was fairly recently.

Case No. 33. This man has been in the Government service since July 1942. The picture is pretty much the same as in the last case, except that he is in a high-salaried position at the present time in the Office of Information and Education. This man, I know definitely, is in the Office of Information and Education of the State Department. He signed an affidavit in 1940 that he was a member of the Communist Party. He has been in the Government service since 1942. Apparently no check was made on him as to his other Communist activities, and I have no further information about him.

Case No. 34. This individual was born in Russia in 1896, and became a naturalized United States citizen in 1938. From July 1934 to April 1940 he worked for Amtorg Trading Corp. The Senate will recall that that is the corporation that was visited by the FBI shortly after the last session ended, and they picked up five or six of the Amtorg

officials in connection with espionage activities. This man worked for that corporation until 1940. He worked with the Maritime Union from June to August 1941, was with the OWI from February 1945 to February 1946, then was transferred to the State Department. His file shows that he has very close connection with the Communist espionage agents. As to this man, I frankly do not know whether he is still in the State Department or not. He went with the State Department some time after February 1946.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hill in the chair). Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from Missouri?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. DONNELL. The Senator referred, a moment ago, I think just before the last case, to one individual as being a high-salaried employee. Does the Senator have information as to what the man's salary is?

Mr. McCARTHY. I have not. I think he was a CAF, class 9 or 10. He was up in the \$7,000 or \$8,000 bracket. I did not pay too much attention to that. He was in a fairly high-salaried position. I could get the information for the Senator, I think. In looking over the papers I have I do not find information as to the salary he receives.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. MUNDT. I notice in several of the cases the Senator has mentioned it was not clear whether or not the officials mentioned were still employed by the State Department. The State Department issued a news release last week in which Mr. Peurifoy stated that 202 Communists and security risks have been dismissed from the State Department since 1946.

I wondered if the Senator had asked the State Department to let him see that list of those who may have been dismissed because of disloyalty reasons, which would greatly simplify the Senator's task in determining whether they are still there? Inasmuch as so much has been said about making information available, it would seem to me to be proper to make a direct request of the Department for a list of those whom the Department has dismissed for disloyalty

reasons, to which the Department could not very well make any other than an affirmative reply.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. Does the Senator from South Dakota know whether Mr. Peurifoy said that they were dismissed for disloyalty reasons, or dismissed and allowed to resign?

Mr. MUNDT. I think Mr. Peurifoy's statement said that their relationships with the State Department were severed because of security reasons. I think frequently they are permitted to resign after they have been singled out and their attention has been called to the fact that the State Department has caught up with their disloyalty records, but whether they have been permitted to resign or whether they have been severed, since he has given us the definite figure of 202, there would be an ideal check list for the Senator from Wisconsin to use in finding out whether these persons are still with the Department of State.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. I agree with the Senator, but I think it makes a difference whether they have resigned or are discharged and obtained employment in other departments of the Government.

Mr. MUNDT. One of the great difficulties we confront in trying to get Communists out of Government is that apparently once they have been removed from one department there is no alert given to the other departments so they simply drift from one department to another. So if there were some such list made available to all the employment chiefs, then, assuming that the employment chiefs do not want to hire Communists, they could use that list as a screen.

Mr. FERGUSON. In the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee dealing with foreign affairs, I may say it was indicated that these persons in the majority of cases were permitted to resign rather than to be discharged.

Mr. MUNDT. They were permitted to resign after, I believe, they had been told that the State Department had made an examination of their loyalty status and found it questionable.

Mr. McCARTHY. And permitted to resign so they would find it easier to secure another job.

Mr. MUNDT. Perfectly true.

Mr. McCARTHY. I may say in that connection, Mr. President, that the whole picture seems to be—and you recall I cited some cases along that line—that where they can get one top man in an important position, that then very shortly we see them dragging in their fellow Communists. When that is done we may be sure they will not be discharged for Communist activities. They are allowed to resign so they can be taken over by another department. The disturbing thing is that they are resigning from the State Department and then going into the other branches which, while not technically under the State Department, are to all intents and purposes under the State Department. When they are allowed to resign it does not give them a bad record and they can move into another position.

Mr. MUNDT. I think the Senator is putting his finger on a very important deficiency in the President's so-called security program, because if a Communist is found to be guilty in the eyes of the State Department or any other department of Government and then permitted to resign so as to secure employment in some other department of Government or in some other bureau, or a place in private employment, the general public has had a fraud launched against it, and it is the policy of giving the benefit of the doubt to the Communists instead of the benefit of the doubt to the Government. Certainly when we come to the place where we have discovered a Communist I see no reason why all the departments of Government should not be alerted, and for that reason, when the evidence is complete, the general public might well be alerted so the individual cannot sneak his way into some college faculty, some farmers' organization, some labor organization, or some women's club. Once the security check has pointed out that here is a man attempting to sabotage freedom in this country and trying to sell us out to a foreign tyranny, Government departments are notoriously weak, in my opinion, if they fail then to alert the general public to that fact.

Mr. McCARTHY. I think that is an excellent idea. I may say that merely

alerting the new potential boss sometimes does not do too much good. The Senator was not present when I recited a very unusual case, the case of a man who is now one of our foreign ministers. The case was that of a man who is one of our ministers. His file suddenly disappeared, that is, the vast majority of it. An attempt was made to find out where the file went. The keeper of the file, if one can call him that, said it went to one of the top brass, and it is in his safe, and has been there for 2 years. However, he did not obtain all the material. Some of the remaining material shows that certain secret material was prepared for transmission to a foreign government. The material was prepared for a foreign government. It showed up in Moscow before it even left Washington. Does the Senator follow me? Of course, the Security Agency was very much concerned with that. They apparently had suspicions ahead of time. Their report—and their report of this matter is all in the file, the Senator understands, was to the effect that this man who is now one of our ministers, was shadowed by the Security Agency; their men physically saw him make contact with a known espionage agent. The agent was shadowed to the Soviet Embassy, and that is where the material disappeared, and then showed up in Moscow. When this man's superior officer cleans out his files, I am very curious what that man's file contains.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. I left the Senate Chamber at 7:30 p. m. What number of case is the Senator now on?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am now on case No. 34.

Mr. McMAHON. In the cases the Senator has recited, has the Senator simply read the derogatory information that was in the files or has the Senator attempted to give the full contents of the file in each case?

Mr. McCARTHY. I may say that I am only giving the Senate cases in which it appears clear that there is a definite Communist connection. If there is evidence in the file to show that a man was not a Communist, frankly, those files have not come to my attention.

I am not sure that I get the Senator's thought fully. This man may have been good to his wife and children and all

that sort of thing. What I am interested in is: Does the file confirm what we felt we knew about him? In other words, does the investigative agency's file show that this man was in contact with Communists? Did he belong to Communist-front organizations? Did he belong to a Communist organization? Was he a foreign agent?

I assure the Senator that this is not a game. I am trying to give the Senate as clear a picture as I can. I do not give the Senate anything that would indicate the source of the information.

As I said earlier this evening, I think it is impossible and very unwise for us to pass any legislation providing that we could subpoena, for example, the files of the FBI. I think if we did that we would set the FBI back 10, 20, or 30 years. The only way we can safely use these files is with complete cooperation and understanding. So, for example, when the FBI has cleared the staff of the Senator's committee, they can work with the Senator's committee and give the committee the benefit of its investigation.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes, I am glad to.

Mr. McMAHON. The Senator understands that what I am trying to find out is whether the Senator has in his possession the complete file that is in the State Department, either the original file—I take it the Senator does not have that—or a copy of it. Has the Senator both the derogatory information and any good information that is in that file.

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator asks whether I have complete State Department files. The answer is "No."

Mr. McMAHON. Has the Senator the complete files in any one of the 34 cases?

Mr. McCARTHY. Eighty-one cases.

Mr. McMAHON. The Senator said he had presented 34 cases so far.

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes.

Mr. McMAHON. I take it the Senator is going through all 81. I merely say that when the Senator reaches case No. 81 I hope to be home in bed. That is beside the point. I want to find out from the Senator if in the cases he has read or in the cases that are to be presented, the Senator is able to give the Senate both the derogatory information that is in the file and any contradictory information that indicates that the derogatory information may be in question.

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me answer the Senator.

Mr. McMAHON. That is a yes-or-no question. Would the Senator give this information if he had it in his possession?

Mr. McCARTHY. Does the Senator want the answer?

Mr. McMAHON. Yes.

Mr. McCARTHY. The answer is that I obviously do not have photostats of all the files.

Mr. McMAHON. Has the Senator got—

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me finish. I do not have a counterespionage group of my own. All I can do is pick up the information, check, and make sure it is confirmed by something in the State Department file. The Senator understands I do not have complete State Department files in these matters. I very greatly wish I did. That is one of the things I hope one of our committees will succeed in getting.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. In a moment, if I may. If we are going to have a staff to work on these files the FBI should clear the members of that staff first to make sure that we do not have Communists among its members. When that is done, I hope the State Department will cooperate fully, and will say, "Here are the files. Take a look at them."

I do not have that now.

Mr. McMAHON. At last, that is the answer.

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes.

Mr. McMAHON. The Senator does not have in his possession any information which will indicate that that derogatory statement is true. Does not the Senator realize that if I were to send investigators into his State, perhaps I could obtain 105 or perhaps 1,005 witnesses who would make statements about the Senator that would be totally untrue and incorrect, and the same investigators might go to 2,000 other persons who would say, "Those 105 people are not telling the truth at all. They are very angry with the Senator because he voted for this bill or that bill that they did not like."

Did the Senator ever think of that?

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, if the Senator from Connecticut had been in the Senate Chamber earlier this eve-

ning, he would have heard that question answered.

The Senator from Illinois demanded, loudly, that I furnish all the names. I told him at that time that so far as I was concerned, I thought that would be improper; that I did not have all the information about these individuals. I have enough to convince me that either they are members of the Communist Party or they are giving great aid to the Communists. I may be wrong. That is why I said that unless the Senate demanded that I do so, I would not submit this publicly, but I would submit it to any committee—the Senator's committee or any other Senate committee—and would let the committee go over these in executive session. It is possible that some of these persons will get a clean bill of health. I know that some of them will not.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. The Senator has made my point for me, however, namely, that in the files that he has, there is only derogatory information.

Mr. McCARTHY. No.

Mr. McMAHON. And that he is not able—

Mr. McCARTHY. No.

Mr. McMAHON. That he is not able to give to the Senate the information which contradicts the derogatory information.

Mr. McCARTHY. That is not true.

Mr. McMAHON. Because if the Senator has it and if he is not giving it to the Senate at this time, it would appear to me that he is trying to present a one-sided picture.

I say to the Senator that there is no desire on my part to prejudge a single one of these cases. I do not need to tell the Senator that I am as much opposed to communism in the State Department or in any other Department as he is.

But I tell the Senator that in the course of my career I have examined many Government files and many investigation records, and I have seen in the files statements that, "This man McCarthy" or "This man—

Mr. McCARTHY. Make it "Jones."

Mr. McMAHON. Or "This man Smith is a terrible person. He is not to be trusted. He defrauds his creditors. He even beats his wife. He has been

seen going around the corner with suspicious-looking persons."

And then if we go to other persons in the community, they say, "I am not at all surprised that you have been told that, because Smith had a fight with a man named Jones, who lives down the street. I will bet that you got an interview with him, and that in it he said that this fellow Smith is a terrible man."

I call attention to the possibility that if we had the whole file before us, as undoubtedly the State Department has, the information the Senator from Wisconsin is giving the Senate might be contradicted to the point where creditable witnesses or creditable evaluators of the files would say, "In that event, we cannot believe that information."

I do not say to the Senator that that is so; I merely point out the possibility of its being so.

Mr. McCARTHY. I think I have a fairly good digest of the files. However, in such a case as this, I think we must give the American people the benefit of the doubt. Instead of there being 57 Communists in the State Department, let us say that there are only one or two. If there were one or two Communists who were serving as top officials in our State Department, that alone would be fully sufficient to keep the opposition informed about the operations of the Department.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I ask the Senator to permit me to finish my statement, please.

I have said to the Senator that I am not indicting the 81. I have said there is sufficient in the files to show that there is something radically wrong. If the Senator will remain here and will listen to some more of the cases, I am sure he will be convinced. After all, he came to the floor after I had been speaking for some time.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. Will the Senator advise the Members of the Senate now present whether he is presenting to the Senate a series of personal opinions about the persons or whether he is presenting matters of record?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am not presenting anything except what is confirmed by the files of the individual concerned. In other words, in one case the intelligence

department said, "Get rid of this man. Six professors, some at the University of California and some at Harvard, say this fellow is a fellow-traveler, a Communist, a close friend of Friedman, secretary of the Communists in California, and a close friend of Harry Bridges."

But the "top brass" in the State Department say, "No, because he has not committed any overt act."

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. McMAHON. I certainly would not judge the case upon the basis of what the Senator has just said. I certainly think—and I think it is the American system—

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I yield for a question, not for a speech.

Mr. McMAHON. Does not the Senator think it is the American system that when a man is accused, he shall be given a hearing, that all witnesses, for him and against him shall be heard and adjudged; and then, upon that judgment and upon that evidence, does not the Senator think the judgment should be rendered?

Mr. McCARTHY. I say to the Senator—

Mr. McMAHON. I say to the Senator, if I may continue my question—

Mr. McCARTHY. Certainly.

Mr. McMAHON. I say to the Senator that what we have to be careful of is that we do not imitate the very thing we are against. Star chambers are not for the United States of America, nor are trials ex parte, on the basis of part of the files of the persons concerned, on the floor of the United States Senate, the way to handle this matter.

That is my question.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I ask the Senator from Maine to permit me to answer the Senator from Connecticut first.

If the Senator from Connecticut had been here a little earlier, he would have heard the majority leader demanding that we do exactly that. He demanded that I present the names and indict these people before the country, without giving them a chance to be heard.

I said, "No, I will not do that unless the Senate demands it." I said, "I have the information. I want to present it to any Senate committee, and have the committee decide about it."

This information is nothing new. It has been there a long time. If the Senator or anyone else who is interested had expended sufficient effort, he could have brought this to the attention of the Senate.

I do not fancy at all this condemnation of an attempt to bring this matter before the Senate. I intend to give all the facts. From the information which I have before me, I agree with the intelligence agencies which have said, "These men should not be in the State Department." I agree with the intelligence agencies who said, "Do not give these men top-secret clearance."

I may be wrong. That is why I am not naming them. But I think that soon—tomorrow—the proper Senate committee that is actually interested, not in investigating people who may be Communists, but in investigating as to whether or not the State Department is overrun with Communists, should examine into these matters.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. Is not the essence of star-chamber proceedings that the public are not permitted to know the facts? Is not the essence of the kind of government which we here are fighting the kind of executive government which refuses to permit the legislative authority to know the truth?

After the revelations in the Hiss and the Fuchs and some other cases would it not seem that the Congress should be permitted to exercise its historical authority, never denied until recent years; and does it not seem strange that the Executive would refuse to permit those in the Senate and in the House of Representatives the right to know what is going on in Washington?

I do not see how any defenders of democracy, in view of the Hiss and the Fuchs cases, can still maintain the right of the executive department of government to refuse—as has been occurring repeatedly in recent years—information from the files to be authorized to be seen by the committees of Congress.

Mr. McCARTHY. I may point out to the Senator that the Constitution gives the Congress the right to get the information which we have been demanding for some time. Under the Constitution, of course, the Congress has a right to that information. How we can force the Pres-

ident to give the information to Congress I do not know.

On August 4, 1948, the day Hiss was exposed by the House committee, and the day of the President's famous "red herding" statement, the President signed an order saying, "No more departmental information shall be given to congressional committees."

At that time there might have been a reason for it; at that time the Congress was controlled by the Republican Party, and I can see why the President, with an election coming along, might have felt that the information might have been used for some political gain.

However, the President's party has had control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives for over a year now, and it seems that the President should be able to trust his own party. His party is in control. He should be able to say, "This is information to which the Congress is entitled, under the Constitution. My own party is in power. I will let them have it."

Frankly, Mr. President, I think the President is making a terrible mistake. If I may suggest something to the Senator, let me say that I think he and I certainly should be on the same side in this matter. The Democratic Party certainly is going to suffer because of this, but it should not. I think the Democratic Party has lost control of the executive branch. An unusual group of people—a group of twisted-thinking intellectuals—has taken over in the State Department, in recent years. They think they are right, that is what makes them dangerous.

If the Democratic Party, as we see it represented here in the Senate, had control, I do not think this sorry situation would exist.

So the Senator should work with us in trying to clean house.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. McMAHON. The Senator's observation is entirely beside the point, as was the observation just made by the Senator from Maine. I do not stand here to defend anyone. I simply wish to point out to the Senator that there was a complete file on these persons, and the Senator obviously was giving only the derogatory information.

Mr. McCARTHY. That is not correct.

Mr. McMAHON. I pointed out to the Senator that fairness demanded that the full files be made available, and certainly that should be done before judgment of the case is had. That is my position and nothing else.

Mr. MUNDT, Mr. CAPEHART, and other Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield; and if so, to whom?

Mr. McCARTHY. I shall yield in a moment.

First, Mr. President, let me say that the Senator from Connecticut just indulged in an erroneous assumption when he said I was indicating only the derogatory information. This is a résumé of the file.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at this time?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. I hope the Senator will not follow the suggestion of the Senator from Connecticut and discontinue his effort to purge Communists from the Government.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, the Senator from Connecticut made no such statement.

Mr. MUNDT. The Senator should wait until I finish.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I demand the regular order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin has the floor. A Senator who has the floor can yield only for a question. Senators who wish to ask questions must first be yielded to for that purpose.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, may I first make it clear that I will yield to every Senator present, as often as he wants me to yield, but for the present I am yielding to the Senator from South Dakota, and I will yield to no one else until he has finished his question. I shall be glad then to yield to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. MUNDT. I want the Senator from Connecticut to listen to this statement. I think I am quoting him exactly. I think he suggested that the Senator from Wisconsin should not continue with this effort of his, until the full files are made available to him. Is not that correct? Was not that the Senator's statement?

Mr. McMAHON. That is exactly correct.

Mr. MUNDT. I thought it was correct.

Mr. McMAHON. It is.

Mr. MUNDT. I hope the Senator from Wisconsin will not yield to that kind of argument, because had the argument of the Senator from Connecticut been followed, Alger Hiss would never have been convicted, for Alger Hiss was convicted after the President gave his freeze order denying us the right to see the full file. That would be a complete way to cover up every Communist in the Government.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me answer first, and then I will yield. I say to Senators, let them take their time. I will yield to everyone here, and all night if necessary. I want to say I definitely will not follow the suggestion offered by the Senator from Connecticut that I do nothing until I have the complete file of the case. The President said, "You shall not see the file." In fact, I never know when I have the complete file. I have information from the State Department files, information to which we are entitled. I am giving it to the Senate.

The Senator from Connecticut has said something about my convicting someone. Although even the leader of the Senator's party has said, "You must give us the names." I have refused to do so. I have said, "I will give it to any committee. I will go before any committee. I will be sworn. I will do anything." I want to get some action, and I may say to the Senator, I think he is the type of man who should be working along with me on this matter. I have a great deal of respect for the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. I am not trying to work against the Senator. What did I point out to the Senator and to the Senate? I pointed out that the Senator apparently has been giving the derogatory information contained in files of which he has secured possession. I further pointed out that in those files, if there was information which disproved the derogatory information, it was the duty of the Senator to present it to the Senate. Certainly no investigation of these persons could be consistent with

American methods unless there were an evaluation both of the derogatory information and the information which went to disprove it. If we adopt any other theory than that, I claim we abandon one of the fundamental guaranties which underly our form of government. And if we are going to take the attitude that simply because someone says so—and-so is a Communist, or was seen talking to a Communist, it therefore, ipso facto, settles the matter, then I say we have adopted a theory which I do not understand to be in consonance with our form of government.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. McMAHON. I want to further point out to the Senator that, in fairness—

Mr. McCARTHY. Is this a question? Mr. McMAHON. The Senator has listened to speeches from some of his other colleagues. I am sure he will indulge me in this observation.

Mr. McCARTHY. Go ahead.

Mr. McMAHON. I thank the Senator. If he wants to be fair, and has full and complete files on a man, he ought to read not only the derogatory information but anything else that is said. After it is read I might agree, especially if I could hear the witnesses, with the Senator's contention that a certain individual ought to be kicked out of the Government and perhaps be put in jail. What I do not see is how anyone can form an intelligent judgment simply by reading what a half dozen people say, because perhaps they are rogues, scoundrels, and thieves. Perhaps they have some ulterior motive in making the statements they do. I do not know. I do not judge this case and say the Senator is not right, that the Senator does not have derogatory information, which, if true, would warrant the full penalty of the law. He may be entirely right about it. What I am pointing out is that there may be other facts which we ought to hear in connection with those cases. That is my point.

Mr. McCARTHY. I think the Senator flatters me when he says it is my duty to present the entire file to the Senate and to give the Senate all the information. The President has said we shall not get that file, and, as of the present moment, we are not on a "Dear Joe, Dear Harry" basis. I cannot go to the White House and say, "Harry, give me this file,

because Senator McMAHON insists that you give me the information." All I can do is to give Senators what I can dig up. I have given Senators the fullest, most complete, fairest resumé of the files that I possible could.

For the Senator to speculate that I have other information which I will not give him, is, I think, completely unfair. I have already asked for the complete files. I sent the President a telegram. I said, "Mr. President, here are 57 names. You may have them. But, in fairness to the Senate and the country, let us get the information on these people."

Mr. BREWSTER rose.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me yield to the Senator from Maine, first.

Mr. BREWSTER. Is the issue not as to who is to do the evaluating of which the Senator from Connecticut speaks? Is it to be done by the executive agencies that demonstrate in every way a determination to refuse what has always been considered the constitutional right of the legislative body to find out, or is the evaluation to be made in the historic method, by a duly authorized committee of the Senate? I do not understand that the Senator from Connecticut is denying the right of a senatorial group, nor do I understand him to be admitting it. I am very much interested to know whether he agrees with the executive viewpoint, asserted for the first time, so far as I know, in any substantial way in very recent years, that the executive would not give to committees of the Congress the right to look at files.

The first case I knew of was when, during the war, President Roosevelt refused Senator Truman, then chairman of the Truman committee, the right to examine the so-called Stettinius report. The first action which I took as chairman of the committee afterward was to ask President Truman for it, and he turned that report over, which conclusively demonstrated that we had been very much misled during the course of the war as to the mobilization, and the records thereof, demonstrating that Senator Truman was right in demanding the records, and the President was wrong. The new doctrine by which the President has now directed his subordinates to refuse records is novel, unfortunate, and menacing, and is at the very essence of this entire issue. As I under-

stand, the Senator from Wisconsin is presenting what he feels to be credible evidence that the Executive is not exercising due care. We have no other way, as I understand, to find out, unless some committee will demand the records, and unless the President will release them. How the Senator from Connecticut, himself, as chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee, could determine regarding many matters, unless he had the files from the executive department, it is impossible for the Senator from Maine to understand.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me answer the question first, if I may. I thank the Senator from Maine very much for his statement. He is 100 percent correct. Unless we can obtain cooperation from the Executive, there is no way in the world of cleaning house. I am not giving any evaluation of the evidence, I want it understood. If Senators will listen, they will note that what I am doing is to recite the facts, which the State Departments' own security agency dug up, and which information acted as the basis for their recommendation that the individuals in question, because of being security risks, be discharged and not retained in the service.

I know the Senator from Connecticut has not been present all the time. He has been away this evening. Some of the most incredible cases I have read and some that I shall read of giving a man top secrecy clearance, when the Department's own agency says "He is a bad risk; he is a Communist," have been uncovered. I may say to the Senator, if the investigative agency is overly eager, if they are doing a bad job, if they are persecuting individuals, if they are naming as Communists individuals who are not such, then it is up to the State Department and the President to get a new agency.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a moment, that I may make a final observation?

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes, I shall be glad to yield; and after that I will yield to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. McMAHON. It will only take me a minute. I understand the junior Senator from Massachusetts earlier said that at the next meeting of the Foreign Rela-

tions Committee he would move for an examination of these cases. I may say to the Senator, I shall be glad to second and to support the motion, because I should like to see develop not only the facts the Senator has been able to get, but also other facts that we as a committee may be able to develop. I should like to see that done. It would be quite all right with me, but I again emphasize, as I now take my seat—and I shall not participate in the debate again, so far as I know, and I shall not disturb the Senator further—that perhaps it would have been better had the Senator presented his complaint to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, in which committee I am sure he has full confidence, in order that the derogatory information might be weighed against any information which would tend to contradict it, so that we could have the benefit of that searching information before the Senator decided to come to the Senate floor with it. It is simply a personal observation. The Senator is within his rights. He has decided to do it differently. It is the Senator's responsibility. I thank the Senator very much.

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator need not worry about disturbing me, because there is nothing I am more willing to do than to yield to a Senator. If I may have the Senator's attention, I will answer his question. I assume it was a question. The Senator suggested a course of action which he thinks I should have followed. As I explained earlier this evening, I thought of that. I thought there was some possibility of accomplishing the desired results in that fashion. However, keeping in mind that the members of the Foreign Relations Committee and all the Senators have had substantially the same knowledge and opportunity that I have had, I questioned whether anything would be gained unless the President changed his mind and said, "I will give you the information." Then, when the leader of the Democratic Party, before seeing any of the evidence, made a speech in Chicago and said, "What the Senator from Wisconsin says is all untrue," I thought the only thing to do was what I have done, namely, to let the people of the country know what is going on, and then hope that the pressure of public opinion would be great enough to force the President to clean house. Frankly, I think he will not clean house until he determines it is politically inexpedient for

him to do otherwise. I think the President is one of the cleverest politicians this Nation has ever had. I think when he discovers that the people of the country do not want a continuation of what is going on, there will be a housecleaning.

I shall be glad to yield to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. FERGUSON. Is the Senator familiar with the rule as laid down by the President that not only will he not permit any Member of the Congress or a congressional committee to have access to loyalty files, but that he will not permit the person in charge of them to testify before a committee as to any facts relating to a person's loyalty?

That was true in the Remington case, in which he told an admiral of the Navy, who had charge of one of the files containing disloyalty information, that the admiral was not permitted to testify in relation to it. Is the Senator familiar with that?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am.

Mr. FERGUSON. Therefore, it seems impossible for the committee which might be named to be successful unless the President of the United States should change his order. Does not the Senator feel that the proper committee to investigate the matter is the Appropriations Committee, which has to appropriate the money to pay those persons? The State Department's appropriation is now before that committee. I understand that Mr. Acheson will appear before the committee. That will be the place for the Senate actually to obtain information on those particular persons, not only as to whether they are now in Government employ, but information as to the entire record of the State Department, the FBI, and other departments as to their loyalty.

Mr. McCARTHY. I will say that any committee that looks into the matter will have all the cooperation I can give it. I shall be more than happy to go before the Appropriations Committee and give it all the information I have. I think the Appropriations Committee should certainly look into the question, especially so in the case of the Voice of America.

I think the Voice of America program is a very important program if properly conducted. I think it is almost impossible to spend too much money on it if the money is wisely spent, but I think the picture which we find in connection with

the New York office of the Voice of America should be examined by the Appropriations Committee and that that committee should use a bright light and find out exactly what is going on. I shall cover that matter in some detail when I get down to the final case.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. CAPEHART. Is it not a fact that if it had not been for a congressional committee Alger Hiss would not have been convicted?

Mr. McCARTHY. I think there is no doubt about that. The Senator will recall that at the time the House Un-American Activities Committee turned up the information on Hiss the President said in a public statement, "We had all this information already." I do not know whether he had it, but if at that time the Un-American Activities Committee had decided to quit, Hiss might have been in Calcutta, instead of Service, which might not have been too bad.

Mr. CAPEHART. Is it not reasonable to assume that in the file of Mr. Hiss there are possibly some good points as well as derogatory evidence?

Mr. McCARTHY. I think even the most fanatical Communist may treat his wife and children well; he may provide for them well. I do not think that is the question. The question is whether these persons are a threat to the United States. No matter how much good information there may be in the file regarding them, so long as they are loyal to Russia and to the Communist Party, and disloyal to this Government, I think they have no right to hold Government positions. I think it is a privilege to have a Government job, not a right.

Mr. CAPEHART. Is it not a fact that every man who has been convicted possibly had some good points about him, and there were some persons who would testify that he was a kindly and an honest man?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is certainly true.

Mr. CAPEHART. I did not quite understand the argument which was used a little earlier, that there might be some good points in the files. What difference does it make how many good points there are if the persons involved are Communist sympathizers and fellow travelers? Our jails are filled with persons who were perfectly honest up to

the time they performed the acts or deeds which got them convicted. Is not that true?

Mr. McCARTHY. I take the position that it is not my task to take 81 cases and try and get all the evidence and then determine whether the intelligence unit which evaluates it was doing a good or a bad job. All I am doing is presenting enough of the picture so that I hope both the Democratic side and the Republican side will forget politics and help clean house. I think this is something in which we cannot think of politics as usual. If I were to give my Democratic friends some advice it would be that I think we should get together and do some house cleaning. I notice the Senator from Mississippi frowning. I do not think he was present when I made it clear that if the Democratic Party as represented in the Senate had control of the executive branch I thought we would not have the sorry picture we have today.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. Certainly.

Mr. WHERRY. Is it not a fact, to boil this all down, that the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin is simply asking that an appropriate committee of the Senate make a thorough investigation not only of the files but of any other source of information possible, and let that committee determine whether there are any disloyal persons or Communists, or what have you, such as the Senator has listed in these 81 cases? Is not that the whole crux of the matter?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct.

Mr. WHERRY. Whether there are good things or bad things to be said about them, all the Senator is doing is asking that an investigation be made by an appropriate committee of the Senate. Whether that is correct procedure or not, the Senator is within his rights in asking it.

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct. I do not think a Senate committee can do a complete job unless the President will make the facts available.

Mr. WHERRY. Whether an investigation will accomplish the very thing which the distinguished Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON] labored about will depend on whether all the information in the files is forthcoming to the investigating committee.

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct. I do not claim that all the cases I am reporting to the Senate refer to persons working in the State Department, but in view of the fact that most of them were in the State Department and had top-secret clearance, I think the Senate could call them before a committee and find out in what Government work they are now engaged, or, if they are not engaged in Government work, what they have been doing in private employment, and whether they are members of espionage rings. I am not concerned with the numbers over which the Senator from Illinois labored all night long, whether there are 205 or 57. It is a question of whether there are Communists in the State Department. As to three of them the record is so bad that I can find nothing good regarding them. I cannot conceive of the Secretary of State keeping them on. Under the McCarran law the Secretary of State has the absolute right to clean out any debris he cares to.

Mr. WHERRY. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. Has the distinguished Senator contacted the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations relative to the files which he now has? Inasmuch as the distinguished Senator mentioned that fact, I certainly should like to pay a compliment to the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, and other members of the committee, who have done a pretty good job in insisting upon the departments making reports as to the progress which is being made relative to the subversiveness of persons who are in the departments, and they could do a better job. I should like to state that if all other committees fail, I believe the Committee on Appropriations would be a very good place to start, because if appropriations are withheld from a department or an agency, it can be brought around very quickly.

Mr. McCARTHY. I have unlimited respect for the ability of the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, the senior Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR], and I should like him to know now that at any time at all, tomorrow or the next day, or whenever he wants me to do so, I shall be glad to come to his committee and give him all the information I have. I believe the committee should decide after further and complete investigation, and

after they have asked the President for the files, which of the names they wish to make public.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. DONNELL. I understood the Senator to say that he had made an offer to the President of the United States. Will the Senator state what that offer was and how it was made?

Mr. McCARTHY. I shall be glad to do so. From Nevada I sent a telegram to the President. I was out there making a Lincoln Day speech. I sent a telegram to the President telling him that I had names in my possession and that they were available to him. I have a copy of the telegram here.

Mr. WITHERS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. WITHERS. What kind of speech was the Senator making?

Mr. McCARTHY. A Lincoln Day speech.

Mr. WITHERS. I thought the Senator said it was a Republican speech.

Mr. McCARTHY. We call it a Lincoln Day speech.

Mr. WILEY. The appellations are synonymous.

Mr. McCARTHY. I sent a telegram to the President saying, in effect, "Mr. President, I have the names of 57 individuals in the State Department who are Communists, and those names are available to you." I suggested, however, that he dissolve the order for secrecy. Otherwise, just getting the names would be of no benefit. I heard nothing from the President, except that I read his statement at a press conference to the effect that the Senator from Wisconsin was not telling the truth.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. DONNELL. When did the Senator send this telegram to the President?

Mr. McCARTHY. It was approximately a week ago.

Mr. DONNELL. And the Senator has received no direct response whatever from the President or from the President's office?

Mr. McCARTHY. I have received no response from the President, and no acknowledgment. All I know is that according to the newspaper account the

President is reported to have said that the Senator from Wisconsin was not telling the truth.

Mr. DONNELL. Did the Senator inform the President in the telegram that the 57 persons are or have been in the State Department?

Mr. McCARTHY. I did.

Mr. DONNELL. Notwithstanding the notice given to the President by a Member of the Senate a week ago by telegram, there has been no response received by the Senator from the President?

Mr. McCARTHY. None whatever.

Mr. DONNELL. If these persons are Communists—and we are not deciding that question at the moment—they have been allowed, so far as the Senator knows, to continue in whatever official positions they occupied during the intervening approximate week. Is that correct?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct. I might say that I read the telegram into the Record. I shall be glad to hand a copy of it to the Senator. Since that time the majority leader also joined with the President in reflecting upon the truthfulness of the junior Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. DONNELL. Has the Senator already placed in the Record a copy of the telegram which he has just handed me?

Mr. McCARTHY. I have.

Mr. DONNELL. I missed that part of the Senator's address.

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes, the telegram is in the Record.

I believe I was on case No. 34. This individual was originally cleared for employment in the State Department on June 2, 1946. Since that time, according to the State Department's file, he has admitted his communistic sympathies. I understand that he has resigned in order to take other Government employment. He was not discharged.

Case No. 36. This individual is 43 years of age. He is with the Office of Information and Education. According to the file, he is a known Communist. I might say that when I refer to someone as being a known Communist, I am not evaluating the information myself. I am merely giving what is in the file. This individual also found his way into the Voice of America broadcast. Apparently the easiest way to get in is to be a known Communist.

Case No. 37. This individual has been in the United States since 1930 and was employed by the Office of Information and Education on April 22, 1947. He worked for the Russian Embassy in Turkey for 3 years. From 1944 to 1947 he was with a Russian welfare society. This individual is a very close associate of a known Communist now also with the Voice of America broadcast. The note says that this individual is still with the Voice of America broadcast.

Case No. 38. This individual is employed in a very responsible position in the Broadcasting Division of the Voice of America. As early as December 10, 1946, investigation by the State Department's security agency showed that this man was a fanatical Communist, that he was anticapitalistic, and definitely followed the Communist Party line. In this case there were reports from two different Government investigative agencies. Another Government investigative agency advised that a reliable informant reported that a well-known Communist in Newark, N. J., gave him the unqualified information that this individual was a paid-up fellow party member. While acting as a newspaper reporter prior to his present employment with the Voice of America broadcast he was reported by his superiors to have colored his news reports with Communist theory, and did not give complete and unbiased coverage to such reports. That is important because it is this individual who is now handing out news reports on the Voice of America program. A very close friend of this individual and his brother stated that both are definitely communist.

Mr. WITHERS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield again?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. WITHERS. What is the gentleman's name? Did the Senator call his name?

Mr. McCARTHY. No.

Mr. WITHERS. The Senator did not call any name?

Mr. McCARTHY. Oh, no.

Mr. WITHERS. The Senator does not know who it is?

Mr. McCARTHY. I have called no names. The Senator from Connecticut, I think, gave the best reason why, namely, that we should not attempt to try to convict a man, that that should be done by a committee. I am submitting the evidence without giving the names. I have avoided that in every way possible.

Mr. WITHERS. Does the Senator think all the employees in the State Department are Communists?

Mr. McCARTHY. No. I think the vast majority of these employees are being done an almost irreparable wrong by having them painted with the brush of communism. I have been a lawyer, and out of 100 lawyers there may be 99 honest lawyers and 1 shyster, 1 crook, and the 99 get a bad name. That has happened in the State Department. If there were not some good, honest, loyal men in the State Department, men who were willing to risk their positions, I would not be able to give this report here tonight. I think the vast majority of those employees are loyal, protecting the security of the country for the time being, and in honesty to those employees the shady characters should be removed.

Mr. WITHERS. Will the Senator permit another question?

Mr. McCARTHY. Certainly.

Mr. WITHERS. How does the Senator feel about attacking these men without calling names? How does the Senator feel the other employees who are straightforward feel about it, when he reflects on all of them, and does not call names?

Mr. McCARTHY. I think the condition today is so fraught with danger, I think we are in a period so definitely close to war, that even if we do damage some of the honest employees, I must take the only method I know of whereby I think we can secure a house cleaning. This information is nothing new. This has been known to the Secretary of State, or should have been—it is in the files—for a long time. I have decided that this is the best way of forcing the President to give the Congress the information so that it can clean house, as he apparently is not going to. Whether it is wrong, the Senator can decide for himself. I personally feel that this is the most effective way I can do this all-important job, and I intend to continue attempting to do it in this fashion, until the Senator or someone else shows me that there is some more effective, fairer way.

In that connection, I might say that I am very happy that there are so many Senators on the other side of the aisle who so thoroughly disagree with the majority leader. The majority leader has been condemning me rather vigorously for not giving the names of the people.

I have been making every effort possible to keep the information in such form that no one can detect the names, until a full hearing of each case has been held.

Mr. WITHERS. I should like to ask the Senator what reason he has for not calling names. Does not the Senator think it would be a fine thing to let the public know who the guilty are? Is not the Senator privileged?

Mr. McCARTHY. Earlier this evening the Senator from Illinois said, "You are privileged if you make a mistake. If out of the 81 there are some innocent, if you malign them," the Senator from Illinois said, "you are protected." I made the statement then that when the day comes that I ever say anything on the floor of the Senate which I will not be willing to state off the floor of the Senate, on that day I will resign from the Senate.

Mr. WITHERS and Mr. LUCAS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield; and if so, to whom?

Mr. McCARTHY. I still yield to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. WITHERS. If the Senator does not call names, has he not reflected on the whole Department of State, every one of the employees?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is entirely possible, I will say to the Senator.

Mr. WITHERS. The Senator has the right in the Senate to call those names.

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct.

Mr. WITHERS. But the Senator refused to do so. The Senator asked if I could state a better way. I will say a better way is to give the Senate, the public, the press, and everyone the name of every person the Senator says labors under any suspicion.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator for his suggestion. I do not think I will follow it, however, but I thank the Senator very much.

Mr. WITHERS. I would be better satisfied if I could go along with the Senator in that way. I would hate to follow the Senator only in part.

Mr. McCARTHY. I was not trying to be humorous. I respect the Senator's judgment. I have given the matter a great deal of thought, however, and the way I am presenting the matter is the way I think it should be done, and I intend to present it in that fashion.

Mr. WITHERS. The Senator simply tells us there are persons who are Communists but does not tell us who they are. Is that correct?

Mr. McCARTHY. I believe the Senator was not on the floor of the Senate all evening. I have stated repeatedly that I would go before any Senate committee and divulge names. I have said further that if it were the feeling of the majority of the Senate that they did not want it done in that fashion, that they feel we can do it in a better way, that we can do a better job by making the names public on the floor of the Senate I will be glad to abide by that decision. However I think that would be a mistake. I have dug out information which I think is of the utmost importance and I think we should get down to the job of trying to clean out these unusual people.

Mr. WITHERS. Does the Senator indict or accuse or what is he doing in this speech?

Mr. McCARTHY. I did not understand the Senator's question.

Mr. WITHERS. Is the Senator indicting those whom he claims are guilty of the charges he makes?

Mr. McCARTHY. Am I indicting those who are guilty?

Mr. WITHERS. Yes.

Mr. McCARTHY. I am not indicting those who are guilty. I am giving the Senate information about persons whom I consider to be Communists in the State Department.

Mr. WITHERS. In other words the Senator is suspicious that something is wrong without calling the names?

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator is a smart man. I know the Senator is. I have had many conversations with the Senator and I respect his intelligence. The Senator knows exactly what I am doing. The Senator knows I am giving the Senate what the State Department's investigative agency has said about these investigations. When the State Department's investigative agency has said that this man is a Communist, and that agency says he should not be working in the State Department, I am telling the Senate that. When the officials of the State Department say they will not discharge the individual, anyway, I am giving that to the Senate. I am giving all the information I can to the Senate. The Senator from Kentucky knows exactly what I am doing.

Mr. WITHERS. Does the Senator know that I, like all others, am curious to know the names? When the Senator gives the cases, the press and country at large would like to know who they are.

Mr. McCARTHY. First let me say that this matter is too important for me to use it as a utensil whereby I can satisfy someone's curiosity, no matter how much I would like to see his curiosity satisfied. I do not intend to satisfy anyone's curiosity. I intend to do everything I can to try to clean up what I consider to be a bad mess.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, does the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. CAPEHART. Is it not possible that the Senator from Kentucky might learn the names of these people sooner than he might like to?

Mr. WITHERS. I would like to know them if the Senator would tell me. I will make this observation. The Senator from Kentucky certainly could not learn the names too soon. If the individuals in question are guilty, I should like to say to the Senator from Indiana that no American could learn their names too soon.

Mr. McCARTHY. If I may suggest to the Senator, he is a member of the majority party, and I trust he is on much better terms with the President than I am. All the information I have given the Senate is in State Department files. There are several ways the Senator can obtain the names. No. 1. He can go to the President and say, "Mr. President, how about this case number so-and-so? Let me obtain the further facts on it."

Another way is to sit in when the proper committee asks for the names.

A third way, I will say to the Senator, is simply to come over to my office tomorrow morning and he can see the names, and I will satisfy his curiosity.

Mr. WITHERS. I shall be glad to. Does the Senator object to my divulging the names, if I see them? Have I that privilege?

Mr. McCARTHY. I think it is up to the proper committee—

Mr. WITHERS. I think we should tell the people who they are.

Mr. McCARTHY. I think it is up to the proper committee to decide whether it wants to divulge the names. Let me make myself clear to the Senator. If the majority of the Senate want me to

divulge them in that fashion, yes. But I am not going to follow the Senator's advice and say, "Here you are, Senator, divulge them." Period.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. LUCAS. The Senator divulged four names in his speech in Reno, Nev. Why does the Senator refuse to divulge others before the Senate?

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator knows that he is not stating the facts correctly. I read the speech I made.

Mr. LUCAS. Oh—

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me finish. I read the speech I made.

Mr. LUCAS. Oh—

Mr. McCARTHY. Do not read to me from the Washington Post.

Mr. LUCAS. I have the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, and a few other newspapers.

Mr. McCARTHY. I read to the Senate the speech I made at Reno, Nev. That speech was recorded. If the Senator wants a copy of that record I shall be glad to write to the Republican committee there and ask them to send the Senator a copy of the record. I think it will cost about \$3 or three and a half. The Senator can play that record if he wants to. Otherwise, he can read what I read today into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

I said there was a man, John Service, and I did not say he was one of the 57. An AP reporter called me and asked, "Were you naming the 57?" I said, "No. I did not say these people were Communists. They are not part of the 57." I said, "Here is John Service." I gave his record. Now I may think he is a Communist, but I do not have his file. His file for some mysterious reason has disappeared and is locked up in the safe of the top brass of the State Department. I discussed Service, who was picked up by the FBI when turning over State Department documents. I pointed out that while he was in China he recommended that communism was the hope of China. I commented, as I recall—and it is all in the RECORD here—on the fact that he was now on his way to Calcutta, India, to establish an Indian policy. I made it very clear that he was not one of the 57.

Then I took two other names and I said, "Here is what happens when you clear them out of the State Department." I gave the name of Mrs. Kenney, who

had been listed by the FBI as a courier of the Communist Party while working for the Government. I pointed out that when she was forced out, because of public pressure and the FBI statement, that then she ends up where she is today, in one of the educational organizations or in some part of the UN Organization. I pointed out that the other one—and the Senator was present, and I should not have to repeat this again—who had been in the State Department as secretary to an Assistant Secretary of State. He was labeled as an outstanding Communist. When he was forced out of the State Department he went to work for the UN. I think both those individuals are Communists. Certainly if they are not, they look like them, they talk like them, and they walk like them. As one of my farmer friends once said, if a fowl looks like a duck and quacks like a duck and eats like a duck we can assume it is a duck. Those two individuals certainly answer that requirement.

Then I referred to a fourth one. I made it very clear that he had never been with the State Department. He is a man called Shapley. He headed up the peace conference in New York.

I pointed out to the Senate that Shapley had headed up this outfit that the State Department called a tool of Russia and a sounding board for Communist propaganda. That was in April. The State Department issued a press release in July, to the effect that they appointed this man on the advisory commission—I do not know the name of it—which advises the State Department on UNESCO. So I wish the Senator from Illinois would not plead ignorance of that. He knows it. I went over all this for the Senate earlier today.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes; I am glad to yield.

Mr. LUCAS. The only reason I ask about these four is that it is my understanding the Senator did name them in his speech at Reno, Nev., and that the Senator said definitely—and I am now quoting only from the newspapers, and that is all I have been able to find out other than what the Senator has said tonight—in reply to a question by a reporter if he called these people traitors, he said, "I did not. I did not call them Communists either."

Is that what the Senator said?

Mr. McCARTHY. If the Senator wants to argue about the four, I will say, so that his mind will be at ease, that if he wants me to make it 50 instead of 57 I shall be glad to include two individuals who were named, one by the FBI and the other by the Un-American Activities Committee as being a courier for the Communist Party.

I do not get the Senator's argument. Does he say these people are Simon pure and that I maligned them? I talked about them publicly. If anything I said was not true, they can sue me for libel and slander. If it will make the Senator happy, I will be glad to say that all of them except Service are part of the 57. The only reason I do not include Service is because his file has disappeared, and I am trying to confine myself solely to information which is confirmed by the State Department's own investigative agency.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. LUCAS. I do not have any quarrel with what the Senator says. The only thing I am trying to do is to reconcile the Senator's speech here with the speech reported in the newspapers, and I have not received a satisfactory answer.

Mr. McCARTHY. What would the Senator like to know?

Mr. LUCAS. I should like to know how he reconciles what he has said in the speeches he has made at Republican rallies with what he is saying here tonight. In other words, he named four persons when he was in the West. I agree with the Senator from Kentucky that the sooner the Senator can name these persons, the better off we will all be. So far as I am concerned, it will not be in executive session. If I have anything to say about it, it will be in the open, where every individual in America, every newspaperman can attend, so that they will know definitely, as soon as possible, just who is being charged and who is not being charged with being Communists. That is only fair, as the Senator from Kentucky has so ably pointed out, because every individual in the State Department tonight is under a cloud, he is under a shadow as the result of what the Senator from Wisconsin is doing. I want to get the honest-to-goodness Americans from under that shadow, and whatever Communists are there, the majority party on this side of the aisle will be found to be just as strong in demand-

ing that we clean house, if the Senator has the proof, as is anyone else. The Senator does not need to worry about that.

But the Senator has been moving around here—

Mr. McCARTHY. I ask the Senator to wait a minute, please; I do not yield any further at this time.

The Senator from Illinois says it is my job to prove these things. Since when has it been the job of a Senator who is a member of the minority, Mr. President, to clean house for an executive department? That is the task of the majority, and I hope they take that task on their shoulders.

Nothing the Senator from Illinois has done here tonight indicates that he even remotely realizes the seriousness of this problem.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, let me say that when he makes that statement, he simply does not know what he is talking about. I appreciate the seriousness of the situation the Senator is discussing. No one understands it better than the Senator from Illinois and the country as a whole do, as a result of the speeches the Senator from Wisconsin has made upon this question. If the Senator thinks there is anything frivolous about this, or that we are not trying to cooperate with him in this matter, he simply does not understand the situation.

We are going to help get the facts, and the Senator from Wisconsin is going to help us get the facts. He says he has the evidence there. All that needs to be done is for the Senator to come forward, along with the persons in the Intelligence Department from whom he has been able to get the information in the State Department. We will have them here. The Senator will have to tell us that, of course, and we will ferret this out, from top to bottom.

Mr. McCARTHY. Do I correctly understand that the Senator from Illinois now demands that the President allow the State Department to bring to a Senate committee all the information in the files on these individuals? Or does the Senator feel that that should be kept secret, and that it is my job to probe behind the iron curtain and get the information?

Mr. LUCAS. The Senator from Wisconsin has already been behind the iron curtain.

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator from Illinois says it is my task to get the information. Does not he realize that is the task of the majority party and the majority leader? Does not he agree with me that the President should say to the Congress, in all honesty and fairness, "Here is a serious situation. I will open the files and let the proper committee examine them and learn what the facts are?"

Mr. LUCAS. That is the old argument which has been advanced ever since the days of John Marshall in respect to controversies between the executive and legislative branches of Government relating to the opening of the files. We have had that question over and over again.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I decline to yield further.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, does the Senator decline to yield to any Senator?

Mr. McCARTHY. No; I simply do not wish to prolong what is completely pointless on the part of the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. LUCAS. The whole evening has been rather pointless.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. I understood the Senator to say, in referring to two men, that they walked like Communists, looked like Communists, and talked like Communists. I think if we could spot Communists by their looks—

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, if the Senator from New York is asking a question, I yield; otherwise I do not yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. I will come to the question in a moment.

I think that if we could spot Communists by the manner in which they walk, our task in fighting communism would be far simpler than it is.

I would very much appreciate it if the Senator would tell us—and he would make a real contribution if he would—how he could spot any man as being a Communist by his looks or by his walk. If he can do that, he certainly must have powers of perception which go far beyond anything known in human history.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, let me say to the Senator that I think it is a great mistake to take something that is so very important and try to make a farce of it. The Senator from New York

is intelligent enough to know that if I say a man looks like a duck, eats like a duck, and walks like a duck, I mean that in a figurative sense. The Senator likewise knows that if I say a man looks like a Communist, walks like a Communist, and talks like a Communist, I mean that if a man associates with Communists and talks as Communists do and is very friendly with Communists, praises communism, attacks and belittles American democracy, joins Communist-front organizations, contributes money to them, and praises the Russian Communist system above our own, he probably is a Communist.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, let me observe—

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I call for the regular order.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I think I should let the Senator from New York observe what he has in mind.

Mr. LEHMAN. I wish to point out that the Senator's answer certainly is not responsive to my question. He tried to identify these men as Communists—and they may be Communists—because, as he described them, they walk like Communists, they look like Communists, and they talk like Communists. That is an issue that is not new in politics. The accusation is made by the Senator—

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, let me make clear that I have not seen them physically walk; I have not looked upon their faces; but when I speak of their looking like Communists and acting like Communists and walking like Communists, I am speaking of the record of those men and how they look in that record. The Senator from New York knows that.

I do not know whether those men are tall or short or fat or lean.

Mr. LEHMAN. I did not think the Senator could describe a Communist by the way Communists look.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. DONNELL. Referring to the request for secrecy in regard to these names, I ask the Senator whether he has tried to keep these names secret from the President of the United States?

Mr. McCARTHY. No; I have not. I have offered the names to the President.

Mr. DONNELL. I ask the Senator whether in the telegram he sent from

Nevada about a week ago to the President, there appears this language:

In the Lincoln Day speech at Wheeling, Thursday night, I stated that the State Department harbors a nest of Communists and Communist sympathizers who are helping to shape our foreign policy. I further stated that I have in my possession the names of 57 Communists who are in the State Department at present. A State Department spokesman promptly denied this, claiming that there is not a single Communist in the Department.

Then, omitting some intermediate portions of the telegram, does not the telegram to the President resume as follows:

Despite this State Department black-out, we have been able to compile a list of 57 Communists in the State Department. This list is available to you.

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct.

Mr. DONNELL. Did the Senator so telegraph the President?

Mr. McCARTHY. I did.

Mr. DONNELL. Did the Senator then continue in his telegram to the President, as follows:

But you can get a much longer list by ordering Secretary Acheson to give you a list of those whom your own board listed as being disloyal, and who are still working in the State Department.

Is that a part of the telegram the Senator sent?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct.

Mr. DONNELL. The Senator referred to having spoken at Wheeling on Thursday night. That was Thursday night, February 9; was it not?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct.

Mr. DONNELL. Where did the Senator speak the next night?

Mr. McCARTHY. I did not speak anywhere the next night. The telegram was sent on Saturday, the 11th, in the afternoon.

Mr. DONNELL. So 9 days have elapsed since the sending of that telegram to the President of the United States, signed by the Senator from Wisconsin, I assume. Is that correct?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct.

Mr. DONNELL. And the Senator has not yet received any response?

Mr. McCARTHY. I have not.

Mr. DONNELL. Did the Senator ever at any time indicate to the President of the United States that he would not reveal the names of the 57, upon the President's request?

Mr. McCARTHY. In order to keep the RECORD absolutely clear, let me say that the telegram places no conditions upon my offer to reveal the names. However, in talking to some members of the press several days later, I told them I did not think I would feel free to give the President the names if he were going to maintain the iron curtain of secrecy, and merely say, "57 more red herrings," and claim that the men were simon pure, with no investigation made.

At that time I did indicate that a condition in connection with giving him the names would be that he draw back the iron curtain of secrecy. That condition was not stated in the telegram, but in fairness to the President I say that I assume that the condition was brought to his attention.

Mr. DONNELL. And if it does draw back the iron curtain of secrecy, of which the Senator from Wisconsin spoke, the Senator from Wisconsin is perfectly willing to give the President the names of every one of the 57 persons; is he?

Mr. McCARTHY. There is no question about that. Furthermore, I urge that the proper Senate committee convene, and I shall be glad to give the committee the names.

Mr. DONNELL. And the Senator from Wisconsin will give that committee every name; and the Senator offered a few moments ago, did he not, to give to the Senator from Kentucky, himself, personally, the names, tomorrow morning, if he wants them.

Mr. McCARTHY. I withdrew that, however, because the Senator said he wishes to make the information public.

I have been a lawyer a long time, as the Senator from Missouri has; and I am convinced of the communistic connections of these persons—although it is true that some of them might not have paid dues to the Communist Party. But the reports are so convincing that I am confident those persons are working closely with the Communist Party.

Nevertheless, I do not think that, as a general proposition, one Member of the Senate should rise on the floor of the Senate and should make public the names of 81 persons in that way. If the matter were so urgent that that would be the only way to proceed, the names could be gotten, that would be another matter. But all of us will be back tomorrow, a committee can be convened tomorrow,

and I am perfectly willing to give the names to a committee.

Mr. DONNELL. The Senator from Wisconsin is perfectly willing to give the names to a Senate committee. Is that correct?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct.

Mr. DONNELL. I thank the Senator.

Mr. McCARTHY. If the majority of the Senate thinks it is proper to make them public on the floor of the Senate, I shall be glad to do so.

Mr. NEELY. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. NEELY. A moment ago the distinguished minority leader [Mr. WHERRY], demanded the regular order. I second that demand. The Senator from Wisconsin is discussing an unresponsibly important question. He should be permitted to conclude his address without further interruption, and we should be permitted to hear all that he has to say without being required to sit up all night like wild cats and having to sleep all day tomorrow like hoot owls. Therefore I propose to object to any further yielding by the Senator to anyone, for any purpose except that of asking a question, and I shall demand the strict enforcement of the rule.

Mr. WITHERS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield only for a question.

Mr. WITHERS. I wish to ask one or two questions.

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield for as many questions as the Senator wishes to ask.

Mr. WITHERS. The Senator from Wisconsin stated a short time ago that he would not disclose the names of the persons to the President unless the President would use the names and would pull back the iron curtain; the Senator from Wisconsin said he would give the names to the President if he would start to work on them.

Mr. McCARTHY. No, Senator, this is not a game.

Mr. WITHERS. Wait a minute. I asked the Senator a question. Let him answer it.

Mr. McCARTHY. May I answer the Senator.

Mr. WITHERS. Yes.

Mr. McCARTHY. It may not be the answer the Senator wants, but it will be an answer. I may say to the Senator,

this is not a game. I have told the President he could have the names, and subsequently I indicated I felt it would be useless to give him the names and let him issue a whitewash statement, saying "57 red herrings." I felt that the minimum the American people could ask for was that he revoke the rule which, so far as I know, had never been in existence before he enforced it. He should not be worried about a Congress which has a majority of his own party, and when he does that, he can have the names. But I do not want the names buried behind a curtain of secrecy. I have enough confidence in the Senate however to feel that any committee of the Senate, when it gets the information and takes the trouble to go over it, together with the names, will insist that the President give them the information to which they are entitled. I believe perhaps the American people, both Democrats and Republicans—and I do not think, Mr. President, there will be found any party line of division—the 150,000,000 American people will say to the President, "Mr. President, you cannot hide these Communists behind an iron curtain. Give the Congress the information which is in the files; let them know; let them decide whether or not a house cleaning is in order." I am sure that if the Senator sits in on the hearings—and I hope they are extended—I am sure before he gets through he will agree with me 100 percent.

Mr. WITHERS. I want to ask the Senator this question: If I understand the Senator, he would not give the names to the President, unless the President would use them. Now, I asked the Senator for the names. The Senator said he would give me the names. I told the Senator I wanted to use them, and he would not give them to me, because I was going to use them. In other words, the Senator refused to give them to the President, because he would not use them, and he refused to give them to me, because I intended to use them. Does the Senator find himself in an inconsistent attitude in that respect?

Mr. McCARTHY. I wonder whether we have understood each other. I told the Senator if he came to my office tomorrow morning he could have all the names. As I understand the Senator—and I may have been mistaken—he said he would make them public.

Mr. WITHERS. Yes, that is using them.

Mr. McCARTHY. That is using them.

Mr. WITHERS. Yes.

Mr. McCARTHY. Then the Senator from Kentucky is correct; the Senator from Wisconsin will not give him the names in the morning.

To continue. We were on Case No. 38. This individual is employed in a very responsible position in the Broadcasting Division of OIE, the Voice of America. As early as December 10, 1946, an investigation by the State Department's own security agency was to the effect that this man was a fanatical Communist; that he is anticapitalistic and definitely follows the Communist Party line. Another investigative agency advised that a reliable informer reported that a well-known Communist in Newark, N. J., gave him the unqualified information that this individual was a paid-up party member. I believe I have commented on the fact that here we have two Federal security agencies, each reporting the same thing. I believe I have read this, in regard to his activities as a newspaper reporter.

At the time he organized a strike and picket line, he had repeated conferences with a well-known New York Communist whose name is, of course, in the State Department's report. The State Department's own security agency recommended that this individual not be retained. However, as of today he is in the extremely important position in the broadcasting division of the World-Wide News Unit of OIE, in New York City, thereby to at least some extent controlling information which we are giving to the balance of the world. Do Senators follow this? This is a man who in 1946 was reported, not by one agency but by two, and the security agency recommended that he be dismissed. That was 3 or 4 years ago. The man is still in that very important position. This seems to be one of the most dangerous cases we have. In view of the Secretary's statement that he would discharge before sundown any Communists now in the State Department whose name was brought to his attention, I suggest that he immediately take action on this individual. He can start on him. The Secretary has about 12 hours more or less, in fact, about 18 hours, before sundown. He can show his good faith by discharg-

ing this man. He should have no trouble whatever finding him. He will find that two Federal investigative agencies said, "This man is a Communist, do not keep him; get rid of him." He will find that the man is still working. The Secretary, in case he has not acquainted himself with the McCarran bill, will note that he has the absolute right to terminate this man's services tomorrow. I should like to hope that we would get word from the Secretary to the effect that he had done so.

Case No. 39. This individual was appointed on January 2, 1947, as an economic analyst in Research and Intelligence. Again we find the old pattern back in Intelligence. He had been employed by the Soviet Purchasing Commission for a period from 1932 to 1945. In other words, he worked for the Soviet Purchasing Commission for 13 years. It was established by the State Department's own investigator that this individual could not have qualified for a position with the Soviet Purchasing Commission unless he were a member of the Communist Party. Despite this fact, this individual was given a job in Intelligence; which, as may have been noted, seems to be a favored spot for the Communists.

As to this individual, I frankly do not know whether he is now in the State Department or not.

Case No. 40 is that of another individual in Research, in the State Department since 1947. I do not have too much information on this, except the general statement by the agency that there is nothing in the files to disprove his communistic connections. He is still with the Government.

Case No. 41 is that of an individual born in 1910 in Cleveland, Ohio, appointed to a high position with the State Department, drawing the sum of \$8,478.75 as an Assistant Chief in the Division of Occupied Areas. He is still in a high-paid position in the State Department. Investigation by the State Department's own security agency disclosed that most of his close associates and friends have records as fellow-travelers and Communists. He admitted having contributed money to a Communist-front organization.

There is a memorandum in the file to the effect that Joe Panuch had made considerable efforts to get this man out of the State Department. He was un-

successful, however, and, incidentally, the information I get—and this is not so much from the files—is that this man Panuch tried to do a job of housecleaning and was given somewhat of a free hand under Jimmy Byrnes in starting to accomplish the job. However, when Byrnes left and Marshall took over—Senators will recall Acheson was then Under Secretary—the first official act of General Marshall was to discharge the man, Panuch. Obviously, General Marshall did not know anything about the situation. Some one of the underlings said, "Get rid of this man." It would seem to be only the logical thing that he would not, as his first official act, discharge a man, unless the Under Secretary said, "Get rid of him;" which is rather unusual. Here is one man who had tried to do the job of house cleaning, and the ax falls.

Case No. 42. This individual came to the United States in 1940, and was naturalized in Alabama in 1943. He returned to Germany as a civilian employee of the War Department in November 1946. He was appointed by the State Department to one of our intelligence departments. Both his brother and sister are listed as possible agents of the Comintern, and are active in Communist circles. There was evidence recommending dismissal. The report is that the evidence is sufficient to recommend dismissal. There is no information that indicates anything other than close Communist connections. Despite this fact, this man was never fired, but finally resigned in June 1947.

Case No. 43 is that of an individual who is a research analyst in the Division of Research for the Far East. He was recommended for the position by an individual who was listed by the FBI as a principal in a Soviet espionage case. The record indicates he is running very closely with a pack of Communists. This again is the old pattern—one Communist gets into a department, and he recommends another. In this case the FBI said the man who was trying to get him in is a principal in a Soviet espionage case.

Case No. 44. This is a rather interesting case of an individual who was sent to Paris to represent the State Department. A note dated September 15, 1947, listed him as cleared for Unesco placement. He was described in reports by various witnesses as interested in communism

and by his roommate at the International House as a Communist. He pals around with a friend of two individuals known to be either Communists or fellow travelers. There is something in his file which I think is rather interesting. A note addressed to "David" and signed "M" inquires as to whether there is danger of this individual having another mental breakdown, which he had at one time in the past. While I do not have the exact wording of the note it, in effect, says get rid of this man, otherwise he may break and cause embarrassment if Congress gets ahold of him. The note is contained in the man's private file. It is a pencil note. Reading such stuff as this, one is not surprised at the President's action in signing the order, lowering the curtain.

Case No. 45 is the case of an individual who was a ranking official in the Office of Financial Development Policy. He was appointed in August 1946. Investigation indicates that he was very closely tied up with at least three individuals who have been named as Communists. He also recommended for appointment an individual very closely tied up with a Communist, who has been named as an espionage agent. So far as I can discover, this man was never discharged, but apparently resigned later, whether to take other government employment or private employment, I do not know.

Case No. 46 is the case of a man who holds a high position in the State Department. He had been affiliated with the magazine *Amerasia* from May 1937 to November 1941. This magazine consistently followed the Communist Party line. It was under the direction of Philip Jaffe and Frederick Vanderbilt Field. Field has been a leading Communist and was one of the heads of the American Peace Mobilization, which the President and the Secretary of State publicly labeled as a tool of communism. Jaffe, as Senators will recall, was convicted and fined in connection with the John Service incident. It will be recalled that the FBI picked up Service for having delivered secret State Department documents to *Amerasia*. The State Department files show that this individual has been working very closely with these two men. On March 22, 1946, the State Department's own security agency recommended as follows:

It is recommended that action be instituted to terminate subject's service with the

State Department. It is suggested to achieve this purpose that an appropriate officer of the Department should inform him that his continued presence in the Department is embarrassing to the Department and that he be given an opportunity to resign. If he should not resign voluntarily, action should be instituted under Civil Service Rule No. 12 to terminate his services with the Department.

The Department, however, took no action upon this recommendation.

After that recommendation, the files show that this individual requested a fellow traveler to seek a position with the Board of Economic Warfare. The file further shows that this individual has been visited on several occasions by an alien fellow traveler. He has also recommended two former employees of the *Amerasia* Editorial Board to positions with the State Department. In other words, Mr. President, the usual tactics of getting into an important position and then bringing in fellow Communists.

A report dated August 18, 1947, recorded an interview with a former member of the Editorial Board of *Amerasia* who labeled this individual as "far to the left—awfully close to a fellow traveler." This individual was a subscriber to the *Daily Worker*. The file names a Communist Party member who has twice worked for this individual. The Biographical Register of the State Department shows him to be still in a position of importance there.

Case No. 47. This individual was employed in March 1944 as Division Assistant in the Division of Internal Security. The House Un-American Activities Committee advised on August 18, 1947, that an admitted former Communist Party member was formerly associated with this individual in Communist activities in Washington, D. C. This individual's husband admitted having been a member of the Communist Party. The husband now has a highly confidential position with the Navy Department. The file indicates that this individual has been associated with a group of known Communists.

Keep in mind, Mr. President, that she was given a job in the Division of Internal Security.

A report dated July 16, 1947, states that in 1941 a Senate investigating committee had found that both this individual and her husband were members of the Communist Party. A report dated September 15, 1947, by a Government investigative

agency, advised that a reliable informant reported this individual as a Communist, and that she has been recently contacting a member of the Soviet espionage ring. This individual is still in a highly paid job in the State Department.

Cases Nos. 48 and 49. One of these individuals is in the State Department in the Division of Occupied Areas. The wife is with the State Department in the Division of Research and Intelligence. The file shows that both the husband and wife are known to be close associates of individuals linked with Soviet espionage activities. Nevertheless, the wife was approved for top-secret material on the 11th of February 1947. The order approving her is rather unusual, in that it states, in effect, that the reason for her being approved for top-secret material was that there was insufficient information to warrant her discharge on grounds of disloyalty.

Case No. 50. This individual is an executive secretary in the State Department. He has been reported by another Government investigative agency as having been in contact with a Soviet espionage agent. He is also a close friend of two employees of the State Department who are under investigation because of Communist associates.

Case No. 51. This individual agreed that he was responsible for the State Department's having employed an individual in one of the cases which I covered earlier today. It will be recalled that No. 14 was the case of an individual having furnished material to a known secret espionage ring and who had consistent contacts with the long lists of Communists and suspected Soviet agents. He is still holding an important position in the State Department.

Case No. 52. This individual works for No. 16—I think that is the correct number—who, the State Department files indicate, was one of the most dangerous espionage agents in the Department. This individual was also temporarily employed as a correspondent of another individual listed as a Soviet agent by a Federal investigative agency. He and his wife are also close associates of two other alleged espionage agents who are named in the State Department files. He is presently holding a high-salaried and important position in the State Department and has been given top-secret clearance.

Here is a rather important case. In fact, they are all important. This is case No. 53, involving an individual who has been named by a confessed Communist spy as part of his spy ring. Prior to that time, on August 19, 1946, another governmental agency received information to the effect that he was a recognized leader of the Communist underground. This individual is, in my opinion, Mr. President, one of the most dangerous Communists in the State Department.

Case No. 54. This individual has been connected with a number of Communist-front organizations and was active in attempting to secure the issuance of a nonimmigration visa to a French Communist leader. This individual is presently employed in the State Department.

Case No. 55. This individual was a close friend and associate of an individual described earlier in the day. It will be recalled that he was a very close associate of Soviet agents. A previous employer of this individual described her as having been "wrapped up" in communism and that she later married a man who was also a Communist. The files of the Department show that "she and her husband are contacts of a subject in the — espionage case." The case referred to is a recent and very important Communist case.

Case No. 56. This individual was born in Russia and naturalized in San Francisco in 1929. Two former supervisors on non-Government jobs had recommended him unfavorably. The only favorable reference he had was from three Russian individuals, all in Government employment. He roomed with one of the Russians who had recommended him. The Navy Department informed the State Department that this individual had secret State Department documents in the room shared by him and the other Russian. An investigation was instituted, the outcome of which I do not know. However, this individual was still in the State Department as late as December 1949.

Case No. 57. This individual was employed by the State Department in 1946 as a P-7 consultant. On June 7, 1946, a Government investigative agency advised that this individual was the contact man for a Russian espionage ring.

This report also included information to the effect that he had played bridge and exchanged language lessons with

persons in the Soviet Embassy. On June 7, 1946, the same investigative agency reported that a known Soviet espionage agent was arrested with his wife in Finland in the 1930's, and that while in custody this espionage agent's wife has requested the American consul to forward on her behalf a request for funds from this individual. This individual had been in charge of the training of Soviet marines at one time at a Russian port. Nevertheless, this individual, on September 11, 1947, was given top-secret clearance. The clearance officer in this case said:

In the absence of additional highly derogatory information I feel that top-secret clearance should be given.

I have been unable to find out whether this individual is working with the State Department at the present time, and, if not, whether he is in private or Government employment.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. Certainly.

Mr. LEHMAN. I should like to ask the Senator from Wisconsin whether he has submitted the names represented by the reports he has read and the other approximately 250 names to which references have been made? Has he submitted those names to the Secretary of State?

Mr. McCARTHY. I do not follow the Senator's question. Have I submitted 250 names?

Mr. LEHMAN. I asked whether the Senator had submitted to Secretary Acheson the names represented by the reports which he has read, as well as the other approximately 250 names to which references have been made. The reason I mentioned 250 names is because I am adding the 57 names to the 205 names which have been mentioned on several occasions. I ask whether those names or any substantial number of them have been submitted to the Secretary of State?

Mr. McCARTHY. I have given Secretary Acheson nothing—period.

Mr. LEHMAN. I did not understand the Senator's answer.

Mr. McCARTHY. I said I have given Secretary Acheson nothing—period. So that there may be no confusion, and I think I have explained it twice to the Senator—the Senator is not dull and knows what I am talking about—the 205 persons who were mentioned in Secre-

tary Byrnes' letter were those whom the State Department refused to fire after the Security Agency had recommended that they be fired. I told the Senator that I did not have those names. All I have is the total number. The Secretary of State has those names, however. All he needs to do is to go to his files.

Mr. LEHMAN. I thank the Senator for conceding that I am not dull, but I still do not understand why these names have not been submitted to the Secretary of State. I can understand the Senator's unwillingness to submit to this body or to any other public body the names of men accused on somewhat unsubstantiated charges, but I do not understand his unwillingness to submit the names to the responsible official, the head of the State Department, whom he is accusing of laxness. I wonder whether the Senator will make some further explanation in order that the matter may be clear to me.

Mr. McCARTHY. I am afraid that if it is not clear to the Senator now I shall never be able to make it clear to him, no matter how much further explanation I make. I told the Senator that the Secretary of State has the names as to which I am reading the numbers. They are in the files of the Secretary of State. I am giving the Senator information which is confirmed by information in the files in the Office of the Secretary of State. It should be clear to the Senator that all the information which I am giving on the floor of the Senate has been available to the Secretary of State for a long time. If the Secretary of State does not know that the investigative agency has recommended that certain individuals be discharged, he can easily check and find out. The files are all in his possession.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield for a question.

Mr. LUCAS. Does the Senator know, or can he tell Senators, whether or not the Loyalty Board has checked any of these persons whom he is describing here by numbers?

Mr. McCARTHY. I have just told the Senator I do not know.

Mr. LUCAS. I thank the Senator. I do not believe that the name "Loyalty Board" has come into the debate as yet. But I am not sure. I was not clear as to

what agency the Senator was referring to.

Mr. McCARTHY. The name I used was "investigative agency." When employees from temporary war agencies were transferred to the State Department, a board was set up to screen them. Whether that was called the Loyalty Board, I do not know. It was an investigative agency. I do not know that at any one time there were two investigative agencies. There may have been.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. LUCAS. If I understand the Senator correctly, the persons who are represented by the numbers which he has now given to the Senate, without giving any names, have been recommended to be discharged by the Loyalty Board selected by the President of the United States.

Mr. McCARTHY. I do not know whether that is correct. I have tried to make this clear. I do not have the names of all the individuals the Loyalty Board recommended be discharged. I found in the reports, however, a sizable number whom the investigative agency has recommended should be discharged. Let me make that clear. There was one group of 205, back in 1946. Since that time the investigative agency recommended that other groups be discharged. The treatment which was given to those recommendations was substantially the same as was given to the recommendations in 1946. In 1946, Secretary Byrnes said, out of 285, 79 were discharged. That is the first group. With subsequent groups the same action was taken. I have never had the names of all the groups. I do not even know how many there are. I know 206 is the definite number in the first group, because the Secretary of State has said there were 206.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. LUCAS. Is the Senator familiar with the personnel of the Loyalty Board?

Mr. McCARTHY. Frankly, I am not.

Mr. LUCAS. If it should turn out that some of the individuals whom the Senator has named by number have been cleared by the Loyalty Board, would that affect the Senator's opinion with respect to those persons?

Mr. McCARTHY. I would have to know something of the personnel of the Loyalty Board. When Communists are able to get their men into the Central Intelligence Agency and into the highest spots in the State Department, I assume that a prize target would be the Loyalty Board. So I cannot tell the Senator what I would think of this Board's recommendations. If I had an FBI report on the Loyalty Board, and if it were a good, competent board, certainly that would mean something to me. However, when I find that some individuals who have been reported by the investigative agency to be Communists were given top-secret clearance, and if the loyalty board is in charge of giving top-secret clearance, it would indicate that the Loyalty Board is not too competent.

Mr. LUCAS. I do not know what part the Loyalty Board has played in this investigation.

Mr. McCARTHY. Nor do I.

Mr. LUCAS. But I am sure they will be in it, because undoubtedly they have checked and double checked these individuals who are now identified by numbers. The Senator will find that the President's Loyalty Board is headed by a very capable and competent lawyer by the name of Seth Richardson, who is a very representative Republican and a tremendously loyal American. I see two Senators on the Republican side rising.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. NEELY. I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MAGNUSON in the chair). Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from Illinois for a question?

Mr. LUCAS. All I say is that I hope the Senator will look at the names of the members of the Loyalty Board.

Mr. NEELY. Mr. President, I intend to object to any Senator making a speech in the time of the Senator from Wisconsin. I made that statement before. He will either hold the floor or lose it.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I might say that I thank the Senator from West Virginia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from Michigan for a question?

Mr. McCARTHY. I will yield in a moment. I thank the Senator from West Virginia. The hour is getting late, and I am very willing to yield for a

question, but if I am to finish these remarks tonight, I do not care to yield for any more speeches.

I yield to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. FERGUSON. I merely desired to ask the Senator whether he knew that Seth Richardson was the head of the Loyalty Appeals Board, and not the board which might be operating in the State Department.

Mr. McCARTHY. I understand that Mr. Richardson has no jurisdiction whatsoever over any State Department employee, unless a State Department employee feels he has been badly treated, and appeals to Mr. Richardson's board. But Mr. Richardson does not pass upon any of the cases originally. If the State Department fails to fire a man who should be discharged, then nothing comes to Mr. Richardson.

Mr. FERGUSON. Is it not true that the Senator is speaking about a security committee, composed of State Department employees, rather than a loyalty board, and that he is speaking about a committee that was in existence prior to the Loyalty Board?

Mr. McCARTHY. I might say that I do not know what the technical name of the investigative agency is. I know that within the State Department investigations are conducted. Some of those investigations may be conducted by the FBI; I do not know. I find, however, that in some cases information is received from several investigative agencies. What the technical names are, I frankly do not know.

Case No. 58. This individual was a research analyst with OSS from July 1944 to September 1945, when he was transferred to the State Department, where he is presently in the Research Division. He has been a member of at least one Communist-front organization. For many years he has been a close friend of an important subject in a Russian espionage case, both residing in the same apartment building. A Government investigative agency reported on July 11, 1947, that he was a member of the Communist Party. Now, I ask the Senate to listen to this. He is holding an important position in the State Department today, even though he was reported on July 11, 1947, to be a member of the Communist Party.

Case No. 60. This individual was employed by OSS, in the Division of Re-

search, from June 1942 to September 1945, at which time he was transferred to the State Department. He is now a branch chief in Research and Intelligence. One of his former supervisors stated that he was a Communist.

For some time he has resided with another State Department employee, previously mentioned herein, whose investigation was requested because of communistic activities. Nevertheless, this individual has been cleared and is still working in an important position where he handles top-secret material in the State Department.

Case No. 61. This individual is employed in Research and Intelligence in the State Department. He has been very active in UPWA, and one of his references has been closely affiliated with Communist-front organizations. A Government investigative agency has indicated the very strong possibility of a close tie-up between this individual and another Communist. The file indicates that additional investigations in this case are necessary. He is still in the State Department.

Case No. 62. This file is not important insofar as communistic activities are concerned, but rather is important because it sheds light on some rather unusual mental aberrations of certain individuals in the Department. In this connection, it perhaps should be mentioned that the types of individuals described in this file are regarded as bad security risks by most investigative agencies for the reason that they are rather easy blackmail victims. This file I recommend to the attention of any committee that cares to investigate it. It goes into some detail in regard to the peculiar—how can we put it?—the peculiar mental twists. I was trying to handle this matter delicately. I think this will be of interest to the committee in that it gives a rather interesting picture of some rather unusual mental twists of these gentlemen who are tied-up with some of the Communist organizations.

Also, it is confirmation of what I believe I mentioned earlier this evening when I was talking about one of the top investigators in Washington. I said to him, "Why do you find so many people fanatic about communism? Is there something that is so inviting about it? Is there something mentally wrong?" He said, "You will find if you search

deep enough that there is something mentally or physically wrong with every one of them." There is certainly something wrong with this group. I might say that the new security officer has recommended that they get rid of all such individuals regardless of whether they are shown to have any communistic connection or not.

Case No. 63. This individual is employed by the State Department in Research and Intelligence. He was with Army Intelligence from 1944 to June 1946. In April 7, 1947, he was given a security clearance from the State Department. The files of the State Department investigative agency show that he is a very close associate of a former War Department employee who was dropped because it was believed he passed information and material to Soviet agents. One of his associates at the War Department, with whom he has since been in contact, is an individual who has been very active with communistically inclined groups. He has been a very close associate of another known Communist sympathizer. He has been given top secret clearance despite association with other known Communist sympathizers.

Case No. 64. This individual is presently employed in Research and Intelligence in the State Department. Again we find them in Research and Intelligence. The investigative agency files show that informants stated that he and his wife maintained a communistic and un-American attitude. The file indicates that the wife admitted being a member of the Communist Party. The file further shows that he is a close friend of a number of Russian agents connected with a major espionage case.

The investigation of this case was held up because the investigation at that time might have upset the investigation of what was considered a major espionage case, which was in the process of investigation. This individual apparently still enjoys clearance to top-secret documents.

Case No. 65. This individual is also still in the State Department in the Office of Information and Education and holds an important position. It would appear from his activities that he is very definitely communistically inclined. However, it is entirely possible that this individual is merely a left-winger who has been dominated by No. 81, who will

be covered later, and a group of Communists and fellow travelers who have surrounded No. 81, to the extent that he has received credit for many of the Communist activities of No. 81. By No. 81 I refer to the case which I shall cover shortly. For that reason, while the work flowing from his office would indicate that he is sympathetically inclined at least toward Communists, I would hesitate in labeling him as such. In any event, however, I feel that he certainly is a bad risk in that position.

Case No. 66. This individual is also employed by the State Department as a music director in the Voice of America. He was listed on the draft classification as 4-F because of being a psychoneurotic. He and his mother, with whom he lived, provided a coffee kitchen for communistically inspired protest groups. He also worked for a time for a Communist-dominated organization. He studied for a time in the New School for Social Research under Hans Eisler, who, Senators recall, appeared before the House Un-American Committee. This individual is mentioned principally because he seemed to be representative of the group which accumulated around No. 81, whom I consider one of the big shots.

Case No. 67. This individual was employed by OWI in March 1942, and transferred to the State Department when that agency was taken over by the Department. After a meeting of Communists and Communist sympathizers, he was arrested for disorderly conduct. Two members of the Soviet underground attempted to get him out of difficulty and hush up matters so he would not lose his position in the State Department, which indicates that he is of importance to the Soviet underground. This information was set forth in detail in a memorandum dated June 17, 1946, by an investigative agency, and brought to the attention of the State Department. However, this individual was still with the State Department in June 1947, and still had top-secret clearance. On July 19, 1947, a hearing was finally held. I am not aware of the outcome of this hearing. However, my best knowledge is that he is no longer with the State Department, but whether he resigned, was discharged, or whether he received a job with some other Government agency I do not know. I feel this case is important, Mr. President, for a number of reasons; one of them being that after

it was definitely proven that the Communist underground had a deep interest in this man, and wanted to help him out, he still was given access to top-secret material for more than a year.

Case No. 68. This individual was with the OIE. He signed Communist Party petitions in which he alleged that he was a member thereof, as did his parents also. On November 4, 1941, the Civil Service Commission recommended his removal from the Government. This was never acted upon. He is still in the State Department and has been given top clearance.

Case No. 69. This individual was also employed by the OIE. However, little information was available on him except that he is a Russian, and that his sister is a known Communist and that he associates closely with Communists.

Case No. 70. This individual again is the typical Voice of America employee. The investigative agencies have indicated that he is affiliated with Communist-front organizations and has communistic sympathies. He is still with the State Department.

Case No. 71. This individual was employed by OIE in February 1943. He entered the United States in 1942 illegally. He is a Bulgarian. He lived 6 months with the editor of a Communist-controlled Bulgarian newspaper. He is a close associate of known Communists.

The Government investigative agency reported that the subject was reluctant to bear arms during the war, and that he faked inability to understand or speak English so as to avoid the draft. He was issued a certificate of naturalization on October 8, 1945, on a false petition which stated that he entered the United States on May 6, 1941. He is still working for the State Department, despite a rule that aliens shall not work therein, and while I have not been able to go into the matter completely, I have been informed that he also has top-secret clearance.

Case No. 72. This case, Mr. President, is interesting in that it is the direct opposite from the cases I have been reading. I cite it to show that unless one has a communistic background one cannot qualify for a position with the Voice of America, at least in the New York office. This man applied for a job with the Voice of America. He was investigated in the fall of 1946 for a position on the Russian desk of OIE. Investigation showed he

was a refugee from the Red revolution. He was naturalized in 1927. He has a reputation as an expert in Russian affairs, having studied them for a period of many years. He was employed with OSS from February 1942 to December 1942, and then was requested to resign. He was forced to resign because of Communist pressure. A known Communist and a NKVD agent in the United States openly stated, according to the Intelligence files, that he was too anti-Communist to be employed by OSS. This man's immediate superior with OSS told him he was forced to fire him because of circumstances beyond his control. A high State Department official confirmed the reason for this man's dismissal from OSS.

This individual was very highly recommended by several witnesses as a high type of man, a democratic American, who supported democracy for Russia and opposed communism. However, he was turned down and was never employed by OIE. This was at a time when they were taking on all the other debris I have just described. Fortunately, however, his services are being presently made use of by McCloy in Germany, where he is acting fiscal adviser and, I understand, doing a good job. I believe I overlooked stating that he was born in Kiev, Russia, in 1877. I do not confuse this man, as I said, as being a Communist. The reason I cite the case is to show that the one good, sure way not to get into the Voice of America is that one is a loyal American and an anti-Communist.

Case No. 73. This individual is in the Foreign Service. He was born in 1913, practiced law from September 1936 to September 1942. He was with the Board of Economic Warfare from November 1942 to September 1943. He has been with the State Department as a senior economic analyst from September 1943 until the present time. He was an applicant for a position as Foreign Service career officer. An investigative report dated June 1947 disclosed that he has always associated with known leftists and was highly recommended by four well-known fellow travelers. While in California his closest associates for several years were two active Communists. A former law associate of this individual refused to recommend him for Federal employment, stating he was extremely

far to the left. A memorandum in his file dated December 12, 1946, requested investigation of black-market activities on his part in Spain. No report on this point, however, has been made available. A superior court judge in California, who has known the subject well, stated that under no circumstances would he recommend him for a Government position, because of his extreme leftism, and that he would not have him in any responsible Government position. Another California judge said this individual associated closely with fellow travelers, and he would definitely not recommend him. This individual, to the best of my knowledge, is still in Foreign Service, stationed in Madrid, Spain.

Case No. 74. This individual was employed on an American mission to the Far East during 1947. Intelligence units indicated that he was furnishing information to a Russian agent, and two sources of information reported that he was representing himself as an American intelligence agent. At that time he had been given clearance to confidential information. He was relieved of his particular assignment and transferred to different work within the Department.

Case No. 75. This individual was employed in December 1946 in the Foreign Service in the State Department. According to the files in the Department, he is a known contact of two suspects in the investigation of Soviet espionage activities in the United States. The investigative report dated March 1947 showed he sent material to one of the Soviet espionage suspects who had previously given him the names of two well-known Communists whom he could contact abroad.

Case No. 76. This does not involve communistic activities, but does shed some light upon the possible reasons for some individuals' being employed by the State Department. This involves the case of a young man who was very patently incompetent and who had made gross misstatements in his application. He was turned down for employment. One of the superiors in the Department then wrote a note to the officer who had the task of deciding whether or not to employ this young man. That was after pressure had been applied from above to get him a job. The following is the comment made by the employing officer: "If \_\_\_\_\_ is so little concerned with the quality of Department personnel, there is

little we can do. I believe he is more interested in the politics of the situation."

That is signed and dated.

Case No. 77. This young man applied for a position in the State Department. The file indicates he is a very close friend of reported Communists, and that he is closely associated with members of Communist-front organizations. The file indicates that his wife belongs to an organization listed as subversive by the House Un-American Activities Committee, and that a relative of his has a financial interest in the Daily Worker.

Mr. President, I believe I have covered this case before, and what I have just said seems to be a repetition. This is the case of a young man who ended up as a speech writer in a well-known house in Washington.

Case No. 78. This individual has made application for a P-8 position in the State Department. He has been employed by the Treasury Department from April 1940 up to the present time, except for military release from July 1942 to December 1942. State Department files show that he was highly recommended by two individuals engaged in Soviet espionage activities. Another Government investigative agency indicated that he was one of the contacts of the subject of a Soviet espionage case. One of his references refused to recommend him because of his association with pro-Communists. This individual is still holding a high-salaried position with the Treasury Department, in work, as I understand, directly with the State Department.

Case No. 79. This individual is on the special project staff at the State Department. The intelligence report in his file indicates that numerous informants reported he was pro-Communist, radical, and of dubious background. However, I understand he has been given top-secret clearance.

Case No. 80. This individual is a chief in the Division of International Labor. The Department's investigative agency indicates receipt of information in October 1946 to the effect that this individual was a member of at least one Communist-front organization and is a fellow traveler. He, however, still retains his position in the State Department.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. Does the Senator from Wisconsin have a case No. 37 among the cases he is presenting?

Mr. McCARTHY. I cannot tell at the moment, because the reporters for the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD have been using some of my papers. But I assume I had a case No. 37.

Mr. FERGUSON. I wondered why the Senator took them out of order. Is there any reason why he did not take them in order, beginning with No. 1, and going down through them?

Mr. McCARTHY. I did take them in order.

I get the impression that the Senator may have a file of his own, and apparently I do not have the same cases he has. I am very glad to know the Senator has, if that is the answer. However, I have taken them in order.

Mr. FERGUSON. I thank the Senator.

Mr. McCARTHY subsequently said: Mr. President, some of the papers have just been returned to my desk; and if I may do so, I shall give the Senator from Michigan the information that I do have, a case No. 37.

Mr. FERGUSON. The Senator does?

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes.

Mr. FERGUSON. May I see it?

Mr. McCARTHY. Certainly.

Next, Mr. President, I come to case No. 81. I think this individual has been doing this Nation untold damage because of the high position she holds in the Voice of America. This individual was in the Voice of America project, in the New York office, until some time ago. She was transferred to Europe, technically under control of the Commanding General, in the same type of work as the Voice of America, and subsequently the entire project was transferred back to the State Department, and she is today in the State Department.

I should like to read this material. Incidentally, this is the last case we have.

The file in this case contains a wealth of information indicating that this individual is an extremely dangerous and active Communist, completely disloyal to the United States, and loyal to Soviet Russia. Much of the information here, however, was given in strictest confidence but I shall try to give somewhat of

a picture of this person.

It is perhaps sufficient to point out that the witnesses without exception have stated in essence that this individual has collected in her office a mixture of fellow-travellers and pseudo liberals and outright Communists. These witnesses indicate that the group is close knit and attempts a vicious character assassination of anyone who attempts to disagree with them, and apparently rather successfully so.

All this information comes from the files of the investigative agency, and, as I have just said, shows that the witnesses indicate that the group is close knit and attempts a vicious character assassination job of anyone who attempts to disagree with them.

The witnesses without exception seem to feel that this individual has exerted a great deal of control over the information used on the Voice of America, and is doing the United States immeasurable damage.

I understand that this individual is now in Europe, and, although technically under the control of the Army, is in effect, to all intents and purposes, under the control of the State Department, and is still doing the same work as that involved in the Voice of America, formerly worked on in New York.

Mr. President, since this paper was dictated night before last I find that she is back in the State Department.

Immediate steps should be taken, in my opinion, to obtain not only the discharge but the prosecution of this individual.

Mr. President, I may also say that I feel very strongly that cases Nos. 1, 2, and 81 should not only be discharged but should be immediately prosecuted. However, unless the President will cooperate with us in that, the possibility of a successful prosecution is rather remote, because of the complete iron curtain of secrecy.

I wish to thank very much the Senators who very patiently have remained here and have listened to what may have been somewhat tedious during the last 8 hours.

I assure them that I tried to keep my remarks as brief as possible, while at the same time giving Senators all the pertinent information from the files.

MARCH 30, 1950

### Information on Lattimore, Jessup, Service, and Hanson Cases

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, first I should like to pay tribute to 13 people who have been of unlimited help to me in this matter, and without whose night and day work it would not have been possible to assemble the facts which have been assembled to date. If the work is effective in accomplishing what we hope it will, the thanks of the Senate should go to those people, who are my staff.

I shall be glad to yield freely during the speech. However, I crave the indulgence of Senators not to ask me to yield until I have reached the point of presenting certain documentary evidence in the Lattimore case. I believe that questions asked of me before that time would be premature. Therefore, I shall decline to yield until I have presented certain documentary evidence in the Lattimore case.

Mr. President, before going into matters which I think might be of interest to the Senate in the Lattimore, Jessup, Service, and Hanson cases, I thought it might be well to clear the air and record in regard to two matters.

As the Senate knows, there has been considerable criticism by a number of well-meaning people of the naming of names in public before the individuals have had an opportunity to be heard.

It might be well, therefore, to briefly cite the record as to why names have been named in public rather than in private. On the 20th of February, as the Senate will recall, I gave to the Senate in some detail 81 cases of individuals whom I stated the files indicated ranged all the way from being bad security risks to very dangerous individuals.

At that time I pointed out that perhaps some of those individuals would be able to produce facts to offset the effect of the material in the files and show that they were actually loyal employees. I stated in effect—and while I have not had an opportunity to check the number of times in the record, my office tells me that I did so over a dozen times—that I would consider it extremely improper and unfair to name names in public

before the individuals had a chance to appear in executive session.

The leader of the majority [Mr. LUCAS], however, on five separate occasions demanded that the names be publicly named. His first demand was on page 2043 of the RECORD. Again on page 2046, he had this to say:

I want to remain here until he names them. That is what I am interested in.

Again on page 2049, he said:

Will the Senator tell us the name of the man for the Record? We are entitled to know who he is. I say this in all seriousness.

Again on page 2053, he said:

The Senator should name names before that committee.

Again on page 2063, he said:

Why does the Senator refuse to divulge names before the Senate?

The very able Senator from Kentucky [Mr. WITHERS] also on almost countless occasions asked me for the names, stating on page 2063:

Does the Senator realize that I, like all others, am curious to know the names? When the Senator gives the cases, the people and the country at large are entitled to know who they are.

At that time, in answer to the urging of the Senator from Illinois and the Senator from Kentucky, I stated that I would not give the names in public unless a majority of the Senate demanded that they be made public, and this is all a matter of record.

After the subcommittee had been appointed and the Senator from Maryland [Mr. TYDINGS] made chairman, he saw me on the floor of the Senate and stated that a public hearing had been scheduled, and asked if I would be ready to appear and testify. At that time I urged that the hearings be in executive session, and reminded him of the statements which I had made on the Senate floor.

He informed me that the first hearings would be public, and that later we would go into executive session. Later I was informed by the press that the Senator from Maryland had made the state-

ment that I could present my cases as I saw fit. I again contacted him and told him that if that were the case, I thought the names should be given in executive session, but was again informed that the first hearings would be public.

I then contacted my colleague, the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER] and told him that while I thought this might be good politics for the majority members of the subcommittee because of the position in which it would place me, it was so unfair to some of the individuals who might be able to produce evidence giving them a clean bill of health, that something should be done.

The Senator from Iowa informed me there was nothing that he or the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE] could do because the Senator from Maryland had made the announcement that the first hearings would be open, and it was not even brought to a vote, inasmuch as the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. MCMAHON] and the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN] so obviously went along with him. I do not like to take the time of the Senate on this point, but so much has been said about it in the press that I think the RECORD should be made absolutely clear.

At the time of the first public hearing, after I had begun to testify, and had already passed out to the members of the press the first case covering Judge Kenyon, the Senator from Maryland [Mr. TYDINGS] then told me that if I cared to we would go into executive session. He, of course, knew full well that to go into executive session, so far as the Kenyon case was concerned, would be meaningless, after I had commenced the case and handed the evidence thereon to the press.

I had tried to make it clear that the Kenyon case was presented as one of a sequence which I had hoped to present the first morning, that is, if I had been allowed to proceed. I felt that it was important, not so much from the standpoint of Judge Kenyon but rather as a typical case, to show the complete incompetence of the loyalty board for the reason that in this case the files contained more than 28 documents showing membership in organizations listed as subversive or Communist front—that regardless of this, the loyalty board never even went through the motions of asking the judge for an explanation as to why she joined these organizations, which the Secretary of State himself had

stated were evidence that an employee was a bad security risk.

After being held to the Kenyon case by what I considered rather petty bickering for 2 days during which, according to my staff, I occupied approximately 5 percent of the time, the committee adjourned over the week end and stated that Judge Kenyon would be called as a witness.

The chairman of the committee then magnanimously offered that the other cases which I was prepared to present the first day be given in executive session. I do not condemn or criticize the chairman for this maneuver. It was extremely clever. However, after presenting one case to show how the loyalty board worked, a case which happened to be a lady judge, it would seem unusual in the extreme that the committee retire into executive session to consider the cases of those prominent State Department officials in whose activities the public was so vitally interested.

I might say that, while at the time I felt that the Senator from Illinois was wholly wrong in demanding the names be made public and while I originally was very much disturbed by the very clever maneuvering of the Senator from Maryland [Mr. TYDINGS] in getting the names into public print, I am not too sure that perhaps some good has not been accomplished.

After all, an individual who takes a high Government position must realize that for the good of the country his actions and motives should be subjected to the closest scrutiny. After all, the aims and objectives of the group who have been formulating a rather disastrous far eastern policy should be subjected publicly to a cold and searching light. Therefore I am not too sure that the Senate majority leader and the chairman of the committee may not have performed a service to the country when one insisted that the names be made public and the other maneuvered those names into the public press.

Incidentally, later today I intend to discuss those who think we should write off this entire investigation because it might cause some suffering to the families of the betrayers of America, while at the same time forgetting the vast amount of suffering of the families of the hundreds of millions whom they have betrayed.

Again, Mr. President, I am going to take a very brief time to clear the air on another matter which normally would not be considered of sufficient importance to be referred to, but it has received so much attention by the members of the committee and others that I feel impelled to mention it.

Since my Lincoln Day speech there has been confusion in the minds of some as to the figures used. At every meeting, or in discussing the matter with the press, I used both the figure 205 and also the figure 57. It might be well briefly to review the situation to which each of those two figures apply, especially so in view of the fact that there have been those who have argued that my use of two different sets of figures proves that my information in regard to bad security risks, fellow travelers, and so forth, is false. As to the 57, I said:

I have in my hand 57 cases of individuals who appear to be either card-carrying members or certainly loyal to the Communist Party.

Now as to the figure 205. I shall first read to the Senate a letter written by the then Secretary of State, Byrnes, at the inception of the so-called loyalty program. This letter was written to Representative SABATH and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on August 1, 1946, on page A4892. The letter, which deals with the number 205, reads as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, July 26, 1946.

DEAR ADOLPH: I have yours of May 24 expressing your concern with respect to certain allegations made on the floor of the House to the effect that "hundreds, if not thousands, of employees have been eliminated from the State Department by the screening committee because of communistic leanings or activities or membership." Such statements are incorrect—

I am reading from Secretary Byrnes' letter. I should point out that at that time Secretary Byrnes was under rather heavy criticism from some of the more left-wing elements who claimed that he was indiscriminately firing people because of their left-wing leanings, and this letter appeared to be in answer to that. He said:

Such statements are incorrect and do a grave injustice not only to the employees of the Department but to Government employees as a whole, the great majority of whom are loyal American citizens. I therefore welcome this opportunity to answer your

specific questions in the order in which they are presented.

(1) Pursuant to Executive order, approximately 4,000 employees have been transferred to the Department of State from various war agencies such as the OSS, FEA, OWI, OIAA, etc. Of these 4,000 employees, the case histories of approximately 3,000 have been subjected to a preliminary examination, as a result of which a recommendation against permanent employment has been made in 284 cases—

I believe this is a misprint; I believe it should be 285, but I am not sure—by the screening committee to which you refer in your letter.

(2) Of the 284 individuals who have been the subject of adverse recommendation as indicated in (1), above, the services of 79 have been terminated.

Senators will understand the Secretary was referred to the Board which the President had appointed to screen the State Department employees, and recommend who should be discharged because of their disloyalty or because they were bad risks.

(3) Of the 79 actually separated from the service, 26 were aliens and therefore under "political disability" with respect to employment in the peacetime operations of the Department. I assume that factor alone could be considered the principal basis for their separation.

(4) With respect to the 79 thus separated, the following breakdown is submitted:

Aliens .....	26
Failure to comply with foreign-service regulations, such as citizenship for 15 years prior to foreign assignment and other reasons disqualifying the individual for service abroad.....	13
Close connections or involvement with foreign governments or their organs, past records indicating a high degree of security risk, etc.....	40
Total.....	79

The Department is equally concerned with disclosing subversive activities or associations of all kinds whether Communist, Nazi, or Fascist, in any employees present or prospective.

(5) Because of the security considerations involved in the mission of the screening committee, I do not feel at liberty to disclose publicly the identity of its membership. This committee, incidentally, has no power or authority to eliminate anyone from employment in the State Department. It simply makes recommendations which the Assistant Secretary for Administration may accept or reject in whole or in part in the light of all the relevant evidence.

I call the Senate's attention to the fact that such is still the situation. The Loyalty Board of the State Department has no power whatsoever to discharge any employees, nor has the Review Loyalty Board of the Civil Service Commission. The Review Loyalty Board of the Civil Service Commission can do what they did in the Service case. They can pick up the ball and say, "We are not satisfied with the clean bill of health you gave this man. Send the case back to the Loyalty Board." Then the Loyalty Board is free to do as it sees fit, unless it is reversed, of course, by the Secretary.

I continue to read Secretary Byrnes' letter:

I hope what I have said above corrects any misapprehensions which you may have entertained as to the Department's personnel policy. Like any other administrative mechanism, it is not perfect. However, I am entirely sure that it has been fair to the Department's employees in its operation. It is my firm intention to see that it remains fair.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES.

I then pointed out at various meetings, either in speeches or in discussing the matter with members of the press, that out of the first group of 3,000 employees which was less than 20 percent of the total of the 16,000 who were working in the Department, 284 according to the Secretary's letter were found to be dangerous security risks. I called attention to the fact that for some unexplained reason the State Department insisted on keeping 205 of those whom the President's own security board—appointed for that purpose—named as dangerous security risks. I further pointed out that while I did not have the exact figure on the number adversely ruled on by the subsequent screening of the balance of 13,000 employees of the State Department the modus operandi was the same in subsequent cases; namely, first the security board investigating and, apparently, doing a fairly good job of investigating, and then placing its finger upon individuals that are dangerous from the security standpoint and the State Department discharging a few and retaining the rest. Just so there can be no future doubt or mistake about these figures, let me repeat the figure 205 was used in connection with the Secretary of State's letter to the effect that they were not discharged even though the security

board labeled them as dangerous security risks.

As I have said previously, I do not know how many of those individuals are still in the State Department. How many of those names appear in the list I gave the Senate committee I do not know, but we can assume that it is that sizable number.

The figure of 57 referred to what I called individuals who appeared to be either members of the party or certainly loyal thereto.

Since my Lincoln Day speaking tour, during which I made the statement that I had the names of 57 individuals who were either members of or at least loyal to the Communist Party, a great number of phrases have been interchangeably used, such as card-carrying Communist, fellow traveler, disloyal people, and bad-security risk. Which of those phrases is properly applicable to each of the cases I gave the committee, only complete and painstaking investigation will tell.

A new phrase, however, which might well apply to some of the most dangerous individuals in our State Department—that is, from the American point of view—is bad-policy risk.

By "bad-policy risk," I mean individuals who influence or shape official United States policy, which forwards the interests of the totalitarian communist half of the world at the expense of the free God-fearing half of the world. Whether the individual acts thus because of disloyalty or merely because of stupidity is sometimes relatively unimportant.

The question which I feel should concern the Senate and the country infinitely more than the question of whether any of the particular individuals named have actually paid their dues and carry a Communist Party card, is the question of whether or not—either because of design or for any other reason—they are actually devoted to the interests of this the Nation which has given them the high positions which they hold.

The more deeply I delve into this subject, the more I am convinced that two distinct but at the same time interlocking areas of operations are almost completely controlled and dominated by individuals who are more loyal to the ideals and designs of communism than

to those of the free, God-fearing half of the world. I refer to the Far Eastern Division of the State Department and to the Voice of America.

Let me make it clear that in referring to those two divisions, I do not include all of the employees. I realize full well that of the thousands of employees in the State Department, all but a small percentage are honest and loyal Americans. But that small percentage can and has been doing almost untold damage. The State Department is the life-work of most of those employees. They have given to it years of service, unquestioned loyalty; and they have served it with great pride.

In the far-flung places of the world, those loyal men and women have spent their lives and exercised all their ingenuity to give to their department and their Government every possible bit of information and advice they consider useful.

Career employees of the State Department, by virtue of their long residence in every foreign country on the globe and their close association and, many times, friendship with citizens and officials of those countries, have had access to, and have reported on, every phase of economic and political affairs in the nations to which they are attached. Those are the real experts of the State Department.

It is a tragedy when we find the advice and experiences of such outstandingly able employees stored in a multitude of steel filing cabinets and disregarded, while the Department of State's closed corporation of untouchables call upon pro-Communist idealists, crackpots, and, to put it mildly, bad security risks to advise them on American diplomatic policy.

Two weeks ago I presented to the foreign relations subcommittee some documentation on a Mr. Owen Lattimore. I referred to Mr. Lattimore at that time as a bad security risk. That was at the public hearing. I should have also referred to him by the additional and more appropriate designation of "bad policy risk."

Subsequently, in executive session, I told the subcommittee that I thought this man was one of the top Communist agents in this country. Today, I intend to give the Senate some documentation to show that he is a Soviet agent and also that he either is, or at least has been, a member of the Communist Party.

I realize that this is an extremely shocking statement.

The State Department publicly labels this man as its outstanding authority in the Far East. He is also, and I believe rightly so, described as the architect of our far-eastern policy. Therefore, a charge that this man is an agent of Russia and a member of the Communist Party is one that can be made only after the most deep and painstakingly thorough study. If lightly made without adequate proof, it would be irresponsible to a most alarming degree. On the other hand, any one in the important and responsible position of a Senator who had such information and failed to make it known to the public would be guilty of worse than treason.

Some time ago I worked on the so-called 5-percenter investigation, where I had the honor of serving with the most able Democratic chairman, the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. HOBY], as well as with other members, both Democrats and Republicans, who in my opinion operated in a completely nonpolitical manner. Since that time, certain loyal and disturbed Government employees apparently have felt it their duty to give to me information in regard to individuals and activities which they consider dangerous to this Republic of ours.

The increasing pile of evidence which I have accumulated since that time in regard to individuals holding high positions in our Government—and with apparently not even the remotest sense of loyalty or responsibility to this Nation—has created in me a deep and disturbing fear as to the final result of their activities.

Let us take the case of Owen Lattimore, for example. When his activities first were brought to my attention, the first reaction was, "Why not take this to the President or the Department of Justice?" However, I then recalled two rather famous cases. First, the Hiss case, in which even after a complete exposition of his treasonable acts by the House Un-American Activities Committee, the President shrugged it off with wisecracks, apparently honestly feeling that the only purpose of the committee in exposing traitors high in Government was to hamper him politically. That attitude, the Senate will recall, the President retained even after Hiss' indictment,

when the President referred to this as a red herring. This, of course, could mean only one thing to me—namely, that taking a case of the same or even more serious nature to the President would result in the same red-herring treatment.

The next question which occurred to me was, of course, "Why not go to the Justice Department?" While we have a new Attorney General whom I personally like and respect, I could not help but remember that at the time of the Service case, we also had an apparently able Attorney General. It will be recalled that in that case the FBI, after months of painstaking work by scores, or perhaps hundreds of agents, developed what J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the Department, publicly referred to as "a 100 percent airtight case" of espionage and treason.

J. Edgar Hoover, as everyone knows, is not known for overstating his case. I am sure we all agree that he is the ablest law-enforcement officer in this Nation and, I think, in the world. When he stated that after the tremendous amount of labor put into that case, it was a 100 percent airtight case of treason and espionage, I believe most of us would be willing to rely on his judgment on the case.

Strangely, however, after the arrest of six suspects in that case of treason, there was an unusual sequence of events, resulting in a most fantastic finale. The curtain was rung down when a young Department of Justice attorney disposed of Hoover's six 100-percent airtight cases of treason with a statement to the effect that he could cover all of the facts in that case in less than 5 minutes, and then proceeded to assure the court that there was not the slightest indication of disloyalty.

Obviously, with that treatment by the administration of the carefully investigated and developed case which the head of the FBI called a 100-percent-airtight case of treason, I felt that the Department of Justice was not the correct place to take what I consider an even more dangerous case.

The next question is, Where should it be taken? The answer, I think, is inescapable: to the 140,000,000 American people. That is where I have been taking it, and where I shall continue to take the cases of those whom I consider a danger and threat to this Republic.

When I commenced this work, I realized the fact that the odds were greatly against bringing it to the successful conclusion of cleaning out that small but dominant percentage of disloyal, twisted and, in some cases, perverted thinkers who were rendering futile the Herculean efforts of the vast number of loyal Americans in the State Department who have been even more deeply disturbed than I have been at the way the world is being rapidly delivered to communism.

In discussing this matter with some of my friends before launching upon this project, they pointed out to me the apparent futility of the task, and that the road has been strewn with the political corpses of those who have dared to attempt an exposure of the type of individuals whom I intend to discuss today.

They pointed out to me the obvious fact that those in this Nation who are part of a Communist worldwide conspiracy would stop at nothing in order to attempt to discredit and hamper any effort toward a long-needed housecleaning.

This has been amply proven over the years, and certainly to some additional extent over the past 4 or 5 weeks. In fact, the word has gone out that if only this investigation can be caused to fail, if in this case those who may exert efforts to make it succeed can be sufficiently smeared and discredited, then no one will dare to probe into such devious and smelly passages until it will be too late.

However, over the past few weeks tens of thousands of disturbed American people have written urging that this housecleaning—perhaps I should say rodent-destroying—task be continued. This has given me even greater and renewed confidence in the good common sense and inherent decency of the 140,000,000 people who make up this Nation.

Many of those people have expressed a deep concern for fear that I may quit this fight. I want to assure them now that, in the words of John Paul Jones, "I have just begun to fight."

In connection with the Lattimore case, I have here several documents which might be of some interest. I also have the name of a witness which I am turning over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This witness has been used by the Justice Department as a Government witness in another matter. The

Department has trusted his veracity and publicly indicated confidence in his truthfulness.

This man will testify substantially as follows:

That he has been a member of the Communist Party for a number of years; that he was high up in Communist circles; that his party work required that he know the members of the party so that he might distinguish between Communists who were subject to party discipline and the loyal fellow travelers over whom the party had no discipline.

He will testify that it was part of his job to have this information—not, Mr. President, on every one of the 50,000 or 60,000, or 70,000 Communists in the United States, but on the important ones who were relied upon to do the important work for the party.

He will further testify that Owen Lattimore was known to him to be a member of the Communist Party, a member over whom they had disciplinary powers.

I have before me another document, the original of which is being given to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I quote the pertinent parts from this affidavit:

I met and got to know Owen Lattimore in the spring of 1936 in Moscow when he and E. C. Carter were very obviously receiving instructions from the Soviet Government concerning the line which the Institute of Pacific Relations ought to follow. I would be willing to so testify if subpoenaed. However, I request that my name be not publicly used at this time, but you do have my permission at this time to quote what I have said and give a copy of this to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

I have another statement which I had a great deal of difficulty getting. I had no difficulty obtaining the information from this man, but he was extremely reluctant to sign a statement, fearing that his job might be endangered if he did so. He also stated that he had been reading about how the committee was operating and seemed to feel that if he were subpoenaed and gave testimony which was damaging to anyone charged with communistic activities or of being bad security risks, and so forth, he would be given a rough time by the committee. We tried to reassure him as much as possible and finally obtained this statement. He gave his consent to his name and this statement being given to the FBI. We had to promise him,

however, that his name would not be given to the committee. We had to further promise him that in making known the contents of his affidavit it would not be done in such a fashion that he could be identified.

This affidavit ties Owen Lattimore in so closely with John S. Service and the Amerasia case that before giving the contents of the affidavit I feel it necessary to cover the facts in that case. I, therefore, ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point the case of John S. Service as I presented it to the Foreign Relations Subcommittee.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the case was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### SERVICE

This case is that of John Stewart Service. This man is a foreign service officer of the Department of State and at the moment is in Calcutta, India, where he is helping determine the all-important policy of our Government toward India.

The name of John Stewart Service is not new to the men in the Government who must pass on a governmental employee's fitness as a security risk.

When Mr. Petrify testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee he said that Service had been cleared four different times.

It is my understanding that the number has now risen to five and I earnestly request that this committee ascertain immediately if Service was not considered as a bad security risk by the Loyalty Appeal Board of the Civil Service Commission, in a post audit decision, handed down on March 3 of this year.

I understand that this Board returned the file of Mr. Service to the State Department with the report that they did not feel that they could give him clearance and requested that a new board be appointed for the consideration of this case.

To indicate to the committee the importance of this man's position as a security risk to the Government, I think it should be noted that he is one of the dozen top policy makers in the entire Department of State on far-eastern policy.

He is one of the small, potent group of untouchables who year after year formulate and carry out the plans for the Department of State and its dealings with foreign nations; particularly those in the Far East.

The Communist affiliations of Service are well known.

His background is crystal clear. He was a friend and associate of Frederick Vanderbilt Field, the Communist chairman

of the editorial board of the infamous *Amerasia*.

Half of the editorial board of this magazine were pro-Communist members of the State Department and the committee is in possession of these names.

On June 6, 1945, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, after an exceedingly painstaking and careful investigation covering months, arrested Philip J. Jaffe, Kate Louise Mitchell, editor and coeditor of *Amerasia*; Andrew Roth, a lieutenant in the United States Naval Reserve stationed in Washington; Emanuel Sigurd Larsen and John Stewart Service, who were employees of the State Department (this is the same John S. Service to whom I have just referred and who is presently representing the State Department in Calcutta, India); Mark Julius Gayn, a magazine writer of New York City, who is about to leave for Russia. They were arrested on charges of espionage in connection with the theft of the following Government records: 360 classified documents from the State Department, including some top secret and confidential classifications; 163 prepared by ONI; 42 prepared by MID; 58 prepared by OWI; 9 from the files of the War Department.

Some of the important documents picked up by the FBI at the time of the arrest were as follows:

First. One document marked secret and obviously originating in the Navy Department dealt with the schedule and targets for the bombing of Japan. This particular document was known to be in the possession of Phillip Jaffe, one of the defendants, during the early spring of 1945 and before the program had been effected. That information in the hands of our enemies could have cost us many precious American lives.

Second. Another document, also marked top secret and likewise originating in the Navy Department, dealt with the disposition of the Japanese fleet subsequent to the major naval battle of October 1944 and gave the location and class of each Japanese warship. What conceivable reason or excuse could there be for these people, or anyone else without authority to have that information in their possession and at the same time claim freedom of the press? That was the excuse they offered. They stole this document for no good purpose.

Third. Another document stolen from the Office of Postal and Telegraph Censorship was a secret report on the Far East and so stamped as to leave no doubt in anybody's mind that the mere possession of it by an unauthorized person was a clear violation of the Espionage Act. This was not an antiquated paper but of current and vital interest to our Government and the Nation's welfare.

Fourth. Another document stolen was from the Office of Military Intelligence and consisted of 22 pages containing information obtained from Japanese prisoners of war.

Fifth. Another stolen document, particularly illuminating and of present great importance to our policy in China, was a lengthy detailed report showing complete disposition of the units in the army of Chiang Kai-shek, where located, how placed, under whose command, naming the units, division by division, and showing their military strength.

Many of the stolen documents bear an imprint which reads as follows:

"This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 United States Code 31-32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."

Despite the very small circulation of 1,700 copies of this magazine it had a large photocopying department. According to Congressman Donnero, who sponsored the resolution for the investigation of the grand jury, this department was working through the night, in the small hours of morning, and even on Sundays. It could reproduce the stolen documents—and undoubtedly did—and distribute them into channels to serve subversive purposes, even into clenched fists raised to destroy our Government.

In June 1944 *Amerasia* commenced attacks upon Joseph C. Grew, who had during his stay in the State Department rather vigorously opposed the clique which favored scuttling Chiang Kai-shek and allowing the Communist element in China to take over.

Larsen, one of the codefendants in this case, subsequently wrote a lengthy report on this matter. I would like to quote briefly from parts of that report:

"Behind the now famous State Department espionage case, involving the arrest of six persons of whom I was one, an arrest which shocked the Nation on June 7, 1945, is the story of a highly organized campaign to switch American policy in the Far East from its long vested course to the Soviet line. It is a story which has never been told before in full. Many sensational though little explained developments, such as the General Stilwell affair, the resignation of Under Secretary Joseph C. Grew and Ambassador Patrick Hurley and the emergence of a pro-Soviet bloc in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, are interlaced with the case of the six, as the episode became known.

"It is the mysterious whitewash of the chief actors of the espionage case which the Congress has directed the Hobbs committee to investigate. But from behind that whitewash there emerges the pattern of a major operation performed upon Uncle Sam without his being conscious of it. That operation vitally affects our main ramparts in the Pacific. In consequence of this operation General Marshall was sent on a foredoomed mission to China designed to promote Soviet expansion on our Asiatic frontier. It was a mission which could not but

come to grief and which may yet bring untold sorrow to the American people.

"How did it happen that the United States began to turn in 1944 upon its loyal ally, the Chiang Kai-shek Government, which had for 7 years fought Japan, and to assume the sponsorship of the rebel Communist regime which collaborated with the Japanese during the period of the Stalin-Hitler Pact? How did it come to pass that Washington since 1944 has been seeking to foist Communist members upon the sole recognized and legitimate government of China, a maneuver equivalent to an attempt by a powerful China to introduce Earl Browder and William Z. Foster into key positions in the United States Government? How did it transpire that our top-ranking military leader, General Marshall, should have promoted an agreement in China under which American officers would be training and equipping rebel Chinese Communist units at the very time when they were ambushing our marines and when Communists the world over were waging a war of nerves upon the United States?"

"Whose was the hand which forced the sensational resignation of Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew and his replacement by Dean Acheson? And was the same hand responsible for driving Ambassador Patrick Hurley into a blind alley and retirement?"

In describing the arrest, Larsen had this to say about his arrival at the office of the United States Commissioner:

"There I found myself sitting next to John Stewart Service, a leading figure in the pro-Soviet group in the China Section of the State Department, and to Lt. Andrew Roth, Liaison officer between the Office of Naval Intelligence and the State Department, whom I also knew as an adherent of pro-Soviet policies. Both of them were arrested separately the same night in Washington."

Larsen then goes on to describe John Stewart Service, John P. Davies, Jr., and John Carter Vincent as the pro-Soviet group in the China section whose views were reflected by *Amerasia* and whose members were in close touch with Jaffe and Roth. In connection with this, it will be remembered that John Service, as Stilwell's political adviser, accompanied a highly secret military commission to Yenan. Upon the return of this mission, you will recall that Stilwell demanded that Chiang Kai-shek allow him to equip and arm some 300,000 Communists. Chiang Kai-shek objected on the grounds that this was part of a Soviet plot to build up the rebel forces to the extent that they would control China. Chiang Kai-shek promptly requested the recall of Stilwell and President Roosevelt relieved Stilwell of his command. It was at this time that Service submitted his Report No. 40 to the State Department, which, according to Hurley, was a plan for the removal of support from the Chiang Kai-shek Government with the end result that the Communists would take over.

The espionage cases apparently had their origin when a British intelligence unit called attention to material being published in *Amerasia* which was embarrassing its investigations.

Preliminary investigations conducted at that time by OSS disclosed classified State Department material in the possession of Jaffe and Mitchell. The FBI then took over and reported that in the course of its quest it was found that John Stewart Service was in communication from China with Jaffe. The substance of some of Service's confidential messages to the State Department reached the offices of *Amerasia* in New York before they arrived in Washington. One of the papers found in Jaffe's possession was Document No. 58, one of Service's secret reports entitled: "Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek—Decline of His Prestige and Criticism of Opposition to His Leadership."

In the course of the FBI investigation *Amerasia* was revealed as the center of a group of active and enthusiastic Communists or fellow-travelers. To give you a better picture of *Amerasia*, it perhaps should be mentioned here that Owen Lattimore was formerly an editor of *Amerasia*, and Frederick Vanderbilt Field, a writer for the *Daily Worker*, was the magazine head. Mr. Jaffe incidentally was naturalized in 1923 and served as a contributing editor of the *Defender*, a monthly magazine of International Labor Defense, a Communist organization, in 1933. From 1934 to 1936 he had been a member of the editorial board of *China Today*, which was a publication of the pro-Soviet American Friends of the Chinese People. At that time he operated under the alias of J. W. Phillips. Under the name of J. W. Phillips, he presided in 1935 over a banquet at which Earl Browder was a speaker. He also lectured at the Jefferson School of Social Science, an avowed Communist Party institution. He was also a member of the board of directors of the National Council of American Soviet Friendship. The *New York Times*, subsequent to his arrest, referred to him as an active supporter of pro-Communist and pro-Soviet movements for a number of years.

According to an article in *Plain Talk* magazine Jaffe has been a liberal contributor to pro-Soviet causes and on one occasion he reserved two tables at a hotel banquet held to launch a pro-Communist China front in the name of "The fifth floor, 35 East Twelfth Street," which happens to be the national headquarters of the Communist Party.

I realize that this history of Jaffe's activities is unnecessary for most of the Members of this investigating body, but I feel that the record should be complete so that anyone who reads it will understand the background of the individual to whom his four codefendants had been delivering secret State and War Department material. His coeditor, Miss Mitchell, gave a party for John S. Service when he returned from

China. Service had previously attended a special press conference held by the Institute of Pacific Relations, in which he supported the position of the Chinese Communists.

Larsen had this to say about his codefendants:

"I knew Jaffe and his group as the editor of a magazine which had almost semi-official standing among the left wingers in the State Department."

The night Kate Mitchell was arrested, she had in her possession, according to Congressman DONDERO, a highly confidential document entitled: "Plan of Battle Operations for Soldiers," a paper of such importance that Army officers were subject to court martial if they lost their copies.

Congressman FRANK FELLOWS, a member of the Committee on the Judiciary which investigated the grand jury which failed to indict Service, wrote a minority report in which he stated:

"The author of the resolution under which this committee assumed jurisdiction stated upon the floor of the House. 'The President authorized the arrest to be made and the arrests were forbidden by the State Department.'"

Under Secretary Joseph C. Grew very urgently insisted upon a prosecution of the six individuals who were picked up by the FBI on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage. He thereupon immediately became a target in a campaign of vilification as the culprit in the case rather than the six who had been picked up by the FBI.

Lieutenant Roth wrote a series of articles for a New York paper and published a book in which he vigorously attacked Grew for his opposition to the Communist sympathizers in the State Department insofar as the far-eastern policy was concerned.

Under Secretary Grew, after a lifetime in the diplomatic service, resigned and President Truman announced that Dean Acheson would take over the post of Under Secretary of State.

"During my conference with Mr. Jaffe in October," Larsen said, "he dropped a remark which one could never forget. 'Well, we've suffered a lot,' he said, 'but, anyhow, we got Grew out!'"

In regard to the legal handling of this case, the following is found in Plain Talk in an article by Larson:

"While public attention was largely focused upon extraneous issues, the espionage case itself was following a special course behind the scenes. It appeared that Kate Mitchell had an influential uncle in Buffalo, a reputable attorney by the name of James M. Mitchell, former president of the New York State bar association. Mr. Mitchell was a member of a very influential law firm in Buffalo—Kenefick, Cooke, Mitchell, Bass & Letchworth. The New York City correspondents of that law firm include the most redoubtable Col. Joseph M. Hartfield, extremely well known and extremely influen-

tial in Government circles in Washington. Colonel Hartfield, who is regarded by some as one of the most powerful political lawyers in the country, made at least four trips to Washington where he called on top officials of the Department of Justice in the matter."

In that connection I would like to quote again from Congressman DONDERO's talk on the House floor, in which he stated:

"I have heretofore charged and reiterate now that the court before whom these cases were brought was not fully informed of the facts. A summary of the court proceedings has been furnished to me, which shows no evidence or exhibit obtained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation presented to the court. Jaffe's counsel told the court that Jaffe had no intention of harming the Government, and United States Attorney Hitchcock told the court there was no element of disloyalty in connection with the case. If that is the fact, may I respectfully ask what purpose did these individuals have in mind in stealing these particular files?"

"Had this same thing happened in certain other governments, these people would undoubtedly have been summarily shot, without a trial. Let us not forget we were still at war with Germany and Japan when these files were stolen, and Jaffe, in whose possession they were found had been for more than 10 years a leader and heavy financial supporter of Communist propaganda causes, according to the FBI."

As I stated above, after the grand jury failed to indict Mitchell, Service, and Roth, the House passed a resolution in which it directed the Committee on the Judiciary—

"To make a thorough investigation of all the circumstances with respect to the disposition of the charges of espionage and the possession of documents stolen from secret Government files which were made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation against Philip J. Jaffe, Kate L. Mitchell, John Stewart Service, Emmanuel Sigurd Larson, Andrew Roth, and Mark Gayn, and to report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House, if the House is not in session) as soon as practicable during the present Congress, the results of its investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems necessary."

This committee then confirmed a report of a theft of a vast number of documents from the State, War, and Navy Departments, which ranged in classification all the way from top secret to confidential. This committee report indicates that a number of the members of the grand jury voted for the indictment of Service and Mitchell on the espionage charges, but that the required number of 12 did not so vote.

It will be noted that the committee was not appointed for the purpose of passing upon the guilt or innocence of the espionage suspects, but was appointed for the purpose of investigating the way that the case was handled and to make recommendations. The committee did not in any way question

the theft of the documents. However, it seemed to place a great deal of stress upon the fact that the documents might not be admissible in evidence because of the method of obtaining them.

For example, on page 5, the report states as follows:

"4. Many of the identifiable documents might have had their evidential value destroyed by reason of the possibility of the court's sustaining the defendants' motions attacking the warrants of arrest.

"VI. Judicial decisions require scrupulous care to see that searches and seizures are reasonable. While search and seizure on arrest may be made without a search warrant, yet this is not so unless the warrant of arrest issued after 'probable cause' of guilt had been established by legal evidence."

On page 6, the following statement is made:

"If the warrant for arrest was not issued on 'probable cause' substantiated by facts, the evidence disclosed as a result of the search and seizure incident to the arrest based on such a warrant would be subject to suppression and, therefore, not usable as evidence of the crime for which arrest was made."

While I have not seen any testimony of any of the grand jurors, and do not know where it is available, this would seem to indicate that the committee felt that the grand jury was disturbed, not so much by the question of guilt or innocence of the defendants, but by the question as to whether or not the guilt or innocence could be proven. They apparently felt that much of the material would not be admissible because of the method of search and seizure. The following comment will be noted on page 7 of the committee report:

"Most of the items seized at Jaffe's office were typewritten copies. Some of such copies were proved to have been typed in one of the Government departments. It may be fairly inferred that the originals of such copies were never removed but that copies were made at the department or agency where the original reposed."

This makes it very clear that the committee felt making copies of secret documents and then delivering the copies to unauthorized persons placed the crime in a different class from the delivery of the originals. It is rather difficult to understand this reasoning in view of the fact that photostats or copies of an important secret document would normally be of as much value to an enemy power as the originals. The committee further pointed out that additional reason for not finding the grand jury at fault is because any of the six can still be further prosecuted on the charge of espionage. The majority report makes some excellent recommendations, which the Secretary of State might well read. I especially call his attention to recommendations 1, 2, and 3, on page 9, which read as follows:

"1. That the head of every department and agency of our Government see to it that more—much more—care be exercised in personnel procurement. That all those considered for Government positions in every echelon be investigated so thoroughly as to insure that no one be employed unless absolute certainty has been attained that nothing in background, present attitude, or affiliations raises any reasonable doubt of loyalty and patriotic devotion to the United States of America.

"2. That the watchword and motivating principle of Government employment must be: 'None but the best. For the fewer, the better, unless above question.'

"3. That each and every present employee who fails to measure up to the highest standard should be discharged. No house divided against itself can stand."

One of the members of the six-man committee, Congressman Hancock, was prevented by illness from participating in the report. Two of the members of the committee wrote dissenting opinions, which meant that the decision to absolve the grand jury of responsibility was made by a 3-to-2 decision.

Congressman FELLOWS, in his dissenting opinion, made the following statement:

"Jaffe either took these documents himself or his confederates took them for him. And two of the documents found were 'top secret,' so marked and so designated. I can see no point in arguing that these papers may not have been of much value. The thieves thought they were. The Government agencies so adjudged them. And the facts show that the defendants could have had their choice of any documents they wished; they were given no protection so far as the State Department was concerned."

"This transaction, or rather a series of transactions involved, embraces the unlawful removal of 'top secret,' 'secret,' 'confidential,' and 'restricted' files from the Department of State, in our national Government. This is a very serious offense. In time of war, this is a most serious offense. When war is in progress, or even in time of peace, it is of little or no concern whether the files removed were 'originals' or 'copies,' the fact that information of either or any classification was removed from the secret files in the Department of State and was delivered to any individual, or group of individuals, who had no lawful right to receive the same, is the essence of the offense. When that very secret information was thus unlawfully revealed to others, no matter how the same was imparted to Mr. Jaffe, whether by an original, or by copy, or by any other method, the real damage has been done.

"There should not be any attempt made in the report to either minimize or acquit anyone from the magnitude of the act or acts committed. The report filed appears to be at least an attempt to either minimize or

completely justify some of the unlawful acts which were undoubtedly committed.

"All those who participated in any way in the removal, or attempted removal, of these documents from the Department of State—or who copied such reports and thereafter delivered such copies to Mr. Jaffe, or to any other person, not lawfully entitled to receive the same, should be prosecuted, and all these participating, in any degree in the unlawful acts under investigation, should be immediately discharged from their positions in our Government. The report should speak strongly and without any reservation upon that subject.

"The questions here involved are so grave and the offenses so great, that no effort should be made to protect or defend those who so offended, but the report should be made both firm and strong—to speak the truth—but to place the blame where the same rightfully belongs."

This is but a small portion of the pertinent background of Service, but certainly, beyond doubt, it forever excludes this man as a security risk by whatever yardstick it is measured.

Again we have a known associate and collaborator with Communists and pro-Communists, a man high in the State Department consorting with admitted espionage agents, and I wish to say to this committee what I said on the floor of the Senate on February 20, 1950:

"When Chiang Kai-shek was fighting our war, the State Department had in China a young man named John S. Service. His task, obviously, was not to work for the communication of China. Strangely, however, he sent official reports back to the State Department urging that we torpedo our ally Chiang Kai-shek and stating, in effect, that communism was the best hope of China.

"Later this man—John Service—was picked up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for turning over to the Communists secret State Department information. Strangely, however, he was never prosecuted. However, Joseph Grew, the Under Secretary of State, who insisted on his prosecution, was forced to resign. Two days after Grew's successor, Dean Acheson, took over as Under Secretary of State, this man—John Service—who had been picked up by the FBI and who had previously urged that communism was the best hope of China, was not only reinstated in the State Department but promoted. And finally, under Acheson, placed in charge of all placements and promotions."

Mr. Chairman, today this man, John S. Service, is a ranking officer in the policy-making group of "untouchables" on duty in Calcutta, India, one of the most strategically important listening posts in the world today and since the fall of China the most important new front of the cold war.

Five times this man has been investigated as to his loyalty and his acceptance as a security risk to the Nation.

What possible reason could there have been for even a second investigation of his record.

He was not an acceptable security risk under Mr. Acheson's "yardstick of loyalty" the day he entered the Government.

He is not a sound security risk today.

Mr. McCARTHY. In this connection, let me remind the Senate that the material involved in this case, the stolen documents, included the following Government records: 360 classified documents from the State Department, including some top secrets and confidential classification; 163 prepared by ONI, the Office of Naval Intelligence; 42 prepared by MID; 58 prepared by OWI; 9 from the files of the War Department.

It will be recalled that J. Edgar Hoover at the time said this was a "100 percent airtight case against Service, Roth, and their codefendants."

Now here is the affidavit to which I referred earlier. This affidavit is to the effect that the night before John S. Service, Lt. Andrew Roth and four codefendants in the Amerasia case were arrested, the individual who signed this affidavit was at the home of Owen Lattimore.

He states that he was introduced to John S. Service and Lt. Andrew Roth. He states further that Roth, Lattimore, and Service spent a great deal of time by themselves, discussing certain papers or a manuscript. He states that their actions seemed strange at the time, and that at that time Lattimore stated that they were going over a manuscript. He states further that he went into another room in the house on a personal matter and that Roth followed him in and grabbed his—that is Roth's—brief case, which most likely contained the documents or manuscript.

Then I have another statement gotten under almost the same circumstances, which is being turned over to the FBI. Again there was great reluctance to sign the paper. In it substantially the same facts are set forth, except this man did not see Roth rush in to grab his brief case. He stated, however, that when he later asked Lattimore for an explanation, Lattimore stated that they had been declassifying secret documents in favor of some friends; that Lattimore further stated that this was a common Washington practice; that Lattimore further stated that Roth and Service were arrested because of a feud they had with some people in Washington. It must have been a rather serious feud with the FBI, I assume.

I have before me the photostat of another document. A copy of this photostat is also being forwarded to the FBI. This is a rather unusual document for a number of reasons. In order that the significance of this document can be fully understood, I beg the indulgence of the Senate while I briefly recite some history which is known to most of the Senators—the history of the official Communist Party line insofar as Chiang Kai-shek was concerned.

From 1931, when Japan seized Manchuria, until 1935, the Communist Party line was anti-Chiang. He was denounced repeatedly as a tool of Japan during that period of time.

In 1935 at the world Communist meeting in Moscow—I believe that was the seventh meeting of the Comintern—the so-called united front, or Trojan-horse policy, was adopted—a policy calling for the Communists to combine with the governments in power and to get into strategic positions so that Moscow could control, or at least exert influence on, the governments in question. At this time, in 1935, as the Senate will recall, Chiang Kai-shek made an agreement with the Chinese Communists.

From 1935 to 1939 the Communist line was pro-Chiang Kai-shek.

In 1939, after the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the Stalin-Matsuoka Pact, the Communist Party line again became anti-Chiang Kai-shek.

As the Senate will recall, this continued until June 22, 1941, the day Hitler invaded Russia, at which time the Communist Party line again switched and was pro-Chiang Kai-shek.

This continued until 1943. The Senate will recall the Russian victory at Stalingrad in the early spring of 1943, and the reversal in the course of the war at that point, which up until then had been going rather badly against Russia. The Communist Party line again definitely became anti-Chiang Kai-shek.

If any particular day could be said to be the day when the party line changed, which cannot be tied down to a day, but, if it were possible to fix the day, it would probably be April 26, 1943—the day Stalin broke relations with the exiled government of Poland, which at that time had armed forces fighting with us in Italy. Undoubtedly, history will some day record that April 26, 1943, marked the beginning of World War III—the time Russia decided she was no longer

in danger from Hitler and could pick up her temporarily postponed plans for world domination.

I mention this brief history of the shifting official Communist Party line toward Chiang because it is important to understand, and it should be kept in mind in order to grasp the full importance of this document.

This is a letter—there is nothing like a good filing system—dated June 15, 1943, which is when the line had again swung to anti-Chiang Kai-shek. This is a letter from Owen Lattimore, director of Pacific Operations, Office of War Information. The odd thing is that he is writing to his boss in the Government service, telling the story to him, not writing to someone who is working for him.

The first paragraph reads as follows:

In your capacity as a member of our Personnel Security Committee there are certain things which you ought to know about Chinese personnel. It is a delicate matter for me to tell you about these things because of my recent official connection with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. For that reason I am marking this communication secret.

The reason for marking this document secret becomes abundantly clear as you read through it. In it he directs the recipient of the letter to get rid of all the Chinese in OWI who were loyal to either the Nationalist Government or Wang Ching-wel, who, as the Senate will recall, was the Japanese puppet in China.

He then issues instructions that the personnel be recruited from the shareholders of the New China Daily News, a Chinese Communist paper in New York.

In the letter he condemns the other Chinese papers. He also points out that the Nationalist and Wang Ching-wel group are engaged in handing out carefully colored news and doctored editorial policies and are intensely jealous of and hostile to the New China Daily News which, so to speak, flaunts its sins by being so readable that the Chinese public in America buys it for its own sake.

He even admits that it would be rash to say that there are no Communists connected with the New China Daily News.

He then shrugs this off, however, by saying that these Communists are not "tied to the chariot wheels of Moscow."

Incidentally, at that time the only other New China Daily News was pub-

lished in the Communist headquarters of Yen-an. However, since the Communists have taken over China, there is, as far as I know, at least one New China Daily News in each of the larger Chinese cities which the Communists occupied.

Do Senators get the picture? At that time there was in New York a New China Daily News. There was also one in Yen-an, Communist headquarters, and as the Communists took over China they established a new Chinese Daily News in each of the major cities of China.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. ANDERSON. Did the Senator mention the name of Lattimore's boss?

Mr. McCARTHY. No, I did not. I would rather not mention it. I should be glad to let the Senator see the letter, if he wants to see it. I shall tell the Senator why I would rather not mention the name. I do not have any documented material on this particular individual, except that he is mentioned in another affidavit which I shall cite. He is not now employed by the Government. I do not have enough information to decide whether or not he is a loyal American at this time.

Mr. ANDERSON. Is it not true that if Lattimore was working for someone in the Government at that time, it could be found out?

Mr. McCARTHY. The letter is addressed to Mr. Joseph Barnes, Office of War Information, New York, N. Y.

Mr. TOBEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. TOBEY. Would not the regular thing be to insert the entire letter in the RECORD?

Mr. McCARTHY. If the Senator will allow me to proceed as I think I should, I would rather do it in that way. If the Senator from New Hampshire, or any of the other Senators, cares to read the entire letter, I shall be glad to let them do so.

Mr. TOBEY. Is it the Senator's intention to place the entire letter in the RECORD?

Mr. McCARTHY. No; it is not.

Mr. TOBEY. I suggest that that be done. The quotation from it is taken out of context.

Mr. McCARTHY. I shall refuse the Senator's request at this time. The let-

ter is marked "secret," and it is my present intention not to put any secret documents into the RECORD, even though I think they might well be declassified in view of the fact that the purpose of marking it secret was, very obviously, so that the people would not know that Mr. Lattimore was saying, "Fire from the OWI any man who is loyal to Chiang and hire individuals who are loyal to the Communist government."

Mr. TOBEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. TOBEY. If the letter is marked "secret," I suppose that applies in toto. If the Senator is reading excerpts from the letter, is he not violating his own principle, when the whole letter is marked "secret"?

Mr. McCARTHY. This will become abundantly clear as I proceed. Some of the affidavits in regard to certain individuals cover unusual personal habits, which I feel I should not attempt to make public on the Senate floor to the Nation. I do not intend to read those. I intend to read into the RECORD portions of the affidavits which I think are proper; and regardless of whether any Senator may disagree with me, that is the procedure which I intend to follow. The entire document is being made available to the FBI. I respect the Senator's thought, but I have been living with this problem a long time, and intend to develop each case as I think wise, regardless of whether some other Senator may disagree with me.

Mr. TOBEY. My only thought was that it is wholly inconsistent to take a paper marked "secret" and pick out certain things without placing the letter in the RECORD in toto.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me finish the contents of the letter, first. He then goes on to authorize the retention of a Dr. Chi and Mr. Chew Hong. He points out that Chi is loyal to him, Lattimore, and that Chew Hong is loyal to Chi. He then goes on to state that as long as Dr. Chi remains loyal to him—Lattimore—there will be no difficulty with either Chew Hong or Chi.

Perhaps some background on Dr. Chi would be of interest to the Senate.

Before Dr. Chi came to America he was president of Shansi Law College and was also commissioner of education in the Shansi Province.

In America, prior to being in the OWI Dr. Chi was the editor of the Chinese Daily News in New York, the Chinese Communist Daily. Dr. Chi is the father of Ch'ao-ting Chi who now awaits in China for passage to the United States as the official representative of the Chinese Communist government to the United Nations. Ch'ao-ting Chi, in the publication Pacific Affairs, for December 1934, writes an article for his good friend, the editor, Owen Lattimore.

Thus we have the picture of Lattimore using his high office in the OWI to shape the Communist line for China through a Chinese Communist whose son now awaits being seated as a representative of the Chinese Communists in the United Nations. It is important to point out that Lattimore's maneuver was based upon fraud and misrepresentation. We have here an excellent example of the far-flung Communist discipline so much insisted upon by Lenin.

In closing the letter he also urges the necessity for exercising pronounced agnosticism when any of our Chinese personnel are attacked—meaning, of course, after they have first gotten rid of those who are loyal to the Nationalists and Wang Ching-wei.

In the last paragraph he again urges the strictest confidence in acting on this letter.

The Senate will recall the date of this letter—June 15, 1943—a time when Chiang Kai-shek was our very badly needed ally in the Pacific; a time when the war was not going too well with us; a time when officially we were committed to all-out cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek. It was at this time that Lattimore sends this highly secret letter in which he twice urges the strictest secrecy be followed in getting rid of any Chinese who are loyal to our ally, Chiang Kai-shek, and the recruiting of personnel solely from the shareholders of the Communist New China Daily News.

I shall be glad now to yield to the junior Senator from New York.

Mr. LEHMAN. May the junior Senator from New York ask the Senator from Wisconsin whether he has made available to the subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate the information and the facts contained in his charges, a part of which, and only a part of which, is submitted here today?

Mr. McCARTHY. The answer is "No."

Mr. LEHMAN. May I ask the Senator from Wisconsin why the answer is "No," when a committee has been set up by the Senate, of which the Senator of course is a distinguished Member, to investigate charges, why he should be unwilling to submit his facts to the committee created for the sole purpose of investigating these charges? It seems to me that is the place to which charges should be referred for investigation if the charges are made in good faith, rather than to submit in this Chamber certain so-called evidence, selected to suit the purpose of the distinguished Senator, in order to provide a spectacle and a sensation for the press and the galleries. In the way the Senator from Wisconsin has chosen, an accused man has no chance to answer. But in the special committee created by the Senate, the greatest legislative and deliberative body in the world, an accused person can make his reply. I should like to have an explanation of this from the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator says that a man does not have a chance. There were men in China who did not have a chance because of traitorous acts of certain individuals. Some people shed crocodile tears for the suffering to which the families of traitorous individuals are bound to be subjected. They forget entirely about the families of 400,000,000 people who have been sold into slavery by these same persons who are traitors to this Nation and to 400,000,000 people who thought they could depend upon us, a great and good ally. I shall proceed, regardless of what the Senator from New York thinks or says, to develop these facts in detail before the American people.

I do not intend to discuss the activities of the subcommittee. I have told the subcommittee exactly where they can get the material necessary, and I hope the subcommittee will proceed with their staff, with the money which we gave them, to do the task which I have been trying to do with no staff whatsoever except my own.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. The Senator says he is developing his case before the American people. I would have no objection to

that if he would do more than make unsubstantiated charges.

Mr. McCARTHY. It makes no difference if the Senator has objection.

Mr. LEHMAN. When charges are made against the loyalty of a man he should be given an opportunity to answer those charges in the same forum in which the charges are made. I should like to ask the distinguished Senator why he is so delicate in refusing to yield to the request of the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY] to give the full text of the information, when the Senator from Wisconsin has no hesitation whatsoever in coming before this body and before the American people and attempting to damn and blacken the reputation of many people who may be innocent.

Mr. McCARTHY. If the Senator would like to know why some of these documents are not being made available to the press, if he will step over here I will show him part of a document which will make very clear to him why it would be completely unfair to make them available. Does the Senator care to step over? [Laughter.]

Mr. LEHMAN. I am delighted to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will be order in the Senate. The Chair admonishes the occupants of the galleries that they are guests of the Senate, and are not permitted to indulge in demonstrations of approval or disapproval.

(Mr. LEHMAN thereupon crossed the Chamber and approached Mr. McCARTHY'S desk.)

Mr. LEHMAN. May I see the letter?

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator may step to my desk and read the letter.

Mr. LEHMAN. I should like to see it. The Senator invited me to come over to read the letter. I am here to read the letter. Will the Senator from Wisconsin let me see the letter?

Mr. McCARTHY. Does the Senator wish to come close enough to read it?

Mr. LEHMAN. I think I would like to read the letter in my own way.

Mr. McCARTHY. Will the Senator come here and see it?

Mr. LEHMAN. I would like to read it in my own way.

Mr. McCARTHY. Will the Senator sit down?

Mr. LEHMAN. May I say, Mr. President—

Mr. McCARTHY. I do not yield further at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin declines to yield further.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. Certainly. I shall be glad to yield at any time, assuming that I have unanimous consent to allow these speeches to be made, rather than questions being asked, without losing the floor.

Mr. McMAHON. In his colloquy with the Senator from New York, the Senator from Wisconsin stated that he intended to discuss in full detail, and in the way he saw fit, the activity of all the traitorous individuals. I should like to ask the Senator from Wisconsin if he includes in that classification Judge Kenyon, Philip Jessup, Mr. Hanson, or Mrs. Brunauer.

Mr. McCARTHY. I shall spend considerable time today on Mr. Jessup, and I hope the Senator will remain in the Chamber. I think the American people will wonder why the Senator from Connecticut did not go into the matters in detail when Mr. Jessup appeared before the committee. I do not wish to be put in the position of getting into a personal argument on the matter in the Senate, because I do not believe this is the proper forum for it, nevertheless I was very much disappointed when I asked of the committee the right to cross-examine Mr. Jessup when he appeared before it. I told the committee that there were certain facts which I could develop through Mr. Jessup. The committee did not even give me the courtesy of an answer to my request. The committee did not even properly examine Mr. Jessup. After Mr. Jessup had finished with his statement all I heard the Senator from Connecticut say was, "I am very happy that you are a constituent of mine."

I might say that when Mr. Hiss had finished his formal presentation—a formal presentation much more colorful and much more appealing than Mr. Jessup's—before the House Un-American Activities Committee, if that committee had followed the same line which the Senator from Connecticut followed in regard to Mr. Jessup, Mr. Hiss undoubtedly still would be determining foreign policy in the State Department.

The Senator from Connecticut asked me another question. He asked me whether or not I intended to include Judge Kenyon in this discussion today. The Senator knows full well why the

Kenyon case was presented. The Kenyon case was presented as the first in a sequence of cases. As I said at the time, it was presented, not because Judge Kenyon herself was important, but I knew that as we went through the various cases we would time and time again hear the statement, "Well, he has been cleared by the Loyalty Board." Therefore, I took a typical case to show just what being "cleared by the Loyalty Board" meant. Unfortunately, it happened to be the case of a lady. I took a typical case in order to show just what it meant to be cleared by the Loyalty Board. It was a case in which the Board had documentation with respect to 28 organizations which had been declared to be Communist-front organizations. They had not been declared to be Communist-front organizations by McCARTHY, but they had been declared to be Communist-front organizations by the Attorney General, the House Un-American Activities Committee, the California Committee, the Coudert Committee. I presented her case to the committee to show that 28 organizations, according to our exhibits, showed her name, and showed that she was a sponsor of the organizations. The committee did not even go through the motions of calling her and asking her, "Judge why did you join? Were you a dope, or did you join purposely?" That was the importance of the Kenyon case. The Senator knows that. The Senator knows also that I have never accused Judge Kenyon of being a traitor. Whether she joined these organizations, as she said, because she may have been—I do not recall her testimony—I think she said she joined without knowing it, or without knowing something about them. I do not know what she said. However, so far as the Loyalty Board is concerned, if it did not know why she joined those organizations, it certainly should have found out before giving her a clean bill of health, especially in view of the fact that the Secretary of State had said that membership in even one of those organizations—not 28, but 1—was evidence that an individual was a bad security risk.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. McMAHON. Will the Senator now answer my question whether he regards Miss Kenyon, Mr. Jessup, Mr. Hanson,

or Mrs. Brunauer as traitors to the United States?

Mr. McCARTHY. If the Senator will remain on the floor—and I hope he will remain—he will hear in some detail exactly what I have to say about Jessup. Then the Senator may decide for himself whether Mr. Jessup is merely a stooge who does not know what he is doing, or whether he has planned what he has done. I intend to come to that next. I do not intend to discuss the Jessup case until I reach it. I shall get to it before the Senate adjourns tonight. So, if the Senator will wait, I shall get to that case.

I intend to discuss the Hanson case. I intend to point out the work Lattimore is doing in connection with Hanson's work. When I have finished, if the Senator has any doubt in his mind as to the facts in these cases, I shall be very glad to have him question me. However, I shall not discuss the Jessup case until I get to it. We have some extremely interesting documents in the Jessup case. Mr. Jessup will have some difficulty explaining some of them.

Mr. McMAHON. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. As I understand, the Senator does not wish to state at this time his opinion as to whether or not Mr. Jessup is a traitor. With respect to Judge Kenyon, Mr. Hanson, or Mrs. Brunauer, does he care to give a direct answer to the question whether or not they are traitors within the classification which was referred to in the Senator's colloquy with the Senator from New York?

Mr. McCARTHY. If I were in a position to ask a question of the Senator from Connecticut, I would ask him whether he considers Mr. Lattimore a traitor.

Mr. McMAHON. Is that the Senator's answer to my question?

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator will hear what I have to say about each of these individuals, if he will be patient and sit down.

Mr. McMAHON. I thank the Senator.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. CHAVEZ. If everything which the Senator from Wisconsin has stated about the persons regarding whom the

Senator from Connecticut has inquired is true, and if everything he has stated proves interesting to the Senate and to the audience, can the Senator from Wisconsin tell us of what crime the persons are guilty under American law?

Mr. McCARTHY. Of what statutory crime?

Mr. CHAVEZ. Of what crime; yes. Of what crime are they guilty under American law?

Mr. McCARTHY. I shall let the Senate decide that question. I am merely giving the facts as to these individuals. I am not in the Attorney General's office. When I get through I think the Senate will have just as good an idea as I have as to what crime they are guilty of. I have some more documents which shed further light on that subject.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I wonder whether the Senator from Wisconsin, prior to making his charges public with reference to the cases of Judge Kenyon, Mr. Hanson, Miss Brunauer, and Mr. Jessup, and now Mr. Lattimore, consulted with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or divulged such information to them as he had in his possession.

Mr. McCARTHY. First let me say none of this information came from the FBI nor from any FBI agent. Let me further say to the Senator from Minnesota that if I had had any correspondence or any conversation with any members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation I do not feel called upon to give it to the Senator. Is that clear? The Federal Bureau of Investigation will have available every speck of evidence that I pick up. I do not flatter myself with the thought that I can do this more efficiently than the FBI. I think they have done an exceedingly fine job. I assume that practically all this evidence must also be in the files of the FBI.

The FBI has not gone over to the Justice Department and insisted upon his prosecution. Let me first say, whether they have done it or not I do not know. But I was brought up on a farm, and an old farmer said to me, "If a cat once drinks scalding water you have difficulty getting him to drink even cold water from then on." If the FBI starts developing a case on a man such as Lattimore, all one has to do is to look back and see

what happened in a case such as that of Service, and one cannot be surprised at why they do not insist upon prosecuting Lattimore.

Let me say something about the Service case so the Senator can understand why perhaps the FBI has good reason to leave it to the Justice Department to decide when prosecution shall be started. The Government attorney in the Service case was a young man named Hitchcock. Hitchcock quickly disposed of this case, which the FBI had worked up over months of detailed investigation. The case was worked up by scores of FBI men. This man Hitchcock then got up before the court and said, "I can dispose of this case in less than 5 minutes. There are no indications of disloyalty here." In other words, he could take all of J. Edgar Hoover's work and say, "He has nothing."

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I have this question. I gather from the Senator from Wisconsin that it is his opinion that the information he has now presented to the Senate was undoubtedly already in the files of the FBI, and therefore there was not any particular need for his immediate giving of that information to the FBI?

Mr. McCARTHY. I do not know whether it is there or not. I have a great deal of respect for the FBI. I sincerely hope and assume that they have done a much more competent job of investigating than I have. But on the assumption that they may not have all this information, every scrap of evidence I get is going directly to the FBI. When I say I assume they have it, I do not know. I hope they have it.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Let us assume that the Senator is correct—that the FBI has it. I have high regard for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I share the high regard in which the Senator holds that agency. I have extremely high regard for the head of the Bureau, J. Edgar Hoover, and I share the high regard in which the Senator from Wisconsin holds him. I should like to ask the Senator if the FBI has the information, or if he assumes it has it because it possesses, as the Senator says in his own words, better investigators than he, would it not be a dereliction of duty on the part of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves-

tigation, who has taken an oath to uphold the Constitution and to defend it, and to uphold the law of the land, if he were not to reveal or identify a traitor, since we have laws pertaining to traitors? I should like to ask the Senator from Wisconsin if he will give us an answer as to whether or not he believes that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, has been derelict in his responsibility in the sense that he has not prosecuted what the Senator from Wisconsin calls a top Communist agent, an agent of Russia, who is or has been a member of the Communist Party, thereby making him obviously a traitor?

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator from Minnesota knows the answer to that question. He knows that the FBI has no power to prosecute. He knows that the only function the FBI has is to gather evidence. He knows that the only individual who can decide whether to prosecute is the Attorney General. He also knows very well that if the Attorney General desired to prosecute one of these men high up in the State Department he would have to obtain the President's consent. Do not load this onto J. Edgar Hoover.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. Not till I have completed my answer. J. Edgar Hoover did a phenomenal job in the Service case, and if the Department of Justice had done an equally good job, Service would not be in the Far East trying to turn the whole business over to Russia. Do not try to hide behind the skirts of the FBI. They have done a phenomenal job. If J. Edgar Hoover had control over the Department of Justice so the cases he prepared would be presented, then we would have a much cleaner Federal Government.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a final question?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Am I to understand it, then, the Senator from Wisconsin is saying that the distinguished, patriotic, and devoted American citizen, in the person of J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the FBI, is so anxious for his job that when a top Communist agent, a No. 1 traitor, is disclosed by the records of the FBI, the distinguished Director of the FBI would not resign and make public the information if the evi-

dence is there to substantiate the charge? Does the Senator say that the Director of the FBI would protect the Attorney General and protect the President rather than the United States of America if he had the evidence to substantiate that a man is a traitor?

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator knows that the Director of the FBI has one job and that is to develop information, develop the case, and make it available to the Attorney General. There is no doubt whatsoever in the mind of the Senator from Minnesota as to that. Mr. Hoover is one of the few men left who are fighting energetically against communism, and there is nothing the Communists would like better than to get J. Edgar Hoover out of his job. I certainly hope the Senator from Minnesota is not urging that he resign. [Laughter in the galleries.] I think that if J. Edgar Hoover were to resign it would be a major catastrophe. So do not ask me those things, Senator. [Laughter in the galleries.]

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Of course, the Senator from Wisconsin did not mean to tell the distinguished Members of the Senate that the junior Senator from Minnesota is suggesting that the patriotic, loyal public servant, J. Edgar Hoover, resign. What the Senator from Wisconsin is trying to do at the moment is to interpret the remarks made by the junior Senator from Minnesota. I should like to ask the Senator from Wisconsin, since he has seen fit to make this public declaration because of his loyalty to the Republic, which loyalty no one can question, whether he believes that J. Edgar Hoover would be less loyal if he had in his records the same information as to an outstanding public enemy, Soviet top-Communist agent. I remind the Senator that he assumes the FBI has the records and as he says better investigators than he is. In other words, does the Senator from Wisconsin feel that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation would be so lacking in intestinal fortitude and patriotic devotion to public duty that he would not resign if he knew that the records of the FBI disclosed a top Soviet agent in the State Department who could not be prosecuted? Am I to assume by the remarks of the Senator from Wisconsin, that the Director of the FBI would be

a party to a conspiracy to protect a member of the State Department? Am I to assume that the Senator from Wisconsin is the only man in the Government who has the courage to speak in behalf of the Republic? I shall not indulge in that assumption, Mr. President. I believe that if Mr. Hoover had the information he would be the first to call it to the attention of the people of the United States, and not wait till he could secure a public forum, such as the forum of the United States Senate, to make the charge.

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator from Minnesota knows full well that the Director of the FBI has no authority whatsoever to call the attention of the public to things which are in his files. In fact, the Senator from Minnesota is one of those who has been urging that the files should not be made available to a committee in executive session. He certainly cannot ask that the files be made available to the world at large. Certainly he cannot say that the fact that Mr. Hoover will not publish the files on the front pages of all the newspapers indicates disloyalty on the part of J. Edgar Hoover. There is something rather contradictory in the Senator's position, that is, that the files should not be made available to Senators such as the Senator from Maryland [Mr. TYDINGS], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE], and the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN], but that J. Edgar Hoover is disloyal if he will not make them available to the world at large. I do not question the Senator's sincerity, but I do question the Senator's reasoning power on that point. [Laughter in the galleries.]

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Let me say that the Senator from Minnesota wishes to reciprocate in kind the observations the Senator from Wisconsin has made, in that the Senator from Minnesota does not question the sincerity of the Senator from Wisconsin, but does question the logic of the Senator from Wisconsin and the deductions which have been made by him.

Let us get clear—

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, under the rules, I shall not lose the floor by yield-

ing to permit the Senator from Minnesota to make observations.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin requests unanimous consent that he not lose the floor when observations are made by other Senators. Is there objection? The Chair hears none.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I wish only to observe, first, that at no time have I said anything as to whether or not the President should open or keep closed the files. That matter is not before the junior Senator from Minnesota. It is before a special committee of the Senate.

Second, I wish to observe that I do not care to have the Senator from Wisconsin twist my remarks, or interpret them in such a manner as to confuse their meaning. The junior Senator from Minnesota holds the Attorney General, Mr. McGrath, and the Director of the FBI, Mr. Hoover, in the highest esteem. The junior Senator from Minnesota believes in them, trusts them, pays tribute to their patriotic, loyal service. It is my position that if J. Edgar Hoover had the information which the Senator from Wisconsin says is available in the files, or which the Senator assumes to be available, Mr. Hoover, because of his patriotic devotion to his country, would have made the information public, would have called it to the attention, first, to the distinguished Attorney General, Mr. McGrath, then the President of the United States, and then to the attention of the people.

In view of the loyal service of Mr. Hoover and of the loyal service of Mr. Richardson, head of the Loyalty Board, does the Senator from Wisconsin believe that either one of them would cover up the record of an alleged traitor—an allegation made on the part of the Senator from Wisconsin? Does the Senator from Wisconsin believe that Mr. McGrath, or Mr. Hoover, or Mr. Richardson would be part of a conspiracy to cover up for a "bad policy risk"—I quote now—"a top Communist agent," "a Soviet agent who is or has been a member of the Communist Party, and an agent of Russia"?

I should like to have the Senator from Wisconsin answer whether he believes that Mr. Richardson and Mr. Hoover would be parties to such a conspiracy to cover up for that kind of a person in the

employ of the Government of the United States.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, let us take up the various questions the Senator from Minnesota has asked.

He has asked about Mr. Richardson. Personally, I do not know him, except I have had an experience at arm's length, without seeing him, during the past several weeks. As the Senator from Minnesota will recall, I made the statement before the committee, under oath, that the John S. Service case had been post-audited by Mr. Richardson's Loyalty Board. I pointed out that Mr. Richardson's Loyalty Board, on March 3, sent that case back to the State Department, saying, "Not only are we dissatisfied with the clean bill of health you gave Service but we want you to appoint a completely new loyalty board."

Mr. Richardson's top executive officer, when asked by the press whether or not I was telling the truth, said, "No; we have never heard of Service."

The Senator from Minnesota asks me whether Richardson would cover up anything. I know that his top executive, when asked about the facts I gave on Service, said, in effect, "McCARTHY is lying. We never heard of Service."

Then something happened in the State Department. Apparently they became a little worried about the machinery which had been set in motion and about the fact that too many papers had been signed. So the next day they had to admit that I was right, and that on March 3, as I had said, the Review Board sent Service's case back.

So I wrote to Mr. Richardson and said, in effect, "Can you give us an explanation of this? Why does the head of the Loyalty Board tell the American people a deliberate untruth? Why they said there was nothing to my case on Service and why they said they had never heard of him, and yet the next day admitted that I was right in every detail?"

What do Senators think his answer was? He said, "I had to say this because too many people were asking questions."

So, when the Senator from Minnesota asks me about what Mr. Richardson would cover up my answer is, "I do not know."

As to J. Edgar Hoover, I think the Senator from Minnesota is doing a thing he certainly should not do, after serious thought, namely, attempting to convince

the American people that J. Edgar Hoover condones what is going on in the State Department. It is not his task to approve or disapprove what the State Department does. The Senator from Minnesota knows, and I know, that J. Edgar Hoover has no power whatsoever to hire or fire anyone in the State Department. The Senator from Minnesota knows, and I know, that all J. Edgar Hoover's organization can do is to develop the facts. The Senator knows that if J. Edgar Hoover started making those facts available to the public he would not continue in his job for more than a moment.

Although I am sure the Senator from Minnesota does not want to see the services of Mr. Hoover dispensed with, yet I know there are in this Nation communistic and un-American persons who would like nothing better than to see Mr. Hoover retired to private life.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield to the Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I thank the Senator from Wisconsin.

Let me say that the observation I am going to make, with the indulgence of the Senator from Wisconsin, is not based upon an attempt to heckle the Senator from Wisconsin.

What difference does it make whether one person thinks Mr. Hoover is doing the right thing or not; or what difference does it make whether Mr. Richardson, who is only one individual, is trying to do certain things or not? I think what we should emphasize is the protection of American rights. If I correctly understand the Senator from Wisconsin, that is all he is trying to do; he would like to have removed from the Government service, no matter where, anyone who would not protect American rights.

The colloquy which has occurred between the Senator from Wisconsin and the Senator from Minnesota has been in regard to whether Mr. Hoover is doing the right thing or whether Mr. Richardson or someone else is doing the right thing. Should not the question be, Is the law being obeyed? After all, Mr. President, should we have a Government based upon what Mr. Hoover thinks or upon what someone else may think or upon what Mr. Richardson or I or the Senator from Wisconsin thinks; or should we have a Government of law?

Therefore, should not the question be, Have any laws been violated? If so, let us prosecute or punish those who violate them.

We should not take up other matters simply because they are entertaining; we should not engage in colloquy simply because it is entertaining. It might entertain for the moment anyone who is listening, but that does not prove a thing.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I wish to thank the Senator from New Mexico for giving the Senator from Minnesota that advice.

The Senator understands that no matter how intelligent or unintelligent a question may be, when a Senator asks a question of me, I try to answer it. I am not accusing the Senator from Minnesota of asking an unintelligent question, but I gather that the Senator from New Mexico is criticizing me for yielding to permit the Senator from Minnesota to make an observation. I say that, rightly or wrongly, I feel that when I discuss a subject so important as this one, I should freely yield. Another Senator may think the Senator from New Mexico is not wisely taking up time. However, so far as I am concerned, I shall give the Senator from New Mexico all the time he wishes.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Very well, and I thank the Senator. In this particular instance, I am not criticizing either the Senator from Wisconsin or the Senator from Minnesota; neither am I trying to heckle the Senator from Wisconsin or to keep him from saying anything about this matter.

Mr. McCARTHY. I know the Senator from New Mexico is not.

Mr. CHAVEZ. My point is, Let us keep the record clear. The only way the American people will get any benefit from it is by a consideration of whether the law is being obeyed, not by a discussion of what the Senator from Wisconsin or I may think about some Government officials. What I think about some Government officials probably could not be said in polite society; and what the Senator from Minnesota thinks about some Government officials probably could not be said in polite society. However, it is basic, if we are to have a government of laws—not a government based on the ideas of the Senator from Wisconsin or of the Senator from Minnesota or of the Director of the FBI or of someone else—that the laws be obeyed.

If the laws are obeyed, I think the people of the United States will have a better government.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from New Mexico. Frankly, I feel very strongly that when any Senator rises on this floor and tries to indicate—of course, I may have misinterpreted the remarks of the Senator from Minnesota—that a man with the background of J. Edgar Hoover would condone what is going on, then I think I should make it as clear as possible that Mr. J. Edgar Hoover has no power whatsoever over the situation, no function to approve or disapprove.

Mr. President, I have before me another affidavit.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at this point?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. ANDERSON. I have waited until the Senator finished with the letter from Mr. Lattimore, to ask the Senator a question about it, if he does not mind.

Mr. McCARTHY. I may say to the Senator that I am not through with the documentation on Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. ANDERSON. However, the Senator from Wisconsin read from a letter dated June 15, 1943, did he not?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct.

Mr. ANDERSON. I believe the Senator fixed as April 26, 1943, the date when the party line changed.

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me make that clear. I say that if we can fix any particular date, I think that would be it. Some persons say the party line commenced to change after the German surrender at Stalingrad. Others say that the time we can more definitely fix for it is the date when Stalin broke relations with the Polish Government-in-exile. However, I would say that April 26, 1943, is about as close as any date we can determine upon.

Mr. ANDERSON. I wished to ask the Senator whether he would make any comment on such papers as have been filed by General Stilwell, for example, about his relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, or by General Marshall and many other persons. I do not believe the Senator would question their loyalty, and I wonder whether he differentiates between them and Mr. Lattimore because of some other history or because of that individual date.

Mr. McCARTHY. I intend to dwell on this letter. I think Lattimore was as

much responsible, if not more so, for Stilwell's activities in China as any other one individual. If the Senator will carefully study his record I am sure the Senator will believe that to be the case.

The Senator understands that it is impossible for me, with a limited staff, to present a court case here; but I am sure that if the Senator will sit here and will listen to the material which I am presenting, he will be convinced that the clique of Lattimore, Jessup, and Service has been responsible, almost completely—under Acheson, of course—for what went on in the Far East, although there were other individuals taking part. If the Senator will wait until I have completed my remarks, then if he has any questions, I shall certainly try to answer them. However, I am reasonably certain that when the Senator from New Mexico, for whom I have unlimited respect, sees this evidence, he will quite heartily agree with me.

Mr. President, I have before me an affidavit which is of interest, covering the testimony which will be given by a former general in the Red army, who has indicated his willingness to testify if subpoenaed. His testimony will be to the effect that while a general in the Red army, and while at Moscow, he was in close contact with a general, whom he names, who is named in the affidavit, who was one of the top generals in Soviet intelligence. This conversation was in 1935 or 1936. He was discussing with that top man of Russian intelligence the difficulty of getting good intelligence information from Mongolia and the Far East generally.

I may say incidentally this former Russian general states that he gave a statement to a Government investigative agent. Whether that was the State Department, or what investigative agency it was, I frankly do not know. The testimony will be that the thing that particularly disturbed Russian intelligence was that they had difficulty getting Russian agents into the Far East, because of the suspicion of the Japanese and the Chinese at that time. That, Mr. President, you understand, was 1935 or 1936. The testimony will be that the head of the Russian intelligence told this witness, this prospective witness, that they were having excellent success through the Institute of Pacific Relations, which the Soviet intelligence, through Communists in the United

States, had taken over. In connection with this, he particularly mentioned Owen Lattimore and another individual whose name the Senate would recognize, who is not at present connected with our Government. That name is also in the affidavit. The individual has not been connected with the State Department, but did spend some time with Lattimore in the OWI. I am not using his name on the Senate floor today, in view of the fact that he is not in the Government. But the entire affidavit is being turned over to the FBI.

This former Red army general will further testify that, at the time he was in Moscow, the name of Owen Lattimore meant nothing to him, but that it was only after he reached the United States as a fugitive from Soviet persecution, and in the late thirties, that the significance of the Russian intelligence became apparent to him. His testimony will further be that in the course of visits to other European capitals, he had received approximately the same information about IPR, and also about Lattimore, and the other, named as a Soviet agent in this affidavit.

I have before me another affidavit, which—

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. McCARTHY. I should like to refer to another affidavit, first, so we may have both of them in mind. I have before me another affidavit, the original of which is being handed to the FBI. This affiant lives in China. While Lattimore was there the affiant was an editor of a newspaper in Tiensin and another in Peking.

He states that Lattimore was a leader in several pro-Russian student uprisings in China. He points out Lattimore's known connection with and control over the magazine Asia, which later became Amerasia. The Senate will recall that one of the editors of Amerasia was arrested and found guilty of conspiracy to steal secret documents from the State Department, the War Department, and the Navy. I refer to Jaffe. There is a rather humorous vein in this affidavit. He points out that Chiang Kai-shek was displeased with Lattimore, who as the Senate will recall, was sent by Roosevelt as an adviser to China. He was sent over there for 6 months. Chiang Kai-shek apparently did not want to hurt Roosevelt's feelings by requesting Latti-

more's recall, so he handled this in an oriental fashion. He appointed Lattimore a Chinese official and sent him back to represent him in Washington. [Laughter.]

He points out that the Lattimore crowd was responsible for the indoctrination of Stilwell against Chiang Kai-shek. He will point out in his testimony that this was abundantly clear to anyone who lived in China.

The affidavit of this editor of a Chinese newspaper is I believe valuable principally to show Lattimore's leadership of pro-Russian Chinese student uprisings.

I am glad to yield now to the Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. ANDERSON. Does the Senator mean to convey the impression that the Institute of Pacific Relations, in 1935 and 1936, was under Communist control?

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me explain to the Senator. I was going to cover this later, but I will do it briefly now, and I will cover it more at length later. The IPR was established back in the early twenties by some outstanding men. It took some time for the Communists to gain control of it. There are 50 trustees on the board of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which it will be understood, consists of 10 councils.

Apparently the party has made no great attempt to place men upon that council, and so far as I know, of the 50, they have never had a membership of more than 10, or at most 15. In other words, the party has never had, and it does not even now remotely have control of the board of trustees. There is, however, the executive committee, which consists of 10 individuals. Those are members of the board of trustees, largely who live in and around New York. The party has made a tremendous effort either to get Communists, fellow travelers, or merely deluded liberals on that particular board. Three, four, or five members have been about the most they have had on the board, who actually have done a rather effective job of control.

Mr. ANDERSON. I was wondering whether the Senator could fix the time, because if he would fix the time, for example, as 1935 or 1936, I should be glad to name for him people whom I am quite sure he would never call Communists.

Mr. McCARTHY. Oh, I can give the Senator the names of any number of out-

standing men. As I said, on the board of trustees I think there has at all times been a sizable number of outstanding men, and on the executive board there have also been some outstanding men.

Mr. ANDERSON. I was only hoping the Senator might indicate why, if the other 35 or so out of 50 distinguished people were not Communists, it proved that Lattimore was, because he associated with them, the heads of great American universities, prominent editors of newspapers, distinguished citizens of every type. They are not brought into this discussion.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I am not pointing out that Mr. Lattimore was a Communist, because he associated with those men on the board of trustees. I am now reading an affidavit from a Red Army officer as to what his testimony will be in regard to information which he got from Russian intelligence. This is a part of the entire picture.

One of the recent activities of Lattimore, which I wish to point out to the Senate today, is a recent trip to Point Barrow, Alaska, in May of last year. He had two cameras with him on that trip, as did everyone else who went on the trip. Point Barrow is, as Senators know, the northernmost place in Alaska, and one of the main approaches to the American Continent near the Arctic. It would be interesting to know where the pictures are today which Lattimore took with those two cameras.

I think the committee might also try to investigate, to find out how that trip was arranged. In this connection I understand that in Professor Lattimore's home in Baltimore he has a room devoted to special photographic equipment. Understand, I have never been in the room, but that is my information.

I also discussed Owen Lattimore with Freda Utey who was formerly a member of the British Communist Party. Her husband was picked up by the OGPU and has apparently since died in a Siberian prison camp. She states that while she was not admitted to the secret meetings between the Russian Communist leaders and the IPR delegates, it was common knowledge at the institute where she worked, in the Russian Council of the institute, in Moscow, that the Soviet government was paying a large sum as its contribution to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

In regard to Lattimore, she states that at the time she met him in Moscow

in 1936, in her opinion he was not yet a Communist, but that later when she knew him in Baltimore in 1940, he had definitely decided to throw in his lot with the totalitarian enemies of America and of freedom because he has become convinced that the Communists were destined to win.

She states further that a few months after she had gotten to know him in Moscow, she met him in London where he told her that he had almost lost his job as editor of Pacific Affairs because he had published an article by the Trotskyite, Harold Isaacs.

Keeping in mind that Pacific Affairs is a publication for 10 councils, the publication of which Jessup was editor being the publication for the American Council. I should like to call the Senate's attention also to an article by Philip J. Jaffe, entitled "China's Communists Told Me," which appeared in the New Masses of October 12, 1937. It will be recalled that this is the same Philip Jaffe who recently was found guilty of conspiracy to steal secret documents from the State Department and the War and Navy Departments in connection with the Amerasia case.

In this article Jaffe gives considerable detail about his travels in China with T. A. Bisson and Owen Lattimore, giving details as to their stay at the Communist foreign office in Yenan and being greeted on arrival at Yenan, the Communist headquarters, by Agnes Smedley. Miss Smedley, it will be recalled, has been named by General MacArthur's intelligence service as one of the most energetic workers for the Soviet cause in China for the past twenty-odd years.

Let me make it clear: I do not claim the distinction of having exposed Lattimore. He has long since been exposed to the State Department. For example, on October 26, 1946, nearly 5 years ago, the Washington Times-Herald in an article entitled "State Department Sends Soviet Sympathizer as Aide," we find the following:

Another Red sympathizer, if not a Communist, Owen Lattimore, has been named Special Economic Adviser to Tokyo.

As the Senate well knows, the American Legion, through its Americanism Commission, for years, has been waging a gallant fight against odds in an attempt to maintain America as a free Nation.

In March of 1949 its subcommittee on subversive activities put out a document entitled "Summary of Trends and Developments Exposing the Communist Conspiracy." In this it listed a number of individuals as "unsuitable and inappropriate for Legion sponsorship." One of the names is Owen Lattimore. Certainly this was known to the State Department when they sent Lattimore to Afghanistan on the Point-4 mission. Also the fact-finding committee of the California Legislature on page 199 of its fourth report on un-American activities had the following to say: "Among the Communists and fellow travelers who have been writing books for public schools is Owen Lattimore."

I fear in the case of Lattimore, I may have perhaps placed too much stress on the question of whether or not he has been an espionage agent. In view of his position of tremendous power in the State Department as the "architect" of our far-eastern policy, the more important aspect of his case deals with his aims and what he advocates; whether his aims are American aims or whether they coincide with the aims of Soviet Russia. Therefore, forgetting for the time being any question of membership in the Communist Party or participation in espionage, I would like to deal briefly with what this man himself advocates and what he believes in.

It does not take any counterespionage staff to determine what he stands for. It does not take an investigative group to determine whether he favors communism over our form of democracy. All it takes is a detailed study of his voluminous writings.

We wonder why a man as brilliant as Lattimore would set forth his aims so clearly over a number of years—especially when he now denies those aims so loudly. I suppose, however, if we had the answer to that question, we would also have the answer to why Hitler wrote his Mein Kampf and why Stalin wrote his Principles of Leninism.

He is undoubtedly the most brilliant and scholarly of all the Communist propagandists, and also the most subtle of the evangelists who have deceived the American people about the Chinese Communists.

I might say that if we study him we cannot help but see that here is a brilliant individual. That is what makes

him dangerous. If he were merely a dupe, such as are some of the persons he has been using, he would not be so dangerous to the Nation. Nevertheless, no one can read his books carefully without realizing that they are replete with pro-Soviet propaganda; twisted half truths about America; misinformation about the Chinese Communists; and historical distortions and omissions designed to trick the American public into support of policies advantageous to Moscow.

In a moment I shall give some quotations from Lattimore's books. But first I wish to emphasize the point that the administration's disastrous far-eastern policy reflects point by point Mr. Lattimore's recommendations and advice.

In this connection the Senate will recall that when I gave the name and some facts in the Lattimore case to the Foreign Relations Subcommittee in executive session, the State Department made the following statement:

He [Lattimore] has never been employed by or connected with the State Department, except once. About 5 years ago, and for a period of 4 months only, he was associated with a mission outside the United States.

Once thereafter, on a single day, although not employed or compensated by the State Department, he publicly addressed a group of State Department employees.

On another occasion, although not employed by the State Department, he took part over a period of 2 days in a citizens' round-table conference, in the company of many distinguished Americans who likewise were participating in this discussion.

There was no other contact, association, employment or connection between the State Department and this individual in any manner or form, at any other time, save as mentioned above.

I call attention particularly to the all-inclusive language:

There was no other contact, association, employment or connection between the State Department and this individual in any manner or form, at any other time.

For that reason it might be well to give Lattimore's employment and contact with the State Department and other Government agencies.

In 1941 he was appointed by Roosevelt as adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. While I do not have any documentary proof as to why President Roosevelt picked Lattimore for this job, the best information available would indicate that it was largely on the recommendation of Henry

Wallace. He remained with Chiang Kai-shek, however, only 6 months and was then sent back by him to the United States.

Shortly after his return to the States, he was put in charge of the Overseas Division in charge of Pacific operations of the OWI.

Incidentally, Mr. President, I had hoped I would have, for the benefit of the Senate today, some of the excerpts from the broadcasts which he beamed out to China and the Pacific. They were really "dillies."

In 1944 he and John Carter Vincent accompanied Henry Wallace on a tour of China, after which Wallace made his report to the State Department, recommending the torpedoing of Chiang Kai-shek.

Incidentally, in this connection the State Department issued a press release—and I have a copy of it in my hand—denying the existence of such a report and stating as follows:

The Department reiterates in the plainest language that it does not have in its files and does not know of the existence of any report of the nature suggested by Mr. Judd.

This was in answer to a demand by Congressman Judd that the report be produced from wherever it is and published.

The Senator from Maryland [Mr. O'CONNOR] subsequently proved conclusively that the State Department was again mistaken—if that is the correct term—in this connection. The Senator obtained from Wallace a summary of his report and, as will be recalled, made a report to the press.

Upon his return from this trip, Henry Wallace wrote a book entitled "Soviet Asia Mission," in which he pays tribute to Owen Lattimore for his invaluable assistance. He also points out on page 17 that the President—Mr. Roosevelt—"urged me to take Owen Lattimore with me, who, he said, was one of the world's great experts on the problems involving Chinese-Russian relationships."

This would seem to indicate that not only the State Department but the President have looked to Owen Lattimore as their adviser and expert on far-eastern policy.

In 1946 Lattimore headed a special mission to Japan, again to make recommendations to Mr. Truman and the State Department.

In 1949 he attended the Indo-American Conference in New Delhi, India, according to a copy of the Indian News Chronicle. According to this newspaper and the Hindustan Times, our Ambassador to India also took part in this Indo-American Conference. This conference was jointly sponsored by the State Department and the Institute of Pacific Relations.

At the present time Lattimore is in Afghanistan. While the State Department denies he has any connection with it, the following information was obtained from the Library of Congress:

The Afghanistan Government asked the United States in December 1949 to send a preliminary mission to Afghanistan to investigate the possibility of economic development under United Nations technical assistance program. Owen Lattimore was selected to be the head of this mission, which included a Mr. Caustin, of the United Kingdom, who is a member of the United Nations Secretariat; a Mr. Kirk, of Canada, who is with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization; and a fourth member, an engineer, whose name is not known. The purpose of this mission was to pick out some key economic projects which might provide the basis for long-term assistance.

In other words, Mr. President, the Afghanistan Government asked this Government to send a preliminary mission there to investigate the possibility of assistance under our point 4 program. That is the program which Hanson is now planning.

For some time he has also served on a State Department lecture panel, his job being to properly indoctrinate other State Department employees. In this connection I call attention to an editorial written by Frank Waldrop which appeared in the Times-Herald of June 6, 1946.

Whether or not the Secretary of State will ever admit that Lattimore has a desk in the State Department is comparatively unimportant. The fact concerning which there can be no doubt whatsoever is the dominant influence of Mr. Lattimore over the formulation and implementation of the policy which has delivered China to Stalin. One can find in his books the clearest exposition of the theories and views which have been the basis for the administration's disastrous China policy and which are reflected in the White Paper. Indeed the report from its Foreign Service officials in China during the war, as given in the

White Paper, read like extracts from Lattimore's books. Lattimore's views are followed by the State Department insofar as the Chinese Communists are concerned. These Chinese Communists are represented by Lattimore and his friends in the State Department as "democrats," "liberal agrarian reformers," "progressives not under Moscow's direction," or, more recently, as "detachable from" Soviet Russia. We hear a new term for them every day.

The general drift of the line of propaganda put across by Mr. Lattimore in his writings is clearly shown by the following blurb on his book, *Solution in Asia*.

This is what the editor says about the book:

He shows that all the Asiatic peoples are more interested in actual democratic practices, such as the ones they can see in action across the Russian border, than they are in the fine theories of Anglo-Saxon democracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism. . . . He inclines to support American newspapermen who report that the only real democracy in China is found in Communist areas.

Lattimore's admiration for Russian democracy is characterized by the following passage in the same book:

To all of these peoples (along the Russian frontier from Korea and Manchuria past Mongolia, Sinkiang, Afghanistan, and Iran all the way to Turkey) the Russians and the Soviet Union have a greater power of attraction. In their eyes—rather doubtfully in the eyes of the older generation, more and more clearly in the eyes of the younger generation—the Soviet Union stands for strategic security, economic prosperity, technological progress, miraculous medicine, free education, equality of opportunity, and democracy, a powerful combination.

The quotation appears at page 139.

That is Lattimore's description of Communist Russia. In "The Situation in Asia," Lattimore is engaged in "problems of policy," which—

are continuous, and atom out of each other at successive stages, in such a way that even when the same kind of policy is followed or proposed, it must adapt itself in details to the changing situations which it is intended to manage.

I have read from page 216.

To illustrate, Lattimore goes on to say: American policy at the end of the war sought to slow down the rate of change in Asia and give priority to the political stabilization and economic recovery of Europe. Since then, however, in spite of American

policy, the rate of change has been greater in Asia than the rate of recovery in Europe. We should therefore, recognize the necessity of adapting our policy to the changing realities; and we can only do so by relaxing our pressure on Asia to subordinate its interests to our interests and those of Europe, and by increasing our pressure on Europe to join us in a policy of negotiating compromises on terms acceptable to Asia.

I have read from page 217.

This is a roundabout way of saying that, since the march of communism is irresistible in Asia, American policy should be to leave it alone, and then, through threatening to stop Marshall aid, to force European nations to do the same, that is, to negotiate compromises on terms which are acceptable to the Communists in Asia. In other words, it is a policy of appeasement of communism in Asia, which is to be jointly pursued by all nations under American leadership.

At page 43 Lattimore attacks what he calls "the grandiose and disastrous American attempt to determine the character and outcome of the Chinese Civil War." Does he mean the Marshall mission to China and the policy of forming a Kuomintang-Communist coalition? If so, Lattimore is for it. For he says that "this Marshall policy was a statesmanlike effort to secure for the United States a position of free maneuver." I have read from page 148. He blames the Marshall failure, and here he follows all standard Communist propaganda, on the assertion that "all during the period of his mission, the Kuomintang kept accumulating American supplies and American transportation kept moving Kuomintang troops into north China and Manchuria."

This is Communist propaganda, pure and simple. For it is by now generally known, and documented by the White Paper, that no such thing happened, and that General Marshall himself stated in testimony before Congress that a ban was imposed on arms and ammunition shipments to China which was a virtual embargo. Moreover, Lattimore fails to point out that the Soviet troops in Manchuria were systematically preventing Chinese troops from moving into Manchuria, either by sea through the port of Dairen, or overland through the Great Wall pass Shanhaikwan, or by air to Mukden and Chankchun, while the Soviet troops were building up large

Chinese Communist forces all over Manchuria. The tragic story is now presented in the document China Presents Her Case to the United Nations, which was laid before the United Nations General Assembly by the Chinese Government, November 25, 1949.

After stating that the Marshall mission "was a statesmanlike effort to secure for the United States a position of free maneuver"—that is, the mission to get the Chiang Kai-shek government to take in the Communists—Lattimore feels that the Truman doctrine is "the first damage to this position of maneuver," and he blames the Eightieth Congress for his assertion that General Marshall, was "blackmailed into destroying what remained of the position of free maneuver in China policy which he himself set up." This blackmail, of course, was the China Aid Act of April 3, 1948—and he makes this abundantly clear—which Lattimore wrongly describes as having been taken out from the money for the Marshall plan for Europe. In other words, he says that the attempt on the part of Congress to give the \$125,000,000 aid to Nationalist China was blackmail.

The fundamental thesis of the book is the following statement:

Clearly, the Communist ascendancy had become so decisive that it could not be reversed (p. 151).

He goes on to spell out this assumption with some remarkable predictions of subsequent Soviet policies:

We must also abandon the stubbornly lingering delusion that we can somehow maintain footholds by supporting rump territories or rump government somewhere south of the Yangtse, or on the coast, or on the island of Formosa (p. 179).

This is Lattimore saying this should be the policy which should become the State Department policy. He says, "Don't think you can maintain a rump government beyond the Yangtse, don't think you can maintain one on Formosa."

Here he was prepared to write off free China in favor of the Communists, even if the Communists were still on the north of the Yangtse, or when they were controlling only one-third of China.

I might say that I dislike taking up so much time developing these quotations from Lattimore's works, but I think it is such an important part of the entire picture that it should be made a part of the Record at this time.

Lattimore's predictions regarding Soviet policy were accurate:

We shall soon have a government in China firmly established in the heart of the land and controlling practically the whole of its fringes. This government will be recognized de jure and de facto by Russia. The new government of China will claim China's big five position in the United Nations, including the right of veto.

That prediction has not come true as yet, of course.

These lines were written a full year before the Communists took such steps.

Lattimore does not believe that anything should or could be done to arrest the march of communism in China and Asia. However, he is not advocating a policy of appeasement of Communist aggression. He believes that Communist rule is good in itself.

As Senators listen to this, I ask them to keep in mind Dean Acheson's speech before the National Press Club several months ago. This is what Lattimore says:

Throughout Asia today there prevails an atmosphere of hope, not of despair. There is not a single country in Asia in which people feel that we are entering an age of chaos. What they see opening up before them is a limitless horizon of hope—the hope of peaceful constructive activities in free (sic) countries, and peaceful cooperation among free (sic) peoples. There will be disillusionments along the way as these hopes unfold. They should not come from America, or as the result of American policy.

In other words, he says to America, "Keep your hands off."

A great part of Asia's hopes, however, will be fulfilled, and should be fulfilled with American cooperation. We have everything to gain by being on the side of hope (p. 238).

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield, to permit me to ask a few questions?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield for a question, certainly.

Mr. DONNELL. I should like to ask the Senator, first, briefly, what has been the connection of Mr. Lattimore with the State Department, and over how long a period?

Mr. McCARTHY. First, let me state what his connection is as of now.

Mr. DONNELL. Yes.

Mr. McCARTHY. This is information which I got from the research branch of the Library of Congress; I called the State Department, but I could not get

this information there. The Library of Congress gave me this information: namely, that the Afganistan Government asked the United States in December 1949 to send a preliminary mission to Afganistan to investigate the possibilities of utilizing the Point 4 program in that area; that Owen Lattimore was selected to head that delegation; and that he is in that area or has recently returned therefrom.

As to his previous connections, it is, I may say to the Senator, hard to put one's finger upon them. As I told the committee the other day he has a desk in the State Department. He has access to the files. Ever since President Roosevelt labeled Owen Lattimore as the outstanding authority, he has been recognized as the "architect"—that is not my phrase—of our far-eastern policy.

For example, when President Truman called in the press at the time of the Japanese surrender he had on his desk only two books. One of them was Lattimore's book from which I have been quoting.

So it is hard to put one's finger on the exact job he has. However, without any doubt, he has been formulating the policy.

Later I intend to cover in some detail the extent to which Secretary Acheson has followed the Lattimore line.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, do I correctly understand from the Senator that at this very moment Lattimore does have this duty to perform on behalf of the State Department in Afganistan?

Mr. McCARTHY. I believe he is on his way back.

Mr. DONNELL. At any rate he has been there until a very few hours before the present time; has he?

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes.

Mr. DONNELL. Will the Senator permit me to ask a few more questions?

Mr. McCARTHY. Certainly.

Mr. DONNELL. The Senator from Wisconsin has referred to one Phillip Jaffe; has he not?

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes.

Mr. DONNELL. Was Phillip Jaffe convicted of a crime?

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes or he pleaded guilty.

Mr. DONNELL. Approximately what was the date of that?

Mr. McCARTHY. That was in 1945.

Mr. DONNELL. So, 4 years before Mr. Lattimore was sent on his mission to

Afghanistan, Mr. Jaffe had been convicted, and that was a matter of public knowledge. Is that correct?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct; there can be no doubt about it.

Mr. DONNELL. I should like to ask the Senator whether he has observed—I am sure he knows the fact, but I ask whether he has observed—that in the published report of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, of the House of Representatives, Seventy-eighth Congress, second session, at page 1446 of that document, the committee had this to say—it is not long, and I should like to read it; and I ask the Senator whether he has observed this, and then I shall ask him a further question:

Throughout its existence in this country the Communist Party has made a specialty of propaganda through publications and periodicals. It would be difficult indeed to compile an absolutely complete list of these publications and periodicals, but the following tabulation presents many of them. In addition to these, there have been thousands of local and shop papers, some of which have been printed and some of which have been mimeographed.

Did the Senator from Wisconsin observe that immediately following that statement by the committee of the House of Representatives, to the effect that the Communist Party has made a specialty of propaganda through publications and periodicals, and stating that, "The following tabulation presents many of them," the very first one that is mentioned is Amerasia? That is correct, is it not?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct. Amerasia has long been known as completely controlled by the Communist Party. I do not think there is any one, no matter how partisan, who would deny the fact that Amerasia is an organ of Soviet Russia.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a further question?

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes.

Mr. DONNELL. Am I correct in understanding that the Senator from Wisconsin in referring to Phillip Jaffe referred to the same Phillip J. Jaffe, managing editor of the editorial board of Amerasia, listed at page 1446 of the document to which I have referred, as being managing editor and a member of the editorial board of 12 persons, of whom Owen Lattimore is listed, likewise, as being one of those members? Am I correct in that?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct. I may say also, for the Senator's benefit, that Far Eastern Survey, the publication of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, for a long time occupied offices adjoining the official offices of Amerasia; in fact, I understand that in order to get into one office, one went through the other—almost a sort of joint venture.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a further question?

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes.

Mr. DONNELL. Then, am I correct in understanding from the statement contained in this report of the House committee, from which it appears that the information I have just read about membership on the editorial board of Amerasia came from the issue of August 1938, that the fact that Mr. Jaffe, who was convicted in 1949, was a member of a board of 12, of whom Owen Lattimore was one member, was known from 1938 up until and including the present time and at the time when Mr. Lattimore was sent to Afghanistan on the mission upon which he is engaged; is that correct?

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator from Missouri is 100 percent correct. I may say that I think he inadvertently stated "1949" when he meant 1945. Jaffe was convicted in 1945.

Mr. DONNELL. In referring to 1949, I was referring to the year which I understood the Senator from Wisconsin to say was the year when Mr. Lattimore was sent to Afghanistan.

Mr. McCARTHY. No; in 1949 he went to New Delhi, India, on a project which was sponsored, apparently jointly, by the State Department and the Institute of Pacific Relations. It was in 1950—a matter of weeks ago—that he went to Afghanistan.

But lest the Senate be misled as to the 1949 project, let me say that I have tried to get the information as to the extent to which the State Department sponsored the meeting in New Delhi. The local newspapers certainly appeared to think it was a State Department project. Our Ambassador over there attended. One of my representatives talked to the members of one labor organization who said they had been invited to send two representatives to this conference, and that while they would not be on the Government payroll, their air travel would be taken care of through the State Department. So, the only information I

can give the Senator as to the sponsoring of that project is that the Indian newspapers all carried it as a State Department IPR project, and apparently either the State Department paid for, or furnished the air travel for the individuals who went there. In 1950, up to this time, until but a few days ago, Lattimore has been in Afghanistan working out the Point 4 program.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a further question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from Missouri?

Mr. McCARTHY. Certainly.

Mr. DONNELL. In whose behalf is it that the Senator understands that Mr. Lattimore is now in Afghanistan working out the Point 4 program?

Mr. McCARTHY. All I can say is the Afghanistan Government asked our State Department to send a man. They said, "We will send Owen Lattimore." I think perhaps the Senator will find that he is on the payroll of UN; of course, being paid American money.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a further question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from Missouri?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. DONNELL. Am I correct in understanding the Senator a few minutes ago to say that the State Department was requested to send a man to Afghanistan on the matter to which he has referred?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct.

Mr. DONNELL. And that Mr. Lattimore was sent by someone on that mission? Is that correct?

Mr. McCARTHY. He was picked by the State Department and sent on that mission.

Mr. DONNELL. And that was in the year 1950, was it?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct.

Mr. DONNELL. That was 5 years after the conviction of Phillip J. Jaffe, to whom reference has been made. Is that correct?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct.

Mr. DONNELL. What was the crime of which Mr. Jaffe was convicted and what was his punishment, if the Senator recalls?

Mr. McCARTHY. I frankly do not know what particular crime he was finally accused of, but it was in connection

with the theft of documents from the State Department, and from the Office of Naval Intelligence. There were 360 taken from the State Department and, while I do not have the exact figures, a sizable number were taken, from the Office of Naval Intelligence, from Army Intelligence, and one other agency. I should like to give the Senator very briefly a résumé of some of the documents, so he will realize their importance, but I am sorry, I do not have the data before me at the moment.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, while the Senator's assistant is looking for that, may I, with his permission, ask another question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from Missouri for a further question?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. DONNELL. May I ask the Senator from Wisconsin has there ever been, so far as he knows, since the publication of the House committee from which I have read—and which, by the way, was printed at the United States Government Printing Office in 1944—has there ever been any serious question raised, so far as the Senator knows, as to the correctness of the conclusion of that committee, that Amerasia was a publication through which the Communist Party put forth propaganda? Is there any doubt of that in the Senator's mind?

Mr. McCARTHY. There is no doubt whatever in my mind, and I do not believe there can be any doubt in the mind of any open-minded individual. The Senator is speaking of Amerasia, I take it.

Mr. DONNELL. I am speaking of Amerasia. Has there ever been, so far as the Senator knows, any action taken by any committee of the House of Representatives or of the Senate, setting aside or contradicting the conclusion of the House committee in 1944 that Amerasia, having Jaffe and also Mr. Lattimore on their editorial board of 12, was a Communist publication? Has there ever been any action of any committee of the Congress which set aside that conclusion or denied its validity?

Mr. McCARTHY. None whatever. Merely to give the Senator a better picture of some of the individuals on the board of Amerasia, I may say I have a letter here signed by T. A. Bisson, who was in the State Department, and also

on the Amerasia board. The letter is addressed to the head of a Protestant missionary council.

Mr. DONNELL. Will the Senator permit me to interrupt to ask whether that is the same T. A. Bisson who was listed by the House committee in 1946?

Mr. McCARTHY. It is the same Bisson. I shall cover this in more detail later. The letter is a fantastic document if ever there was one. He writes to the head of a Protestant missionary council—and I will give the Senator the letter—advising against giving aid in, to quote, "rehabilitating the Red-ravaged districts." In other words, when the Communists departed and the Protestant missionary group undertook to give the people aid, Bisson wrote saying it was wrong. He ends his letter with a postscript, which sounds interesting:

P. S.—I would strongly advise every prospective missionary to China to read Chinese Destinies, by Agnes Smedley.

In case the Senator does not know who Agnes Smedley is, she was the individual about whom MacArthur's intelligence unit issued a document which was placed in the Record in which she is branded as the outstanding Soviet agent for over 20 years.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a further question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from Missouri?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. DONNELL. Does the Senator know of any reason why the State Department has found it necessary, in sending a man abroad, if it did send him, on this Afghanistan project, to select a man who was on the editorial board, consisting of 12 members of a publication which the Congress of the United States, through the House of Representatives, had officially stated was a periodical through which the Communist Party had made a specialty of issuing propaganda?

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me state in this connection that, as the Senator will recall, John Service was arrested. That is the case which Hoover says was a 100-percent airtight case. Joseph Grew, who was then Under Secretary of State, was very vigorous in insisting on the prosecution of Service. Grew resigned. Dean Acheson took over. A few days

later, John Service was reinstated. He is the man who was accused of stealing these documents. Subsequently, he was put in charge, so far as I can determine, of personnel, promotions, and placements in the Far East. The man who stole the documents for Amerasia, an outfit which is clearly Communist-controlled, and who was the subject of this espionage case was picked up by Dean Acheson, and was not only reinstated but was placed in the position of controlling placements and promotions of personnel in the Far East. This may explain why men like Lattimore were assigned such important jobs in the East.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, if the Senator will pardon me, are these the documents Jaffe was accused of stealing, or that he did steal?

Mr. McCARTHY. Not of trying to steal, but which he did steal. These are documents which were recovered from the office of Amerasia by the FBI or Naval Intelligence. I think this is the one which was recovered by the FBI—either the FBI or Naval Intelligence. First, there is a document marked "Secret," obviously a document originating in the Navy Department, with the schedule and targets for the bombing of Japan. This particular document was known to be in the possession of Phillip Jaffe on one of the days during the early spring of 1945, before the bombing program had been undertaken. That information, in the hands of our enemies, could cost us many precious lives.

Second, there is another document, also marked "Top Secret," likewise originating in the Navy Department. It dealt with the disposition of the Japanese fleet subsequent to the major naval battle of October 1944, and gave the class and location of each Japanese warship. What Jaffe wanted that for is a \$64 question.

Third, there is another document stolen from the Office of Postal and Telegraph Censorship, a secret report on the Far East, which was so stamped, leaving no doubt in the mind of anyone.

Another document stolen from Military Intelligence consisted of 22 pages; and one of the documents, of considerable interest, which was found in his possession and that apparently reached Jaffe before it reached the State Department, was John Service's report No. 58, a report highly critical of Chiang Kai-shek. Does the Senator follow me? Before that document reached the State

Department from Service, he had first mailed it to Phillip Jaffe.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, I give assurance that I am going to trespass only a very short time further on the Senator's time, but I should like to ask another question or two.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from Missouri?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. DONNELL. This is in connection with the query that is in my mind as to why it would be necessary for our Government in selecting a person to go to Afghanistan to restrict itself to a man who had been connected with an organization such as Amerasia, as a member of a board consisting of 12 members, of whom Jaffe, who was convicted in 1945, was one. The further question I have along that line arises from a similar query. I find in the same report of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives, published in 1944, that there is a series of exhibits listed. I should like to ask the Senator a question based thereon. The report says:

In this section of the report will be found numerous exhibits of Communists and Communist-front organizations. The personnel of these organizations reveals an extensive interlocking directorate with the other organizations that are discussed in these volumes. In his memorandum on the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties, the Attorney General has called attention to the importance of the interlocking directorate in identifying Communist-front organizations.

Then, I point out to the Senator, and will ask him the question in a moment, the fact that among the exhibits that reveal a part of the personnel of these organizations, or, I should say, among those organizations, is the Maryland Association for Democratic Rights.

I want to ask the Senator whether he has noted that at page 1136 of the report of the House of Representatives in 1944, 6 years before Mr. Lattimore was selected to go to Afghanistan, it appears that the Maryland Association for Democratic Rights, listed as an organization under the heading of "Miscellaneous Communist and Communist-front Organizations," included among the sponsors of a certain conference the name of Owen Lattimore. I ask the Senator if he knows why it is necessary that our Government should have any

organization acting for or with the consent of our Government to restrict its choice of a man to go on an important diplomatic mission to Afghanistan to someone who is not only connected with a publication such as Amerasia, but is also a member of an organization which is listed among Communist and Communist-front organizations? Can the Senator explain the necessity for our Government, or anyone connected with it, or with its approval, confining itself, in the instance cited, to a man who is connected with such organizations?

Mr. McCARTHY. I can see no conceivable reason for it. There is an excuse for some of these unusual individuals being appointed, I suppose, but the picture has been so clear and it has been painted over so many years that there can be no conceivable reason for this man's being appointed. There are, after all, a vast number of good, intelligent individuals who are not painted with the brush with which Lattimore has been painted, who could do a good job.

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Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I shall yield for a question.

Mr. ANDERSON. In furtherance of the questions raised by the senior Senator from Missouri [Mr. DONNELL], is the Senator from Wisconsin familiar with the fact that the House of Representatives took recognition of some of the publications and appointed a committee to investigate many of the charges made? Is he familiar with the results of the investigations?

Mr. McCARTHY. The results of the investigation of the publications?

Mr. ANDERSON. No; the charges made against hundreds of citizens which resulted in Republicans and Democrats voting unanimously to discredit most of the charges.

Mr. McCARTHY. I am not sure that I understand the import of the Senator's question.

Mr. ANDERSON. I asked the Senator if he is familiar with the fact that the House of Representatives, stirred up by these charges, appointed a committee to look into them, that there was evidence before the House that charges had been preferred by employees of the Department without the faintest consultation with a single member of the committee,

and that it resulted in new rules which prohibited them from issuing publications of this character. I wonder if the Senator wants to review the whole procedure of the House of Representatives.

Mr. McCARTHY. So far as I know, there is no Member of the House who has objected to the finding that Amerasia is a mouthpiece for the Communist Party.

Mr. ANDERSON. Is the Senator familiar with the fact that among those listed were many persons who held high political office, men who were even Members of the Congress of the United States, and would it not have been the duty of the House to expel Members who belonged to such organization?

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator is picking out one of the weakest bits of evidence and asking whether—

Mr. ANDERSON. I was somewhat disturbed by the questions of the Senator from Missouri who had not seen this list and might not be familiar with the fact that the House of Representatives itself has taken some recognition of the situation.

Mr. McCARTHY. I agree with the Senator from Missouri that when we find a person belonging to Communist organizations, then, under no circumstances, should they be permitted to represent the United States until we find out why they joined the Communist organization. In connection with Lattimore's connection with Communist-front organizations, I invite attention to the fact that the American Legion has named him as one of the individuals who should, under no circumstances, be sponsored by any Legion group. The California senate committee also named him as an individual who is writing subversive books for colleges or schools. It is the entire picture which is important. It is not the question of belonging to the Maryland association; it is the entire chain of events.

Mr. ANDERSON. Has the Senator identified Lattimore with employment by the State Department? Was the man from Canada appointed to the State Department?

Mr. McCARTHY. He was appointed by the United Kingdom. Our State Department is not the head of that group. Even if we did not have evidence putting him at work in the State Department, the fact remains that both Roosevelt and Truman considered Lattimore an expert on the Far East. Roosevelt, according to

Wallace's book, pointed out that "this man is our greatest expert on Chinese-Russian relations." I believe you can ask almost any school child who is the architect of our far-eastern policy is, and he will say, "Owen Lattimore."

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. DONNELL. The distinguished Senator from New Mexico has made inquiry as to whether the Senator from Wisconsin knew of the fact that subsequently to the preparation of the lists from which I read the House of Representatives had taken notice of them and appointed committees, and that many persons were exonerated, or words to that effect. That may be entirely correct, but is it not a fact that two things are true, first, that the lists which I read are not mere lists which were presented to the committee, but are set forth in a report of the committee, and in this section of the report there will be found various things? Is it not also true that there has been no exoneration of Amerasia? Certainly if everyone else had been exonerated along the lines of the distinguished Senator's question, Jaffe's statement with reference to the charges to which the Senator has referred clearly demonstrates that there has been no exoneration of Amerasia set forth in the official report of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator is 100-percent correct. In that connection, I should like to point out that Frederick Vanderbilt Field, a man who has admitted and proclaimed to the world that he is a Communist, was editor of Amerasia for a considerable period of time.

Mr. DONNELL. May I ask the Senator if he will permit me to invite the attention of the Senate to the fact that at page 1446 of the official report, from which I have read, Frederick Vanderbilt Field is stated to be chairman of the editorial board, according to the issue of March 1943, and that according to the issue of August 1938, Frederick V. Field was shown to be chairman of the editorial board. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct. In connection with that I ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the Record at this point a brief article entitled "Millionaire Communist—A Case Study of Frederick Vanderbilt Field," published in the May 1949 issue of the magazine Plain Talk.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

**MILLIONAIRE COMMUNIST—A CASE STUDY OF FREDERICK VANDERBILT FIELD**

(By Archie Black)

Of the half dozen millionaire Communists in the United States, none provides a more fascinating case history than Frederick Vanderbilt Field. The great-great grandson of Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt, with an annual income well into the upper brackets, Mr. Field suffers none of the disabilities of a lowly proletarian.

A Vanderbilt without power, Frederick V. Field, as he prefers to be known, has hitched his star to the Communist chariot in pursuit of power. That, too, explains the servility which this Vanderbilt scion has displayed in the presence of Communist commissars. Furthermore, being a mediocre writer, Mr. Field has been able to satisfy his ambition of becoming a columnist in the pages of the Daily Worker. And the Communist movement sets up no barriers for the playboy; his volatile and fickle temperament can find ample expression in the Red pastures. Undoubtedly the analyst of the future will discover other psychological facets in the make-up of a millionaire Communist. As a social phenomenon, the type has hardly been studied.

Sympathy for oppressed peoples all over the world is the theme song for Mr. Field's writings. And it is said that, in general, he tries to practice what he preaches. On the occasions when he seems to revert to type and snub the proletariat, he does so through his eagerness to serve Moscow's higher-ups. An example occurred a few years ago when Earl Browder, then general secretary of the Communist Party, sent word that he was coming to see Field at the latter's office. Field rushed down to meet him. A lame Negro woman was waiting to take the elevator. At the sight of the party's grand sachem Field became so flustered that he unceremoniously shoved the woman out of the way to make room for Browder, whom he escorted into the elevator.

A tall, slender man in his early forties, Field has a high brow and thin face which give him the air of an intellectual. Though he has never had to do a day's work at any gainful occupation, he works hard and earnestly for a multitude of party causes. Frequently he puts in long hours in his office at 23 West Twenty-sixth Street—a building which serves as headquarters for Communist fronts.

When Frederick Vanderbilt Field invited Whittaker Chambers to luncheon at the Vanderbilt Hotel in New York City in the middle 1930's, to discuss a certain crucial underground matter, Field was already closely linked to the Communist Party machine. Less than a decade earlier he had graduated from Harvard (class of 1927) where he had had a good academic record and had served,

among other leading activities, as president of the Harvard Crimson. When he entered college, classmates of his say, he had little interest in politics. But in the atmosphere of Harvard at the time that Laurence Duggan and Alger Hiss were also students, Field began to be converted to the political left.

After his graduation Field traveled to England to study at the school of economics of London University. Here the lectures of Harold Laski were influential in turning him further toward socialism. His break with his family past became apparent in the presidential campaign of 1928, when, after dallying with the idea of supporting Alfred E. Smith, he publicly endorsed Norman Thomas and became active in the affairs of the American Socialist Party. For a time he acted as secretary to Mr. Thomas. In 1928 he organized the League of First Voters, a group which had its origin in Harvard and which aimed to fight for liberalism and socialism.

During the early thirties Field grew more and more dissatisfied with the slowness of socialism in achieving reforms. Those who were intimate with him at the time report that he was obsessed with the idea of using quick action to get quick results. He viewed the Soviet Union as having succeeded. Like so many who began as Socialists, he turned to the more militant gospel of Stalinism. How large a part in his awakening to the true faith was played by Communist wooing of his ego can only be surmised.

One of Field's first party assignments was to help lead others down the road he had taken. Appropriately, it was the open-road tours to which he was detailed as president. This Communist-controlled travel outfit was designed to show Potemkin villages to visitors in the Soviet Union. That was before the iron curtain descended, but the innocents who took the tours saw only what the Kremlin wanted them to see.

By the time of the Stalin-Hitler pact in 1939, the Vanderbilt heir was an established toiler in the Communist party vineyard and a willing slave of its Fuehrers. He undertook a major role in the Communist task of softening up America with "peace" propaganda, to block out preparedness against the Nazi aggressors. Field served as national secretary and one of the chief financial backers of the American Peace Mobilization (APM) launched in September 1940—the Communist front which flooded the country with the slogan, "The Yanks Are Not Coming." Under his leadership, APM picketed the White House and opposed lend-lease and conscription as a spearhead of the attacks on our democracy.

"On the afternoon of June 21, 1941, he (Frederick V. Field, national secretary) suddenly called off the picket line around the White House," reported Attorney General Francis Biddle in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Hitler had attacked the Soviet Union. No more antidefense propaganda was fed into

the APM mimeograph machines. Super-patriotism and dedication to the "people's war against fascism" were the order of the day. And on February 13, 1942, Frederick Vanderbilt Field applied for a commission in the United States Army Military Intelligence.

After an investigation, the Army turned him down. Mr. Field was hurt; he was eager to aid the war effort. Why were his services refused? His stated reason for applying was that the Far East had been his specialty. Actually, so far as it known, he has visited the Orient three times, living there for a year on one occasion.

It is as an authority on the Far East that Field has shone particularly in the varied theaters of Stalinist culture. He has given a lecture course on "The Far East in World Affairs" at the Jefferson School of Social Science—the party-line academy listed as subversive by the Attorney General, and of which Field was one of the organizers. He has written voluminously on Asiatic affairs for the Daily Worker, the New Masses (now Masses and Mainstream), and the highbrow Communist monthly, Political Affairs. Unfailingly these articles are full of diatribes against United States imperialism in the Pacific, against the iniquities of the Chinese Nationalists, and against United States interference with the course of democracy in China as it might be bestowed by the Communists under Mao Tse-tung.

The line Field follows is the same that has been peddled with such success to our State Department and our muddled intellectuals by the fellow-traveler writers and commentators. It is doubtful whether Field's party writings have influenced anyone outside the faithful who read the prescribed party organs. But through his Communist-front activities, he has aided in a more subtle plan to reach the public at large with propaganda designed to keep the United States out of the Orient so that the Soviet Union might have clear sailing there.

Appearing in pamphlets under the imprint of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), Field's party-line views won a wider audience. (For two articles analyzing Communist influence in the IPR, see Plain Talk for December 1946 and January 1947.) In 1920, after he left London, Field attended the third biennial conference of the IPR in Kyoto, Japan. He was to play a long and increasingly important role in this organization, leading to its almost complete Stalinization. Field was one of the eight members of the inner circle of the IPR's American Council—the executive committee of its board of trustees.

Field is no longer connected with IPR, which has purged itself of the Stalinist group that misdirected it. But he has a new vehicle for his activities in behalf of a Sovietized Asia. This front, with the high-sounding name of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, has Field and other Communists on its board of directors.

The current program of the committee stresses that the United States should give no aid to Nationalist China, but should do business with and aid Communist China, and investigate the "China lobby" in Washington.

A secret directive of the Communist Party of New York State, dated March 1, 1949, and signed by May Miller, assistant organization secretary of the party, ordered all sections and counties of the party to plan action in their communities on the China question, following a special outline prepared by the committee. Miss Miller's letter to the comrades concluded:

"Any inquiries in relation to further activity can be received by writing to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy at 111 West Forty-second Street, New York City."

Typical of Field's current line on China is a 15-page article signed by him which was published in the January 1949 issue of Political Affairs (a magazine "devoted to the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism"). He rejoices that "under the leadership of the great Communist Party of China and its renowned chairman, Mao Tse-tung, the heroic Chinese people are discharging their duties with honor. The imperialists are being decisively beaten back in China." These are hardly novel sentiments for Field to express. What is new is this undisguised call to United States Communist action:

"It is incumbent on the American people, in the first place the American labor and progressive movements, not to overlook this opportunity to demand an end to all political, military, and financial intervention in China. It is our task, as American Communists, to help mobilize the forces of labor and all anti-imperialists in our country, to deal such further blows at Wall Street, that the Chinese New Democracy may consolidate its victories and move firmly and powerfully on the road toward socialism."

Though most of the millionaire Communist's thunder against the world intrigues of Wall Street is directed to the East, his concern for downtrodden colonial peoples extends also to Latin America and to Africa. He served as executive vice president of the Council for Pan-American Democracy, which devotes most of its propaganda to opposing "United States Imperialism" in Latin America. He has entertained Lombardo Toledano, the leading promoter of the Stalinist line in Latin American labor circles.

The executive secretary for the council is Marion Bachrach, a sister of John Abt, avowed pro-Soviet attorney whose wife, Jessica Smith, edits Soviet Russia Today. All three of them were members of the inner Russia First circle in Washington. It was a circle in which cocktails and the cause often mixed. And Frederick Vanderbilt Field served as a base for this mixture.

On October 21, 1945, for example, a quiet, unreported cocktail party was held at 18 West Twelfth Street, the private home of Mr. Field.

About seventy persons were present and each paid \$100 for the privilege. The purpose of this exclusive gathering, far from the eyes of the press, was to raise funds for the Communist-controlled Council on African Affairs.

The chief notable was Paul Robeson. At such conclaves he speaks instead of singing. He told the sympathetic guests what was on his mind. He had recently made a tour of Europe for the USO and was distressed by what he had "seen," a distress that earlier had been announced by the Soviet Union. Fascist elements were still permitted to rule, according to Robeson. This was the result of State Department instructions to the American Military Government. Next, he indicted the Catholic Church; his accusation was that it was preaching the same fascist sermons which, he charged, it had delivered under Hitler.

Later in the evening—the \$100 tariff not being satisfactory—an appeal was made for additional funds. This brought in \$3,500. A buffet supper was then served; drinks were plentiful. The enlightened guests, clipped for the cause, happily discussed current events. Results: seventy persons, meeting privately, contributed \$10,500 for a Stalinist cause. Nobody, not even the neighbors and certainly not the press, knew or knows anything about this meeting which included among the guests Diana Forbes-Robertson and Muriel Draper.

Though Field held no office in the Council on African Affairs, he was evidently assigned by the party to keep an eye on its activities. His wife, Edith C. Field, served as treasurer of the council in 1946, at a time when its chairman, Paul Robeson, issued a call for a "Big Three Unity for Colonial Freedom" rally, held in Madison Square Garden.

The headquarters of the Council are in the four-story building at 23 West Twenty-sixth Street, which was purchased in 1944 by a partnership of Field, Yergan & Field. It was actually Communist Party property, as subsequent events were to show. Dr. Max Yergan, executive director of the Council, who broke with the party in 1948, bought a one-third share in the building. The rest of the purchase price of \$30,000 was supplied by Field and his wife. When the break came between Yergan and the party, the latter employed the law firm of Pressman, Witt, & Cummer. It became obvious that they would protract the proceedings indefinitely, so Yergan settled for \$5,000. The majority of the Council, Yergan reported, were in favor of his position, but they resigned in protest against the Communist tactics. The organization was then taken over completely by the Communist Party.

The party building, which owes two-thirds of its purchase price to the Vanderbilt fortune, is listed by Mr. Field in the telephone book as his business address. Among the Communist fronts it houses are the American Committee for Protection of the Foreign Born, which is especially active now in de-

fense of Communist agents who never bothered to take out American citizenship; the Civil Rights Congress; the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade; the National Defense Committee, under the aegis of Ferdinand Smith; the Council for Pan-American Democracy, and a district office of the American Labor Party. On the main floor is the elegantly furnished Frederick Vanderbilt Field Library, open to the public.

Sharing Field's interest in some of these causes is his wife, the former Edith Chamberlain Hunter, whom he married in 1937. She studied at the Katherine Branson School in Ross, Calif., as well as in New York and abroad, and was married previously to Phelps Stokes Hunter, of Santa Barbara. Field's first marriage, to Elizabeth G. Brown, of Duluth, in 1929, ended in divorce 6 years later.

Field is a stockholder in other Stalinist enterprises. The Trade Union Service, Inc., of New York owns a number of labor papers, so-called, published for and by party-line trade unions. The law requiring publication of a statement of ownership has revealed that Field, together with Corliss Lamont and others, has a finger in this pie.

When the Wallace campaign cried for funds last summer, the Vanderbilt scion was quick with his checkbook. His contribution was \$5,000, the maximum permitted by law.

In 1945, Field was issued credentials to attend the top-secret sessions of the Communist Party at the time of Browder's deposition and Foster's ascension to the throne. A member of the organizing committee of the Jefferson School, and later a trustee, Field has served also as treasurer of the New York Council of the American-Soviet Friendship. Journalistically, he has been associate editor of the New Masses, chairman of the editorial board of the pro-Communist Amerasia; legal owner of People's Press, edited and published by Frank L. Palmer, for many years a supporter of the party line.

The Daily Worker sent Field to San Francisco in May 1945, to report on the founding of the United Nations. While there he spoke at a meeting on the United Nations Conference presented by the Communist Political Association of San Francisco.

One of Field's UN columns, Molotov versus Vandenberg at Frisco, contrasted the two delegates and, quite naturally, favored the Soviet representative. He reported:

"Molotov has given the clearest expression to the views of those who believe the United Nations are here forming an international organization for the related purposes of eliminating the danger of future fascist aggression and promoting democracy. The Michigan Senator is the leader of those elements who conceive the main task of the new organization to be the policing of the Soviet Union and the promotion of reaction."

Frederick Vanderbilt Field conceives his own main task to be that of a Soviet sentry

in the United States. Molotovs may come and go, Soviet policies may be exposed as those of a most reactionary police state, one independent nation after another may fall under Stalin's iron heel, even Titos and Dimitrovs may be denounced by the Politburo as capitalist lackeys, but the intellectually adrift millionaire Communist will remain unswervingly loyal to the great Red father in the Kremlin.

Mr. McCARTHY. Incidentally, this man Field is no shrinking violet. Field uses the term "we American Communists." He is the man who created what is known as the American People's Fund, Inc. The sole purpose of the fund is to act as a repository for funds which are to be doled out to such Communist organizations as Field decides to name. There is no secret about it. He proclaims the fact publicly. He is a man with a great deal of money, which incidentally he did not earn, but inherited. No one who is on the board could have any conceivable doubt that the chairman of the board is a self-proclaimed and leading Communist. Actually, of course, Field is not a leader of Communists. The Communists are simply using him for his money. He would like to regard himself as a leader, and he has proclaimed himself as such, and he is the chairman of the editorial board. Therefore Lattimore could have had no doubt as to the nature of the organization.

One of Lattimore's subtle methods is to put his own ideas in the mouths of some hapless: Mongol tribesman, or Chinese peasant, who cannot possibly refute Lattimore's assertions, and does not even know what sentiments are being ascribed to him by the learned professor. For instance at page 140 in *Solution in Asia*, he writes:

Let us take an Uighur in Sinkiang Province . . . who learns that among his near kinsmen, the Soviet Uzbeks, a poor man's children may attend, free, a school at which they are taught in their own language . . . that they may go on to the university and become doctors, engineers, anything in the world . . . then he is going to think that the Uzbeks are free and have democracy.

Incidentally, the professor is in error here. Stalin's subjects have had to pay for their high school and college education since 1941.

However, the main point is that this passage is clearly designed to batter down any doubts the reader may have, by confronting him with evidence of Lat-

timore's unique knowledge of people such as Uighurs and Uzbeks, whose names his audience cannot even pronounce and of whose existence they have never heard.

I certainly never heard of them until I took the trouble to read Lattimore's books, and I have probably pronounced Uighur incorrectly.

The poor Uighurs are forced to act as a ventriloquist's dummy in Lattimore's writing. When he thinks that it would be advisable to have someone voice his own admiration for the Soviet Union, Lattimore needs only to drag in some Uighur tribesmen who are obviously not in a position to contradict him. Since no one else in America knows any Uighurs, Lattimore can safely ascribe to these nomads the greatest love and respect for Communist Russia. So, for instance, in his 1949 book, *The Situation in Asia*, he tells us how in 1949, he "ran into" some Uighur pilgrims on their way to Mecca via the Soviet Union, who said to him: "Haven't you heard? The Russians have democracy. They are good to Moslems."

After a perusal of Lattimore's writings, one begins to feel quite sorry for the Uighurs who have no one else to interpret their sentiments, and in all probability have no idea that a professor at Johns Hopkins has been telling the world how much they love communism.

Whereas Marco Polo found, when he returned to Venice from China and central Asia, that his true reports of this strange and unknown world were not believed, Owen Lattimore has been able to convince his readers and lecture audiences that his fantasies or untruths are the truth.

In passage after passage Lattimore slyly slips in big lies and small, always with the air of a detached observer and student of international affairs. In one place he casually refers to "the trend toward increased personal liberty and economic prosperity which has contributed so much to—Russia's—advantages in competing with us" for the favor of the peoples of Asia, as compared with our tardiness in "the evolution of democratic processes." In another place he refers to the grant by Moscow to Mongolia of "independent diplomatic representation and action." All the evidence available contradicts the first statement, and the second is simply not true. But how many

Americans can be expected to know how things are in Mongolia?

Mr. President, in view of the fact that the hour is getting late, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD at this point a further analysis I have made of the writings of Owen Lattimore, so that I may go on to the next case.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

In his book, *The Situation in Asia*, published in 1949, Lattimore has gone even further in deceiving the American people than in his former writings. Also, something new has been added. Formerly, he urged us to recognize only the superior "power of attraction" of the great and good Soviet Union, and the virtues of the Chinese Communists. Now he is also seeking to awaken our fears. This book of his seeks to convince us that, whether or not we like communism, the Soviet Union and its adherents all over the world are certain to win, so we had better appease them if we want to avoid destruction. For instance, he writes: "clearly the Communist ascendancy has become so decisive that it would not be reversed."

It would seem that Lattimore, and others like him, had only two choices after it became increasingly clear to the American people that they had been deluded concerning the nature and aims of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists. They had either to retreat, or advance to the offensive. To retreat would have meant that they would be forced to admit: (a) that the Soviet Government is neither peace-loving nor democratic nor "progressive," but a totalitarian tyranny; (b) that the Chinese Communists are not nice liberal agrarian reformers unconnected with Moscow, but very "real" Communists under Moscow's orders. To retreat would have meant that Lattimore and his friends in the State Department must sacrifice their reputations and possibly their jobs since they would have exposed themselves as ignoramuses or liars.

Having once hitched their wagons to the Soviet star, they had either publicly to recant, or convince us that the Communists are destined to win and so force us to give way to them. Lattimore has chosen the latter course.

In *The Situation in Asia* he tries to maintain his reputation as an objective and scholarly student of world affairs by admitting to a few unpleasant facts about the Soviet Union and the Communists which are by now too well-known to be denied; but his main effort is directed toward frightening us into pursuing a policy of appeasement, by demonstrating that we have no hope at all of stopping the triumphant

advance of communism because we are much weaker than we know.

Whereas formerly, when the climate of American opinion was favorable to the Soviet Government, Lattimore forbore to mention anything bad in Russia, he now writes: "No propaganda can hide (from Russia's neighbors) the fact that there is good and bad in Russia."

Since his readers must be expected to know that the Soviet satellite countries are not happy under the Communist yoke, and that Yugoslavia has broken with Russia, Lattimore can no longer rely in putting across his propaganda on the complete ignorance of his readers. Instead, he seeks to turn the tables on America by arguing that Stalin's abandonment of persuasion for compulsion in dealing with subject peoples is due to fear of an American attack and the necessity to consolidate the defenses of the Socialist world against imperialist America. He writes: "When under the pressure of a war scare the Russians feel that there is no time to take it easy, to explain and persuade, or to ease the transitional processes from capitalism to socialism in countries like Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, or Outer Mongolia. They sacrifice the federalizing aspects of nominal political voting equality between big and little states in the cominform to what they think is the compelling need for harsh military centralization."

Thus, Lattimore argues, the "Tito crisis broke into the open when in the spring of 1948 . . . we (meaning America) prepared to go onto a war footing."

Lattimore manages even to blame America for Russia's looting of Manchuria. "The Russians," he writes, "were afraid that Manchuria, if its industries were left a going concern, might be turned into an American stronghold on the doorstep of Siberia, so they gutted the factories of Manchuria as they withdrew."

Maybe, Lattimore says, this was a bit hard on the Chinese Communists, who were sure they could hold Manchuria, and were loyal to Russia in all questions of common world policy. But, he remarks, "This ruthless example of the sacrifice of the interests of non-Russian Communists has not diminished the Russian power of attraction in Asia."

In this book, as shown by the above quotation, Lattimore has silently abandoned his former pretense that the Chinese Communists are not real Communists. The admission that they are under Moscow's orders is used instead to frighten us, now that they control all of China. This in turn is used as an argument for appeasement. Briefly his argument runs as follows:

"The Soviet Union is not at the moment in a position to give economic aid to Communist China, so if America will give such aid without asking for anything in return, if we will refrain from using our economic power to force political concessions, we may be able

to prevent all Asia joining up with the Soviet Union against us."

One has only to read the published report of Mr. Acheson's speech to the National Press Club last January to see how closely the State Department line follows the Lattimore line.

The first chapters of the Situation in Asia are replete with warnings to America to recognize the limits to our power. He tells us we just have not got what it takes. Russia, he tells us, is stronger than we are largely because of her greater power of attraction, and although the Communist band wagon is not yet completely repaired, anyone who does not jump on it now is a fool, because communism represents progress and is therefore bound to win eventually.

In this book, Lattimore reveals why he is on the side of the Communists. He writes: "To be progressive in politics means to be on the side of that which is going up and against that which is going down."

True, he does not directly assert that he believes this; he says this is Communist theory. But he makes it quite clear that he agrees by telling his readers that when Russians read Stalin's formula for revolution "they are convinced of the farsight and wisdom of their leaders, and have the feeling that their country and their cause are going forward on the tide of history." Stalin's formula, Lattimore continues, "is so electrifyingly exact that it should be studied with cautious respect."

The belief that the Communists are going forward on the tide of history is the keynote of Lattimore's philosophy and teachings. Clearly he is determined to be on the side of the powerful, because, as he tells us, power is the only thing which counts. And since he believes that the Soviets are more powerful than America, he is naturally on the side of the Communists. If, however, America would only stop worrying about moral issues and decide to adopt Communist methods and the Communist philosophy, Lattimore might decide to stick by us.

The issue, Lattimore repents again and again, "is one of power." Americans are just silly to think that moral issues are important. Besides, we aren't moral anyhow, since everything we do is in our own self-interest. The only reason we do not always act like imperialists is that we sometimes find it more profitable not to do so. The only reason, for instance, that we have behaved better in the Philippines than other western powers in their Asiatic colonies is that we just did not need or want Philippine raw materials or sugar.

In case any Americans, inspired by Lattimore's philosophy, should start demanding that we use such power as we have to stop the Communist conquest of Asia, Lattimore hastens to add that there is just one exception to his "force decides" formula. "In China," he warns us, "moral attitudes will take precedence in deciding the future." Since, according to Lattimore, Russia is way

ahead of us with respect to moral attitudes in the eyes of Asiatics, we should not imagine that we can win. Our failure so far in China is in fact due to our immoral attempt to foist a dictatorship on the Chinese people. Soviet Russia has succeeded because she advances by "political infiltration or persuasion which is a moral question."

These totally false arguments are based on an equally false premise, namely, that America did her level best to aid the Chinese National Government and thus prevent the seizure of power by the Communists. The facts are entirely different. But since the State Department has misled the American people in respect to the amount of aid we gave to Chiang Kai-shek's government, Lattimore is here on ground where his ability to tell persuasive untruths has free rein.

Now, Mr. Lattimore is "a great authority" on China. He cannot, therefore, plead ignorance of the true facts. He must know that General Marshall embargoed all arms and ammunition to China in July 1946; that this embargo was not even partially lifted until a year later; and that the first shipment of arms voted for China by the Congress in 1948 did not start arriving until the end of that year. So he must know he is not telling the truth when on page 152 of his book, he writes how much better it would have been "if military aid to the Kuomintang had been suspended," or again, when on page 147 he writes: "All during the period of General Marshall's mission, the Kuomintang kept accumulating American supplies."

Far from giving his readers the facts, he again and again misinforms them about the course and motivation of American policy in China. The incontrovertible facts are that General Marshall was sent to China in December 1945, to try and force the National Government to share power with the Communists. This was the announced purpose of his mission, as shown by President Truman's public statement on December 15, 1945, in which he said that unless and until the Communists were given "fair and equitable representation" in a coalition government, all economic or other aid would be denied to the Chinese Government. Yet Lattimore, far from admitting that United States policy was designed to help the Communists acquire at least equal power with the Nationalists, refers to "American attempts to maintain indirect control (in China) by backing one side against the other in a civil war"; and continues: "The grandiose and disastrous American attempt to determine the character and outcome of the Chinese civil war . . . proved that America does not have the kind of power that can settle Chinese issues" (p. 43).

Further on in his book, Lattimore is indiscreet enough to repeat almost verbatim the charge made by the Chinese Communist radio against America. He writes at page 165:

"It took 3 years and from two to four billion dollars of American money to prove the uselessness of an American attempt to imitate this early Japanese policy in China."

I could cite many other quotations from Lattimore's writings to demonstrate his anti-Americanism. As against his totally unfair and untrue diatribe against America, he insists that Soviet policy "cannot fairly be called Red imperialism." "It certainly," he continues, "establishes a standard with which other nations must compete if they wish to practice a policy of attraction in Asia. Russo-Mongol relations in Asia, like Russo-Czechoslovak relations in Europe, deserve careful and respectful study."

I shall confine myself to mentioning only a few of the most blatant untruths Lattimore has written on other matters. In order to make us believe that Moscow has little or no control over the Chinese Communists, he makes the following false assertion: "The top political and military leadership (of the Chinese Communist Party) is not Moscow trained." Mr. Lattimore, who has been called the best-informed American on Asiatic affairs living today, certainly must know this is not true. He is deliberately deceiving his readers. For the Chinese Communists themselves have been proud to acknowledge the fact that almost all of the important leaders of the Chinese Communist Party are Moscow-trained. Among the many names which could be cited are the following:

Chou En-lai, who headed the Communist delegation which negotiated with General Marshall in Chungking in 1946. Chou En-lai was for years the representative of the Communist Party in China's war-torn capitals and acted as a sort of Communist Ambassador. His charming manners and skill in representing the Communists as democrats is thought to have been largely responsible for General Marshall's falling into the trap set by Moscow.

Today he is Premier and Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist Government at Peking.

Li Li-shan spent 15 years in Moscow before returning in 1945 to his native land with the Russian Red Army, to become the Communist boss of Manchuria, and Stalin's personal watchdog over the Chinese Communist Party.

The Chinese Communist delegate to the San Francisco United Nations Conference in 1945 was Tung Pi-wu, also a Moscow-trained Communist. Subsequently he became head of the Communist government in Peking after it capitulated to the Communists.

Liu Shao-chi, vice chairman of the present Chinese Communist government, is Moscow-trained.

Jen Pi-shih, the economic dictator of Communist China, is Moscow-trained.

Yeh Chien-ying, the present Communist boss of Canton, who was formerly the Communist delegate to the executive headquarters set up by General Marshall in Peiping in 1946 to direct the truce terms which were

supposed to stop the civil war, is another famous Communist leader who was trained in Moscow.

Gen. Liu Po-cheng, the Communist boss of southwest China, known as the one-eyed dragon, is yet another Moscow-trained Communist.

Wang Min, otherwise known as Chen Shao-yu, a most important man in China, was for years the Chinese representative on the executive committee of the Comintern and is Stalin's personal disciple.

Liu Shao-chi, leading theorist of the Chinese Communist Party, was also Moscow-trained.

Even the Chief of Staff of the Chinese Communist armies, Nieh Yung-chun, was trained for his job in Russia.

And if one takes the Chinese Communist leaders, such as Chu Teh, who were not actually trained in Moscow, one usually finds that they were educated in Germany or France by Comintern agents.

Let me mention a few other typical Lattimorisms:

"Greece is a doubtful stronghold because it is a stronghold in which the garrison is besieged by the populace."

In other words, the Greeks wanted to be ruled by a Communist tyranny.

Another:

"Every one of the east European governments, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, had been Fascist or semi-Fascist."

Another untruth. Poland had a predominantly liberal and Socialist government in exile. Nor is it correct to describe Yugoslavia under its monarchy as Fascist. Mihailovitch, murdered by Tito, after leading the Serbian anti-Nazi forces, can by no stretch of the imagination be designated as a Fascist. But Lattimore makes it clear throughout his book that he accepts the Communist definition of a Fascist as identical with a supporter of a capitalist, or free-enterprise system, such as we have in America.

Having done his best, and a very good best it was, to influence American policy along a line which would lead to the defeat of our loyal ally, the Nationalist government of China, and to the Kremlin's conquest of China, Mr. Lattimore is now busy telling us that it is too late to do anything; that there is no longer anything but a corpse in China for us to support. In a debate against Senator Ferguson, on the American Forum of the Air in Washington, on May 9, last year, Lattimore said:

"Senator, I think we ought to try to get down to the basic realities of the situation. . . . From the American point of view, what can American policy do in the situation? . . . (we are left) with nothing there to support, so we cannot talk of the interests we would have defended if there were something there for us to support."

In Solution in Asia, Lattimore was intent on proving that the Chinese Communists

were independent of Russia. He writes (p. 94): "The Chinese Communists were so isolated . . . that they could not receive arms or any other help from Russia, while the intensity of the fight for survival made it impossible for them to slacken or strengthen their civil-war efforts in accordance with 'directives' from either the Third International or the Soviet government. They were on their own."

The period referred to is the late thirties. Now, Mr. Lattimore reads both Chinese and Russian so, if he is in fact the eminent authority he is represented to be, he must have studied the writings and proclamations of the Chinese Communists. So he cannot plead ignorance of the fact that Mao Tse-tung, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, was then on record as follows—I quote from the Chinese Handbook on Party Organization:

"According to the constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, all who recognize the constitution and rules and program of the Communist International and the . . . Chinese Communist Party may become party members. . . . The Chinese Communist Party was born with the help of the Communist International; it grew up under the guidance of the Communist International, and the Chinese revolution developed under the guidance of the Communist International. The Chinese Communist Party and its central committee, with the exception of the two short periods, have been loyal to the guidance of the Communist International. . . . To carry out the international line and to be loyal to the executive committee of the Communist International is to guarantee the success of the Chinese revolution."

During this same period when, according to Professor Lattimore, the Chinese Communists were on their own, their representative on the executive committee of the Comintern, Comrade Wang Min, wrote as follows in the December 1937 issue of the Communist International:

"The Chinese Communist Party is guided by the new line of tactics of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, and the historic report made by Comrade Dimitrov." This historical report I should here explain was the one in which Dimitrov laid down the Trojan horse tactic for Communists everywhere in the world. They were instructed at this Comintern Congress to get influence inside the liberal movements everywhere by pretending to be democrats in order to destroy the non-Communist world from within.

Comrade Wang Min, in his article, explained that abandonment of the policy of overthrow of the Kuomintang Government, and the pretense of being disciples of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, was only a tactic, and once Japan was defeated the slogan of a Soviet China would be revived.

Now I am ready to believe that Mr. Jessup and Mr. Acheson were so innocent and ignorant as to be taken in by this transparent stratagem. But I do not believe that Professor Lattimore was just an innocent dupe. Not only does Professor Lattimore pride himself on his scholarship and intimate knowledge of Russian and Chinese affairs, but we also have direct evidence to show that he himself participated in Moscow in working out the tactics to be pursued in deluding the American and other peoples concerning Moscow's designs and plans.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, in passing I should like to deal briefly with a rather fantastic bill of goods which Lattimore and his friends are trying to sell to the American people and which they apparently are with some success selling to some few members of the press and radio.

I understand that a national magazine of some prominence has been taken in rather completely and is about to run a picture story on it. A well-known radio commentator really swallowed the story hook, line, and sinker. If he is in the gallery, and would like to take a half gainer to the floor, I shall ask the pages to get out of the way.

Sunday night I heard him very dramatically tell his listeners that this man Lattimore, whom McCARTHY accused of being a Communist, rescued the Living Buddha from Mongolia—the Living Buddha, who escaped from Mongolia a step ahead of the Russians.

The reason for bringing the Living Buddha to Baltimore, where he is now teaching at Johns Hopkins, was to have him available when the time came for Mongolia to start its drive upon Russia. According to this radio commentator—I do not have a transcript of the radio address—the Baltimore Living Buddha is to all Mongolians what the Pope is to all Catholics, and the day will come when all Mongolians will rally around the Living Buddha and wrest Asia from Communist control.

I do not blame him so much for having been taken in, because, after all, very few of us have had any reason to make a detailed study of the politics of Mongolia.

I think this is significant in view of the fact that Lattimore and his friends have been making such a tremendous attempt to foist such a fantastic story on the American people as proof that Lattimore cannot be a Communist.

A number of things should be mentioned, however, one is that if this living Buddha fled from Moscow ahead of the Russians, it must have been about 25 years ago, because Russia has had almost absolute control of Mongolia for approximately that period of time. Also it should be mentioned that living Buddhas actually are not very scarce in Mongolia, in that they are merely priests or ministers of Lamaism.

Normally, I would not want to take the Senate's time with this subject, but I do think that because of the fact that there is apparently an attempt to use this living Buddha as proof that Lattimore is a loyal American, it might be well to give you a very brief picture of just how important to the politics of Asia is the Baltimore living Buddha.

Lamaism is a form of Buddhism believed chiefly by peoples of Tibet and Mongolia, and is a mixture of Buddhism and shamanistic practices.

Lamaism believes in reincarnation. After the death of a Hutuktu, that is, the living Buddha, his spirit is said to reappear in the person of some boy born at the time of his death, and thus comes forth reembodyed.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President—  
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOLLAND in the chair). Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from Missouri?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. DONNELL. I should like, if I may, to have the attention of the Senator from New Mexico to this question. I interrogated the Senator a little while ago in regard to some observations by the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1944. I call another matter to the attention of the Senator from Wisconsin, and ask him for whatever observations, if any, he sees fit to make upon it. I refer to the hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the Committee on the Judiciary, which occurred in September 1949, and particularly to a part of each of two pages referring to Frederick Vanderbilt Field, to whom the Senator referred. I ask the Senator what comment he will make upon what I shall read.

A question was asked by Mr. Dekom, who is one of the staff of the Senate committee, as follows:

Are you familiar with the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

The witness, a Mr. Huber, said:

Yes; I am. That is a Communist front set up to promote the Communists in China and the Far East generally; that is, to propagandize the American people on behalf of communism in Asia. This organization was formed at the home of Frederick Vanderbilt Field, who is an ardent supporter of the Communist Party as well as a writer for its publications. In connection with this organization, I was able to attend a closed meeting of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy held in the library of the building at 23 West Twenty-sixth Street, New York, which houses the offices of a number of Communist-front organizations. Paul Robeson has his offices there. The building is owned by Frederick Field. Only known persons were admitted to this meeting, and about 60 were present. Ira Golubilin was the chairman.

Then, at page 580, referring to a meeting held December 3, 1944, he said:

On December 3, 1944, I attended a party of leading Communist functionaries in this country given at the home of Seymour Copstein, a Communist professor, honoring Alexander Trachtenberg. Trachtenberg is the president of International Publishers, the Communist publishing house in New York City; a member of the national committee of the Communist Party; and on the board of directors of the Jefferson School of Social Science.

There were about 30 people present, and admission was by invitation only. Only old and trusted friends of Trachtenberg were invited. Entertainment was furnished by Richard Dyer-Bennett, who sang and played folk songs of Russia.

Then he gives a list of the guests, saying, "The guests included," and among others is the name of Frederick V. Field. Mr. Lattimore was at one time a member of the Amerasia Board, but I would not say, without reference again to the papers, which I do not have before me, that he was a member at the same time Mr. Field was, but I ask, does the information in this hearing, developed in the testimony before the Senate committee in 1949, indicate to the mind of the Senator that Frederick V. Field possessed the qualifications which the Senator has previously indicated, namely, of "close communistic affiliations"?

Mr. McCARTHY. Field goes beyond that. There can be no doubt about Field. He himself said, "I am one of the leading Communists." He himself said, "My mission is to communize the world." He is deluded by the idea that the Communists consider him as a leader. Actually the Communists in this country con-

sider him as a stooge, whose money they use.

Mr. DONNELL. Without reference to documents, a moment ago I said I was unable to state whether Mr. Field and Mr. Lattimore had been on the board at the same time. I call attention to the fact that on page 1446 of the House hearings it is recited that the editorial board consisted of Field as chairman, Jaffe as managing editor, and several other members, including Mr. Owen Lattimore.

Mr. McCARTHY. I shall develop that point later. Frederick V. Field was also on the board of trustees of the American Council of IRP, as was also Alger Hiss, as was also Owen Lattimore, as was also Philip Jessup.

In 1947 one of the members of the board, one of the good American members, insisted that there be an investigation to determine the extent to which the Communists had taken over control of the American Council of IRP. That was very vigorously opposed. Keep in mind that at that time Frederick V. Field was a member of the board. Hiss was then a member, or was shortly thereafter. Lattimore was a member of the board. One of the men who vigorously protested, and sent a letter over his name, which I have, objecting strenuously to any such investigation, was our Ambassador at Large, Philip Jessup. I intend to go into that later. So this man Field has had many activities. For the information of Senators, I have a photostat of the letter which I shall place in the RECORD later, to show how Field used some of his money. I wish the Senator from Missouri would not ask any questions about that now.

The most important Hutuktu—living Buddha—is the Dalai Lama, who is the temporal head of Tibet. The next in importance is the Panchan Lama, who is technically the spiritual head of Tibet. During recent decades, however, the Panchan Lama was driven out of Tibet by the Dalai Lama, and now the Chinese Communists are using the Panchan Lama as a puppet to regain control in Tibet. The temporal and spiritual head of Tibet is therefore the Dalai Lama, with headquarters in Lhasa, Tibet.

The other important Hutuktu, the Djebsung Damba Hutuktu, was not re-embodied since 1924.

Of the important living Hutuktus, the following are the most prominent:

Changchia Htutuktu, Galdan Siretu Hutuktu, Minchur Hutuktu, Chilung Hutuktu, Namuka Hutuktu, Achia Hutuktu, Lakuo Hutuktu, Tsahantarkhan Hutuktu.

A Hutuktu—living Buddha—thus is a religious title. It is not hereditary, but chosen by the process of reincarnation. It represents the top of a series of religious offices. There are, however, hundreds of Hutuktus existing simultaneously, and there are some who are more important than others. The relative importance is mostly determined by the territory over which each exercises control, and there are Hutuktus who control no territory at all.

The Mongols do not live exclusively in Mongolia. Wherever there are Mongols, they are divided traditionally into leagues—such as Ulanab League, the Ikhchao League, the Alashan League, and so forth—and the leagues are in turn divided into banners. The Hutuktus—living Buddhas—sometimes are heads of these leagues; these are important. Others are heads of banners; they are less important. Still others only get the title without any territory; they are the least important.

Diluwa Hutuktu—now teaching in Johns Hopkins University—comes from the Mongols in the Chinese Province of Chinghai, with headquarters at Kokonor—Blue Sea.

So far as I know he never was in Mongolia. So it must have been that one of his ancestors escaped ahead of the Communists by fleeing from Mongolia.

The Kokonor Mongols are divided into 2 leagues and 29 banners. They are a very minor branch of the Mongolian race, because Kokonor is overwhelmingly populated by Mohammedans.

Although Lattimore's Diluwa is a Hutuktu by reason of religious attainment, he is the head of neither a league nor a banner and is a very minor figure, he is not included in any list of living Buddhas, such as the list given above.

Diluwa Hutuktu is primarily a religious teacher, with a handful of disciples, some now in Baltimore, and some in Tibet. He has none in Mongolia.

The whole edifice of Mongolian Government is guided very strictly by the rule of seniority. It is not possible for an individual priest, whatever his rank in the religious hierarchy, to achieve any degree of power and allegiance unless he

has followed the trodden path of promotion.

In this connection I have before me an affidavit—this is the affidavit which I asked the able junior Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN] to glance at—of an American citizen who, for a considerable period of time, edited several newspapers in China and who knew Lattimore while he was in China.

It deals in complete detail with background facts which explain rather clearly why the Living Buddha and his two friends are in Baltimore. This affidavit is also being turned over to the FBI. I might say that this affidavit certainly does not indicate any great plan to use this Living Buddha to reconquer Asia from the Communists. In fact, I might say it deals with nothing grand of any nature.

We next come to Dr. Philip Jessup who is an important part of this entire picture. Perhaps the kindest thing that can be said about Dr. Jessup is that he was simply an unwitting but very willing stooge of the brilliant Owen Lattimore. Unfortunately, however, the damage which he has done is as great as though he were selling out for 30 pieces of silver.

Mr. Jessup, either knowingly or otherwise, became the very, very valuable tool of the Communists in 1943. In order to fully understand the picture at that time it might be well to again recite some history of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I now ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "IPR—Tokyo Axis," written by Sheppard Marley, and published in the December 1946 issue of Plain Talk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOLLAND in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

The article is as follows:

IPR—Tokyo Axis

(By Sheppard Marley)

Some time ago the Institute of Pacific Relations placed the following notice in the personals column of the Saturday Review of Literature:

"Long on curiosity—short on time? IPR popular pamphlets make you a scintillating conversationalist on the Far East. You can deftly discuss everything from Australian slang to the problems of China and the Philippines. Send for a list of Institute of Pacific Relations pamphlets today. Box 939-K."

If a reader of this semi-intellectual lonely-hearts column had made a slight error in the box number and written to 938-K instead of

the IPR's 939-K, she would have received an answer from the gentleman who inserted the following notice in the same issue: "Will lady in a quiet castle seek spiritual relaxation through exchange of correspondence with a highly learned gentleman?"

What the IPR copy writer deftly neglected to mention in this prospectus designed for the busy dilettante was that the publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations are likely to make the deft conversationalist sound similar to a Daily Worker editorial, though on a much more genteel level. For the IPR is still another of the respectable moneyed organizations into which fellow travelers have infiltrated and have developed workers in their own image. The peculiar conjuncture of social conditions and psychological ailments which has resulted in the dissemination of Stalinist propaganda by groups supported mainly with capitalist money is a problem for the academicians. Here we merely offer another case study.

The Institute of Pacific Relations came into being in July 1925, in Honolulu, at an international conference of which the chief engineer was Mr. Edward C. Carter, the present executive vice chairman of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and apparently its most influential officer. The intricate nature of the administrative set-up of the institute makes it ideal for control by a few well-placed persons. Small wonder then that many of its leading and most prolific writers are dependable fellow travelers who faithfully follow the tortuous path Stalin sets—even if they have to slow down around the sharp turns of Soviet policy.

The institute's activity seldom reaches any large section of the public directly, and few persons know that it exists. It is doubtful if 1 out of 1,000 of the parents of boys who fought their way across the Pacific, from Guadalcanal to Okinawa, has ever heard of this organization. Yet in Government circles, including those where America's high policy in the Pacific is determined, the influence of the Institute of Pacific Relations has been enormous and is apparently growing.

During the recent war, the institute supplied many agencies with experts on the Far East. Four IPR staff members worked for the China section of the UNRRA. Three others did research for MacArthur's headquarters on Japanese reconstruction. William L. Holland was the head of the OWI in China. Owen Lattimore was President Roosevelt's gift to Chiang Kai-shek for a time and President Truman's special adviser to MacArthur as well as far eastern head of OWI. The IPR supplied lesser lights to the OWI, OSS, and the State Department. Not all of these workers who joined Government agencies were Communists or fellow travelers. The IPR, however, frequently provided research specialists who were interested mainly in the furthering of Stalin's aims in the Far East.

Many IPR trustees reached positions of considerable importance. In 1941, Lauchlin Currie was President Roosevelt's special emissary to China. William C. Johnstone worked a special assignment for the State Department. George E. Taylor was director of the OWI's Far Eastern Section and later of the State Department's Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs. Benjamin Klizer, a Spokane lawyer, headed the UNRRA in China.

The Institute's aid to the Government was not limited to supplying experts of varying degrees, for the Government bought 750,000 IPR pamphlets for soldiers in the Pacific and Asiatic theaters. Schools, too, have been influenced by IPR publications, especially the series published jointly with the Webster Co., of St. Louis, designed for a 14-year-old reading level. In 3½ years this series sold over a million copies.

Another way in which the IPR influences public opinion is through the newspapers and periodical press. As the IPR itself does not tire of saying, no one seems to know anything about the Far East. The harried editorial writer is immeasurably pleased, when, when he sees on his desk a neat publicity release and a copy of an article on some aspect of Chinese politics which he can now proceed to discuss as deftly as though he had read the IPR's notice in the Saturday Review of Literature.

Like most associations into which the Communists and fellow travelers have moved, the IPR reveals certain inconsistencies and contradictions of policy that can be explained only by the ideological affiliations of its most important figures.

Operating more cleverly in IPR than in most groups they have entered, the Communists and their friends have been able to keep the reputation of this outfit pretty clean. But evidence of their work is easily noted when one takes the IPR material in bulk and breaks it down into two types—the controversial and noncontroversial. What has buffaloned most readers of IPR books, pamphlets, and periodicals is that so much of the stuff is of a very scholarly nature, not at all on subjects that arouse the emotions any more readily than do articles on Chinese pottery. Yet in the last decade or so at least two out of every three articles in IPR's two journals—Pacific Affairs, quarterly, and Far Eastern Survey, biweekly—on such hot subjects as Chinese politics, the Soviet Union, and the general political situation in the Far East, with respect to those two countries and the United States, have been written by such staunch defenders of Stalin as T. A. Blisson, Owen Lattimore, Harriet Moore, Laurence Sallsbury, and others not too numerous to mention in due time.

It may be claimed that by selecting excerpts and quoting "out of context" any writer can be shown to believe almost anything. This is frequently true. Yet the weight of the evidence that links the IPR

to the Communist line is too great to pass off with such platitudes. The writings of the fellow travelers and outright Communists in IPR publications constitute only a small part of the total IPR material—but they constitute its most vital part, and they deal with the subjects that are most significant for American foreign policy, international relations, and public education.

The IPR's chief method of disclaiming responsibility for what appears under its sponsorship is to include a statement in its publications that the views expressed are those of the writers, not of the IPR or any of its component units. But no one is ever fooled by such disavowals, not even IPR people. Owen Lattimore, who edited the IPR quarterly Pacific Affairs from 1934 to 1941, wrote in a report of the IPR secretariat in 1936: "The fact that there is a printed notice in each number [of Pacific Affairs] specifically declaring that each contributor is personally responsible for his own statements of opinion and that neither the national councils nor the institute as a whole can be held responsible has meant little."

The IPR has often protested that it does not select its writers according to their political beliefs, but because of their scholarship and research ability. One wonders, nevertheless, whether the bulk of the IPR publications would yield an impression any different from the one it does now if it were not being used as a front for Communist propaganda. It could hardly do better work for Stalin even if it had been set up by his agents.

The Institute of Pacific Relations is composed of 10 member bodies from each of the following countries: Australia, Canada, China, France, Netherlands Indies, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The Pacific Council, nominally the ruling body, has one representative from each of these national councils. With the members of the Pacific Council scattered over thousands of miles there is little centralized control. Actually the American council is the main unit, and the one most familiar to Americans as well as the one most afflicted with the disease of Stalinist apologetics. Like the parent organization, the American Council is itself a nightmare of administrative complexity. In recent years there has been no meeting of the membership, which now is just below 2,000.

Genuine power in the American Council of the IPR is vested in the executive committee of the board of trustees. Of the eight members of this ruling group, the four most vocal are Communists and fellow travelers. This is what the broad and respectable front of IPR conceals. The big four are Edward C. Carter, Frederick Vanderbilt Field, Harriet L. Moore, and Owen Lattimore. All four, with the recent exception of Field, who has joined the Communist Party, move exclusively on the higher levels of gentility in American academic and political life.

Edward C. Carter, the leading light in the IPR, is not the intellectual type. He has written rather infrequently, but his affiliations are nevertheless enlightening. For many years he was on the board of directors of the American-Russian Institute, which publishes a quarterly dedicated to the scholarly adulation of all that takes place in Stalin's Russia. He has contributed to Soviet Russia Today, a less esoteric market for pro-Soviet articles. In 1938 he signed a statement, published in that magazine, defending the Moscow mock trials. During most of the war years he was a member of the board of directors of Russian War Relief.

The case of Frederick Vanderbilt Field is more obvious. Now a member of the Communist Party, Field is the Daily Worker's special expert on the Far East, and an associate editor of the Communist weekly, New Masses.

Harriet L. Moore has the usual Communist-front connections. She was secretary of the Russian War Relief and a member of the board of directors of the American-Russian Institute, whose publications she edits. She has also been on the editorial board of Amerasia, long a tooter of Stalin's horn among those interested in Far Eastern affairs. This is the magazine which figured as the focal point in the State Department espionage case, as reported by E. S. Larsen in Plain Talk for October.

Of the four chief policy makers of IPR, Owen Lattimore is the best known and most respected in academic circles. He is now director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University. He too had served his stint on the editorial board of Amerasia, and has defended the Moscow purge trials.

Through his editorship of the quarterly, Pacific Affairs, from 1934 to 1941, Owen Lattimore was able to exert considerable influence in IPR. When he took it over, Pacific Affairs was dull, unknown, and devoted mainly to research and statements apparently carefully pruned to remove the slightest trace of a positive point of view about anything more controversial than the depth of the Sulu Sea. As fascism spread and the threat of war increased, Lattimore published articles that took a forthright stand, but in general he followed the popular front line then in vogue. Pacific Affairs contained contributions generally favorable to Soviet Russia, against America's neutrality policy, and in praise of the Chinese Communists.

Is the IPR a pressure group or a research outfit? The letter from Owen Lattimore to Edward C. Carter, which we are publishing on page 18, a remarkable document in several respects, should settle this question once and for all, although the stream of highly opinionated writing emanating from the IPR for years furnishes a clear-enough answer. Three characteristics stand out in a study of the IPR publications:

First, there is not to be found in its literature any fundamental criticism of the Soviet

Union, either of its internal regime or its foreign policy.

Second, there has been abundant and vigorous criticism of the Chinese Government and, especially in recent years, equally strong and prominent espousal of the cause of the Chinese Communists.

Third, there was until Pearl Harbor relatively little criticism on the part of the IPR of Japan's internal regime or its foreign policy.

Indeed, in the light of the accompanying letter from Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Carter and of the additional pieces of evidence as to the IPR's ties with the Japanese imperialists, there is room for a congressional inquiry into this still dark field. In a subsequent article, we shall deal with the first two aspects of the IPR's activity, namely, its pro-Soviet and anti-Chiang Kai-shek stands. Here we shall confine ourselves to five salient features of the strange marriage between the IPR and the Japanese war lords:

1. Owen Lattimore wrote his letter on May 18, 1938, less than 10 months after Japan launched its undeclared war on China and but a few weeks after Hitler's annexation of Austria, events which were regarded in Moscow as the beginning of World War II. In this missive Mr. Lattimore proposed the dismemberment of China and a settlement with Japan on the basis of "what China is and what Japan is, as of 1939, rather than what either country was as of 1936." The occasion for this communication was a memorandum by a Chinese pro-Communist, Chen Han-seng, who had outlined a study of Chinese foreign policy to cover the period of 1931-39. Mr. Carter, upon the receipt of the extraordinary letter, is on record in a memorandum, dated May 20, 1938, addressed to Miriam Farley of the IPR, as follows: "This morning I have received Owen Lattimore's comment with which, of course, I agree." All that remains to be added on this point is that neither Mr. Lattimore nor Mr. Carter made clear the purpose of the proposed settlement. Was it intended to help Japan retain the vast areas in North China gained by her aggression or to enable the Chinese Communists to extend their domains as they did in 1945?

2. Lattimore's suggestion, with which Mr. Carter agreed, contemplated direct action by the IPR in the political field, something which it has been at pains to deny frequently. As recently as October 24, 1946, Mr. Carter wrote to a critic of his organization: "The IPR is not an action group, and I can assure you it has never set up an action group of any nature whatever." It is obvious from Lattimore's letter that in pressing for terms of settlement the IPR certainly qualified as a pressure group, which is hardly distinguishable from an action group.

Is it possible that Mr. Carter, finding himself on the horns of a dilemma, really had meant to endorse the idea of turning over half of China to the Communists and not to

the Japanese? For this is what he wrote on October 24, 1946:

"One of your most fantastically inaccurate statements is the accusation that Mr. Owen Lattimore, back in 1938 and 1939, advocated peace in China by turning over half of China to the Japanese. Mr. Lattimore was far ahead of the vast majority of Americans in recognizing the nature and danger of Japanese aggression—years before our Government and people were fully alive to its menace."

3. In 1936, a Japanese scientific expedition was permitted by the United States to cruise freely in the waters along the Alaska coast, where it took soundings. Around the same time the Japanese tried to establish fisheries rights in the same area. In both of these ventures, it has been charged by Miller Freeman, Pacific-coast publisher and former Navy Intelligence officer, that the Japanese were aided by the chairman of the American Council of the IPR at the time, who was also a member of a special advisory committee on trade and commerce in the Department of State.

4. Upton Close, writer and radio commentator, made the following signed statement: "A few days prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, Mr. Trammel [of the National Broadcasting Co.] received a letter from E. C. Carter, head of the Institute of Pacific Relations, demanding that I be dropped from the air because I was anti-Japanese."

5. The Japan Council of the IPR served the interests of aggression. A dispatch of December 7, 1945, by Frank Kelley, then in Tokyo as correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune, describes how in Japan the IPR was used as a front for imperialist purposes. Prince Fumimaro Konoye, who was Premier of Japan during much of the crucial period between the renewed war on China in 1937 and the attack upon Pearl Harbor 4½ years later, took a deep interest in his country's IPR chapter. He put his personal trusted aides into the key posts in the Japanese IPR, which was supported largely with funds contributed by the very industrialists who helped the militarists plan and carry out wars of aggression throughout the Pacific area. It was Konoye who had ordered the preparation of a report explaining Japan's need for expansion because of population pressure. This report was read to the IPR international conference of 1936, which was held in Yosemite National Park, in California.

The chief secretary of the Japan Council of the IPR, according to Mr. Kelley in the Herald Tribune, was Tomohiko Ushiba, Konoye's private secretary. Through Ushiba, Prince Konoye kept in touch with Edward C. Carter, then chief of the IPR's international secretariat, so that he could keep watch on American State Department policies. Far-eastern experts, such as abound in the IPR, must surely have known that

Prince Konoye was among the leading exponents of Japanese aggression for many years before Pearl Harbor. Yet there is no evidence that the institute ever took any steps to prevent its use as a front for the dissemination of propaganda in the United States and for the gathering of inside political and military information about this country.

Unlike the pink pills served by Dr. Carter when treating Russia or China, these five points bearing upon the relations between the IPR and the imperialists of Japan cannot be sugar-coated. The responsible directors of the IPR, which is in the nature of a higher educational institution, owe it to the public to probe fully into its baffling ties with the Mikado's servants. Considering the semiofficial status which the IPR has acquired in the policy-making branches of the Federal Government, the Congress owes it to the country to investigate the history of the organization, its obscure foreign links, its unduly complex administrative set-up, and its alliances with pro-Soviet and pro-Communist elements both at home and abroad.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., May 18, 1938.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,  
New York City.

DEAR CARTER: I have just been reading with great interest Chen Han-seng's memorandum of 27 April attached to your letter of 9 May. As I shall be going with Fred (probably Frederick Vanderbilt Field, millionaire Communist—Editor) to a regional conference at Seattle at the end of this week and so shall have to miss Holland when he passes through, I am replying directly.

As usual, Chen Han-seng has picked out the really crucial points. The IPR stands to maintain and increase its reputation by presenting the constructive possibilities of a far-eastern settlement. All reactionary estimates of "What is China?" will be based on prewar China and will exclude changes occurring in the course of the war. In pressing for terms of settlement, the IPR is in a better position than any other agency to gauge the character and extent of changes occurring during the war; it could and should establish what China is and what Japan is, as of 1939, rather than what either country was as of 1936.

Of course in order to establish the "is" of 1939, the taking-off point must be the "was" up to 1937; but the "was" should be only the taking off point and the major emphasis should be consistently applied to the processes of change in 1937 and 1938 and the levels attained and further trends indicated as of 1939.

Yours very sincerely,  
OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. McCARTHY. This institute consists of the councils of 10 nations having interests in the Pacific. As originally

set up it was in no way controlled by the Communist Party. Since its creation it has had on both the board of trustees and the executive committee a very sizable number of outstanding and loyal Americans. Membership on the board of trustees or on the executive committee in no way in and of itself indicates any Communist sympathies or leanings. Apparently the board of trustees was not a prime target for the Communists. Of the 50 members, as far as I know, not more than 10 to 15 at any time were Communists or fellow travelers. However, as far as I know, the board actually never meets, but does its business by having the various members send in their proxies.

The executive committee, however, consists largely of trustees who live in or near New York and is 10 in number. The executive committee in effect controls the institute. The executive committee is a prime target for the Communists. The Communists apparently try to have on the executive committee at least four or five members of the party or fellow travelers upon whom they can depend at all times. This, of course, is not a majority but the committee is made up of busy men and the attendance at meetings apparently is such that even three or four can control the activities of the institute.

Then there is the research advisory committee, the principal function of which is to edit and pass upon the material which goes into the American Council's publication, Far Eastern Survey.

Dr. Jessup was vice chairman of the American Council and chairman of the research advisory committee for some time. Under him the council's biweekly publication, Far Eastern Survey, pioneered the smear campaign against Chiang Kai-shek and the idea that the Communists in China were merely agrarian reformers and really not Communists at all. Of this campaign the former editor of the Daily Worker, Louis Budenz, on March 19, 1949, in an article in Collier's entitled "The Menace in Red China," had this to say:

Most Americans during World War II fell for the Moscow line that the Chinese Communists were not really Communists but agrarian reformers. That is just what Moscow wanted Americans to believe. This deception of United States officials and the public was the result of a planned campaign. I helped to plan it.

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The first blast in this campaign was fired in Jessup's publication on July 14, 1943, in an article signed by T. A. Bisson. I think it might be here important to call attention to the record of this man Bisson, who, as I recall, was allowed to resign from the State Department because of his Communist connections in 1946.

I have here a photostatic copy of a letter to Bisson, which I briefly discussed in answer to a question the Senator from Missouri [Mr. DONNELL] asked. As I have stated, this is a rather fantastic document coming from the man whom Mr. Jessup used to initiate the smear campaign—a rather fantastic document coming from a man high up in the State Department, but not too fantastic, however, when coming from a man who worked under Frederick Vanderbilt Field on Amerasia. This is written to the International Missionary Council, 419 Fourth Avenue, New York City. It reads as follows:

I have just noticed the statement in the Herald Tribune that the National Christian Council is cooperating with the Nanking government in "rehabilitating the Red-ravaged districts." Could you tell me whether this step is approved by the boards at home, or is it taken only on the NCC's initiative? In my opinion, any such collaboration involves great risks for the future of the whole Christian enterprise in the Far East.

In other words, any help to the poor people in the Red-ravaged area, in Bisson's opinion, endangers the Christian endeavor in the Far East.

He further says:

The Nanking government is under fire from many Chinese progressives for its direct tie-up with western imperialism, particularly its reliance upon foreign aid in the anti-Communist campaign.

Mr. President, Senators should keep in mind that at that time Bisson was in the State Department and was an important figure—I beg pardon; he may not have been in the State Department at that time. I am not sure. I do not recall at what dates he was in the Department.

Then Bisson, the writer of this letter, goes on to point out that this missionary group should be careful not to make the mistake of alining itself "against the great progressive movements of the future in the East."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the entire letter printed at this point in the Record.

The postscript to the letter is very interesting. In it Bisson says:

I would strongly advise every prospective missionary to China to read Chinese Destinies, by Agnes Smedley.

Mr. President, in case any Senator does not understand the significance of that reference by Mr. Bisson, I refer now to page A725 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of February 10, 1949, which contains a report by the National Military Establishment, or, more specifically, by General MacArthur's intelligence unit, which report was inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD by Representative HAROLD LOVRE. Let me quote briefly from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at that point, for it gives a direct quotation from General MacArthur's intelligence unit report. This covers the individual whose book Bisson says all prospective missionaries should study before they will be qualified to become missionaries to China.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Let the Chair inquire at this time whether the Senator has offered for the RECORD the letter to which he has just referred.

Mr. McCARTHY. I have.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the letter will be incorporated in the RECORD.

The letter is as follows:

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC.,  
New York, November 4, 1933.

DR. A. L. WARNSHUIS,  
International Missionary Council,  
New York City.

DEAR DR. WARNSHUIS: I have just noticed the statement in the Herald Tribune that the National Christian Council is cooperating with the Nanking Government in "rehabilitating the Red-ravaged districts." Could you tell me whether this step is approved by the boards at home, or is it taken only on the NCC's initiative? In my opinion, any such collaboration involves great risks for the future of the whole Christian enterprise in the Far East. The Nanking Government is under fire from many Chinese progressives for its direct tie-up with western imperialism, particularly its reliance upon foreign gunboats in the anti-Communist campaign. If, now, the Chinese Christian Church links itself up with the Nanking regime, which maintains its power through a continuous "white terror" against the Chinese workers and peasants, its future will be deeply compromised. Henceforth, it will flourish or decline in accordance with the fluctuations in the political fortunes of a regime of capitalist exploitation that is steadily outraging the elementary sense of justice of the Chinese masses. Is it wise for the Chinese Christian Church to take sides

in a political struggle of this importance? Might it not be the part of statesmanship to maintain a neutrality that would enable the church to succor the victims on both sides of this domestic conflict? In the long run, I feel convinced that the workers and peasants of Asia will throw off the yoke of foreign imperialism and native exploitation and assume control of their own political destinies. Is the mission enterprise looking ahead toward this future and laying its plans accordingly?

Frankly, I believe that the whole future of the Christian Church—in the west as well as in the east—is bound up with the answer to this question. In many ways the modern church has demonstrated its wisest and most forward-looking policies in connection with the youthful churches in Asia. It is for this reason that I question the wisdom of this reported step of the National Christian Council, which, in my opinion, will align the mission enterprise against the great progressive movements of the future in the east.

Sincerely yours,

T. A. BISSON.

P. S.—I would strongly advise every prospective missionary to China to read Chinese Destinies, by Agnes Smedley.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, in paragraph (e) of the report of General MacArthur's intelligence unit, we find the following:

Agnes Smedley, American-Soviet spy: This American, Miss Agnes Smedley, has been one of the most energetic workers for the Soviet cause in China for the past twenty-odd years.

The Army intelligence report then goes on to state that much harm has been done by Agnes Smedley—

but perhaps it could be mitigated if she is now exposed for what she is, a spy and agent of the Soviet Government.

So we find that Bisson, who either then or later was a State Department employee, and, incidentally, also was one of the members of the Amerasia editorial board, was urging that all prospective Christian missionaries to China, in order to qualify themselves, should read Agnes Smedley's book. I give this information on Bisson because he is the man whom Jessup used to pioneer the smear campaign against Chiang Kai-shek.

Lest anyone question Jessup's control over Far Eastern Survey, let me call to your attention that the Chinese consul objected strenuously to the Bisson line being carried in the Institute of Pacific Relations publication. He was referred to Jessup, who made the magnanimous offer that he would print his answer to Bisson's letter. However, before print-

ing the Chinese consul's answer, Jessup submitted the letter to Bisson and obtained for publication in the adjoining column Bisson's criticism of the Chinese consul's answer in an obvious attempt to ridicule, twist, and distort the meaning of those loyal Chinese who were backing our ally, Chiang. There can be no question there as to where Jessup stood.

Within a matter of weeks after Jessup's labeling the Chinese Communists as land reformers, the Daily Worker and Isvetzia also took up the line of comparing the Chinese Communists with "Iowa farmers."

Professor Jessup must, therefore, be credited by the American people with having pioneered the smear campaign against Nationalist China and Chiang Kai-shek, and with being the originator of the myth of the "democratic" Chinese Communists.

From that time onward we witnessed the spectacle of this three-horse team of smears and untruths thundering down the stretch—Jessup's publication, Far Eastern Survey, the Daily Worker, and Isvetzia. What an effective job they did can best be demonstrated by the fact that this was the line which the State Department followed in formulating its far eastern policy, right down to the last comma.

I personally have stated that I thought that Jessup was a well-meaning dupe of the Lattimore crowd. However, I do not think the decision on that point is up to me; but rather, it is up to the Congress and the American people.

In that connection I hold in my hand two photostats which I think may interest the Senate and the American people mightily.

In order to recognize the significance of these two documents, it might be well for me to digress for a minute and give the background of one Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

Of course, Mr. President, I believe it will be unnecessary for me to go into detail in that respect, in view of the fact that we went over that matter in great detail in connection with the questions asked by the Senator from Missouri [Mr. DONNELL]. Suffice it to say that Frederick Vanderbilt Field acknowledges, proclaims, and brags about the fact that he considers himself one of the top Communists in this Nation. In passing, I may state that he also contributed \$5,000 to the Wallace campaign in 1948.

Getting back to the photostats of the documents in question we should keep in mind that Jessup pioneered the fictional idea that the Communists of China were not really Communists at all. He did that in July 1943. That is when the campaign started.

I now hold in my hand two photostats, one being a photostat of a check in the amount of \$2,500, signed by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, and made payable to Jessup's organization, the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. This check is dated September 12, 1943, and was cashed by the institute.

I also hold in my hand another check, signed by the same man, the man who says, "I am the outstanding American Communist"—Frederick Vanderbilt Field. This check is in the amount of \$1,000, and was made payable, also, to Jessup's organization, the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The check is dated November 27, 1942; and this check also was cashed by that institute.

Incidentally, Mr. President, these checks came, not from Field's own personal account, but from the American People's Fund, Inc., which is a repository created by Frederick Vanderbilt Field for funds for whatever Communist or Communist-front enterprise he saw fit to support. In other words, the American People's Fund, Inc., has no function whatsoever except to act as a band for funds to be turned over to such Communist enterprises as Field decided to contribute to.

Therefore, we find Jessup in 1943 using his magazine to sell to the American people the identical line followed by Isvetzia, one of Soviet Russia's official papers, and also the line followed by the Daily Worker, which, as everyone knows, is the official Communist newspaper in this country, and at the same time receiving funds to support the publication from a man who publicly proclaimed that he was one of the top Communists in this Nation—Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

Whether Jessup was simply a dupe or whether he was publishing the party line for a fee, I leave to the Senate to determine. However, when we consider that Jessup, using Bisson as the writer, started that campaign to smear; and when we consider that in his publication he followed the Communist Party line

right down to the dotting of every "i" and the crossing of every "t"; and then when we consider that he got money for it—\$3,500—from the man who says, "I am the outstanding Communist in this Nation," then I leave it to the Senate to decide whether he was a dupe—if so, he must have been an extremely stupid one—or whether he knew what he was doing for a fee.

Last Jessup say he did not know Field's connections and Field's communism, let me again point out that Field made no secret of the fact that he went all-out in support of communistic Russia. For example, in 1941, he was executive director of the American Peace Mobilization, and led the picket line which picketed the White House and heaped abuse upon the head of the then President Roosevelt, as a warmonger, and used all the foul objectives in the communistic vocabulary. That picket line was before the White House on the morning of June 22, 1941; and let us keep in mind that Field was the director of the organization and leading that picket line. The Senate will recall that was the day when Hitler invaded Russia. Confusion hit the picket line when the newspaper headlines proclaimed Hitler's invasion of Russia, and by early afternoon all the pickets had quietly slunk away. Then the American Peace Mobilization became the American People's Mobilization, which commenced again to vilify the President, not this time as a warmonger, but this time for his failure to establish a second front quickly enough to relieve Joe Stalin.

In view of that, I do not believe there is anyone who can say that Jessup did not know exactly who Field was when he took from him \$3,500 while at the same time publishing the Communist Party line.

I may say that I think the kindest thing we can say about him is that he was a dupe. What I have said so far is that he was a complete dupe. After all, before that time he was simply a professor of international law; and let me say in passing that very little international law originates in China. However, overnight he suddenly became an expert on far eastern affairs. As I have said, I think the man was such a dupe that he did not know that he was being used by Owen Lattimore. That is the kindest thing we can say about him. But dupe or knave, certainly he is not the type of

person we want shaping our foreign policy.

In fact, a few weeks later, Frederick Vanderbilt Field signed an open letter demanding a second front. Mr. Field, incidentally, was the paid secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations from 1933 to early 1940, and was one of the trustees until 1947. Field was also named by Chambers as head of a Communist espionage ring.

Thus we find Jessup taking money from a traitor and a Communist to support his magazine which was following the party line to a "t."

I also have before me a photostat of a letter dated March 17, 1947, which is of some interest. This is a letter written by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, signed by Jessup and others. It expresses vigorous opposition to a proposed investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations to determine whether or not it was Communist controlled. In other words, Jessup says, "No, let us not have this investigation," and sends a letter over his name to that effect. At that time, incidentally, Frederick Vanderbilt Field was on the board of trustees, and Alger Hiss was either on the board at that time or became a member shortly thereafter.

I do not know whether I pointed out to the Senator the fact, but the magazine Amerasia, about whose Communist line there can be no question, for a period of time had its offices right next to the offices of the Jessup publication for IPR.

I think it might be well at this point to discuss also Jessup's connection with various Communist-front organizations.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair inquires whether that particular letter was offered for the Record.

Mr. McCARTHY. No; it has not been. If any of the Senators care to have it put in the Record, I shall be glad to do so.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will proceed.

Mr. McCARTHY. I have noted since the beginning of this inquiry, that there are those who contend that membership in Communist-front organizations and association with Communists is not a serious matter. There are sincere people who are disturbed because they think this is an attempt to establish guilt by association. They forget that we are dealing here with extremely sensitive

positions where the individual has access to top secret material, the disclosure of which might well shove us into or cause us even to lose a war. They forget that it is not a question of guilt by association, but a question of bad security risk by association.

I cannot emphasize too strongly that a naive or gullible person who associates with the wrong people constantly and thereby discloses—perhaps even unknowingly—secret information, has done the country the same damage as the party agent who divulges or obtains the same information, for a fee, or otherwise. Let me repeat, it is not a question of guilt by association, it is a question of bad security risk by association.

For example, if anyone of you of the Senate happened to be a bank president and you found that your cashier was traveling with a crowd of crooks, safecrackers and racketeers, you would undoubtedly no longer trust this cashier with the depositors' money. In your mind, it would not be a question of whether he was guilty of some crime, but rather a question of whether you could safely trust him with large sums of money. In such a case you have to give your depositors, instead of the wayward cashier, the benefit of the doubt. Unfortunately, the State Department does not adopt that rule.

When the State Department adopted the rule which provides that those who travel with Communists and join Communist-front organizations are bad security risks, it was apparently done because of the fact that it has been proven over thousands of years that "birds of a feather flock together."

While it is possible occasionally to get a few good citizens on a letterhead of a questionable organization, you can be certain that if anyone associates with such an organization for any length of time, he is in sympathy with its aims.

That, Mr. President, is just good, everyday American horse sense. And keep in mind, if you will, it was the Attorney General, it was congressional committees, not the Senator from Wisconsin, who listed those organizations as Communist fronts and subversive because of their aims.

Of course, any American has the complete right to join any front organizations he pleases; but having joined such organizations and having exercised that right, he must necessarily jeopardize the

privilege which he has to hold a position in the Federal Government.

In this connection it should be noted that Mr. Jessup was also quite a joiner. Perhaps he was also a dupe in this respect, but it is rather significant that the only organizations that he so prolifically joined were Communist-front organizations. He does not seem to be so prolific in joining any other type of organization, which I believe he should explain.

For example, the American Law Student's Association was affiliated with the American Youth Congress according to the testimony of William W. Hinckley, former executive secretary of the American Youth Congress. That is in the hearings of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, volume 11, page 7039. It was also affiliated with the United Students Peace Committee, of 347 Madison Avenue, New York City, according to an exhibit presented to the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, volume 12, pages 7568, 7569. The United Students Peace Committee was closely interlocked with the American Peace Mobilization, which I recently mentioned in connection with Field and the picketing of President Roosevelt. According to the Daily Worker of February 27, 1937, page 2, the American Law Students Association was affiliated with the American League Against War and Fascism, an organization with an outright treasonable program, which has been cited as a Communist front by the Special Committee on Un-American Activities and Attorney General Biddle.

Jessup was not only a member of this organization but was a sponsor. There is a difference between being a sponsor and merely a member.

In this connection it should be noted that this organization, of which Jessup was a sponsor, the letterhead of which organization bears his name, used the Communist Party print shop, which was known as the Prompt Press, and used union label 209.

In view of the fact that Jessup was the head of a magazine engaged in considerable printing, it is hard to believe that he did not know where this material was being printed. It is hard to believe that he did not know that union No. 209 was the union which was doing the work of the Prompt Press, which is the Communist print shop.

Also, in connection with Communist-front activities, I call your attention to the fact that the National Emergency

Conference was held in Washington in 1939 or 1940. Dr. Jessup not merely attended this affair, but was a sponsor of it, and signed the call of the conference which went against registration and fingerprinting of aliens—things which certainly could not adversely affect any alien with intentions of becoming a loyal American citizen.

Mr. President, let it be noted that he sponsored and issued the call for this organization, which meant, and which said, "We are against the registration and fingerprinting of aliens," and that was at a time when all of us expected war momentarily. Registration and fingerprinting obviously could only be opposed by those aliens who, in those early war days, were engaged in activities in which the FBI and our law-enforcement agencies would be interested.

Why Jessup at that time should have so vigorously opposed such a simple matter it is rather difficult to understand. We know the Communist line at that time was that this type of registration and fingerprinting was an encroachment upon the civil liberties of the individual.

Dr. Jessup's position against the registration and fingerprinting of aliens was enthusiastically supported by the Communist press and by individuals such as Carol King, attorney for Gerhardt Eisler, and Doxey A. Wilkerson, an avowed member of the Communist Party.

This organization later changed its name to the National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights and was cited as a Communist-front organization by both the House Committee on Appropriations on April 21, 1943, and the Special Committee on Un-American Activities on March 29, 1942, and again by the House Un-American Activities Committee on March 29, 1944.

Jessup was not only a sponsor of the above-mentioned affair but the letterhead of the National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights shows that he was a member of the board of sponsors of this organization also.

Here is something of considerable interest. I have in my hand a photostat of the New York Times, dated February 16, 1946—a time at which it was becoming rather clear that Russia had already embarked upon world war III and was committed to annihilation of western nonatheistic civilization. In this letter the brilliant Dr. Jessup urges not only that we quit producing atomic bombs but

that we eliminate the necessary ingredients which were produced for atomic bombs by—and I quote—"means such as dumping them into the ocean."

It should be recalled that at that time the Russians were already engaged in a race to surpass us in the production of atomic weapons.

Let the Senate and the country decide whether he was so stupidly blind that he did not realize what he was urging or whether he planned it that way. I frankly think that the man was merely stupidly following the Lattimore line—a line which in this case certainly was the line which must have warmed the cockles of Stalin's heart.

In this connection I would like to read to the Senate an editorial from the New York World-Telegram entitled "Who Is Dr. Jessup?"

Dr. Philip C. Jessup, the American spokesman in the current United Nation's debate on Nationalist China's charges against the Soviet Union, is the same Dr. Jessup chosen by the State Department to draft a new American policy for the Far East.

For this reason, his past associations and attitudes have become of general public concern.

Over a period of years, Dr. Jessup held various positions in the Institute of Pacific Relations, including the chairmanships of its American and Pacific councils. In these capacities he was in close association with such well-known left-wingers as Anna Louise Strong, Guenther Stein, Harriet Lucy Moore, E. C. Carter, Theodore A. Blisson, Andrew Grajdanzev, and Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

While the institute's publication, the Far Eastern Survey, was under Dr. Jessup's direction, it began a campaign against Nationalist China. Referring to what it called the two Chinas, it said, in an article signed by Mr. Blisson: "One is now generally called Kuomintang China, the other is called Communist China. However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might be called feudal China, the other democratic China."

Let us keep in mind that in July 1943, when this was printed, and also in November 1942, before it was printed, Jessup took sizable checks from a known Communist. This one article in July of 1943 was of course only part of a whole series of like articles.

Thus began the long campaigns to tear down Chiang Kai-shek and present the Chinese Reds to the American people as democrats and simple agrarian reformers. We know them better than that now. But that is due to no contributions by Dr. Jessup.

The Communist-front organizations with which Dr. Jessup has been affiliated or has sponsored include the American-Russian Institute, the National Emergency Conference (organized in 1939 to protest the deportation of aliens who advocated changing our form of government), the National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights and the Coordinating Committee To Lift the Embargo—on Red Spain.

He was one of 12 signers of a letter in the New York Times, February 16, 1946, urging the United States to suspend the manufacture of atomic bombs, following the appointment of the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy.

This letter urged, in order that the discussions on atomic energy control might proceed in an atmosphere of good faith and confidence," that:

Here is where Jessup urged, and it was while the Communists were exerting every effort to outstrip us in the production of atomic weapons—

1. "The United States at once stop the production of bombs from material currently produced"—this to include the preparation of subassemblies and "all other procedures involved in the fabrication of the bomb."

2. "For 1 year, which would seem to be a reasonable time for the commission to mature its plans and to secure action on them by the governments concerned, we will stop accumulating purified plutonium and uranium-225, which are the essential ingredients of atomic bombs."

The letter to the Times added that any fissionable products developed while keeping the Atomic energy plants on a stand-by basis should be dumped in the ocean or returned to their original mixture.

Since the Russians claim they began making bombs in 1947, they might have caught up with us or passed us in atomic bomb production had Dr. Jessup's views prevailed.

Dr. Jessup was a character witness for Alger Hiss at his first perjury trial.

He was the editor of the State Department's White Paper on China, which one student of the subject characterized as a "bulky compendium of many truths, some half truths and frequent contradictions of published and acknowledged fact."

Here, at best, we have the picture of a confused liberal feeling his way round in circles and often finding himself in questionable company. Certainly it is not the record of a man who should be chosen to formulate anything of such tremendous potentialities as an American policy for the Far East.

Imagine sending a Dr. Jessup to preside over a conference on far-eastern affairs at Bangkok, when we have a man like Gen. Douglas MacArthur in nearby Tokyo.

Incidentally, I think it is of interest to note that the State Department, apparently upon Jessup's suggestion, chose

Bangkok as the place for this all-important conference. Anyone who is at all a student of that area knows that it is the hotbed of Russian espionage activities and that the only sizable hotel in the city is owned by the Russian Government. Just why he said, "Let us go to that area instead of to some area controlled by General MacArthur, such as Tokyo," is not clear.

I read further:

If this is the way American foreign policy is being made, God save us from the Russians.

One interesting insight into Dr. Jessup's lack of sensitivity to disloyalty is shown by his answer to the question of the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER] on March 20, last. The Senator asked Jessup if he was of the same opinion now about Hiss as he was at the times last year when, as one of Hiss' character witnesses, he stated that Hiss' reputation for integrity, loyalty, and veracity was good. Dr. Jessup answered the Senator that he saw no reason to alter his statements. One can understand a person standing by his friend on a private basis; but Dr. Jessup, as ambassador-at-large, represents the American people. He is supposed to be aware of the dangerous tactic of infiltration as practiced by Stalin's police state. To put it mildly, Jessup's reaction to gross disloyalty seems obtuse. He can say, without qualification and as a most important public official, that he can see no reason whatever to change his opinion about Hiss' veracity, loyalty, and integrity, even though an American jury has convicted him of perjury and what amounts to far-reaching espionage on damning evidence which satisfied the jury and a Federal judge that Hiss, beyond reasonable doubt, was proved to be an underground Communist agent.

In other words, if Jessup today were in charge of the loyalty program he would say, "In my opinion, Hiss still has an outstanding reputation for veracity, integrity, and loyalty, and I see no reason to change my opinion."

This is in the very best Acheson tradition of "not turning one's back" on treason.

The Senate will recall that I presented to the committee the case of one Haldore Hanson, who has been named by the State Department as chief of the Technical Cooperation Projects Staff, which is developing plans for the Point 4 program.

It will also recall my mentioning the fact that Owen Lattimore is now in Afghanistan in connection with making a study and submitting recommendations in regard to the application of our Point 4 program in that area.

So we find Owen Lattimore again the great planner. This time instead of directing Jessup to pioneer the campaign of vilification against Chiang Kai-shek and the defecation of the Chinese Communists; this time instead of helping Service and Roth in their theft of secret State, Navy, and Intelligence documents, he is helping Haldore Hanson to plan the Point 4 program in that area of the East which has not yet fallen under Communist control.

This is the same Haldore Hanson who in his book, *Human Endeavor*, on page 349, condemns the right-wing groups in the Chinese Government "for fighting against the democratic revolution by Mao Tse-tung and the Communists." This is the same Haldore Hanson who on the same page complains that anti-Red officials within the Government were making indirect attacks upon the Communists, and that "leaders of the Communist Youth Corps were arrested by military officials at Hangkow."

This is the same Haldore Hanson who was the penniless coeditor of a Communist magazine in Peiping when the Japanese-Chinese war broke out. This is the same Haldore Hanson who in chapter 28 condemns the Red-baiting officials in Chungking.

Rather than take the time of the Senate in developing the entire Hanson case, I now ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the RECORD at this point the case of Haldore Hanson as I presented it to the subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

There being no objection, the case was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The next case is that of Haldore Hanson. This man occupies one of the most strategically important offices in the entire State Department.

It is my understanding that he joined the Department of State in February 1942, and is recognized in the Department as a specialist and expert on Chinese affairs.

Hanson, now Executive Director of the Secretariat of the Interdepartment Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, will head up a technical cooperation projects staff of the new Point 4 program for aid to underdeveloped areas which will have charge of the expenditures of hundreds of

millions of dollars of our taxpayers' money over all the world. (Source: Department of State Departmental Announcements 41, dated February 21, 1950.)

The pro-Communist proclivities of Mr. Hanson go back to September 1938.

Hanson was a contributor to *Pacific Affairs*, the official publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations, whose staff was headed by millionaire Frederick Vanderbilt Field, an admitted Communist. Field has devoted his entire fortune to the Communist cause.

It is important that the committee keep in mind that Mr. Hanson also wrote for the magazine *Amerasia*, of which Phillip Jacob Jaffe was managing editor.

Jaffe was arrested, indicted, and found guilty of having been in illegal possession of several hundred secret documents from the State, Navy, War, and other Government Department files.

Mr. Chairman, I have before me a document entitled "Department of State, Departmental Announcement 41." The heading is "Establishment of the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development." Then in parentheses, by way of explanation of this rather high-sounding name, we find "Point 4 program."

The first paragraph of the order reads as follows:

"1. Effective immediately there is established under the direction of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs of the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development (TCD)."

On page 4 we find that the chief of this technical cooperations project staff is one Haldore Hanson.

Paragraph 2 on page 1 sets forth the following responsibilities of Hanson's division:

"The interim office is assigned general responsibility within the Department for (a) securing effective administration of programs involving technical assistance to economically underdeveloped areas and (b) directing the planning in preparation for the technical cooperation and economic development (Point 4) program. In carrying out its responsibilities the interim office will rely upon the regional bureau, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, and other components of economic affairs area for participation in the technical assistance programs as specified below, and upon the central administrative offices of the administrative area for the performance of service functions."

From this it would appear that his division will have a tremendous amount of power and control over the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars which the President proposes to spend under his Point 4 program, or what he has referred to as the bold new plan.

Hanson's appointment is not made by the President, but by the State Department and is not subject to any Senate confirmation. Therefore, it would seem rather important

to examine the background and the philosophy of this young man.

The State Department Biographical Register gives what would on its face seem to be a chronological story of an increasingly successful young man. It shows that he graduated from college, for example, in 1934 at the age of 22; that he was a teacher in Chinese colleges from 1934 to 1937; and then a press correspondent in China from 1936 to 1939; a staff writer from 1938 to 1942; then in 1942 he got a job in the State Department at \$4,600 a year; that in 1944 he was listed as a specialist in Chinese affairs at \$5,600; that in 1945 he was made executive assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State at \$6,500; that in May of 1948 he was made assistant chief of the area division number 3; that on June 28, 1948, he was made Acting Chief for the Far Eastern Area, Public Affairs Overseas Program Staff; that on November 14, 1948, he was made Executive Director of the Secretariat of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation. There is certainly nothing unusual about this biography. Nothing there to indicate that this man might be dangerous in the State Department as Chief of the Far Eastern Area, Public Affairs Overseas Program Staff, during a time when the Communists were taking over China. However, much is left out of this biography. It does not show, for example, that this young man was running a Communist magazine in Peiping when the Japanese-Chinese war broke out. It does not show, for example, that he spent several years with the Communist armies in China, writing stories and taking pictures which the Chinese Communists helped him smuggle out of the country. Nor does this biography show that this man, after his return from China, wrote a book—a book which sets forth his pro-Communist answer to the problems of Asia as clearly as Hitler's *Mein Kampf* set forth his solutions for the problems of Europe.

Nothing that he has said or done since would indicate that he repudiates a single line of that book.

This man clearly believes that the Communists in China stand for everything that is great and good. His is not the picture of a mercenary trying to sell his country out for 30 pieces of silver. In reading his book, you are impressed with the fact that he firmly believes the Communist leaders in China are great and good men and that all of Asia would benefit by being communized.

Take, for example, what he had to say about Mao Tse-tung, the head of the Communist Party at that time and now the Communist ruler of China, and Chu Teh, commander in chief of the Eighth Route Communist Army, and according to *Life Magazine* of January 23, 1950, No. 2 man in prestige to Mao Tse-tung.

In chapter 23, entitled "Political Utopia on Mt. Wut'ai" in describing a meeting with an American Major Carlson, here is what he had to say:

"We stayed up till midnight exchanging notes on guerrilla armies, the farm unions, and the progress of the war. I was particularly interested in the Communist leaders whom Carlson had just visited and whom I was about to meet. Mao Tse-tung, the head of the Communist Party, Carlson characterized as 'the most selfless man I ever met, a social dreamer, a genius living 50 years ahead of his time. And Chu Ten, commander in chief of the Eighth Route Army, was 'the prince of generals, a man with the humility of Lincoln, the tenacity of Grant, and the kindness of Robert E. Lee.'"

For a man slated as Chief of the Bureau which may have the job of spending hundreds of millions of dollars throughout the world this indicates, to say the least, a disturbing amount of hero-worship for the No. 1 and No. 2 Communist leaders in the Far East today.

On page 349, he condemns the right wing groups in the Chinese government for "fighting against the democratic revolution as proposed by Mao Tse-tung and the Communists."

On the same page he points out that anti-Red officials within the government were making indirect attacks upon the Communists and that "leaders of the Communist youth corps were arrested by military officers at Hankow. I myself was the victim of one of these incidents and found that local officials were the instigators."

From Hanson's book it appears that the Nationalist Government knew of his close collaboration with the Communist army. For example, on page 350, we find that his passport was seized by the police in Sien when they found that he was traveling from Communist guerrilla territory to the Communist headquarters. He states that the man responsible for this illegal action was Governor Ching Ting-wen—one of the most rabid anti-Red officials in China. The Governor's purpose was merely to suppress news about the Communists.

Before quoting further from this book written by Mr. Hanson, it might be well to give a clearer picture of the job which Secretary Acheson has picked out for him. The State Department document lists some of the duties of his bureau as follows:

1. Developing over-all policies for the program.
2. Formulating general program plans and issuing planning directives.
3. Coordinating specific program plans developed by the regional bureaus and making necessary adjustments.
4. Approving projects, determining action agencies, and allocating funds for United States bilateral programs.
5. Directing negotiations and relationships with intergovernmental agencies and with other United States agencies participating in the coordinated program or otherwise carrying on technical assistance activities.
6. Initiating and developing plans for technical assistance programs for individual

countries or groups of countries within their respective regions.

7. Reviewing program proposals affecting their regions which originate from any other source.

8. Negotiating and communicating with foreign governments.

9. Directing State Department personnel assigned abroad to coordinate and give administrative and program support to, bilateral programs.

10. Continuously evaluating programs and projects within regions.

11. Proposing program changes.

12. Initiating instructions to the field carrying out their responsibilities and reviewing all other instructions concerned with technical assistance programs.

This gives you some idea of the tremendous powers of the agency in which Mr. Hanson is a top-flight official.

Let us go back to Hanson's writings:

All through the book he shows that not only did he have complete confidence in the Communist leaders but that they also had complete confidence in him. On page 256 he refers to how Communist Generals Nie and Lu Chen-Tsao acted as his couriers, smuggling packets of films and news stories for him with the aid of Communist guerrilla spies into Peiping.

In this connection I might say that he very frankly points out that the Communists do not tolerate anyone who is not completely on their side. Hanson makes it very clear all through the book that he is not only on the Communist side, but that he has the attitude of a hero worshiper for the Chinese Communist leaders.

His respect and liking for the Communist leaders permeates almost every chapter of the book. For example, on page 284 and page 285, he tells about how some ragged walfa whom he had gathered into his sleeping quarters regarded Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh as "gods." He then goes on to tell about their favorite Communist General, Holung, and states that they convinced him that Holung was a very extraordinary man whom they described as "big as a Shantungese, heavy as a restaurant cook but quick as a cat in battle." He then goes on to describe on page 285 how, when he met General Holung, he found him to be much as the hero-worshiping boys had described him. "He is," said Hanson, "a living picture of Rhett Butler from the pages of *Gone With the Wind*."

This praise of Chinese Communist leaders goes on page after page. On page 278, he describes Communist General P'eng as the most rigid disciplinarian and "the most persistent student of world affairs."

In chapter 26 he speaks with apparently bated breath of the "brain trust" of Communist leaders who were immortalized by Edgar Snow in his *Red Star Over China*.

On page 295 in referring to two other Communist generals, he said: "Should this

book ever fall into Communist hands, I must record that those two lonely men made excellent company during my 3 weeks in Yen-an."

After describing in complimentary manner this university and the students, on page 296, he says, "Every cadet divides his time between political and military subjects. On the one hand he listens to lectures on Marxian philosophy, the history of the Chinese Revolution, the technique of leading a mass movement; on the other hand he studies guerrilla tactics, the use of military maps, and the organization of a military labor corps."

On page 297 he points out that no tuition is charged at the academy and that each student is supplied with uniform, books, and food, plus a pocket allowance, and then has this to say: "Some recent visitors to Yen-an have spread a report that the academies are supported by Russian rubles—a thin piece of gossip. I was told by several Chinese leaders, including Mao Tse-tung, that the largest contributions were from American sympathizers in New York."

On pages 297 and 298 Hanson relates that in talking to one of the Nationalist war lords: "I suggested that he could learn a great deal from the Communists about discipline and integrity of leadership."

On page 303 Hanson has this to say: "My attitude toward Communist China's leaders was a mixture of respect for their personal integrity and a resentment of their suspiciousness. They impressed me as a group of hard-headed, straight-shooting realists."

After an interview with Mao Tse-tung he states, "I left with the feeling that he was the least pretentious man in Yen-an and the most admired. He is a completely selfless man."

Following is Hanson's description of how the Reds took over. I quote from page 102:

"Whenever a village was occupied for the first time, the Reds arrested the landlords and tax collectors, held a public tribunal, executed a few and intimidated the others, then redistributed the land as fairly as possible."

In chapter 28, in comparing the Communists to Chiang Kai-shek's troops, Hanson had this to say:

"I left Yen-an with only one conviction about the Communists; that they were fighting against the Japanese more wholeheartedly than any other group in China."

He then goes on to condemn "Red-baiting" officials in Chungking.

On page 312 of his book, Hanson quotes a Communist editor as stating as follows:

"Our relationship to the U. S. S. R. is no different than that of the American Communist Party. We respect the work of Russia's leaders and profit by their experience wherever we can, but the problems of China are not the same as those of Russia. We plan our program from a Chinese point of view."

Hanson then adds, "The explanation seemed logical enough to me."

In connection with Hanson's position as Chief of the Technical Cooperation Projects Staff, in charge of Truman's Point 4 program, the following on pages 312 and 313 of his book would seem especially significant. He quotes Mao Tse-tung as follows:

"China cannot reconstruct its industry and commerce without the aid of British and American capital."

Can there be much doubt as to whether the Communists or the anti-Communist forces in Asia will receive aid under the Point 4 program with Hanson in charge?

Gentlemen, here is a man with a mission—a mission to communize the world—a man whose energy and intelligence coupled with a burning all-consuming mission has raised him by his own bootstraps from a penniless operator of a leftist magazine in Peiping in the middle thirties to one of the architects of our foreign policy in the State Department today—a man who, according to State Department announcement No. 41 will be largely in charge of the spending of hundreds of millions of dollars in such areas of the world and for such purposes as he decides.

Gentlemen, if Secretary Acheson gets away with his plan to put this man to a great extent in charge of the proposed Point 4 program, it will, in my opinion, lend tremendous impetus to the tempo at which communism is engulfing the world.

On page 32 of his book, Hanson justifies "The Chinese Communists chopping off the heads of landlords—all of which is true," because of hungry farmers. That the farmers are still hungry after the landlords' heads have been removed apparently never occurred to him.

On page 31 he explained that it took him some time to appreciate the appalling problems which the Chinese Communists were attempting to solve.

In chapter 4 of Hanson's book, he presents the stock Communists' arguments for the so-called Stalin-Hitler Pact of 1939.

Secretary Acheson is now putting Hanson in the position to help the Communists solve the appalling problems in other areas of the world with hundreds of millions or billions of American dollars.

The obvious area in which this man will start using American money to help the Communists solve the people's problem will be Indochina and India.

It should be pointed out that this case was brought to the attention of State Department officials as long ago as May 14, 1947. At that time the Honorable Fred Busbey, on the floor of the House, discussed this man's affinity for the Communist cause in China.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, in my opinion the all-important thing to be determined is not so much the question of whether Latimore was a Russian agent or whether Service was guilty of espionage in the Amerasia case, nor the

disloyalty or bad judgment of many of the particular individuals in the group of untouchables determining the far-eastern policy, but rather, to determine to what extent our far-eastern policy has paralleled the Communist Party objectives.

At this point I would like to read a brief of the Communist Party objectives insofar as the Far East is concerned, as laid down by the Asiatic Cominform of May 1949:

1. Conquer China; (2) conquer Hainan, and (3) Formosa (air base to neutralize Ryukyu and Okinawa).

2. Infiltrate and conquer Indochina and Burma.

3. Infiltration and riots in India and Pakistan; Philippines.

4. Infiltration and riots in Japan; wean Japan from the United States.

#### PROPAGANDA

(a) Japan cannot survive without trade with China.

(b) United States taxpayers cannot pay the tax bills to support 88,000,000 Japanese.

(c) Maintain split between Japan and Philippines.

(d) Maintain split between Japan and Australia.

(e) Omit all mention of Japan's deeds in China (1931-45).

5. Prevent Far Eastern Pact (Pacific Alliance) at all costs.

6. Keep Nehru out of Far Eastern Pact.

7. Woo Afghanistan.

8. Self-determination in Sinkiang Province. Future ethnic ties to Soviet Uzbeks, etc.

9. Infiltration, riots in Iran. Get pro-Soviet Ministers appointed.

It should require no comment to cause anyone with even a semiopen mind immediately to recognize the fact that the Latimore line follows that line practically 100 percent. The important question, of course, is not whether Latimore follows that line, but whether the State Department actually follows that line.

In connection with the question of whether or not Acheson knows what the party line actually is, I would like to quote to you from a letter written by the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES] to the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] in April of 1947.

In that letter the Senator from New Hampshire questions whether the State Department Far Eastern Planning Branch is following two official documents which set forth in detail the Communist objectives in China. He points out those two documents are available

at the Library of Congress or at the State Department.

The two documents are as follows:

1. The Program of the Communist International and Its Constitution. Workers Library Publishers. 1928. Third American edition, 1936.

2. The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semicolonies, adopted as a resolution by the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, September 1, 1928.

Acheson's answer sheds considerable light perhaps on why he may, without even knowing it, be following the Lattimore Communist line. He points out that his top adviser on Chinese affairs "advises me that he has never even read the two Communist documents under reference. I have never read them myself."

Can anyone imagine a person trying to plan a policy or a campaign against Hitler without having read his *Mein Kampf*?

So we find the Secretary of State admitting that he and his top advisers in Far Eastern Affairs do not even take the time to acquaint themselves with the Communist aims in that theater.

I can assure him that Lattimore knows what the Communist aims are.

Let us see how much of the party line of the Soviet Agent, Lattimore, has found its way into Secretary Acheson's Far Eastern policy.

The Secretary of State made his most important speech on Far Eastern policy before the National Press Club on January 12 last. While in that speech he refers to the detachment of the provinces of northern China by the Soviet Union and he somewhat frowns upon this action, he asserts that we must do nothing by way of intervention, such as aid to Chiang on Formosa, which would merit the Chinese wrath that they now have for the Russians.

But the important thing in Mr. Acheson's speech, and the main burden of his argument, is that in the rest of China a democracy has been born. He states that communism is a subtle instrument of Soviet foreign policy, which would "if it could, take from these people what they have won, what we want them to keep and develop which is their own national independence, their own individual independence, their own development of their own resources for their own good, and not as mere tributary states to this great Soviet Union."

Has Acheson the temerity to state that the people of China have won China for themselves? Does Acheson want the Chinese people to keep their present government? Does Acheson really want us to believe that they have won their national independence and their own individual independence?

This is exactly the line that Lattimore wrote in his article, *Asia Conquers Asia*, in March of this year in which Lattimore refers to Russian communism only as a "hypothetical threat—a card unplayed."

Acheson ended his China policy speech of January 12 with these words. Listen to the mind of Lattimore in the voice of Acheson:

What we conclude, I believe, is that there is a new day which has dawned in Asia. It is a day in which the Asian peoples are on their own and know it and intend to continue on their own. It is a day in which the old relationships between East and West is gone, relationships which at their worst were exploitations and which at their best were paternalism. That relationship is over and the relationship of East and West must now be in the Far East one of mutual respect and mutual helpfulness. We are their friends. Others are their friends.

Let us compare that with the final paragraph in one of Lattimore's latest books, *Situation in Asia*:

Throughout Asia today there prevails an atmosphere of hope, not of despair.

Acheson says:

What we conclude, I believe, is that there is a new day which has dawned in Asia.

Lattimore said:

There is not a single country in Asia in which people feel that we are entering on an age of chaos. What they see opening out before them is a limitless horizon of hope—the hope of peaceful constructive activity in free countries and peaceful cooperation among free peoples. There will be disillusionments along the way as these hopes unfold. They should not come from America, or as the result of American policy. A great part of Asia's hopes, however, will be fulfilled, and should be fulfilled with American cooperation. We have everything to gain by being on the side of hope.

Acheson at the National Press Club said a new day had dawned for Asia. Lattimore, his teacher on oriental affairs, tells of the "limitless horizon of hope in Asia."

Acheson told the Press Club:

It is a day on which the Asian peoples are on their own and know it and intend to continue on their own.

Lattimore had said—

There will be disillusion along the way as these hopes unfold. They should not come from America, or as the result of American policy.

Lattimore wrote that it was China that conquered China. Acheson believes that China has conquered China.

The best authority on China affairs in the Senate is perhaps the junior Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND].

I wish to quote his estimation of the grave problem that we are considering. In a speech printed in the Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on March 23 of this year, at page A2255, he said—and I shall not read the entire speech:

There is one great void in the speech of the Secretary of State dealing with our Asia policy. He treats the islands of Formosa, Hainan, Kinmen, Chosen, and the Pescadores, with their 8,000,000 people under the jurisdiction of the legal Government of the Republic of China, as though they were ships which had been sunk beneath the waves of the China Sea and the Pacific.

Since Formosa alone has more population than either Australia or Greece, this is hardly realistic. Formosa is closer to the Philippines than the island of Luzon is to the island of Mindanao. It is hardly conceivable that this Government can view with unconcern the moving of international communism off the Asiatic land mass on its first major island-hopping venture.

An American missionary with years of experience in China recently said to me: "Senator, I cannot understand how Chiang Kai-shek can be the No. 1 target in the Far East of international communism and at the same time be the No. 1 target for the Far Eastern Division of our own State Department." From my own observations in China last November and from recent communications from people still there and those who have just returned, I believe that the Republic of China has passed her darkest hour of Dunkerque and Valley Forge. There has been a new rebirth of morale that is of tremendous significance to those who are not so blind that they will not see.

The Benedict Arnolds, the Quislings, and the fair-weather friends have long since departed. The new Cabinet of President Chiang Kai-shek contains many young and able administrators who are men of integrity. . . .

It is not realistic to ignore the fact that the Republic of China has approximately 600,000 men under arms, 300,000 of whom are excellent soldiers. This total number is greater than the combined troop strength of Korea, the Philippine Republic, the United States of Indonesia, Siam, Vietnam, Burma, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, and the United States forces in Japan.

The island of Formosa is not needed by the United States as either an air or naval base. In the friendly hands of the Republic of China, it presents no problem to our own defenses. In the hands of international communism, the many Japanese-built air strips and the excellent harbors would drive a wedge into our Pacific defense line that runs from Japan through Okinawa to the Philippines. In unfriendly hands, it would be a strategic loss that no competent military, naval, or air commander would or has overlooked.

Does Acheson believe that Mao's conquest of China is the birth of a new day? Does he think that the Chinese people are now "on their own," as he says?

He looks upon the Chiang government with horror and he sees the bright new day for 400,000,000 Chinese.

He was asked by a questioner after his January 12 speech the following question:

You stated that the present trend in Asia is to throw off foreign domination. Is not the present debacle in China the very reverse of this; that is, the allowance of a foreign power to overthrow an existing government?

But Acheson did not answer that very pointed question.

Acheson takes the same position as his grand counselors on far-eastern affairs—Lattimore, Jessup, and Service—he has adopted almost wholly the thesis of Lattimore's article in *United Nations World for March 20*, "Asia Has Conquered Asia."

But let us take a look at the real record. Let us take a look at a secret document of our Department of State, entitled "Current Foreign Relations," printed for the month of March 1950, which was not meant for the eyes of the American public, the contents of which the people are entitled to know at this time in view of the astounding position of the Secretary of State.

I read directly from page 10 of this secret document, and I might incidentally commend this document to the attention of the Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND]. There is much in it which I believe will shock him also. This, Senators will understand, is not written by the Lattimores and the Jessups and the Services. This is written by some of the loyal people in the State Department who know what is going on and that undoubtedly is why it is marked secret. I read directly from page 10 of the secret document:

Position in Far East, the Communist conquest of the mainland of China and the conclusion of the Soviet-Chinese treaty of alliance constitute the greatest advance which Soviet imperialist expansion has achieved since the war, and this advance is no doubt a major factor behind the attitude of confidence which appears to characterize the current Soviet outlook.

That is the true state of affairs. That is a bit different from Jessup's statement before the committee when he tried to treat what is happening in Asia as a victory for the United States; it is a bit different from his attitude when he condemned me for having in some way interfered with that successful program in the Far East. Mr. President, the true state of affairs as set forth in that document is not meant for the eyes of the public. That is the opinion of the loyal Americans in our Department of State whose voice has been muffled by the small group of intellectuals that has ensnared Acheson's mind.

It was not Chinese democracy under Mao that conquered China, as Acheson, Lattimore, Jessup, and Hanson contend. Soviet Russia conquered China and an important ally of the conquerors was this small left-wing element in our Department of State.

I should like to point out that this document is a direct contradiction of what Dean Acheson himself has publicly told the people. It is a direct contradiction of everything that Owen Lattimore has said.

This secret document, which is less than a month old, dated March 19, expresses the frank analysis of the situation from the American point of view. I would like to read the frank analysis of the situation from the Russian point of view as contained in a broadcast from Moscow on December 17 last, as follows:

The Chinese people have dumped Chiang Kai-shek into the garbage can of history. The same fate awaits the United States puppets in other countries. Inspired by the grand historical victory of the Chinese people, the people of Indonesia and Viet Nam, the Philippines, Southern Korea and Burma are intensifying their national liberation struggle. The democratic movement is gaining ground and strength in Japan where people refuse to be tools in the implementation of the plan cooked up by Wall Street.

It sounds almost like Lattimore in his latest article.

With the triumph of Chinese democracy, the popular liberation movement of the peo-

ples of Asia under the oppression of the imperialists has entered a new and more advanced stage.

The mind of the Soviet Foreign Office is as sharp as steel. The mind of the left-wing crowd in the American State Department is as soft as curdled milk.

The truth, as the Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND] has pointed out, is that the only fighting force in the whole of Asia is the army of Chiang Kai-shek.

Acheson on January 12th referred to support of Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa in these terms:

Some silly adventure which some people in this country are urging.

And—

The folly of ill-conceived adventures:

The great mind of the Secretary of State refers to the support of the Nationalist cause as "silly" and "folly," while it still has the best-equipped army of China and is even now on the offensive.

For his benefit let me point out that the most recent battle he led was the battle of Kinmen, an island off the coast of China opposite Formosa. As reported by the New York Herald Tribune:

On October 25, 17,000 Communists with supporting artillery made a night attack on Kinmen. By the twenty-seventh, the three Nationalist armies there, sparked by regiments trained under Sun Li-jen, had annihilated the attackers, of whom 8,000 were captured and 9,000 killed or drowned. The Nationalist air force aided the defenders.

The battle of Kinmen is the largest battle in which the Communists were defeated. For the first time, the new Chinese forces trained on Formosa had a test with the Communists, and came out triumphant.

Another recent battle was the battle of Tengpu Island, in the Chusan group, off the coast south of Shanghai. According to the same source:

On November 3, a somewhat smaller Communist force attacked Tengpu Island (near Tinghai), and on the sixth they were finally destroyed by units of the four armies in the Chusan group.

The reporter of the Herald Tribune commented:

The morale of the Nationalist troops participating was good, and as a result of the battles they captured artillery and small arms which strengthen their position.

The above quotes are from a dispatch by A. Doak Barnett, New York Herald Tribune, December 29, 1946.

We have seen the flow of crocodile tears for the families of those who have been named as the formulators of that policy. The searchlight of truth has finally been thrown upon these men and it is unfortunate, indeed, that their families have suffered from the adverse publicity. But to those who shed tears for the families of these people with whom I also sympathize, I say: What kind of tears will you shed for the 400,000,000 people of China, the free leaders of which

are now being prepared for liquidation as Mao drinks vodka with Stalin in Moscow?

The left-wing intellectuals are now in the process of actually preparing world tragedy. Can we stop them before it is too late? Can we have done with this business of subversion and degeneration behind high-sounding, phony diplomacy?

The Senate of the United States should take firm hand in its constitutional role of helping now to formulate a real foreign policy for the United States of America.

JUNE 2, 1950

Lattimore Letter on Chinese Employed by OWI; Additional Information on Philip Jessup

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, first I should like to compliment the Senator from Michigan for his outstanding presentation of the legal aspects of the Amerasia case.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at this point a number of documents. The first is a letter dated June 15, 1943, marked "Secret," written by Mr. Owen Lattimore to Mr. Joseph Barnes, of the Office of War Information. This letter has been discussed in some detail in the past. In discussing it before the National Convention of Editors, I pointed out that this letter constituted an order by Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Barnes to discharge all anti-Communist Chinese and to replace them with Chinese friendly to the Communist Party. The State Department subsequently put out a White Paper in which they said this was untrue, and in effect said that actually this document constituted a direction to be very careful not to hire Communists. Since that time I made the decision to make public some of the allegedly secret files, which explain the purport of this letter very well. These files are rather unusual. We find the case of two Chinese Communists who had been declared ineligible for Government employment. It is a case which Mr. Lattimore had succeeded in having reopened before the Loyalty Board. I am not able to find the exact quotation from the finding of the Loyalty Board. However, I am asking that these documents be printed in the RECORD, and anyone who wishes to see the exact words of the Loyalty Board will find them in these papers. The Loyalty Board in effect said: "This puts us in the very unusual position of either approving for Government employment a known Communist or turning down the recommendation of the head of the Department." In this case it was Mr. Lattimore. They decided not to turn Mr. Lattimore down and they hired the two Communists whom Mr. Lattimore mentioned in this letter. I think it is rather important that all Members of the Senate have access to these documents, and I ask

that they be inserted in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the letter and documents were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., June 15, 1943.

MR. JOSEPH BARNES,

Office of War Information,

New York, N. Y.

DEAR JOE: In your capacity as a member of our personnel security committee there are certain things which you ought to know about Chinese personnel. It is a delicate matter for me to tell you about these things because of my recent official connection with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. For that reason I am marking this communication secret.

When we recently reduced the number of our Chinese staff in New York it was quite obvious that there was going to be trouble and that this trouble would take the form of accusations against the remaining personnel. The fact is that certain of the personnel with whose services we dispensed had connections outside the office. This leads directly into the main question. It is extremely important from the point of view of security that intelligence information should not leak out of our office through our Chinese personnel. It is an open secret in Washington that the security of various Chinese agencies there is deplorable. Any pipeline from our office to any of those agencies is not a pipeline but practically an open conduit.

However, it is not only a question of Chinese Government agencies. There is also a well-organized and well-financed organization among the Chinese in this country connected with Wang Ching-wei, the Japanese puppet. This can be traced back to the history of the Chinese revolution as a whole. To present it in the fewest possible words: Sun Yat-sen was largely financed for many years by Chinese living abroad. Not only Sun Yat-sen but Wang Ching-wei had close connections among the overseas Chinese. However much he is a traitor now, the fact must be recognized that Wang Ching-wei is a veteran of Chinese communities abroad, including those in the United States.

Chinese in the United States come almost exclusively from a few localities on the coast of China, practically every one of which is now occupied by the Japanese. Thus these Chinese in America have both family connections and financial investments which are under the control of the Japanese, and because of his years of political organizing work

Wang Ching-wei knows all of these connections and can apply pressure through them.

On the other side there is a special organization within the Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party at Chungking which is charged with maintaining political and financial connections with Chinese overseas. This overseas bureau also has a detailed knowledge of the Chinese communities in America and is able to apply pressure. Thus there is a very intense conflict going on every day in every Chinatown in America between the Wang Ching-wei agents and those of the Kuomintang. It must be remembered that while the Kuomintang is able to operate in a private way as a political party among Chinese residents in America, it is also the party which "owns" the Chinese Government and is thus able to make use of Chinese Government agencies.

Thirdly, there are numerous Chinese in America who are politically unaffiliated. There are, of course, Communists, but they have neither the money nor the organization of the Wang Ching-wei and Kuomintang groups. The genuinely unaffiliated Chinese are a curious compound of Chinese politics and the American environment. They tend to be intensely loyal to China as a country, without conceiving that the Kuomintang or any other political organization has a monopoly right to control of their thoughts and actions. They are like Americans; they like to give their political allegiance, not to have it demanded of them. They are reluctant to support a regimented series of causes laid down for them under orders; like Americans, they often give moral and financial support to a scattered number of causes, some of which may even conflict with each other to a certain extent.

The conflict between the Wang Ching-wei organizing group and the Kuomintang organizing group in America cannot be fought out in the open. Both sides have very good reasons for not courting publicity. Each is anxious to bring into its fold as many of the unaffiliated Chinese as possible. Each is also anxious not to be exposed as an "un-American" organization or a foreign political group working on American soil. Both of them accordingly find it very good tactics, not only to cover up themselves but to put pressure on those whom they are trying to bring under their control, to accuse unaffiliated Chinese of being Communists. This is an accusation which covers up the accuser at the same time that it puts pressure on the accused.

One of the outstanding rallying points of the unaffiliated Chinese in America is the New China Daily News in New York. This is controlled by an organization of laundrymen. I understand that the shareholders number two or three thousand and that they take an active interest in the newspaper. The essential thing about these laundrymen is that in the nature of their business they are independent small-business men. This means that they are on the one hand fairly

well insured against Communist ideology, since the small-business man of whatever nationality is likely to be a man who has made his way by his own initiative and enterprise and is therefore extremely suspicious of collectivist economic theories. On the other hand these Chinese small-business proprietors are reluctant to submit themselves unquestioningly to the control of the vested interests which have grown up in China in association with the dominant Kuomintang. The New China Daily News would probably not come under much pressure if it were not for the fact that it is one of the best edited Chinese papers in America with a growing circulation. It does not need to be subsidized or supported by a patron like many, perhaps the majority, of Chinese papers. It pays dividends on its own merits. A number of Chinese language papers in America receive subsidies from the Kuomintang. At least two, and perhaps three, receive subsidies from the Wang Ching-wei group. One or two others trace back to the group within the Kuomintang, which was at one time headed by the late Hu Han-min, a leader of a right-wing faction within the Kuomintang. The Hu Han-min group, though once regarded as right-wing conservatives, are now regarded in China as "old-fashioned liberals"—liberal, so to speak, short of the New Deal. They are less bitterly involved in Chinatown politics than the Wang Ching-wei and Kuomintang groups. The two latter, which are engaged in handing out carefully colored news and doctored editorial policies, are intensely jealous of and hostile to an unaffiliated paper like the New China Daily News which, so to speak, flaunts its sins by being so readable that the Chinese public in America buys it for its own sake.

It would be rash to say that there are no Communists connected with the New China Daily News. Here it is necessary to consider another peculiarity of the politics of Chinese living out of China. These Chinese are far from being tied to the chariot wheels of Moscow; but when it comes to resisting the trend toward totalitarian regimentation within China they are often willing to support parts of the program advocated by the Chinese Communists within China. This is so much a part of the pattern of politics of Chinese living out of China that it is not uncommon to find wealthy men, even millionaires, supporting the program of the Chinese Communists in whole or in part. This was, for instance, conspicuous in Malaya before the fall of Singapore. For such prosperous and independent Chinese it was a question either of backing their independent judgment of the steps that needed to be taken toward creating a working democracy within China, or of paying financial tribute to the Kuomintang, which sometimes tends to be autocratic, and not infrequently spurns advice from Chinese abroad at the same time that it demands their financial contributions.

In the specific setting of America, it is the independent small-business man—like the laundryman—rather than the very few wealthy merchants who most conspicuously maintain this tradition of political independence. In America, some of the most wealthy individuals are either committed to Wang Ching-wei and his puppet Japanese party or at least are hedging until they have a better idea of how the war is finally going to turn out.

In the circumstances we have to be extremely careful about our Chinese personnel. While we need to avoid recruiting any Chinese Communists we must be careful not to be frightened out of hiring people who have loosely been accused of being Communists. We have to be at least equally careful of not hiring people who are pipelines to the Wang Ching-wei group or to one or other of the main factions within the Kuomintang. After all, as an American Government agency we should deal with the Chinese Government or regular agencies of the Chinese Government, but should not get in the position of committing ourselves to the Kuomintang, the political party which controls the Chinese Government, as if it were itself the Chinese Government. You will recognize both the importance of this proposition and the delicacy which it requires on the operational level.

For our purposes, it is wise to recruit as many unaffiliated Chinese as we can, to pick people whose loyalty will be reasonably assured on the one hand by the salaries which we pay them and on the other hand by the fact that they do not receive salaries or subsidies from somewhere else.

Mr. Chi and Mr. Chew Hong, both of our New York office, conform excellently to these requirements. Mr. Chi I have known for many years. Until his family estates were occupied by the Japanese, he was a wealthy landlord. He was brought up in the older scholastic tradition in China, before the spread of modern western education, but at the same time he is keenly interested in the national unification of China and the orderly development of a stable political organization there. I know by long experience that he is anything but a Communist; I also know that because of his seniority, his background of independent wealth, and his superior mentality he is not a man to be pushed around by party bureaucrats. Chew Hong is a much younger man, but one whom Dr. Chi trusts and of whose integrity he is convinced. There is something in their relationship of the old Chinese standards of disciple and master. As long as Dr. Chi stands in the relationship of loyal friendship to me and the loyalty of an honest employee of an American Government agency, there will be no difficulty with either man, nor irresponsible playing with Chinese politics, and no leakage to any Chinese faction.

The retention of both men is therefore a guaranty to the secrecy and security of the work of OWI as well as a guaranty of the

confident fulfillment of directives. I urge you not to be high-pressured into getting rid of either man. I know that both men may be subjected to attacks. Given the time to work on it, I could undoubtedly trace such attacks to their origin and give you the full details. I doubt whether the Personnel Security Committee of OWI would be able to trace such attacks, rooted in the intricacies of Chinese factional politics, to their source; but I should not like to see us placed in a position where, after getting rid of people now attacked, we would be forced to hire people who would actually be the nominees of factions not under our control.

It is for this reason that I have written this long letter to urge you to report to our Personnel Security Committee the necessity for exercising pronounced agnosticism when any of our Chinese personnel are attacked.

In the meantime I am doing my best to check over our Chinese personnel in San Francisco.

Once more I urge you to observe the strictest confidence in acting on this letter, because in certain quarters it might be considered that I am under a moral obligation to see that OWI is staffed with Chinese who take their orders from some source other than the American Government.

Yours,

OWEN LATTIMORE,  
Director, Pacific Operations.

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE,  
DIRECTOR AND CHIEF EXAMINER,  
October 12, 1942.

*The Commission (via the Executive Director and Chief Examiner):*

MEMORANDUM OPINION—IN THE MATTER OF  
CHEW SIK HONG, ASSISTANT FIELD REPRESENTATIVE, OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

Hong received a temporary appointment in December of 1941 as assistant field representative, \$2,600 per annum, Office of War Information, at New York City. The appointment was made under Executive Order 8564, subject to investigation.

He was born in 1910 at Yiping, China, of Chinese-American parents, his father having been born in San Francisco. His citizenship is appropriately established. He arrived in the United States in November of 1920 at San Francisco. He was educated in the California public schools, completing part of his high school and some of his university work in China, the university work being taken at Tsing Hua University. In May of 1937 he graduated from the University of California with an A. B. degree in political science and history. Apparently he was unemployed in San Francisco from May through August of 1937 when he went to New York City, receiving his first employment there in October of 1937. For a period of about 2 years until September 1939, he served as executive secretary of the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance at a salary of \$900 per annum. From September of 1939 to July of

1940 he engaged in establishing a Chinese newspaper known as the China Daily News with address at 106 Mott Street, New York City. From July 1940 to the date of his employment with the Federal Government he operated as president and editor of the China Daily News at a salary of \$960 per year.

The issue presented by the case is Hong's loyalty, there being indications in the evidence that organizations, enterprises, and individuals with whom he has been affiliated are communistic.

Hong's connections do not appear to be extensive. The investigation is thus not particularly broad in scope and is confined largely to contacts with members of the Chinese community in New York City who are thought to be in a position to report with some significance on his activities.

1. The Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance is reported by a number of witnesses as being an organization affiliated with the Communist Party. It is concluded from the evidence that this allegation is well founded. It appears that the organization was originally started as representative of the trade indicated by the title. The evidence in the record shows that several years ago a division occurred among the membership. Witnesses report that it was the Communist element that caused the split and thereafter the conservative group in the membership, as distinct from the radicals or Communists, withdrew and established their own organization under the name of the Chinese Hand Laundry Association. The incident as reported conforms closely to the Communist pattern of organizational penetration. At the special hearing, Hong was asked how he might account for the fact that the alliance has the reputation of being communistic. He stated that it may have originated during the split several years ago and due to the fact that it does not exclude Communists or any other political groups from membership. At the time of the division the conservative elements brought a lawsuit challenging the election which reflected the split. The conservative group after extended litigation lost this suit. The incident is reported on by attorneys who participated and also by others. From such reports and from inferences, which it is believed may be drawn from Hong's own statement, it is believed that the organizational division represented a victory for the Communist group in the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance and that the cumulative evidence shows the alliance to be a Communist Party affiliate.

In addition to the foregoing, significance is attached to items extracted from past copies of the Communist newspaper, Daily Worker. An item in an issue of the Daily Worker on May 5 of 1938 consists of a letter from James Lee, secretary of the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance and supervisor of Hong. Lee's letter refers to the record of the alliance and pleads for your confidence and good will.

In another item in the Daily Worker, issue of January 31, 1938, a report is made on activities resulting in the obtaining of ambulances for shipment to the south Chinese front. According to the news item the announcement of the completion of the ambulance undertaking was made by one Chu Tang of the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance. The item reported that procuring of two more ambulances was to be undertaken by the alliance in cooperation with the American League for Peace and Democracy and the American Friends of the Chinese People.

In a record found in the New York City Police Department it is stated that the Daily Worker, July 24, 1940, announced a meeting protesting closing of the Burma Road. The list of speakers for the meeting included names of persons generally considered as Communists and included one Lo Ton as representing the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance.

2. China Daily News—the testimony is to the general effect that the China Daily News is a publication by and for Chinese Communists. It is described by some individuals as the Chinese equivalent of the Daily Worker. It is clearly shown from evidence that the China Daily News is the organ of the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance. Hong moved from his second post with the alliance to work first as promoter and second as editor and president.

The paper has been publishing since July of 1940 and probably would supply an accurate application of the Communist Party line test. It is understood that the paper is printed in Chinese and probably a considerable amount of translating would be required to ascertain whether or not the paper adhered to the Communist Party line. There is the additional problem of whether the ordinary conception of the party-line test would apply to a Chinese Communist. Since China was at war with Japan during the period from August of 1939 to June of 1941, there is little likelihood that the test usually applied during this period would have any significance. The Chinese, including the Chinese Communists, were probably not anti-British and certainly favored as much intervention for the Chinese in the Chinese-Japanese conflict as could be provided.

Apart from the foregoing it is believed that the evidence shows the newspaper to be communistic.

There is a report filed with the Dies committee, undated, which states that two Chinese Communist leaders, Leiu Chei Mann of 191 Canal Street, and Tong Manchu, of 172½ Canal Street, were to publish a Communist Party paper in the summer of 1940. 191 Canal Street is the address of the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance. The home residence given by Hong in New York City is 298 West Eleventh Street. However, it should be noted that at the time of the special hearing

Hong stated that one name which he had used at times was Chu Tong.

3. Reference and associates: One of the references supplied by Hong was Mr. Paul Radin, apparently an associate from the time Hong was in California. Paul Radin is a name which has come out in connection with many loyalty investigations. He is a brother of Max Radin, a well-known and spectacular member of the law-teaching profession on the staff of the University of California. In the course of one rather detailed interview, Max Radin described his brother Paul as very far to the left, coupling Paul's name with that of Dr. Robert Brady. Max, it is recalled, stated that his brother Paul and Dr. Brady saw eye to eye as radicals.

Hong referred to a man by the name of Julius L. Bezozo, as one of his associates both in the alliance and in the newspaper organization. Bezozo is an attorney, who is identified as one of the owners of the China Daily News. It is established that he does legal work for the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance and for the China Daily News. It is also shown that he represented the alleged radical or Communist wing of the alliance in a lawsuit which occurred at the time of the division. Bezozo was interviewed and stated that he had known Hong since he first came to New York. He stated that Hong was one of his very good friends and attested to his loyalty. Hong was described by Bezozo as a New Dealer. (Purely as an aside, Hong was described by another witness favorable to him as a "Jeffersonian Democrat.")

In the special hearing Hong referred to his acquaintanceship with Mr. Bezozo and also with a Mr. Tauber, senior member of the law firm which includes Mr. Bezozo. Bezozo is said by witnesses in the investigation to regularly represent Communists in legal matters. The firm, including Tauber, is described as attorneys for the International Labor Defense. The organization, International Labor Defense, is known as a Communist organization supposed to be the American section of the Moscow-controlled Communist International Red Aid. One of its main activities has been to provide legal aid to Communists and fellow travelers and to propagandize communism. According to the Civil Service Commission security files, Julius L. Bezozo was reported as a member of the legal staff of the International Labor Defense in an issue of the Daily Worker dated February 11, 1938.

Bezozo is given as a reference by Hong, as is Dr. Paul Radin.

It is concluded that the activities, affiliations, and associations of Hong, as shown by the Commission's investigation, are communistic. A finding of ineligibility is considered necessary in this case.

J. F. CANNON,  
Legal Adviser.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF LAW OFFICER,

November 14, 1943.

*The Commission, through Mr. Smith and the Executive Director and Chief Examiner:*

I am submitting herewith as a unit the cases of Chew Sih Hong and Dr. Kung Chuan Chi, employees of the Office of War Information. These cases are being submitted together because both individuals are serving in the same section, and it appears that Mr. Hong was employed at the recommendation of Dr. Chi, who in turn was employed by Mr. Owen Lattimore, Director of Pacific Operations of the Office of War Information.

The case of Mr. Hong was previously before the Commission and analyses of the facts in his case were furnished by the undersigned and by Mr. CANNON. We both took the position that Hong's connections with the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance, reputed to be an organization affiliated with the Communist Party, and the China Daily News, said to be a publication by and for Chinese Communists, and his references and associations, were such as to warrant a finding of ineligibility. The Commission transmitted to the Office of War Information a proposed memorandum opinion in the case of Mr. Hong and under date of November 30, 1942, Mr. Elmer Davis in a letter to Commissioner Fleming stated that in view of the information which we furnished him, Hong was terminated at the close of business November 15, 1942. The Commission thereupon advised the Office of War Information under date of December 8, 1942, that the Commission has concluded that a finding of ineligibility is necessary and that the Commission's records have been noted to show that Mr. Hong's services were terminated at the close of business on November 15, 1942, as reported in the letter from Mr. Elmer Davis of November 30, 1942. Previously the Commission had approved the finding of ineligibility and this action was recorded in minute No. 4, of December 4, 1942.

In a letter dated July 27, 1943, Rear Adm. R. P. McCullough referred to previous correspondence regarding Mr. Hong and stated that the letter of November 30, 1942, from the Office of War Information to the effect that Hong had been terminated at the close of business November 15, 1942, was somewhat in error because Mr. Hong had been separated from the New York office of the Office of War Information on November 15, 1942, for duty with the Army and that when he returned in the spring of 1943 he was again employed in the New York office of the Office of War Information, that office not knowing that Hong had been declared ineligible by the Civil Service Commission. Admiral McCullough accordingly requested that the Commission reconsider the case of Mr. Hong. Mr. Moyer then sent the file to the Investigations Division so that an in-

interview might be had with Mr. Owen Lattimore, head of the San Francisco office of the Office of War Information. Mr. Lattimore was accordingly interviewed in San Francisco, and on a later date Mr. Steely interviewed Admiral McCullough and Mr. Marsh, of the Office of War Information, regarding Mr. Hong, Mr. Owen Lattimore being also present during this interview. Mr. Steely reported, among other things, that Mr. Lattimore stated that he wished to keep Mr. Hong on the job, that Mr. Lattimore had an efficient set-up in the Chinese Section in the New York office of the Office of War Information, and wanted to keep it that way; that he had explicit confidence in Dr. Chi, that Mr. Hong is under careful supervision and even if he were a Communist he is not in a position where he can do any damage, that the selection of suitable Chinese was a delicate matter, and it is extremely difficult to obtain a competent employee who does not have connections which might constitute leaks in the organization, that under the present set-up with Dr. Chi and Mr. Hong there have been no incidents of confidential information getting into unauthorized channels, and that there has been no attempts on Mr. Hong's part to use his present position for the spreading of Communist propaganda. Mr. Lattimore also pointed out that Mr. Hong was recently used by the Army to teach Chinese to 224 officers in India. Mr. Lattimore stated that he did not know Mr. Hong but he did know Dr. Chi and is relying upon Dr. Chi's recommendation and knowledge of Dr. Hong.

During the interview in San Francisco Mr. Lattimore made an extended statement regarding Mr. Hong and Dr. Chi and also furnished the investigator with a copy of a letter which he had written to Mr. Joseph Barnes under date of June 15, 1943. The statement of Mr. Lattimore during the interview and the copy of his letter to Mr. Barnes are appropriately identified in the file. It would be a difficult thing to attempt to summarize Mr. Lattimore's lengthy statement or his letter to Mr. Barnes. However, the gist of his comments is that he does not know Hong personally but based on his knowledge of the situation, neither the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance nor the China Daily News are communistic. He then proceeded to give rather involved reasons for his conclusion. He said that he had known Dr. Chi, who is about 70 years of age, in China, that he was a respected and cultured man, and that his knowledge of Dr. Chi is such that he has implicit faith and confidence in his integrity and ability. He told Dr. Chi to select the person he wanted to assist him and Dr. Chi selected Mr. Hong. This was the first time that Mr. Lattimore had any knowledge of Mr. Hong at all.

Among other things, Mr. Lattimore said: "Of course I have no concrete proof that Hong is not a Communist, but in the absence of concrete proof I think there is a prima facie case to show that he is not a

Communist. I know there is a law preventing the hiring of Communists. Personally and frankly, I would not be too worried if an individual Communist were in Hong's position. This is because he would not be able to form a cell and could not get away with anything. He could not commit verbal sabotage, and all of the work coming out of the New York office has to clear through me."

On a later occasion Mr. Lattimore stated to our investigator in part:

"Now I know that the various factions smear a nonconformist by charging him with being a Communist. However, the Chinese Government dare not come out in the open and intervene in such domestic problems. I merely say this: If your people have gone to the Chinese Ambassador or any other Chinese Government representative and such Chinese representative has told you that this man Hong is suspected of being a Communist, then I say you should discount such evidence and certainly should not declare the man ineligible merely on that kind of evidence. It is true that I don't know anything about Hong personally except what I have learned from Dr. Chi. It is also true that he could be a Communist without my knowledge. It is also true that he could have hoodwinked Dr. Chi. However, until concrete evidence is presented that he is a Communist, then I believe that based on Dr. Chi's standing and reputation and ability, his judgment that Hong is not a Communist is a prima facie case in favor of Hong and should not be reversed on the testimony that you may have received from anyone representing the Chinese Government or, for that matter, on the testimony of any Chinese."

It will be noted that the sum and substance of Mr. Lattimore's testimony is that he does not know Mr. Hong, that he does know Dr. Chi, that he has full faith in Dr. Chi and was willing to employ Hong on Dr. Chi's recommendation; that he does not know whether Hong is a Communist, but does not think he is and that even if Hong were a Communist, he would still like to retain Hong in the service, because Hong could do no harm in his position.

In his letter to Mr. Barnes, Mr. Lattimore outlined the entire situation as he understood it, described the relationship between Hong and Dr. Chi, and then said:

"As long as Dr. Chi stands in the relationship of loyal friendship to me and the loyalty of an honest employee of an American Government agency, there will be no difficulty with either man, no irresponsible playing with Chinese politics, and no leakage to any Chinese faction. The retention of both men is therefore a guaranty to the secrecy and security of the work of OWI as well as a guaranty of the confident fulfillment of directives. I urge you not to be high-pressured into getting rid of either man. I know that both men may be subjected to attacks. Given the time to work

on it, I could undoubtedly trace such attacks to their origin and give you the full details. I doubt whether the Personnel Security Committee of OWI would be able to trace such attacks, rooted in the intricacies of Chinese factional politics, to their source; but I should not like to see us placed in a position where, after getting rid of people now attacked, we would be forced to hire people who would actually be the nominees of factions not under our control."

The foregoing letter from Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Barnes was written in strict confidence and is not to be quoted to any outside source.

The evidence before the Commission at the time unfavorable action was originally taken in the case of Mr. Hong tended to indicate rather strongly that Hong is a Communist and engaged in activities having for their purpose support of Communist Party interests. The recent investigation and interviews have not changed the evidence and have on the contrary elicited some information tending to strengthen the position that Hong is pro-Communist. Thus it was brought out in addition to all of the other information that Hong was active in the American Student Union during his school years.

The evidence indicated that Hong is pro-Communist. The question now for determination is whether his employment should be approved because of the strong representations of Mr. Lattimore that Hong is probably not a Communist, but even if he is a Communist Mr. Lattimore still wishes to retain him because Hong will work under close supervision and will not be able to do any harm.

On the one hand it can be argued that since we are reasonably convinced that Hong is pro-Communist, it is our responsibility to require his removal notwithstanding Mr. Lattimore's representations. On the other hand the Commission could, if it wished, take the position that since Mr. Lattimore has assumed responsibility, the Commission can afford to permit Hong's retention in the service. If the Commission takes the latter position it will be tantamount to saying that although we believe the individual is a Communist, we will be willing to rate him eligible provided the employing agency is willing to assume the responsibility. I doubt that the Commission can afford to avoid the issue in this manner. If we believe Hong is a Communist then we should rate him ineligible.

Do we believe Hong is a Communist? The Commission's original finding was based on Hong's connections with the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance and with the China Daily News. Much of the information regarding the communistic nature of the alliance and the newspaper came from Chinese, some of whom were connected with competing newspapers. We ourselves have not read the China Daily News. Mr. Lattimore states he has read some of the issues and has found nothing communistic in them, although he

admits there might have been something communistic in the issues which he has not read. Mr. Lattimore has spent years in China and from his statement and letter to Mr. Barnes it would appear that he is thoroughly familiar with the various political factions. His conclusion is that Hong's connections, in the light of his knowledge of the situation, do not necessarily point to procommunism. In matters of the Chinese, Lattimore is somewhat of an expert and his opinion is entitled to considerable weight.

Since we have no direct evidence that Hong is a Communist, and since the original decision was based on the circumstances of Hong's connections and in view of Mr. Lattimore's representations, I am ready to reach the conclusion that possibly we made an error in the case of Mr. Hong; I am, therefore, ready to recommend that Mr. Hong be rated eligible for retention in his position in the Office of War Information.

In the case of Dr. Chi, I recommended in my memorandum of May 7, 1943, that he be rated eligible. Mr. Smith did not agree with me. The Commission has not yet acted on the case of Dr. Chi. For the reasons stated in my memorandum of May 7, 1943, I again recommend that Dr. Chi be rated eligible.

ALFRED KLEIN,  
Acting Chief Law Officer.

Mr. MOYER:

I do not believe I clearly understand Mr. Lattimore's point of view regarding the cases of Chi and Hong. It seems that he is, in effect, suggesting that whatever evidence we may have, short of being positive and direct, tending to show the applicants to be communistically inclined is entitled to very little weight and that his judgment, based on his personal knowledge of Chi and on Chi's appraisal of Hong, should prevail. However, as pointed out by Mr. Klein, there is no absolute proof that the applicants are Communists and in view of Lattimore's knowledge of the complicated Chinese political situation, gained through years of residence in China, I am also willing to change my previous recommendation for both applicants from ineligibility to eligibility.

FARRAR SMITH.

SEPTEMBER 2, 1943.

WILLIAM H. McMILLEN:

As requested by you, Mr. Frank Marsh and Admiral McCullough of the Office of War Information were interviewed on August 31, 1943, relative to the case of Chew Sih Hong, assistant field representative in the New York office of OWI. Mr. Owen Lattimore, Director of Pacific Operations, OWI, who is sponsoring Mr. Hong and upon whose recommendation OWI requested that this case be reopened, was also present during this interview.

Mr. Hong was originally investigated in New York for this position and was rated ineligible by the Commission (see minute 4

of December 4, 1942). The file also shows that on November 30, 1942, the Commission was informed that Mr. Hong's services were terminated at the close of business November 15, 1942, as a result of information furnished the OWI by the Commission in a letter dated October 26, 1942.

The Commission was subsequently informed under date of July 27, 1943, by Admiral McCullough that the information furnished it by Mr. Elmer Davis, under date of November 30, 1942, regarding the termination of Mr. Hong's services, was somewhat in error as Mr. Hong was separated from the New York office of OWI for duty with the Army and that upon his return in the spring of 1943 he was again employed in the New York office as the New York office was not advised of the fact that Mr. Hong had been declared ineligible by the Civil Service Commission.

On the basis of Rear Admiral McCullough's letter of July 27, 1943, this case was reopened for the purpose of interviewing Mr. Owen Lattimore of San Francisco and some additional investigation was also made.

During my interview with Mr. Marsh, Mr. Lattimore, and Admiral McCullough, the evidence secured during investigation of Mr. Hong was discussed and they were advised fully regarding the substance of the derogatory information.

As reported by Investigator H. R. Memering, who interviewed Mr. Lattimore in San Francisco, Mr. Lattimore does not know Mr. Hong personally and in recommending him for retention in the service, he is relying upon Dr. Kung Chuan Chi, assistant language editor (Chinese) in the New York office of OWI. Mr. Lattimore has known Dr. Chi since about 1936 when he met him in Shansi Province in China. Mr. Lattimore is also personally acquainted with Dr. Chi's son, Dr. Chi Chao-Ting. Mr. Lattimore added little to the testimony given Mr. Memering in San Francisco.

Dr. Kung Chuan Chi has been investigated by the Commission for his position as assistant language editor (Chinese), OWI, and his case is now pending before the Commission. In view of the fact that Mr. Lattimore is relying upon Dr. Chi's recommendation regarding Mr. Hong, the OWI representatives were also informed of the unfavorable information secured regarding Dr. Chi and his son, which included testimony to the effect that the young Dr. Chi is or was until recently, a Communist and that he at one time was a delegate to the Third Internationale in Moscow and to the effect that the elder Dr. Chi was removed from his position as commissioner of education in the Shansi Province because of Communist activities.

Mr. Lattimore devoted considerable time to a discussion of factional strife among the Chinese and possible interests on the part of witnesses giving derogatory testimony regarding Mr. Hong. He appeared inclined to explain away all accusations of communism

made against Mr. Hong on this basis. He also advanced as a reason for believing the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance not to be a Communist organization the fact that this organization was composed of small businessmen whose interests would be affected adversely under communism. Mr. Lattimore said he could not understand why the story that the elder Dr. Chi was removed from his position as minister of education in the Shansi Province because of Communist activities would be circulated. Mr. Lattimore also stated that Dr. Chi was known to Congressman WALTER H. JUDD, of Minnesota, and that Congressman JUDD, a former missionary, spent some time in Shansi Province during the time Dr. Chi was an official there. It was pointed out to Mr. Lattimore that testimony regarding Dr. Chi's removal was secured by the Commission both in New York and San Francisco. The information received in San Francisco came from a source found to be reliable in the past by the Commission. The informant did not know Dr. Chi personally but had to inquire about him to secure this information. That this latter source should be biased against Dr. Chi in making this statement appears to be unlikely.

After a lengthy discussion of the various angles in the case, such as the intricacies of Chinese politics, possible motives witnesses testifying might have, etc., as well as the derogatory testimony itself, Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Marsh, and Admiral McCullough were asked whether, in view of the information in the case, they felt that Mr. Hong should be retained. Their statements were substantially as follows:

Mr. Lattimore stated that he wished to keep Mr. Hong on the job, that he had an efficient set-up in the Chinese section in New York and wanted to keep it that way, that he has explicit confidence in Dr. Chi, that Mr. Hong is under careful supervision and even if he were a Communist that he is not in a position where he could do any damage, that the selection of suitable Chinese was a delicate matter and it is extremely difficult to obtain a competent employee who does not have connections which might constitute leaks in the organization, that under the present set-up with Dr. Chi and Mr. Hong there had been no instances of confidential information getting into unauthorized channels and that there had been no attempts on Mr. Hong's part to use his present position for the spreading of Communist propaganda, etc. Mr. Lattimore also pointed out that Mr. Hong was recently used by the Army to teach Chinese to 224 officers in India. Mr. Hong was highly praised for this work in a letter from Colonel Gilchrist of the United States Army.

The substance of Mr. Lattimore's statements was to the effect that he wants to retain Mr. Hong and is still relying upon Dr. Chi's recommendation and knowledge of Mr. Hong, all evidence to the contrary notwithstanding.

Mr. Marsh stated that he recognizes the intricacies of Chinese politics and he feels that if Mr. Lattimore still wants to employ Mr. Hong, knowing the nature of the testimony against him, the risk involved, etc., he would recommend that Mr. Lattimore be permitted to retain Mr. Hong as an employee of OWI in his present position.

Admiral McCullough said that if Mr. Hong was to be removed on the basis of the evidence that he had heard in the case that he felt that others higher up in the organization should also go, that others had been retained against whom the evidence was more damaging than it was against Mr. Hong, that he would go along with Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Marsh in favor of Mr. Hong's retention in the service.

In view of the fact that Mr. Lattimore is placing so much reliance upon Dr. Chi, whose case is also pending before the Commission at the present time, it is suggested that Dr. Chi's investigation be considered in connection with the Hong case.

Mr. Lattimore was asked whether there was anything unique about Mr. Hong's services which could not be performed by other Chinese translators and he said "no" but that he wished to keep his present organization in view of the fact that it was functioning efficiently.

In view of the testimony obtained during the subsequent investigation of Mr. Hong in San Francisco and the evidence secured in the investigation of Dr. Chi regarding Communist activities on the part of him and his son, I can see no reason why the Commission should disturb its previous rating of ineligibility in Mr. Hong's case.

E. NEWTON STEELY.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Mr. President, some time ago in discussing the State Department's Ambassador at Large, I pointed out that he had received a great deal of money, or at least his organization did, for the support of the publication which he was operating. At that time I had checks totaling only \$3,500. This was Communist money.

The State Department again put out a white paper on this subject, and said that the only Communist money paid was \$3,500, and that that represented a small portion of the cost of running the organization.

Since that time I have dug up additional photostats, and of course, obviously, I have not even scratched the surface, because it is difficult almost to the point of being impossible to get photostats of checks of a hostile organization, one controlled by Communists. But I have dug up a total of \$6,000 of Communist money paid to this particular organization, and in view of the fact

that the State Department put out the official word that the total amount was only \$3,500, when obviously they could have found out what the total was, when they had only to call Mr. Jessup up and say, "Mr. Ambassador, how much money did your organization get?", I think it is important that the photostats of these checks go into the RECORD. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the photostats were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

No. 34.

AMERICAN PEOPLES FUND, INC.,  
16 WEST TWELFTH STREET,  
September 12, 1943.

Pay to the order of American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, \$2,500.  
AMERICAN PEOPLES FUND, INC.,  
FREDERICK V. FIELD, President.

To Madison Avenue office, Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, Madison Avenue at Sixtieth Street, New York, N. Y.

[Endorsement]

Pay to the order of the Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co.

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF  
PACIFIC RELATIONS.

No. 7.

AMERICAN PEOPLES FUND, INC.,  
16 WEST TWELFTH STREET,  
November 27, 1942.

Pay to the order of American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, \$1,000.  
AMERICAN PEOPLES FUND, INC.,  
FREDERICK V. FIELD, President.

[Endorsement]

Pay to the order of the Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co.

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF  
PACIFIC RELATIONS.

No. 54.

MADISON AVENUE OFFICE,  
GUARANTY TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK,  
January 22, 1942.

Pay to the order of American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, one thousand dollars.

\$1,000.

FREDERICK V. FIELD,  
Special Account.

[Endorsement]

Pay to the order of any bank, banker, or trust company or through the New York Clearing House. Endorsement guaranteed.

CORN EXCHANGE BANK TRUST CO.  
January 28, 1942.

No. 159.  
 MADISON AVENUE OFFICE,  
 GUARANTY TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK,  
 December—, 1941.  
 Pay to the order of American Council, In-  
 stitute of Pacific Relations, one thousand  
 five hundred dollars.  
 \$1,500.

FREDERICK V. FIELD,  
 Special Account.

[Endorsement]

Pay to the order of the Corn Exchange  
 Bank Trust Co.

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE  
 OF PACIFIC RELATIONS.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, in discussing the present Ambassador at Large, Mr. Jessup, I originally made the statement that he had a great affinity for Communist causes. That was a gross understatement. Since that time we have proven not only a great affinity for Communist causes, but a great affinity for Communist associates and a great affinity for Communist money. I think it should be said, however, in fairness to him, that there is no evidence that he personally benefited from the Communist money received. Apparently it was for the support of the publication which he was running, a publication which, incidentally, without any question at all, was following the Communist Party line right down to a "T."

Mr. President, I made the statement that I had documentary proof that he was affiliated with five different Communist-front organizations. The State Department denied that. They said, "No, only one," apparently on the theory that if an Ambassador of this country belonged to only one organization which the Attorney General had declared was a front for the Communist Party, doing their work, that would not disqualify him. Of course, I differ with them in that. I think if a man in Jessup's position belonged to one, that would certainly at least raise a question as to his qualifications.

However, I then produced the photostats showing five Communist-front organizations with which he was affiliated. The State Department said, "That is wrong; he belongs to only two." At this time I ask unanimous consent to insert in the Record the official citations of the five Communist-front organizations with which Mr. Jessup was affiliated, and of a sixth in which Mrs. Jessup occupied a position on the executive committee. My reason for inserting the document

showing the Communist affiliation of Mrs. Jessup is not because we are concerned with her, but because this is one of the organizations with which Mr. Jessup was also very closely affiliated.

Mr. President, I call the attention of the Senate to the fact that in one of these documents a Union Label No. 209 is used. Mr. Jessup was in charge of the publication of a magazine, so I assume he would recognize that label, without any difficulty. This happens to be the union label of the Communist print shop in New York.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Wisconsin?

There being no objection, the matters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**DATA ON COMMUNIST-FRONT ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH AMBASSADOR PHILIP JESSUP WAS AFFILIATED**

Source: Citations by official Government agencies of organizations and publications found to be Communist or Communist fronts, prepared and released by Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, December 18, 1948.

**AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS**

1. Cited as a Communist front which received funds from the American People's Fund, another front organized and directed by Frederick V. Field as a repository for funds to be distributed to Communist enterprises. (California State Legislature Committee on Un-American Activities, report 1948, p. 168.)

NOTE.—American People's Fund—Organized and directed by Frederick Vanderbilt Field "as a repository for funds to be distributed to Communist enterprises." This "Communist financial organization has paid out large sums of money to . . . Communist and Communist-front organizations" such as National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Allied Labor News, American Russian Institute, American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee. (California State Legislature Committee on Un-American Activities, report 1948, p. 168.)

**COORDINATING COMMITTEE TO LIFT THE SPANISH EMBARGO**

1. Cited as one of a number of front organizations, set up during the Spanish Civil War by the Communist Party in the United States and through which the party carried on a great deal of agitation. (Special Congressional Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, report, March 29, 1944, pp. 137-138.)

2. Cited as a Communist front. (California State Legislature Committee on Un-American Activities, report, 1947, p. 210.)

**NATIONAL EMERGENCY CONFERENCE**

1. Cited as a Communist front. (Special congressional Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, report, March 29, 1944, p. 49.)

2. It will be remembered that during the days of the infamous Soviet-Nazi pact the Communists built protective organizations known as the National Emergency Conference, the National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights, which culminated in the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties. (Congressional Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Report No. 115, September 2, 1947, p. 12.)

3. Cited as a Communist front. (California State Legislature Committee on Un-American Activities, report, 1948, p. 115.)

**NATIONAL EMERGENCY CONFERENCE FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS**

1. Cited as a Communist front. (Special congressional Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, report, March 29, 1944, pp. 48 and 102.)

2. It will be remembered that during the days of the infamous Soviet-Nazi pact the Communists built protective organizations known as the National Emergency Conference, the National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights, which culminated in the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties. (Congressional Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Report No. 115, September 2, 1947, p. 12.)

3. Cited as a Communist-front organization defending Communists.

After the dissolution of the American League for Peace and Democracy in February 1940, the Communist Party frantically organized a new series of front organizations. The National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights was one of the new fronts and it was filled from top to bottom with veteran Communist Party liners. (California State Legislature Committee on Un-American Activities, report, 1948, pp. 112 and 327.)

4. Cited as subversive and un-American. (Special Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, Report, April 21, 1943, p. 3.)

**AMERICAN RUSSIAN INSTITUTE FOR CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION (ALSO KNOWN AS THE AMERICAN RUSSIAN INSTITUTE)**

1. A direct agent of the Soviet Union, engaged in traitorous activities under the orders of Stalin's consular service in the United States. Founded in 1926, the semiofficial status of the American Russian Institute is established. (California State Legislature Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 1948, pp. 169 and 327.)

2. Cited as a Communist organization supported by intellectuals. (Massachusetts House Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 1938, p. 279.)

**Branches of American Russian Institute cited by the Attorney General**

1. American Russian Institute of San Francisco, cited as a Communist organization. (Attorney General Tom Clark, letter to Loyalty Review Board, released September 21, 1948.)

2. American Russian Institute of New York. Cited as a Communist organization. (Attorney General Tom Clark, April 21, 1949.)

3. American Russian Institute of Southern California, Los Angeles. Cited as a Communist organization. (Attorney General Tom Clark, April 21, 1949.)

4. American Russian Institute of Philadelphia. Cited as a Communist organization. (Attorney General Tom Clark, April 21, 1949.)

**AMERICAN LAW STUDENTS ASSOCIATION**

Affiliated with three organizations cited by various Government agencies as Communist or Communist-front.

1. The American Law Students Association was affiliated with the American Youth Congress.

(1) Cited as subversive and Communist. (Attorney General Tom Clark, letters to Loyalty Review Board, released December 4, 1947, and September 21, 1948.)

(2) It originated in 1934 and has been controlled by Communists and manipulated by them to influence the thought of American youth. (Attorney General Francis Biddle, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, September 24, 1942, p. 7685; also cited in re Harry Bridges, May 28, 1942, p. 10.)

(3) One of the principal fronts of the Communist Party and "prominently identified with the White House picket line . . . under the immediate auspices of the American Peace Mobilization." (Special Committee on Un-American Activities, report, June 25, 1942, p. 16; also cited in reports of January 3, 1939, p. 82; January 3, 1941, p. 21; June 25, 1942, p. 16; and March 29, 1944, p. 102.)

(4) Launched during August of 1934 and for about 7 years one of the most influential front organizations ever established by the American Communist Party. (California Committee on Un-American Activities, report, 1948, p. 179.)

(5) The purpose of the Young Communist League in controlling and building this American Youth Congress is the same as in its other youth groups, namely, to build up a united front, to push the objective of and produce cadres for the Communist Party among persons to whom they would be unable to make a direct approach. (Massachusetts House Committee on Un-American Activities, report, 1938, p. 525.)

(6) Cited as subversive and un-American. (Special subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, report, April 21, 1943, p. 3.)

(7) Cited as a Communist front. (Pennsylvania Commonwealth Counsel before the reviewing board of the Philadelphia County Board of Assistance, January 1942.)

2. The American Law Student Association was affiliated with the United Students Peace Committees of 347 Madison Avenue, New York City.

(1) The American Student Union announced that it set up the front movement, the United Student Peace Committee, in 1938, which has brought into its front 17 national youth organizations. (Special Congressional Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, January 3, 1939, p. 80.)

3. The American Law Students Association was affiliated with the American League Against War and Fascism.

(1) Cited as subversive and Communist. (Attorney General Tom Clark, letters to Loyalty Review Board, released December 4, 1947, and September 21, 1948.)

(2) A Communist-front organization. (Attorney General Francis Biddle, in re Harry Bridges, May 28, 1942, p. 10.)

(3) Established in the United States in an effort to create public sentiment on behalf of a foreign policy adapted to the interests of the Soviet Union. (Attorney General Francis Biddle, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, September 24, 1942, p. 7683.)

(4) The American League Against War and Fascism was organized at the first United States Congress Against War which was held in New York City, September 29 to October 1, 1933. Four years later at Pittsburgh, November 28-29, 1937, the name of the organization was changed to the American League for Peace and Democracy. It remained completely under the control of Communists when the name was changed as it had been before. (Special Committee on Un-American Activities, report, March 29, 1944, p. 53; also cited in reports, January 3, 1939, pp. 69 and 121; January 3, 1940, p. 10; June 25, 1942, p. 14.)

(5) Hollywood unit cited as a Communist front. (California Committee on Un-American Activities, report, 1943, p. 91.)

(6) The Communist Party has since the inception of the league been a component and controlling part of it. William Z. Foster, chairman of the Communist Party, admitted his party was "a vital factor" in the league. (Massachusetts House Committee on Un-American Activities, report, 1938, pp. 298 and 460.)

(7) Cooperated with the Communist Party in defense of Morris U. Schappes, party member convicted of perjury. (Rapp-Coudert committee, report, 1942, p. 293.)

(8) The American League Against War and Fascism, predecessor of the American League for Peace and Democracy, both described by Earl Browder as Communist transmission belts. (New York City Council committee investigating the municipal civil-service commission.)

4. The American Law Student's Association utilized the Communist Party print shop known as the Prompt Press, using union label 209.

#### CHINA AID COUNCIL

1. Cited as a Communist front and a subsidiary organization of the American League for Peace and Democracy. (California Committee on Un-American Activities, report, 1948, pp. 151, 319, and 336.)

2. Cited as a subsidiary of the American League for Peace and Democracy. (Special Congressional Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, report, June 25, 1942, p. 16.)

China Aid Council combined with the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans. National office, 200 Fifth Avenue, New York City, Algonquin 4-3162.

Mrs. James Roosevelt, honorary chairman; His Excellency Dr. Hu Shih, His Excellency Dr. W. W. Yen, honorary vice chairmen; Dr. Claude E. Forkner, chairman; Arthur Upham Pope, treasurer.

Executive committee: Dr. Henry A. Atkinson, Dr. Henry L. Bibby, Lyman R. Bradley, Mrs. Edward C. Carter, Dr. Ch'ao Ting Ch'i, Mrs. Elizabeth B. Cotton, Margaret Forsyth, Dr. Claude E. Heaton, Philip J. Jaffe, Sally Lucas Jean, Mrs. Philip C. Jessup, Dorothy McConnell, Edgar H. Rue, Mrs. Gordon M. Tiffany.

Mildred Price, executive secretary.  
Dorothy Gillam, promotion director.

American Law Student's Association, Woolworth Building, room 530, New York, N. Y. Faculty advisory board: Northwestern University School of Law, Dean Leon Green; New York University, Dean Frank Sommers, Prof. F. D. Snowers, Prof. Augustin Dorby; Prof. William Walsh, Prof. Herman Grey; St. Johns University, Vice Dean John Maloney, Prof. D. S. Edgar, Sr., Prof. D. S. Edgar, Jr.; Columbia University, Prof. Elliot Cheatham, Prof. Walter Gellhorn, Prof. Philip Jessup; Brooklyn Law School, Prof. Jerome Prince, Prof. Abraham Rotwein; Yale Law School, Prof. Fred Rodell, Prof. Abe Fortas; National Executive Board, Robert Page, president; Thomas Levinia, vice president; Morris Engel, secretary; Norman Leonard, treasurer.

Union label No. 209, which is the Communist print-shop label.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to place in the RECORD another document, a photostat. At the time I spoke to the National Association of Editors—and that seems to be a speech which has concerned the State Department considerably—I made the statement that at the height of the Communist smear campaign which was conducted by Mr. Jessup's publication, the Far Eastern Survey, Mr. Jessup was the chairman of the Research Advisory Committee. That is the committee which has the absolute editorial control of the magazine. The State Department

issued a white paper—spent about a month doing it, with \$10,000 a year men—and came back with the statement that Mr. Jessup was merely a member of the fifty-man board of trustees.

Mr. President, because of that I am producing for the RECORD a photostat showing that Mr. Jessup, first, was chairman of the Research Advisory Committee in 1944, which is when the smear campaign reached its peak; second, that he was also a member of the executive committee, which contains the names of a number of known Communists; and, third, that he was also on the board of trustees.

I might say that the mere fact that a man's name has appeared on a list of the board of trustees does not of itself indicate that he is a Communist. The aim of the Communist Party, insofar as the Institute of Pacific Relations was concerned, that is, the American Council, was to get at least three or four of their men on the executive committee, individuals residing in and around New York, so that they could maintain control of the executive committee. They did not seem to care much whether they had control of the board of trustees or not.

We have gone over lists of the board of trustees for 10 or 15 years, and we find that of the 50 on the board of trustees, normally no more than eight or nine were active Communists. Their top aim was to get some of their members on the executive committee, to control that. For example, we find Frederick V. Field, we find Philip C. Jessup, and Harriet Moore, a very well-known Communist. Lattimore was not on the board at that time. He had been on for some time. Alger Hiss, incidentally, was on the board for a period of time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the photostats were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### AMERICAN COUNCIL INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

##### MEMBERS OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 1944

Robert D. Calkins, chairman, School of Business, Columbia University, New York City.

Eugene E. Barnett, International Committee, YMCA, New York City.

G. Ellsworth Huggins, Catlin Farish Co., Inc., New York City.

Philip C. Jessup, professor of international law, Columbia University, New York City.

James L. McConaughy, United China Relief, Inc., New York City.

Lawrence Morris, Hawkins, Delafield & Longfellow, New York City.

Mrs. Ada Comstock Notestein, former president, Radcliffe College, Cambridge, Mass.

Lawrence D. Seymour, Dodge & Seymour Ltd., New York City.

Frederick V. Field, Council for Pan American Democracy, New York City.

Raymond Donnett, secretary, American Council IPR, New York City.

#### MEMBERS OF RESEARCH ADVISORY COMMITTEE 1944

Philip C. Jessup, chairman, professor of international law, Columbia University, New York City.

H. Foster Bain, mining geologist and engineer, Engineers Club, New York City.

Rupert Emerson, Foreign Economic Administration, Washington, D. C.

Grayson Kirk, professor, Institute of International Studies, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

Benjamin H. Kizer, Graves, Kizer & Graves, Spokane, Wash.

Harriet Lucy Moore, American-Russian Institute, New York City.

Frank M. Russell, professor, University of California, San Francisco, Calif.

Harold Sprout, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.

Eugene Staley, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D. C.

Raymond Donnett, secretary, American Council, IPR, New York City.

#### 1944 BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Commodore B. C. Allen, United States Navy, San Francisco, Calif.

Riley H. Allen, Honolulu Star Bulletin, Honolulu, Hawaii.

Frank C. Atherton, Castle & Cooke Ltd., Honolulu, Hawaii.

Eugene E. Barnett, International Committee, YMCA, New York City.

Carroll Binder, Chicago Daily News, Chicago, Ill.

Pearl S. Buck, East and West Association, New York City.

Robert D. Calkins, School of Business, Columbia University, New York City.

Joseph P. Chamberlain, department of public law, Columbia University, New York City.

Allan E. Charles, Lillieck, Geary, Olson & Charles, San Francisco, Calif.

Joseph S. Davis, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, California.

Len DeCaux, Congress of Industrial Organizations, Washington, D. C.

W. F. Dillingham, Oahu Railway & Land Co., Honolulu, T. H.

Edwin R. Embree, Julius Rosenwald Fund, Chicago, Ill.

Brooks Emeny, Council on World Affairs, Cleveland, Ohio.

John Fairbank, Office of War Information, Washington, D. C.

Frederick V. Field, Council for Pan American Democracy, New York City.

Galen M. Fisher, Institute of Pacific Relations, San Francisco, Calif.

Huntington Gilchrist, American Cyanamid Co., 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York City.

Henry F. Grady, American President Lines, San Francisco, Calif.

Mortimer Graves, America Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D. C.

Jerome D. Greene, formerly board of overseers, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

Mrs. Edward H. Heller, trustee, Mills College, Oakland, Calif.

Paul G. Hoffman, the Studebaker Corp., South Bend, Ind.

G. Ellsworth Huggins, Catlin Parish Co. Inc., New York City.

Edward F. Ingraham, chairman, International Student Association, Boston, Mass.

Phillip C. Jessup, professor of international law, Columbia University, New York City.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD a copy of an article which appeared in the New York Times on Saturday, February 16, 1946, in which Mr. Jessup joined with certain other individuals urging that we stop manufacturing any atomic bombs, and that we dump into the ocean any atomic-bomb material which had been developed. I am sure that Joe Stalin would not have objected too strenuously if we had done that at that time.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Wisconsin?

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**URGE BOMB-MAKING VACATION—COLUMBIA PROFESSORS ASK DECLARATION TO AID UNO COMMISSION**

**TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:**

In view of the establishment of the UNO Commission on the Atomic Bomb, we would like to suggest a declaration of policy of the following nature by the President of the United States in order that the discussions of the UNO Commission may proceed in an atmosphere of full good faith and of confidence in their successful outcome for international peace.

1. The United States will at once stop the production of bombs from material currently produced. This includes the preparation of subassemblies and all other procedures involved in the fabrication of bombs.

2. For 1 year, which would seem to be a reasonable time for the Commission to mature its plans and to secure action on them by the governments concerned, we will stop accumulating purified plutonium and uranium-235, which are the essential ingredients of atomic bombs. The plants which produce

these materials will be kept merely in a stand-by condition. For this purpose they will run at the minimum rate compatible with maintaining them in good order, but they will not accumulate the resulting purified and fissionable products. As produced, these will be eliminated by appropriate means, such as dumping them into the ocean or returning them to their original mixture.

3. We are prepared to have the disposition of our present stockpile of bombs considered as one of the items in an agreement to be entered into by us and the other governments.

L. C. Dunn, Irwin Edman, A. P. Evans, Selig Hecht, P. C. Jessup, R. M. MacIver, Edgar Miller, F. C. Mills, George B. Pegram, I. I. Rabi, Jan Schilt, C. S. Shoup.

New York, February 13, 1946.

(The signers of the foregoing letter are, respectively, professors of zoology, philosophy, history, biophysics, public law, sociology, biochemistry, economics, graduate faculties (dean), physics, astronomy, and economics.)

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, the hour is growing late. I had prepared to address the Senate at some length on some difficulties which we were presently having in producing testimony before the committee, but rather than take up the time of the Senate in reading the entire prepared address, I ask unanimous consent to have it inserted, not in the Appendix but in the body of the RECORD, and in the same shape and manner as though verbally given to the Senate.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** The Chair is advised that it will appear, under those circumstances, as a statement, not as a speech. It will be in smaller print.

Mr. McCARTHY. I agree with the Chair. The Chair is certainly correct in his ruling, and that is acceptable.

However, I should like to discuss with the Senate very briefly one of the things which concerns me very deeply.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** Does the Senator make the request that his statement be printed in the RECORD?

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** Is there objection?

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**STATEMENT BY SENATOR McCARTHY**

I would like to get the Senate's advice today on a subject which I consider of great import.

As the Senate knows, over 3 months ago I gave to the Senate a brief résumé of what was in the files of some 81 cases of individuals

presently, or in the recent past, working in the State Department.

Since that time my continued investigation has caused me to give to the committee appointed by the Senate an additional 25 names of individuals whose files indicate that they are, at least in my opinion, very dangerous to the security of this Nation.

As the Senate knows, I have pointed out to it that the files on those individuals were built up by thousands of investigators in the FBI, CIA, Office of Naval Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Secret Service, and so forth, at a cost of millions upon millions of dollars over years of time. I pointed out to the Senate that it would be impossible for me to duplicate even remotely the material in the files of all of those individuals because of the limitations of (1) time, (2) trained investigators, and (3) finances.

I have reproduced the evidence from parts of those files at great difficulty and shall continue to do so unless and until all of the files are opened.

I have pointed out time after time that the proof of all my charges can be found in the files and there alone. By that I mean all of the files, not merely the denuded, loose-leaf State Department files.

I say to you, Mr. Truman and your administration leaders who shout that the charges cannot be proved, take one of your top men whom I have named, such as Service, Lattimore, or Jessup, and open the files in that single case—the State Department files, the Civil Service files, the FBI files, and the files of any other Government agency which has investigated the case. Do this, Mr. Truman, so that there will no longer be any doubt in the minds of the American people as to whether or not McCARTHY is giving them the correct facts.

This is certainly not too much for the American people to ask of their President. What conceivable reason can you have for falling to take just one case and lay all the evidence on the table? If you continue to refuse, sooner or later the American people are going to become completely fed up with this campaign of your administration leaders: that it is McCARTHY's task, and not yours, to furnish the proof which you have in the files. Why are you hiding the proof, Mr. Truman? The American people would like to have an answer to that question.

You have long condemned vested interests, Mr. Truman. What more vicious vested interest could there be than the vested interests of the Communists in keeping their agents in our State Department? Why do you defend this vested interest, Mr. Truman? Why not prove to the American people tomorrow that you are right and I am wrong by cracking all of the files on one of those individuals whom I have named?

Why are you afraid, Mr. President, to crack, for example, the complete files on John Stewart Service, Philip Jessup, Owen Lattimore,

or Haldore Hanson, the head of the technical staff of the point 4 program?

You will recall Mr. Lattimore asked that I adequately describe him off the Senate floor so that he might sue. You will recall that when I offered to do this providing he make his files available for any libel action, he refused. I can understand this refusal on his part, but neither I nor the American people can understand this refusal by you to make his files available—not available to the public, but merely available to the Senate committee and its staff.

I have described the communistic activities of a number of your top experts, Mr. President, as they appear in the files. A number of those experts have threatened suit, if the statements were made off the Senate floor. I have offered to accommodate them, but not if you protect them and hamper the defense of a potential libel suit by keeping the proof locked in Government vaults. Let's you and I accommodate them, Mr. President. You make their files available, and I will help them start their lawsuits—not that I think they will. You recall Alger Hiss made that mistake. But let's you and I call their bluff, Mr. President. Here perhaps is one place where we can cooperate for the benefit of the country.

When I pointed out to the Senate that I could not individually produce witnesses to prove the vast amount of material in those files—some of them containing thousands of pages of evidence—the Senate apparently agreed with me and voted unanimously to subpoena all of the files so as to get a complete picture of those individuals. At the time this was done, not a voice or a vote was raised against it. Since that time, however, as the Senate knows, the President has decided not to make any file available except the skeleton State Department files in some of the cases. Significantly, the files in the cases of Lattimore, Service, Jessup, and others of the more dangerous individuals will remain secret by Executive fiat. To date, no explanation has been made by the President or anyone else as to why part of the files of certain individuals should be made available to the committee and the files of others remain sacred.

When part of the files of part of the cases which I presented to the Senate were opened to the committee, it originally looked as though a step forward had been made and as though something might be accomplished. Strangely, however, the \$10,000-a-year men on the committee staff, who I understand had received the approval of the FBI for this work, were denied the right to see the files. The result of this denial was that the Senators who certainly have no training for this type of work were denied the expert aid which they would need, not only to evaluate the material in the files, but also to determine whether and how badly those files had been raped and denuded.

If the files had been made available in accordance with the demand of the Senate and thoroughly studied by a competent staff, there could then have been no doubt whatsoever in the minds of the Senate or the American people as to just how right or how wrong I was.

The opportunity to have this done I eagerly courted. I was certain then and I am still certain that if the administration felt that I was mistaken it would welcome the opportunity to make those files available (with the proper restriction, of course, so as to safeguard our investigative agencies) so as to prove to the 150,000,000 people in this country who have grown to suspect the loyalty and other things about some of our State Department personnel that my charges were false.

When the President decided to stick by his original black-out order—an order originally passed when Hiss was being exposed to the public eye—I decided that even though the Senate in its original resolution indicated that it would not expect me to do so, that I would develop enough information about some of those individuals to convince the Senate and this Nation how grave the danger was with the hope that public opinion might finally force the administration to clean house.

As the Senate knows, it was a tremendous and costly task to try to reproduce the documents and the evidence which is so easily available in the files of our investigative agencies.

This, however, has not been my major difficulty. The major difficulty has been in getting the evidence into the record before the committee.

As the Senate knows, Senate committees have long followed the practice of allowing Senators who are not members of the committee to sit in and take part in the questioning of witnesses and to be of assistance in developing the facts. I therefore asked the committee for this right—especially for the right to cross-examine hostile witnesses, those whose files indicated, at least to me, that they were dangerous and disloyal to this country.

I pointed out to the committee that I had been living with this subject for some time and studying it in detail and even though the committee members might be potentially more effective cross-examiners, that they simply did not have the background in the short time allowed them to prepare themselves.

I pointed out to the committee further that no witness who was willing to tell the truth should fear my cross-examination, nor should any committee which was interested in actually getting the truth.

By a split vote of 3 to 2—the Republicans voting to allow me to examine; the Democrats against it—I was denied this right. At that time I considered breaking any relations with this committee whatsoever and refusing even to attempt to present witnesses to it.

However, I decided against this course when I was assured by the chairman that I could at least sit in with the committee while my witnesses were testifying. Subsequently, this right was denied me and I was asked to produce witnesses without even the right to be present when they testified. Again I considered refusing to present further witnesses, but again decided against that course of action and submitted the names of very important witnesses to the committee.

Since that time very unusual developments occurred. The picture can perhaps best be given by reading a wire which I have today received from the top security officer in OSS—the man who was technically in charge of OSS.

The Senate will recall that I asked that Mr. Archbold Van Beuren, the security officer of OSS, and General Donovan of OSS be called as witnesses. I stated at that time that they would be able to shed valuable light not only on the Amerasia case, but some additional light on some other State Department officials. Strangely, however, instead of calling those witnesses, two of the investigators for the committee merely interviewed them, after which the announcement was made that they would not be called.

Let me now read to you the wire I received this morning from Mr. Van Beuren:

NEW YORK CITY, June 2, 1905.

Senator JOSEPH R. McCARTHY,

*Senate Office Building:*

Messrs. Tyler and Heald, attorneys for Tydings Committee, called on me May 23. I have a strong feeling they were more interested in my reactions to Mr. Bielaski's testimony than they were in my knowledge of early stages of Amerasia case. At no time did they ask for my opinion as Security Officer of OSS of the importance of the documents which I saw. I myself volunteered that I definitely felt their unauthorized possession constituted a threat to national security in time of war. I told them that if the Tydings committee was interested in that I would be glad to testify. I could also confirm and supplement Mr. Bielaski's testimony, as well as testify to the circumstances which led General Donovan to hand over the documents taken from Amerasia's office to the Secretary of State in person. They said that, on the basis of what I told them, they felt it was not necessary to call me and they would so recommend.

I feel they were primarily interested in getting information from me which would contradict or possibly discredit Mr. Bielaski's testimony, rather than information that would further their investigation of the Amerasia case.

I wonder if the attorneys would have urged that I be called had I contradicted Mr. Bielaski.

ARCHBOLD VAN BEUREN.

As I have informed some of the Senators, at this time we have available over a score of witnesses who could give valuable evi-

dence on the Amerasia case and on communism in the State Department. Some of those witnesses are willing witnesses, some reluctant, others hostile; but if put under oath and properly examined, their evidence can be of very considerable value.

I would like to ask the advice of the Senate on just what I should do under the circumstances, after the sequence of events culminating in the experiences of Mr. Van Beuren. My present thought is that it would be a waste of time and a great abuse of the confidence of those witnesses to give their names to the staff and have them subjected either to the type of horseplay to which Mr. Van Beuren was subjected or the abuse to which Mr. Budenz was subjected. I have, therefore, tentatively decided not to present the names of any further witnesses to the committee unless and until it consents to the very simple and reasonable request that the minority members be allowed to subpoena such witnesses as they desire, and that upon their appearance the minority counsel be allowed to develop the story from them (with, of course, the right of any member of the committee or the chief counsel to conduct such subsequent cross-examination as is desired). I, frankly, think that is a reasonable position. However, it is not an arbitrary position. The witnesses are available. I want to have them heard. I consider the evidence important. However, I don't want to subject them to horseplay and abuse. Nevertheless, I shall be glad to abide by any advice which the Senate cares to offer.

I hope that those witnesses, together with such other witnesses as I am developing, will give the Congress and the country at least some semblance of a picture of the dangerous material contained in the files of the individuals whose names I have given the committee, and that thereafter, perhaps, the President can be induced to clean house before it is too late.

I realize that many Senators are extremely busy on other issues, issues of great importance also. But I would like to urge upon my fellow Senators that they take the time to go over the actual proof that has been presented—go over all of the documents—and I shall be more than happy to make them available to any Senator who wants them.

I realize that it has been coming in piecemeal. I realize that many of the Senators, consequently, do not have a complete picture of what has been proven. But I want all the Senators—both Democrats and Republicans—to know that I shall be more than glad to take time out to present them a picture of what has been proven to date—not a picture in my words, but a picture by the documents and sworn testimony.

In view of the piecemeal fashion in which the evidence, under the circumstances, has been necessarily presented, plus the fact that much of the valuable testimony has been taken in secret, I assume that very few of the Senators know that a rather complete

case has been presented against the man who now heads the technical staff of the point 4 program.

For example, the evidence available now shows that this man was in a joint business venture with one of the top spies named in the Sorge diary and listed as a Soviet agent in the reports forwarded by MacArthur's intelligence section to the House Un-American Activities Committee. The individual named as a spy is Nym Wales, who is Mrs. Edgar Snow. She and the man who is now head of the technical staff of our point 4 program ran a Communist magazine in Peiping at the time when, according to the evidence in the Sorge case, she was a part of the Sorge Communist spy ring. The Senators will recall that Sorge was a Russian spy who was hung by the Japanese during the war. One of the other men in the spy ring was given life imprisonment and has since been released. The evidence in the Sorge case shows that Nym Wales was one of the American contacts for the Sorge spy ring. This, you understand, is all a matter of record. It is also unquestioned that this top Soviet spy was in partnership running a magazine with the man who is now largely responsible for the planning of the spending of millions of American dollars under our point 4 program.

The testimony taken in executive session, which the committee has not released, is to the effect that this man Hanson was an important part of the Communist organization in the United States. The State Department, of course, has taken no action whatsoever in this case, except to still make the fantastic and screaming denial that there are no Communists or Communist sympathizers in the State Department.

I assume also that very few Senators know the extent of the testimony which has been laboriously dug up covering Mr. Philip Jessup, the State Department's ambassador at large. As of now there is a complete case against Mr. Jessup, showing that he was in charge of a publication which was supported by Communist funds and which was doing the work for the Communist Party. I refer to the Far Eastern Survey, the publication of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which had an interlocking directorship with Amerasia, and whose publication was put out in offices immediately connected with Amerasia. Documentary proof also shows Mr. Jessup's connection with five different Communist-front organizations. I assume very few of the Senators are aware of the fact that after it was brought to the President's attention that the publication run by Mr. Jessup was being supported by Communist money and following the Communist Party line in toto and that he was affiliated with five organizations named officially as fronts for the Communist Party, that then Mr. Jessup was given top-secret clearance to all A- and H-bomb information. I would suggest to those who say that no case has been completely proven that they look over

the evidence and documents in the Jessup case and that anyone who can add two and two cannot help but understand that the case against Mr. Jessup has been completely proven.

Originally I stated that Mr. Jessup had a great affinity for Communist causes. That was an understatement. Since that time not only has that been proven but it has also been proven that he had a great affinity for Communist associates and a great affinity for Communist money—not perhaps for his personal use, but to support his publication which was doing the Communist job.

This was information which had been hidden from the public and which the President refused to divulge by showing Mr. Jessup's file, but which I have painstakingly produced over a period of 3 months. In this connection, I thought the Senators might be interested in the photostats of the actual checks representing money paid to support the Far Eastern Survey, which was run by Jessup. You will recall that the State Department issued an official pronouncement to the effect that only \$3,500 of Communist money had been used. However, I have here photostats showing \$6,000 of Communist money paid to support this publication. I have additional copies if any of the Senators care for them.

You understand, of course, that when I have been able to get photostats from a hostile source totaling \$6,000 that unquestionably many, many more thousands of dollars were paid. The amount, of course, could very easily be determined, if the committee decided to subpoena and examine Mr. Field's financial records. I suggest in this connection, they also subpoena the financial records of Amtorg. Amtorg and the Communist, Field, have been the principal sources of funds for Soviet espionage in the United States.

In view of the amount of work which the Senators must do, I doubt very much that they realize that the sworn testimony shows that the man who is today head of the technical staff of the President's point-4 program was the coeditor of a Communist paper in Peiping some 15 years ago and that his partner was a well-known Communist also. That, gentlemen, is the sworn testimony. Either there was perjury, or this man Hanson was a coeditor of a Communist magazine.

I doubt that the Senate knows that there is sworn testimony to the effect that this man after he was in the State Department was known to the top Communists as a member of the party and considered and treated as such by them. That, gentlemen, is the sworn testimony.

But as of this very moment he holds this top and important job in our Government.

Now I would further suggest to Members of both parties that before they heed the statement, for example, of the Attorney General that there are no Communists or pro-Communists in Government, that they remember the case of William Remington and

Michael Lee—that they remember, for example, the statements of men like Vice Admiral Russell S. Berkey, who, on May 15, said that United States bungling enabled the Communists to overrun China. In connection with that I want to quote to you what Admiral Berkey said:

"The Chinese Reds would still be north of the Great Wall if specific items of arms authorized by Congress 2 years ago had reached the Nationalist forces in time. For some reason or other it took 9 months to get specific items to China. Somewhere in the United States somebody slipped up, bogged down, or was interfered with. It has never been made plain why this material did not arrive in time."

Obviously, it was not a slip-up. It was planned between the Remingtons and Lees in the Commerce Department and the Acheson clique in the State Department.

I suggest to the Senators that they remember also that Remington, whose case is now being heard by a grand jury, was passed with flying colors by the Loyalty Board, whose job it is to protect America against Communists, fellow travelers, and dangerous individuals. I suggest also that they remember that Michael Lee not only had the approval of the Loyalty Board, but that he received the public sanction of the Secretary of Commerce after all the evidence on him had been developed, and remember also that had the Amerasia case been fully developed in 1945, this man Lee would have long since been removed from his position of power and would not have been able to sabotage Congress in its efforts to fight the spread of communism in Asia. Remember that he was one of the characters named in Amerasia—the evidence of which has been buried for 5 years until finally forced out.

I think the country owes a deep debt of gratitude to those Senators who completely and wholeheartedly supported this anti-Communist fight even at a time when the smear brigade looked as though it might accomplish its assigned task. At that time, it certainly didn't seem politically expedient for them to support this fight. The welfare of the country and that alone could have prompted them. I would like to call the roll of those Senators, but they were not impelled by political motives then and they are not looking for publicity or political gains now.

Let me make it clear, however, to the administration, to the Senate, and to the country that this fight against communism, this attempt to expose and neutralize the efforts of those who are attempting to betray this country shall not stop regardless of what any individual or group in this Senate, or in the administration may say or do. I hold myself accountable, not to them, but first to the people of my State, secondly to the people of the Nation, and thirdly to civilization as a whole.

In closing I would like to mention another subject.

A few days ago one of my colleagues authorized a statement that among the Amerasia documents was one that showed that the State Department had sent out a secret dispatch in July of 1944, setting forth the views of Amerasia which advocated the settlement of postwar problems in Japan and building up and arming the Chinese Communists. At the time the Justice Department, even though it had the dispatch, categorically and flatly denied that any such cable was in existence. Now, however, the State Department admits its existence after it has been smoked out, and attempts to explain it by calling it something that had been put out by the press section and sent to missions abroad for their information. This, too, is preposterous. The dispatch was a secret dispatch sent out under the name of the Secretary of State and nothing in it indicated that it was anything but an authoritative endorsement of the policy of Amerasia at that time. It was sent to the American Ambassador with a copy to COMINCH, the military designation of the President, and to certain other operational units. It called for consideration of the possibility of establishing the leading Japanese Communist outside of Japan as a Tito for Japan. It also represented an endorsement of the position that the Communists were then taking in China—that American aid and American military millions and arms should be sent to the Chinese Communists despite the fact that there was all kinds of evidence that the same Communists were then planning the revolution that has since come to pass in China in opposition to our then ally, the Chinese Government. Maybe Hull didn't send it, but if he did not who had such sweeping authority?

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I should like to discuss a matter with the Senate, and I should like to call it especially to the attention of the Senator from California, and I should like to obtain the advice of the entire Senate on the subject. I have made a tentative decision. It is not arbitrary, and is subject to change if the Senate as a whole were to disagree with me.

When the investigation was first commenced, as the Senate will well remember, I explained to the Senate that it would be impossible for me to reproduce all the evidence in the 81 cases given to the Senate. That number, 81, was later increased by an additional 25 names which I gave the committee. I again explained to the committee what material was in the files. I explained that that had been produced, as they know, over a period of years, at a cost of millions and millions of dollars, by thousands of competent investigators. Obviously I, working on my own, with no

authority of subpoena, could not conceivably reproduce all that evidence.

As Senators will recall, the Senate unanimously agreed—not a voice or a vote was raised against the proposition—that we should subpoena all the records, not merely the State Department files but all the files, and secure the complete record and do a job of house cleaning.

As the Senate will recall, the President then refused to make the files available, but finally made available some of the skeleton, denuded, State Department files.

The administration then commenced a rather effective campaign, using all the publicity channels available to it, to convince the American people that even though the President had the files in his grip, even though he had all the proof, that it was right and proper for him to hide that proof and require McCARTHY to go out and try and reproduce all that material, despite the fact that the Senate agreed that was impossible.

In view of the fact that those who had not seen the files could not very well be as deeply disturbed by the dangerous material in the files as those of us who had seen them, I decided that I would attempt to produce enough of material in some of the more dangerous cases so as to convince the Senate and the country of the imminent danger of the situation, with the hope that perhaps the pressure from the public and from the Senate might force the President to crack open the files—I do not mean publicly, but to the committee—and do a house-cleaning job. I ran into many difficulties, but nothing quite like what I ran into the last few days.

Originally I asked the committee to allow me to cross-examine the witnesses. There has been, as the Senators know, a long practice that a Senator who is not a member of committee be allowed to sit in and examine such witnesses as he desires. I pointed out to the committee in this case that I felt it was especially important that I be permitted to do so, in view of the fact that the five Senators who were on the committee freely admitted that they were not prepared to conduct the examination. They had not been living with this subject and studying it as I had been for months. As I told them, even though they might be potentially much more brilliant cross-examiners than the Senator from Wisconsin, I felt under the circumstances I could be of some benefit if I sat in and

cross-examined. The answer was "No" by a 3-to-2 majority, three Democratic Senators voting against it and two Republicans voting that I should be allowed to cross-examine.

At that time I considered the wisdom of dropping any connection with the committee whatsoever. I felt that this was an indication that they were not interested in securing the facts. However, the chairman later assured me that even though I would not be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses, at least I would be allowed to sit in when my witnesses were cross-examined in executive session. Later, when some of my witnesses were called—when I say "my witnesses" I mean those I asked the committee to call—I found that Mr. Owen Lattimore, whom I had named as one of the top Communists in the country, was being allowed to sit in on an executive session, he and his lawyer. I found that before I had arrived the minority counsel had been ordered from the room. If Senators can get that picture—the chairman said, "We will not allow the minority counsel in the room, but we will allow Mr. Lattimore and his attorney."

The next move was to eject me from the room also. At that time I again considered dropping any connection with the committee and refusing even to attempt to submit witnesses to the committee, feeling that the committee was not interested in obtaining the facts. I decided against that and submitted the names of additional witnesses, two or three, just to see what would happen. I submitted the names of William J. Donovan, head of the OSS during the war, and his top security officer, Mr. Archbold Van Beuren—certainly two outstanding men whose integrity and truthfulness has not been questioned as far as I know.

Then we find the most fantastic situation conceivable, something unheard of in any Senate or House committee; unheard of even in a kangaroo court. We find that two investigators went up and interviewed Mr. Van Beuren, and then came back and said, "He will not be called." I was anxious to know what happened at that meeting, knowing that Mr. Van Beuren was the man in charge of the Amerasia case, who sent the men out on the raids, the man who had lived and slept with this case for months—I was curious why this man was not called, especially in view of the valuable information he had. So I sent a telegram asking him whether he had been inter-

viewed, whether he had refused to testify, or just generally what the situation was. Let me read his telegram. I think it is so important I have had photostatic copies made. Photostats are available to any Senators who want them. Let me read the telegram to the Senate.

JUNE 2, 1950.

Senator JOSEPH R. McCARTHY,  
*Senate Office Building:*

Messrs. Tyler & Heald, attorneys for Tydings committee, called on me May 23. I have a strong feeling they were more interested in my reactions to Mr. Bielaski's testimony than they were in my knowledge of early stages of Amerasia case. At no time did they ask for my opinion, as Security Officer of OSS, of the importance of the documents which I saw. I, myself, volunteered that I definitely felt their unauthorized possession constituted a threat to national security in time of war. I told them that, if the Tydings committee was interested in that, I would be glad to testify.

Listen to this, if you will:  
I could also confirm and supplement—

Confirm and supplement—

Mr. Bielaski's testimony as well as testify to the circumstances which led General Donovan to hand over the documents taken from Amerasia's office to the Secretary of State in person. They said that, on the basis of what I told them they felt it was not necessary to call me and they would so recommend.

Here was the chief of the committee's investigating staff, a man receiving \$11,000 or \$12,000 a year, and another member of the staff assigned the task of developing the facts; and when the security officer of OSS, in charge of the Amerasia raids said, "I can give you testimony that will not only confirm but also supplement Mr. Bielaski's testimony; I can give the committee the story of why General Donovan thought this was so important that he personally took these secret documents and handed them to the Secretary of State," the two investigators said, "Well, under the circumstances we do not want your testimony."

Let me read further from the telegram.

I feel—

Again quoting Mr. Van Beuren—

I feel they were primarily interested in getting information from me which would contradict or possibly discredit Mr. Bielaski's testimony rather than information that would further their investigation of the Amerasia case.

Mr. Van Beuren continues:

I wonder if the attorneys would have urged that I be called had I contradicted Mr. Bielaski.

ARCHBOLD VAN BEUREN.

So we have the fantastic picture, first, of the committee saying, "We will not do any investigation on our own whatsoever." None has been done so far as I know, except by the man Tyler who was sent down to check on what McCARTHY did in West Virginia—a rather thorough investigation of that, and I gather, rather fruitless.

Aside from that new investigation, the committee says to me, "You must produce all the witnesses." Then the committee says, "We will not let you at the files, even though we know the proof is in the files. If you do not convict the 81, then we are justified in whitewashing. Then we can say that nothing has been proved so far."

So, Mr. President, I gave the committee the name of Bielaski. It took the committee weeks to call him at which time, of course, his testimony was taken in secret, because it might prove communism in the State Department. Then the committee interviewed my other witnesses, to try to get them, if possible, to make a liar out of my first witness. However, the committee found from them that it could not do that because the witness said, "No, Bielaski is telling the truth, and I can give you more information."

So now the committee says: "No; we shall not call you."

Mr. President, that brings up what to me is a most important question. We have over a score of witnesses who can give valuable information from the standpoint of helping to do a house-cleaning job. Some of them will simply supply the minor links in the chain. Some of them will be hostile witnesses and will have to be put under severe examination and very vigorously examined and made to tell the truth, under the threat of prosecution for perjury. However, we have a score of witnesses to be heard if the truth is to be disclosed.

The question is, if I give the names to the committee staff, will the staff indulge further in this type of senseless horseplay?

So, Mr. President, under the circumstances, I have tentatively decided not even to attempt to continue trying to force proof upon this committee. I think it is a complete waste of time.

However, the material is there. It should be produced.  
What should be done, I frankly do not know.

If some other committee which is interested in getting the facts would care to go into this matter, they could be produced before such a committee.

I sincerely hope the Senate will go into this unusual situation and will perhaps be of some assistance in deciding how we can produce the evidence, in view of this type of activity on the part of the staff of the committee.

JULY 12, 1950

## Statement of Four Individuals on State Department Personnel Files; Analysis of Senator Tydings' Statement to Press Regarding State Department Files

Mr. McCARTHY. I shall need only about 5 minutes to present my remarks, and then I shall yield the floor.

Mr. President, this morning I sent to the President of the United States a letter and the photostats of six documents. I felt that this material might be of some interest to the Senate, and, therefore, I sent to the Senate Chamber copies of each of the photostats and copies of the letter to the President, with the request that a copy of each be placed upon the desk of each Senator.

I understand that copies were placed upon the desks of all Republican Senators, but that the clerk for the majority, upon the advice of the Democratic majority leader, the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Lucas], decided not to place copies on the desks of the Democratic Senators.

Mr. President, I think this material is certainly not of such nature that it should be restricted to only one of the parties. I believe it is certainly of just as much interest—and perhaps more so—to the Democrats as it is to the Republicans. Therefore, in view of the fact that I was unable to have this material placed on the desks of Democratic Senators, I intend to read some of it into the RECORD.

Mr. President, there has been considerable discussion pro and con as to the condition of the State Department's so-called loyalty files, and in the minds of many persons there has been considerable question as to whether or not the so-called loyalty program is working adequately.

The Presiding Officer will recall that the grand jury which recently was dismissed in New York discussed the subject in some detail, and pointed out that the loyalty program was most inadequate to protect the security of the Nation.

I have before me, Mr. President, four affidavits which are of a rather startling nature. These affidavits were made by persons who had nothing to gain by making them. In fact, one of the individuals, who is now working in the State Department, runs the risk of losing his job if his name becomes known.

One statement which I shall read was made by a person employed in the State Department. Another affidavit is by a young man who is now working for Sears, Roebuck & Co., and, I believe, going to school on the side. The third affidavit was made by a young man who is now a special agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and who also worked for the State Department for some time. The fourth affidavit was made by a young man who is in the Foreign Service School at Georgetown University, and who also worked for the State Department for some time.

Mr. President, as the Senate will recall, in the latter half of 1946 it became general knowledge that the President was about to inaugurate or put into effect a loyalty program. At that time the attention of Congress and of the country was focused upon this subject of Communists and disloyal people in the Government by the Marzani case. The Senate will recall that Marzani was a high State Department employee who was convicted in connection with his communistic activities.

At that time, the President—and wisely so, I believe—commenced planning a loyalty program, apparently for the purpose of avoiding future Marzanis within the State Department and within other branches of the Government. That Presidential order was signed early in 1947. The Congress appropriated \$11,000,000 to implement the Executive order. We find from these affidavits that when it became known that the President was about to inaugurate a loyalty program, someone within the State Department—and, as of this time, I do not know who—initiated the most fantastic project I have ever heard of. He hired a total of at least eight individuals, four of whom made affidavits which are now in my possession. The task of those individuals was to go to the files, and, using their own judgment, to destroy and to tear from the files any material of a derogatory nature, either insofar as the communistic activities, morals, or

anything else on any employee, were concerned. It apparently was a tremendous project, which lasted at least 5 months. I intend to read to the Senate the affidavits of some of the individuals who took part in this unusual project. It will be understood that the individuals whose files were being rifled were not being protected at that time from any congressional committee. They were being protected from the President's own loyalty program.

**Affidavit No. 1:**

I, Francis Eugene Brien, age 25, make this statement. No promises have been made to me to furnish this statement. If called upon I am willing to relate the facts in this statement.

I reside at 1709 North Roosevelt Street in Arlington, Va., near Falls Church, Va. In August 1946 I went into the Walker-Johnson Building of the State Department at New York Avenue and Eighteenth Street. I filled out an application form and started working a couple of days later on August 15 in the State Department personnel files. My employment was only temporary for the duration of a file project.

Listen to this, if you will, Mr. President:

I and the other clerks received instructions orally and by a form paper that we were to go through all the State Department personnel files and remove all papers, letters, memorandums, and reports except administrative forms containing the employee's application, background information, and Ram-speck raises and administrative forms of that nature. We worked on this project removing the papers from the files until December 31, 1946. After all of the papers were removed from the files, they were thrown into wastebaskets and cardboard boxes. The remaining administrative papers I have described remained in the files and the files were taken to adjoining offices next to the big file room where the information left in the file was typed on a card.

One of the other affidavits is by the man who did the typing of this material on the card.

I can't recall now any specific case but I do know that all papers, reports, memorandums which reflected on the State Department employee were removed from the file and disposed of in wastebaskets and boxes except the papers I have described. I did not actually take part in destroying the papers but, after we threw the papers in the baskets and boxes, the next day the room was cleaned up and I presume the charwoman took care of emptying the baskets and boxes. I do not recall being told why we were stripping the files of all material except the administrative forms.

George Copp was the supervisor in charge of myself and the other clerks on this project.

Let me make it clear here that while Mr. George Copp's name appears as supervisor I have no way of knowing at this time whether Copp was doing this on his own initiative or whether he merely received orders from someone higher up. I assume that this was not Copp's own project, and that he was merely a man working under orders of someone higher up in the department.

I recall at first George Copp stated we had to complete this project in 3 months. I don't see how he could possibly have estimated such a short time, but finally he told us that he had to extend the deadline till the end of December 1946.

The Senate will remember that that is the time when the new Congress took over.

George Copp was always telling us to hurry and get the job done; otherwise he would be made the "goat." He said this so many times that we nicknamed him "the goat."

I left in the State Department in December 1946 because my temporary assignment as clerk was finished.

I have read this statement of three pages and it is true.

That is one statement. The next statement—and, Mr. President, keep in mind that here we have the picture of a State Department project for the destruction of files which cost millions of dollars and millions and millions of man-hours to produce. This statement was made by a State Department employee. I have cut out those sections of the statement which would indicate who signed it. I have informed the President, however, that if he will personally assure me that this man will not lose his job because of having given this statement I will make the name available to him—after first getting this man's permission, of course. Here is the statement:

The following is information I am giving freely and voluntarily, without any promises whatsoever. I furnish this information because it is the truth.

There is a section eliminated, showing where this man is now working and what his duties are. The statement continues:

In August 1946 I started working as a clerk in the State Department at the Walker Johnson Building, at Eighteenth and New York Avenue NW., Washington, D. C. I was assigned to a project with other clerks on

the State Department personnel files. We all were instructed to remove all derogatory material from the personnel files, and we were instructed to dispose of this material. The derogatory material consisted of letters, memorandum which reflected on the employee.

I can't remember any specific file, because we all worked on so many files. But we worked on this project from August till the end of December 1946. All of the derogatory material in the files was destroyed or thrown away. I can't recall what reason was given to me and the other clerks as to why the derogatory material was being pulled out of the file and destroyed.

I am furnishing this statement only in strictest confidence, and furnish it for the purpose of information only, being assured that no publicity will be given to me on furnishing this statement. I have read this statement of two pages and the facts are true.

We next come to the statement of a young man who is now a special agent in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. At the time the facts which he states occurred he was not working for the FBI. I now read his statement:

JULY 11, 1950.

I Burney Threadgill, Jr., make this statement without any promises whatsoever. I make this statement in order to tell the truth.

In the fall of 1946 I contacted a Mr. Holcombe who was personnel placement officer for the State Department at the Walker-Johnson Building. He advised me that he would hire me only as a temporary clerk on a file project of the State Department files. I started working in the State Department files at the Walker-Johnson Building around November 1, 1946. I worked for about 6 weeks on this file project. My duties were to take the file which contained the qualifications of the State Department employees, background forms, and administrative promotions, and type this information on a card for that employee. The files were brought to me and placed on my desk.

This is the young man who took the cleaned-out files and made out a new card on each individual. He stated that he personally did not know what occurred in the file room. He took no part in rifling the files himself.

I continue to read:

This project was being performed apparently on some sort of deadline date because George Copp who was supervisor over the clerks on this project was often telling me and the others that we had to get the job done and that it had already passed a deadline and that he had arranged to extend the deadline and that if we did not meet the

new deadline it would reflect on his efficiency.

I do not know or recall what the other clerks were doing with the files before I received them because I was at a desk and had the files brought to me where I typed the contents on a card as I previously stated in this statement. I do recall that the files brought to me contained the original application, administrative forms such as Ram-speck promotions and transfers. I also recall that some very few contained investigative reports.

This project was very confused, hurried, and very little supervision of the clerks. I recall talking to one of the other clerks (I can't recall his name at this time) when he told me that he knew some of the employees of the State Department had come to the files and removed the derogatory material which was in the file on themselves.

So we find that not only were there eight individuals on this file job, but the State Department employees themselves came in and cleaned out their own files.

I continue reading:

I was located in an office where I did not see or have reason to go into the big room where the files were. The following is a plan where I was located.

He drew a plan of the room in which he was located, which was some distance from the file room.

The statement then continues, as follows:

I have read this statement of three pages and it is true.

The other statement on this particular phase of the case was made by a young man who is now in his third year at Georgetown University, in the Foreign Service School. His statement is as follows:

JULY 6, 1950.

The following information is given by me freely and voluntarily without any promises whatsoever. I furnish this information because it is the truth and I feel it is my patriotic duty to furnish the facts as I experienced them.

I am living at 1002 North Fifteenth Street, Arlington, Va., at the present time.

In August 1946 I was released from the United States Navy in California. I came to Washington, D. C., and while in Washington, D. C., I was looking for a job. I went into the Walker Johnson Building of the State Department at Eighteenth and New York Avenue NW. I talked to a fellow in the State Department by the name of Holcombe. I got a temporary clerical job in the files at the Walker Johnson Building. These files were the departmental personnel files located in the Walker Johnson Building. I started work on these files in September 1946. When I

reported for duty I was told that I would be working on a project on these files. This project had been going on for some time before I started. There were at least eight persons who were working on this project.

I was not formally and specifically instructed as to what the purpose of the project was, but from what I was instructed by the other clerks, I and the other clerks were to go through each personnel file and pull out all derogatory material from the file. In addition to the usual personnel forms, the files contained all kinds of letters, reports, memorandum concerning the individual person. As per instructions I received, all of the clerks on this project were to pull out of the files all matters considered derogatory, either morally or politically.

The project was very confused, but I and the other clerks pulled out of each personnel file any material which could be considered derogatory. This material was removed and some was thrown in wastebaskets by us and some was thrown in a cardboard box. I don't know what happened to the derogatory material we pulled out from the files, but I do know of my own knowledge that a good lot of it was destroyed.

I do not recall details of each personnel file I examined, but the material I pulled out of the files pertained to either the morals of the person or in some way reflected on his or her loyalty.

Listen to this, Mr. President:

I recall one thick report on one State Department employee who was accused of being a photographer and a member of some subversive organization which published some sort of news report. This was removed from the file and disposed of.

I worked from September till the end of December 1946, working on this file project, pulling out and disposing of the derogatory material as per my understanding given me.

I left on December 31, 1946, and this project on the personnel files was still not finished, but my temporary appointment ran out and my employment with the State Department ended.

I can't recall who the official in charge of these files was. I met him only a very few times, but I could easily recognize him if I saw him.

I have read this statement of three pages and the facts are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Mr. President, as will be recalled, when I first presented to the Senate a résumé of the material on some 81 individuals who were either then working in the State Department or had been working there, I pointed out to the Senate, and repeatedly before the committee, that if Communists, fellow travelers, and so forth, were to be really exposed and gotten rid of it would be necessary to get not only the loose-leaf State De-

partment files which had been so thoroughly cleaned up, but also to obtain the FBI files, the Civil Service Commission files, and where any individuals had been investigated by the Army, Navy, or Secret Service, we should also obtain those files.

When the President finally made the State Department skeleton and thoroughly denuded files available, I pointed out on the Senate floor that the files were useless and that they had been completely rifled. Shortly thereafter the chairman of the investigating committee held a press conference. I want to quote what he said at that time, as reported in the New York Times in an article written by William S. White.

I ask unanimous consent to place this article in its entirety in the RECORD, as well as an article appearing in the New York Herald Tribune on the same subject.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Herald Tribune of June 22, 1950]

**TYDINGS ASSERTS FBI CLEARED STATE DEPARTMENT FILES—SAYS CHECK-UP SHOWED NO LOYALTY DATA TAMPERING AS CHARGED BY McCARTHY**

(By Raymond J. Blair)

WASHINGTON, June 21.—A check by the FBI has failed to substantiate Senator JOSEPH R. McCARTHY's charge that 81 State Department loyalty files have been "raped" to eliminate damaging evidence, Senator MILLARD E. TYDINGS, Democrat, of Maryland, said today.

Senator TYDINGS is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee investigating charges by Senator McCARTHY, Republican, of Wisconsin, of communism in the State Department. The loyalty records were made available to the Tydings subcommittee May 4 by President Truman. Senator McCARTHY recently charged they had been "raped, skeletonized, or tampered with" so that they did not contain all of the relevant material.

Senator TYDINGS told reporters that upon hearing Senator McCARTHY's charge, he asked the Justice Department to investigate. Today he received the Department's report, he said, in a letter from Peyton Ford, assistant to Attorney General J. Howard McGrath.

The report said, Senator TYDINGS stated, that a study by FBI agents had shown the files were "intact" and that all FBI material on the 81 individuals involved, whom Senator McCARTHY has accused of Communist leanings, was included.

Senator TYDINGS also said that study of the files would be completed by the subcommittee Sunday night. It was not clear, how-

ever, whether this program was acceptable to all subcommittee members.

[From the New York Times of June 22, 1950]  
**McCARTHY IS HELD REFUTED ON FILES—TYDINGS SAYS FBI REPORTS DOSSIERS NOT TAMPERED WITH—GROUP TO END EXAMINATION**

(By William S. White)

WASHINGTON, June 21.—Senate investigators will close on Sunday night their 2-month examination of 81 confidential State Department loyalty files and will return them at once to the administration.

This was disclosed today by Senator MILLARD E. TYDINGS, Democrat, of Maryland, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee that has been intermittently reading the dossiers in the White House in its investigation of Senator JOSEPH R. McCARTHY's charges of communism in the State Department.

At the same time, Mr. TYDINGS asserted that a special inquiry by the Federal Bureau of Investigation had established as false Mr. McCARTHY's accusations that the files had been "raped" before being turned over to the subcommittee.

A letter just received from Peyton Ford, First Assistant Attorney General, stated, Senator TYDINGS added, that a special inquiry made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation produce the following results:

"That the files are intact, that they have not been 'raped, skeletonized, or tampered with' in any way and that the material turned over to the State Department by the FBI is still in the files."

"Thus," Mr. TYDINGS added, "the McCARTHY charges are not sustained by the facts." He declared himself unable to give out the text of Mr. Ford's letter because it would disclose the names of some of the persons whose files were under study.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I shall read very briefly from the New York Times article:

Senate investigators will close on Sunday night their 2-month examination of 81 confidential State Department loyalty files and will return them at once to the administration.

This was disclosed today by Senator MILLARD E. TYDINGS, . . .

At the same time, Mr. TYDINGS asserted that a special inquiry by the Federal Bureau of Investigation—

I call the Senate's attention to this statement—

had established as false Mr. McCARTHY's accusation that the files had been "raped" before being turned over to the subcommittee.

A letter just received from Peyton Ford, First Assistant Attorney General, stated, Senator TYDINGS added, that a special inquiry

made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation produced the following results:

"That the files are intact, that they have not been 'raped,' skeletonized, or tampered with in any way, and that the material turned over to the State Department by the FBI is still in the files."

"Thus," Mr. TYDINGS added, "the McCARTHY charges are not sustained by the facts."

Mr. President, in this connection I ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD a letter from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated July 10, 1950.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,  
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,  
Washington, D. C., July 10, 1950.  
HON. JOSEPH R. McCARTHY,  
United States Senate,  
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I have received your letter dated June 27, 1950, inquiring whether this Bureau has examined the 81 loyalty files which the members of the Tydings committee have been scrutinizing and whether such an examination by the FBI has disclosed that the files are complete and that nothing has been removed therefrom.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has made no such examination and therefore is not in a position to make any statement concerning the completeness or incompleteness of the State Department files.

For your information, the Federal Bureau of Investigation furnished Mr. Ford, at his request, a record of all loyalty material furnished the State Department in the 81 cases referred to. For your further information, I am enclosing a copy of Mr. Ford's letter to Senator TYDINGS which I have secured from the Attorney General.

Sincerely yours,  
J. EDGAR HOOVER.

Mr. McCARTHY. In view of what is contained in the press release which I have just read to the Senate, I should like to read the second paragraph of Mr. Hoover's letter, as follows:

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has made no such examination and therefore is not in a position to make any statement concerning the completeness or incompleteness of the State Department files.

Mr. President, in view of the contents of the last two documents which I have inserted in the RECORD, I think it should be clear to the Senate why I decided to send this material directly to the President. I hoped that he would act. Another reason for doing so was that when

I originally developed and exposed information showing Communists, fellow travelers, and traitors in the State Department the President condemned my methods and said I should have brought the information directly to him and he would have acted. I shall give him that opportunity to act at this time.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the letter I sent to the President. I do not desire to insert the entire letter, because in portions of it I refer to the activities of the chairman of the committee in an uncomplimentary manner which may constitute a violation of Senate rules if they were inserted in the RECORD. Therefore I should like to ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD at this point the letter I sent to the President with the exception of the paragraphs I have marked out on page 4, and the paragraph which I have marked out on page 5.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JULY 12, 1950.

The PRESIDENT,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Today American boys lie dead in the mud of Korean valleys. Some have their hands tied behind their back, their faces shot away by Communist machine guns.

They are dead today not because they were less brave or had less to fight for than the North Korean Communists who manned those machine guns, but because the program adopted by this Congress to avoid just such a war in Korea, and signed into law by you, Mr. President, was sabotaged.

Last year Congress voted money to fortify South Korea and to help anti-Communist forces in the entire Asiatic area. One item of \$75,000,000 was appropriated; another of \$27,000,000; another of \$10,300,000.

As you and all of us know, the program for military aid to South Korea was sabotaged to the extent that only \$52,000 worth of wire out of the above millions appropriated was sent to Korea with which to stem the threatened onslaught of Communist planes, tanks, artillery, etc.

While the Russians were sending to North Korea tanks, artillery, and planes, our State Department "experts" on the Far East were sabotaging our program to militarily aid the Korean Republic, and Secretary of State Dean Acheson was announcing to the world that we would not aid the South Koreans if they were invaded. We can assume that not only were the North Koreans listening, but Stalin as well.

Two of those State Department experts, Mr. Jessup and his superadviser, Lattimore, were telling the world that Korea did not count in the Far East defenses of democracy. Lattimore, as you will recall, Mr. President, publicly stated that our only problem in Korea was to let her fall without having it appear that we pushed her to her doom.

It does not seem improper, Mr. President, to ask at this time why it is that Mr. Acheson could expedite a \$60,000,000 order of guns and bullets for Communist Poland, but did the opposite for the anti-Communist forces in South Korea.

Obviously, as President you must rely on the advice of others. Men, both great and small, have been betrayed by advisers in the past. It is understandable that a President can be betrayed by his political friends. But it is not understandable nor excusable if he keeps those political friends in positions of power after they are exposed as betrayers not only of him but of the Nation.

At this time I would like to bring to your attention documented facts showing how your own well-meaning program to clean the subversives out of government, which program was initiated in 1946, was sabotaged by those advisers whom you apparently still trust. In 1946 the attention of Congress was directed to disloyalty in the Government when the Carl Marzani case was broken. As you know, he was one of the top State Department employees convicted of perjury in connection with his communistic activities.

In response to the growing demand in Congress at that time, you ordered, and Congress later approved a Federal loyalty program. Eleven million dollars was appropriated to put that program into effect.

The proof of how this program was sabotaged is attached hereto in the form of photostats of signed statements from people who were hired by the State Department to assist in the job—people who now come forward with nothing to gain and at least one of whom has a job to risk by giving this information.

One of these individuals now works for the State Department. Another is a third-year student at Georgetown University; a third is in private industry; a fourth is presently an FBI agent.

You will note that the name and other job information contained in the statement of the State Department employee has been blocked out in the photostat. This was done because this man gave the statement only on the condition that his name not be used and he got no publicity in connection therewith. However, if you will give me your personal assurance that his job will not be endangered thereby, I am sure I can obtain his consent to let his name be given to you.

Three of the four innocently, as far as they were concerned, took part in a file stripping operation fully described in the statements. Their statements refer to the files as person-

nel files. These files became the present loyalty files after the loyalty program was put into effect. They were hired by the State Department and paid with public funds to destroy files which had been built up at tremendous cost and labor in order to protect the security of this Nation.

This information is being brought to your personal attention for two specific reasons.

(1) When I started to expose Communists, etc., in the State Department, you condemned my methods and stated that if I had brought the information to you, you personally would have taken the necessary steps to correct the situation.

I attach hereto a photostat of two clippings—one from the New York Times, the other from the New York Herald Tribune, quoting Mr. TYDINGS. The other is a letter from the FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover.

I call your attention to paragraph 2, which reads as follows:

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation has made no such examination and therefore is not in a position to make any statement concerning the completeness or incompleteness of the State Department files."

(Paragraph omitted.)

For those reasons this material is being presented directly to you, Mr. President.

There are those who have made pleas for unity in this time of crisis. I join them in that plea, but I must define that unity to the point where it will have meaning for those we send today to Korea to fight and die.

We must all be unified in our loyalty to this Nation. There is no place in a hot war for men with lukewarm loyalty.

There was never a place for them in the cold war. But they were there.

Even in normal times, the information given you would be shocking. Today, however, it is doubly shocking because of the disastrous sequence of events in Asia, which today has brought us to the very precipice of defeat by the Communist half of the world. It reveals the groundwork laid for keeping and protecting people in the State Department who are unfit to serve this country.

Why would the State Department find it

necessary to strip the files unless the information, when placed before the loyalty boards, would have caused the removal of those individuals? The stripping was successful to the extent that this Nation was and is being betrayed. For proof you need merely look upon the chain of events which have led to repeated disaster for the United States and victory for Russia in Asia.

Today Korea is the crisis area. Where will it be tomorrow if the same men act as your advisers and mold your thinking, Mr. President?

The magnitude of this file-stripping operation is better understood when you realize that it took 6 months to strip the State Department files of information on the disloyal, the bad security risks, the fellow travelers, and the traitors, and it took a crew of eight to do the job.

You will note that the statement of one of the young men who took no part in the file-stripping job, but who had the task of making out cards on the clean files, shows that he was advised that State Department employees were allowed to inspect and rifle their own files.

If this was an accepted procedure during the cold war, what is now being done in fraud and deceit now that the real day for the traitors to do their work is at hand?

Someone in the State Department ordered the files stripped. Who was he? He must be found, Mr. President. And when found you decide how close he is to the top of the list of those who pledge their allegiance to the Soviet Union. You decide whether he is merely a dupe or guilty of high treason.

There are those who say we should not now spend time searching for those responsible for the disasters of the past few years. Common horse sense dictates, however, that in order to protect America in the critical weeks, months, and years ahead we must determine who in positions of trust seek to betray us, and then act to get them out of Government. If allowed to remain, they will undoubtedly tip the scales for disaster and against victory for this Nation.

Respectfully yours,  
JOE McCARTHY.

AUGUST 4, 1950

## Challenge to Senator Tydings To Play Recording of Wheeling Speech

Mr. McCARTHY. I have before me, Mr. President, the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of July 20, on which date the Senator from Maryland [Mr. TYDINGS] addressed the Senate. I might say that I sent word to the Senator from Maryland to be here, advising him that I was going to discuss a matter which concerned him personally. I am sorry he did not see fit to come.

Let me say, first, that during the course of the investigation there has been considerable dispute as to whether, in Wheeling, W. Va., I said there were 57 or 205 Communists in the State Department. Normally, it might not be considered too important as to which figure was used. However, those figures have been made of great importance by the chairman of the subcommittee and by the majority members of the subcommittee.

I have said that I sent the President a telegram calling attention to the fact that I had a list of 57 Communists. I have also called attention to the fact that there was a spy ring extending deep into the State Department, and that a complete investigation of Amerasia would furnish part of the key to that ring. I also have quoted from a letter from former Secretary Byrnes, dated July 26, 1946, in which he pointed out that 284 individuals in the State Department at that time were bad security risks, and that 79 of them were discharged, leaving 205. (Secretary Byrnes' letter was inserted in the RECORD by me in my speech of February 20, 1950.) I have stated that all of this information was known to Secretary Acheson for the reason that complete FBI reports on all of these individuals are available to him.

Following the day on which I made the speech in Wheeling, W. Va., I sent a telegram to the President in which I asked him to get the names of the additional 205 persons whom former Secretary Byrnes had named. So the figure 205 has been used in connection with the letter of the former Secretary of State, and the figure 57 has been used in connection with the names I personally had, which names were given to the Tydings-

McMahon committee as well as additional names in which the evidence was not strong enough to list them as part of the 57, but nevertheless unfit for sensitive Government jobs. This made a total of 81 on July 20. The Senator from Maryland told the Senate that the junior Senator from Wisconsin had said in West Virginia that he had the names of 205 Communists and then went on to say, and I quote:

Mr. President, I wonder if I can get unanimous consent to play a radio recording of the Senator's own voice. I am not asking Senators to take my word, but to hear the Senator's own voice. He says he has not made this statement.

In other words, the statement of 205.

Later on, on the same page, the Senator said:

They have gone from 205, in Wheeling, down to 57.

The Senator from Maryland complained about the lack of newspaper coverage his talk would get—well this statement of Senator TYDINGS got coverage. The press apparently understood the Senator from Maryland. I have before me a copy of the Washington edition of the Daily Worker, the Washington Post, from which I quote:

All the apparatus was in place. TYDINGS was about to let the Senators hear the Wisconsin Republican's own voice charging there were 205 card-carrying Communists in the State Department. McCARTHY had made the claim in a broadcast over Station WWVA at Wheeling, W. Va., last February.

I have before me a copy of the Milwaukee Journal of July 6, 1950, in which it is said:

TYDINGS said he had a phonograph recording of the West Virginia speech to prove McCARTHY lied, but was not permitted to play it on the Senate floor.

Mr. President, it is very important, I think, to determine whether the Senator from Wisconsin or the Senator from Maryland lied. That one of them lied is obvious. Either the Senator from Wisconsin was lying when he said that he used the figure 57, or the Senator from Maryland was lying when he said, "I have

here a recording of McCARTHY's voice which will prove he was lying."

While this question may not in itself be very important, I think it is important to have a decision on the matter, once and for all, so that the Senate and the country can better evaluate the report of the majority members of the subcommittee, and other statements made by the Senator from Maryland [Mr. TYDINGS].

I do not know how the Senate can force the Senator from Maryland to play that recording, I do not know how it can call his bluff. This is one time when the press can perform a service to the country and to the Senate. Members of the press can go to the office of the Senator from Maryland and say, "MILLARD, let us hear that recording. Let us hear the voice of McCARTHY using the figure 205." Let the press say to the Senator from Maryland, "Show us where McCARTHY used the figure 205, 206, or 207 in any place except in connection with the letter of former Secretary of State Byrnes."

I have stated on the floor of the Senate a number of times that I have only used the figure 205 in connection with Secretary Byrnes' letter. That figure was in

the wire to the President the day after I spoke at Wheeling. I said, "I do not have the names of those 205. I do know the names of 57."

As I have said, whether it is 205 or 57 may not be important in itself, but it becomes important when the Senator from Maryland says McCARTHY has perpetrated a fraud on the Senate in saying he used the figure 57 when he actually used the figure 205. It is now important to know whether the Senator from Maryland may not have been practicing a fraud when he stated he had a recording of my speech which would prove that the Senator from Wisconsin had lied.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair reminds the Senator that he has spoken more than 5 minutes.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask the Senate to force the Senator from Maryland to play the recording so that we may know whether the Senator from Maryland or the Senator from Wisconsin deliberately lied. It is a very simple matter to find who spoke falsely.

It is rather a serious matter to tell the Senate and the country that you have a recording to prove another Senator lied and then lack the honesty to play the recording.

DECEMBER 6, 1950

## American Foreign Policy

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, it is unnecessary to tell the Senate, the country, or the world that America is facing the greatest military disaster in its entire history. Day by day and hour by hour the situation grows blacker, blacker for the world, blacker for the United States, and more particularly is it painfully blacker for over 100,000 American young men in Korea.

At this very moment the mothers and wives of those young men are treading deeply into the valley of darkness and despair. It is not necessary to use high-sounding words to describe the situation to our men in Korea. Those men, their mothers, fathers, and wives, see the situation in its elemental ugliness. They are face to face with facts—facts that cannot be escaped by pious platitudes. It is high time for all, including those responsible for administration policy, to get down to rugged reality, to look at conditions as they actually are today, and not as we wish them to be.

It is not too late for a realistic examination or a reexamination, if you will, of the situation to produce some lessening of the perils of those gallant men now fighting on one of the frontiers of freedom. Upon the results of such an examination we must chart a course of effective action, and we must be prompt in doing so. Promptness, Mr. President, is no less required than realism, we are like the firemen who debate while the house burns down.

In this time of peril, it is the duty of everyone—Democrat, Dixiecrat, or Republican—to work in the national interest. We are all, first of all, Americans. But it is not in the national interest to unite in support of error, or of policies that have failed. Unity then would only compound the damage of the past. World history is littered with the corpses of nations which were united behind bad leadership following the wrong course.

Let us briefly examine the three plans which this administration has used in three of the major areas of the world in the last 5 years.

No. 1: The Forrestal plan, which Truman fortunately adopted for Greece and Turkey. As we all know, the Forrestal plan, simply stated, was to give all the

necessary military aid to people who themselves were willing to fight communism—enough military aid to make them strong enough to withstand international communism. While sufficient economic aid was given to make the military aid effective and workable, the emphasis at all times under the Forrestal plan was to be on military aid. The Forrestal plan, as we know, proved very successful.

No. 2: The Acheson-Marshall plan for all of western Europe, which was directly opposite to the Forrestal plan for Greece and Turkey. It consisted of giving the maximum economic aid with no thought whatsoever of any military defense of western Europe. In fact, the over-all plan was to build up the area economically and keep it defenseless from a military standpoint.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. KEM. Is it not true that the Marshall plan, as originally proposed by General Marshall, included Russia among its beneficiaries?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is certainly true.

The Acheson-Marshall plan fitted perfectly with Communist Russia's desire for a power vacuum in all of western Europe. On paper, as we know, there was a material and welcome change in the Acheson-Marshall plan for western Europe over a year ago. The change is on paper. At that time, as the Senate will recall, we voted vast sums of money for the military defense of western Europe. As of today, however, western Europe is still defenseless, while our State Department holds lengthy conferences with European leaders on such questions as whether or not an additional 500 policemen can safely be allowed to Western Germany.

No. 3: The Hiss-Acheson-Jessup-Lattimore-Vincent plan to turn all of Asia over to the Communists and to then cooperate with those friendly Communists. In other words, in one area of the world the plan was to fight international communism with economic aid; in another area it was to fight international communism with military aid; and

in the third area it was to turn everything over to the Communists.

I know it is unnecessary to comment upon the fact that of the three plans the only one which has been successful from the American standpoint is the Forrestal plan as applied to Greece and Turkey. The most disastrous for America and most successful from the standpoint of international communism was, of course, the Hiss-Acheson-Jessup-Lattimore-Vincent plan for Asia. As of today the failure of the Acheson-Marshall plan for western Europe has not yet been demonstrated to the American people. Suffice to say we are creating in Europe exactly what Russia desires; namely, an area which is becoming economically prosperous, but completely undefended—a power vacuum. In Stalin's wildest and most optimistic dreams of 5 years ago, he could hardly have pictured a 5-year development more favorable to international atheistic communism.

Of the three plans the Hiss-Acheson plan for Asia should be completely and unequivocally repudiated in its every vicious detail. The Forrestal plan, which worked so well in Greece and Turkey, obviously must receive wholehearted approval; and the Acheson-Marshall plan for Europe should be completely changed so as to conform to the Forrestal plan for Greece and Turkey.

Now let us look briefly at the State Department's plan for Asia insofar as it affects the life and death of this Nation and the life and death of 100,000 of our young men in Korea—the plan to turn all of Asia over to international communism, or, putting it in Lattimore's words, to "allow them to fall, but do not let it appear that we pushed them." This plan was proceeding according to schedule until Truman on June 26 ordered MacArthur to defend South Korea. This, of course, was directly contrary to Acheson's previous public statements in which he publicly assured the Chinese Communists that neither Formosa nor Korea was within our defense perimeter, thereby inviting the Communists to move into Korea and Formosa. While it appeared upon the surface on June 26 that Truman was scrapping the disastrous Hiss-Acheson-Jessup-Lattimore-Vincent plan, actually the reversal and the scrapping did not go deep. It can now be seen that the Communists sustained only a temporary, minor loss, that is, temporary and minor unless—unless at this late

date we scrap the entire Acheson plan, lock, stock, and barrel, and scrap the men who were responsible for the plan.

For example, as we all recall, part of Truman's order to the Seventh Fleet was that it prevent the Republic of China from taking any military action against the Chinese Communists on the mainland. Truman's orders to the Seventh Fleet also were to break Chiang Kai-shek's blockade of the Communist mainland. This released over a quarter of a million Communist troops which were stationed upon the mainland of China opposite Formosa.

Strangely—and rather significantly—in Acheson's speech of last week he admitted that he knew that those troops started moving north to the Manchurian border after they were assured by the Acheson-inspired Truman order that they could safely leave the China coast and there would be no danger of Chiang Kai-shek moving over.

As a result of this Acheson-inspired Truman order, at this moment a quarter of a million troops which had been immobilized on the China coast by Chiang Kai-shek's forces are now surrounding and cutting to pieces American forces in North Korea. Those Chinese Communists are using equipment which would not have gotten to them had the American fleet not been ordered to break Chiang Kai-shek's blockade of the China coast. This double barreled action to aid the Chinese Communists was not United Nations action. It was action taken by President Truman under the advice of Dean Gooderham Acheson.

At this point I should like to pay tribute to a Senator who has been doing a most important work, and who made a great speech on the floor of the Senate today. I refer to the Senator from Maryland [Mr. O'CONNOR]. He is performing a valuable service in attempting to stop the flow of these goods, even at this late date.

Let us keep that part of the picture clearly in mind. While the President was ordering our young men to fight and die in the battle against Communists in Korea, Acheson was saying to his Chinese Communist friends—the "agrarian reformers": "Don't worry, the Acheson hand will again be quicker than the Truman brain. I will have him sign an order under which the Seventh Fleet will make it unnecessary for you to guard the China mainland from Chiang Kai-shek's 500,000 troops on Formosa. I will

insert in that order a provision forbidding the continuance of the blockade of the China coast by Chiang Kai-shek. Then you can get the necessary war matériel and oil which Chiang has prevented reaching your armies."

But that was only one of the major services which our State Department has rendered the Chinese Communists. With half a million Chinese Communists in Korea—I believe it is now 1,000,000—killing American men, Acheson says, "Now let's be calm; let's not take hasty action; let's do nothing to alienate the friendship of the Chinese Communists who are killing our men. Let's keep them friendly."

With the rim of the world on fire, with the death toll of American men mounting by the hour, the great Red Dean asks us to be calm and patient. It is like advising a man whose home is being pillaged and burned, whose family is being killed, to be calm and not take hasty action for fear he might alienate the affection of the murderers.

Such has been the blueprint for disaster. It doesn't take a military or diplomatic expert to tell the American people that if we continue with the same plans and the same planners 100,000 men will be sacrificed on Acheson's altar of double dealing, and western civilization will have been dealt a staggering blow.

So clear is the answer to the question of what can and must be done that the question almost answers itself.

First. Instead of calmness and patience with the Chinese Communists, what is needed is speedy action of the roughest and toughest kind of which we are capable. The time for patience is past. The time for action is at hand. General Douglas MacArthur should be immediately given the authority to hit the Chinese Communists wherever, whenever, and however he thinks it necessary so long as they are killing American men. We cannot and must not wait on United Nations fiddling while our men are dying. Every minute we wait means more American dead, and new agony and tears for additional American families.

Second. Give the Chinese Republic the airplanes, tanks, guns, and ammunition which are needed to supply the million guerrillas with which they have contact on the China mainland. This will force the withdrawal of vast numbers of Communist troops from the Korean battlefields.

Third. Reverse the Truman-Acheson order to the Seventh Fleet so that Chiang may make such military movements against the China mainland as he and General MacArthur consider advisable. Practically every one of our military men—in fact, every one with whom I have discussed the question—agrees that this action will force the Chinese to withdraw additional vast numbers of troops from the Korean fight, even if Chiang never moves to the mainland. If the threat is there, it will force the Chinese to withdraw additional vast numbers of troops from the Korean fight.

Fourth. Reverse the Acheson inspired Truman order to the Seventh Fleet so that Chiang Kai-shek may again blockade the Communist ports, and, of course, have our Navy take part in the blockade.

Fifth. In Japan we must have immediate peace for a free, sovereign, and democratic Japan with or without Russian concurrence. In these times it is ridiculous for the United States to be in the position of defending the Japanese. Japanese rearmament must proceed at full speed, but on a basis similar to that of the North Atlantic Pact. To forestall the danger of an independent and remilitarized Japan we can establish a western Pacific pact consisting of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, and the Republic of China.

Sixth. In western Europe we should immediately shift from the Acheson-Marshall plan to the Forrestal type of plan, which was effective in Greece and Turkey—the plan to immediately build up the military potential in western Europe, creating an army not of American young men but of European young men, including the tens of thousands of Germans and Spaniards who are willing to fight against Communist aggression. We should be done with the Acheson idea that only American boys can die in the fight against communism.

At home and abroad we can little afford projects of economic defense at the expense of military defense. Any policy or program that does not contribute to rapid and increased military strength on the part of the West cannot be in our best interests. This must be made quite clear to our European allies, for we cannot afford haggling in debate when the necessity of the times demands cooperation, wisdom, and quick action. In this connection it must be kept in mind that Russia wants uncontrolled inflation or

economic collapse in the United States. We must deal with the inflation problem at home, and clearly recognize that one of Russia's war weapons is economic warfare, and that we may have gravely overreached ourselves in economic commitments abroad.

Seventh. Through the prestige of the United States and the appeal of the American ideal as demonstrated, we have an additional vast source of manpower which we must not fail to utilize. On the basis of, say, 5 years honorable American military service we should establish quotas similar to our prewar immigration quotas, but without the unfortunate oriental exclusion clauses for those who will serve our cause. Upon completion of this service these valuable allies should be granted full citizenship in the United States. Plans should be made not only to avail ourselves of this source of manpower now but also if and when Russia succeeds in occupying western Europe.

Eighth. Request withdrawal of recognition of the Chinese Communist government by all those nations to whom we have been giving billions of dollars to strengthen them so as to resist communism.

I think it is extremely important that we notify those European nations that this is a two-way street. When we spend billions of dollars trying to aid them, when the chips are down, we should be able to call upon them for something in return. Certainly it is not calling upon them for much to ask them to withdraw recognition of the government which is conducting undeclared war against our young men. Failure on the part of any of them to do so should be considered by us as proof positive of their bad faith and lack of sincerity, and that they have been obtaining our aid under false pretenses. Such aid should immediately cease to those nations who refuse this request.

We know that at Yalta we were betrayed. We know that since Yalta the

leaders of this Government by design or ignorance have continued to betray us. The depth and foulness of that betrayal no man can as yet outline for those of us who are its victims. We also know that the same men who betrayed America are still leading America. The traitors must no longer lead the betrayed. The international criminals must no longer splatter the pages of history with American blood. We of America are infinitely stronger than those who betrayed us would have the world believe. We are tougher than they have the courage to admit. We are more free than they wish us to be, and we are ready to fight for what we know is right, but we must not fight under the leadership of perfumed, dilettante diplomats. We cannot fight successfully under the leadership of those who are either half loyal or disloyal to what we are fighting for.

Nor do I think that Mr. Marshall should continue his heavy responsibilities at his advanced age, and particularly since he, too, has been heavily involved in the erroneous China policy. I cannot too strongly urge that General Marshall would be infinitely more valuable to the Nation as an elder statesman in Leesburg. If he were there, his doctors would be more satisfied, and his talents would be available as needed, as are those of our other fine elderly statesmen.

Within the next few days I intend to discuss in some detail the insidious Communist Party line attacks by inspired and semiofficial press agents of the Government, and by certain of the dangerous party-line radio commentators and news columnists—attacks by the cabal that hounded Forrestal to death, and did such an efficient job of destroying Chiang Kai-shek in the eyes of the American people; the same cabal that is now making an all-out effort in an attempt to destroy Gen. Douglas MacArthur because he, too, even as did James Forrestal and as does Chiang Kai-shek, stands in the way of international atheistic communism.

DECEMBER 15, 1950

### Statement on Drew Pearson

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, the other night I told one of my fellow Senators that today I intended to discuss the background of one of the cleverest men who has ever prostituted one of the noblest professions—a man who, in my opinion, has been and is doing an infinite amount of damage to America and all of the institutions of our form of Government. When I told the Senator this, he said: "McCARTHY, don't do it." He said it would be like having stood in the mouth of the Cloaca Maxima and having tried to stop the flow. He said: "You will be merely inundated by the slime and smear and he will still go on every day and every week polluting otherwise fine newspapers and poisoning the air waves."

I realize that the task of exposing this man, or perhaps I should say this person, will be an unpleasant, disagreeable task, which will leave me more than a bit bloodied up also, but as I told the Senator the other night—when I was a boy on the farm my mother used to raise chickens. From those chickens the groceries for a large family were supplied, as well as mother's Christmas money. The greatest enemy the chickens had were skunks. In order to protect mother's chickens my three brothers and I had to dig out and destroy those skunks. It was a dirty, foul, unpleasant, smelly job. We learned early in life that the jobs that most badly need doing and are so often left undone are often the most difficult and unpleasant jobs.

I do not agree with the Senator who advised me the other night—I do not agree that this is an impossible task. I think that while it cannot be done overnight, this man can be exposed to the American people for what he is, at which time he will no longer be dangerous.

Before discussing the important place which he holds in the Communist scheme of propaganda, I would like to describe him in the words of some expert witnesses, well known and highly respected by the Senate.

First, let me quote one of the outstanding Senators from the other side of the aisle—one of the great Senators,

not only of today but great in the entire history of this Senate, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE]. On the floor of the United States Senate, on the 21st of February 1944, he said:

[Pearson] began his whole tirade with a deliberate lie. . . . It is not often that an ordinary, congenital, deliberate, and malicious liar such as Drew Pearson refers to a printed record on which it is possible to pin him down. . . . What sort of a liar is he, Mr. President, when in the very face of the Record which he himself invites every word that he said is disproved? . . .

Mr. President, I know some of the motive, some of the malice, back of this sudden attack by Drew Pearson on me. . . . Down deep is a fight against representative government. It is a smear campaign against the legislative branch of this Government. . . .

Again I ask, what sort of a liar is Mr. "Skunk" Pearson? (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 90, pt. 2, pp. 1903-1904.)

Next, let me quote Morris A. Bealle, a highly respected writer:

All the boys in the Washington press galleries, except the leftist stooges and Communist sympathizers and "New" Deal dog robbers, have an abiding contempt for this fellow who had brought prostitution of their great profession to its zenith. They say: "When bigger lies are told Pearson will tell them."

He goes on further to say:

"The truth is not in him; he is a pathological liar." (Washington Squirrel Cage, 1948 ed., p. 39.)

Pearson makes his living by blackening characters. He is a smear columnist, a professional character assassin, and the author of false and vile insinuations. (Washington Squirrel Cage, 1948 ed., p. 39.)

On the 17th of December 1941, Representative MARION T. BENNETT, of Missouri, described Pearson as follows:

Pearson and Allen . . . do not have the manhood or honor to admit their mistake. . . . These two columnists have prevaricated. . . . They are well-known in informed circles because of their utter lack of regard for the truth and for being two of the most dishonest, unreliable, and vicious character assassins in America. They are a disgrace to the great newspaper profession. They apparently seldom take the trouble to ascertain the facts. . . .

They make their living in the half light of minds diseased by the filth they alone can imagine. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 87, pt. 8, pp. 9943-9944.)

Mr. President, normally I should not take the time of the Senate in quoting witnesses, but I do think it is important that the record of this man be made clear for the benefit of the well-meaning and deluded newspaper publishers who still are buying his service.

I might say, Mr. President, in fairness to Mr. Allen, that apparently he could not stomach this association and broke it up himself. So it is barely possible that he may have been unfairly blamed for what Drew Pearson was saying; I do not know.

Again on the floor of the Senate on the 12th day of March 1945, a Democratic Senator described Pearson as follows:

It is not only generally known, but it is universally admitted, that Drew Pearson is the biggest and most notorious liar in America today. Not only is Pearson recognized as being the biggest liar, but he is also recognized as being the most perfect smear artist of the press and radio. He will go down in history as Drew Pearson, the sponge, because he gathers slime, mud, and slander from all parts of the earth and lets them ooze out through his radio broadcasts, and through his daily contributions to a few newspapers which have not yet found him out. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 91, pt. 2, pp. 2010-2011.)

On the 20th of May 1943, Representative FRANK BOYKIN, of Alabama, described Pearson as follows:

Drew Pearson is the damndest liar that ever lived. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 89, pt. 4, p. 4723.)

On the 12th of June 1948, the Senator from Maine [Mr. BREWSTER] stated:

I have been a little puzzled by the apparent malevolence of Mr. Pearson.

• • • these attacks of various kinds have developed upon me, with all the cunning and skill he commands—and it is very considerable. I have a very wholesome respect for his tenacity and ingenuity in presenting half-truths in order to fortify whatever views he takes, sometimes walking a very tight rope between situations. • • • he is able so to present a situation as to leave implications which are utterly unwarranted by a full disclosure of the facts. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 94, pt. 6, p. 7957.)

On the 15th of December 1947 the Senator from Washington [Mr. CAIN] had the following to say:

The conversation described by Mr. Pearson never took place. • • • Mr. Pearson has unfairly, unreasonably, and senselessly abused Mr. REECE through an imaginary dialog which was spawned by an individual who has been malicious, irresponsible, and mischief making. • • • Pearson has lied • • • without reason or excuse. Through doing this he has insulted the intelligence of his readers and broken faith with his profession. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 93, pt. 9, pp. 11360-11361.)

On the 25th of April 1944 former Senator A. B. Chandler, of Kentucky, described Pearson as follows:

• • • There is a definition for that sort of liar. He is called a revolving liar. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 90, pt. 3, p. 3634.)

On the 21st of June 1943, EUGENE COX, of Georgia, described Pearson as follows:

This Washington Post happens to be the purveyor of the filth concocted by one Drew Pearson, whom I denounce as a filthy and cowardly villain, a venomous slanderer, and an insinuating rogue, who makes his living in the blackening of other men's reputations and the practice of blackmail blackmailism. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 89, pt. 5, p. 6185.)

He should not have said "The Washington Post"; he should have said "The Washington Edition of the New York Daily Worker." His statement appears in volume 89, part 5, page 6185, of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

On the 20th of May 1943 Stephen Early, White House secretary, is quoted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD in regard to one of Pearson's stories as follows:

There is no truth in any detail of this story. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 89, pt. 4, p. 4724.)

On the 19th of November 1940 former Representative Hamilton Fish made the following statement:

The Pearson-Allen statement is damnably false. • • • This is not a personal issue, but if permitted to continue it may undermine the confidence of the American people in the integrity of our public officials and destroy our free institutions and democratic Government, which is now under attack throughout the world. • • •

The only way I know of (dealing with these contemptible people) is through libel action or horsewhipping or the old gun method. It is too bad that that has gone out. That used to be resorted to in the old days of Benton and Clay. They would have taken a gun and gone after them. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 86, pt. 12, p. 13685.)

On the 26th of December 1940 the following is found in an extension of remarks in the House of Representatives:

A typical example of the lack of regard for truth in the Merry-Go-Round, published by Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen. • • • These smear columnists are rendering a disservice to the public and to public officials by their irresponsible and false statements and deliberate misrepresentations. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 86, pt. 18, p. 6983.)

I hesitate, Mr. President, to take up the time of the Senate in citing these expert witnesses, but I think it is important to do so before going on to what I consider to be a much more important facet of Mr. Pearson's activities.

On the 20th of May 1943, the following statement was quoted by Representative MORRISON, of Louisiana:

Drew Pearson, in my opinion, is the most contemptible, dishonest, and dishonorable smear propagandist in America, and by inference the most colossal liar in the Nation. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 89, pt. 4, p. 4723.)

On the 10th of June 1947, Senator GILLETTE, of Iowa, in referring to one of Pearson's articles, stated:

The intimation • • • as stated in the article, is absolutely without foundation. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 81, pt. 5, p. 5511.)

On the 23d of November 1943, Congressman John W. Gwynne, of Iowa, made the following statement:

The statement of Drew Pearson did contain one truth, believe it or not. I think it must have been an accident. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 91, pt. 8, p. 10946.)

William "Bull" Halsey, fleet admiral, United States Navy, had this to say:

Pearson is a blackguard who, by insinuations and outright lies, tried to destroy public confidence in the Navy's air arm. The scoundrel didn't have the "guts" to take a plane ride with a man he said got his wings by fraud. (Washington Squirrel Cage, 1948 edition, p. 39.)

On the 28th of March 1935, the late Senator Pat Harrison, of Mississippi, made the following statement:

This is so mendacious, it is willful, it is so misleading and untruthful, it is such a damnable lie • • • that I cannot pass it by unnoticed. • • •

• • • These audacious, misleading, incorrect statements carried in the Merry-Go-Round, written by Mr. Drew Pearson, are written because of a motive. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 79, pt. 4, p. 4618.)

I intend to discuss the motive.

On the 24th of May 1949, Congressman CLARE HOFFMAN, of Michigan, described Pearson as follows:

A man who gratuitously smears innocent, defenseless individuals in order to sell his wares, advance his own financial interests, no doubt derives pleasure from the squirming and the suffering of his victims. Drew Pearson, who seldom misses an occasion to throw out a falsehood and insinuation or by innuendo to injure some innocent victim, if he runs true to form, must be chagrined by the death of James V. Forrestal, whom he so vigorously and meanly attacked, because Forrestal is dead and no longer will be humiliated or suffer because of Pearson's slanderous, libelous statements. (Appendix to the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 95, pt. 14, p. A3182.)

Again, in April of 1939, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in referring to a Pearson article, dated April 14, 1939, had this to say:

Those parts of it of which I have knowledge are so thoroughly inaccurate and misleading that they could not in my judgment be substantiated by anyone. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 84, pt. 5, p. 5416.)

Again on the 21st of December 1940, in a press conference Cordell Hull stated:

[The Merry-Go-Round article bore earmarks that] would indicate it to be a deliberate misrepresentation. It is very disagreeable when we are so hopelessly overwhelmed with emergency matters to have an article of whole cloth thrown into our faces and sent over the Nation with the representation that it is based on actual knowledge. (New York Times, December 22, 1940, p. 18, cols. 1-5.)

Again on the 30th of August 1943, in referring to a Pearson article, Hull stated:

I desire to brand these statements as monstrous and diabolical falsehoods. (New York Times, August 31, 1943, p. 1, col. 7.)

As quoted by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE] on February 21, 1944, Hull again referred to Pearson as an "unmitigated and congenital" liar—CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, volume 90, part 2, page 1904.

Jesse Jones, as quoted by Representative O'Connor, of Montana, on the 2d of April 1942, had this to say:

There is no truth in the Merry-Go-Round story of April 1 about me. • • • Practically all references to me and my work by those columnists over the year has been made for the purpose of injuring me, and where there has been any basis for reference to me, the facts are maliciously distorted

through innuendo. This article is typical of their column. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 88, pt. 3, p. 3289.)

The Senate will recall that in 1947 Congressman Robert Jones, of Ohio, was nominated for membership on the Federal Communications Commission. Pearson attacked the nomination of Jones, claiming he had reliable and reputable witnesses who would testify that Jones was a member of the Black Legion. Senators will recall it. The following is found in the answer in the court record in the case of Pearson against King Features and Westbrook Pegler, page 20 of the answer:

One Congressman Jones, of Ohio, was nominated for membership on the Federal Communications Commission. The said plaintiff opposed said nomination and contended that said Jones was a member of the Black Legion.

At a hearing conducted on the confirmation of the aforesaid Mr. Jones, the said plaintiff—

Pearson—

stated falsely that he had affidavits substantiating the membership of said Jones in such Black Legion. The said plaintiff produced as witnesses a person who had been an inmate of the insane asylum, and had a criminal record; a person so senile as not to know in what manner he had reached Washington or the hearing room; and a third witness, likewise with a criminal record, of no credibility whatever. The charges trumped up by said plaintiff were fakes and lies, as he then and there well knew. The witnesses he produced were for the most part perjurers, as plaintiff then and there well knew; the nomination of the aforesaid Jones was confirmed by the United States Senate by a unanimous vote, thus in effect finding that said plaintiff was a faker, liar, and suborner of perjury by a vote of 98 to 0.

In connection with the above the following statement was made by Congressman Jones to the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee of the United States Senate on July 1, 1947:

I believe that any competent lawyer, reading Pearson's testimony, would dismiss it instantaneously as the flimsiest hearsay and of no probative value. . . . Pearson's first charge is wholly false and entirely unsubstantiated. . . . The second charge is false. . . .

I am sure that the members of the committee have every right to take judicial notice of the fact that Pearson's credibility has been attacked upon scores of occasions. It is sufficient, I believe, to cite as witnesses in my behalf as to Pearson's reputation for truth and veracity . . . members of the Washington press corps who in a poll

voted him the most unreliable commentator. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 94, pt. 6, p. 8092.)

The late Congressman Lesinski, of Michigan, had the following to say on the floor of the House of Representatives:

This is one of those damnable lies that has always been produced by Drew Pearson. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 94, pt. 6, p. 7601.)

On the 25th of April 1944, the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKellar] described Pearson colorfully and in detail. I shall quote only a few of the passages:

I do not know Pearson; but really he is an ignorant ass, is he not? . . . This ignorant, blundering, lying ass, who makes his living by lying on Senators and other public men. . . .

If ever there was an opportunity for my temper to be aroused by plain lying, it would be aroused by the plain lying of this so-called Washington columnist. . . . He is just an ignorant liar, a pusillanimous liar, a peewee liar, and he is a paid liar.

Pearson makes his living by making sensational lying statements about men in high office. . . . He actually makes his living that filthy way. He ought to have the contempt of every honest man.

When a man is a natural-born liar, a liar during his manhood and all the time, a congenital liar, a liar by profession, a liar for a living, a liar in the attempt to amuse, or to be as he thinks smart, a liar in the daytime, and a liar in the nighttime. It is remarkable how he can lie.

This revolting, constitutional, unmitigated, infamous liar, this low-lived, double-crossing, dishonest, corrupt scoundrel, who claims to be a columnist. He is not a columnist. He is a monumentalist. That is, a monumental liar. . . . This knave—and I am using very mild language. . . .

Gentlemen, I am not angry, I am just sorry that this great Nation of ours, this Nation of honest men, this Nation of Americans, has within its borders any person so low and despicable, so corrupt, so dishonorable, so groveling, so desirous of injuring the character and the accomplishments of his fellowmen, as this low-born low-lived, corrupt, and dishonest Drew Pearson. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 90, pt. 9, pp. 8683-8687.)

On Sunday this miserable, lying, corrupt, dishonest scoundrel, Drew Pearson, with a dishonest and disordered mentality and a putrid and corrupt morality, wrote and published another lying article about me. . . .

This is a lie out of the whole cloth, known to be a lie when Pearson wrote it, known to be a lie when Silliman Evans bought and paid for it, and no person with character sufficient to sleep with a hog or to associate with dogs or polecats would write such an article or would print such an article. In-

deed, Pearson, in his mental make-up is a cross between a ranting maniac and a drunken Silliman Evans. . . .

The article had no resemblance to truth, but is simply the result of a disordered and corrupt mind working only for money paid for it by Silliman Evans. . . . (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 92, pt. 7, pp. 9090-9091.)

On the 17th of October 1945, Congressman Joseph J. Mansfield, of Texas, made the following statement:

I consider this paragraph so grossly erroneous in point of fact that it should not be permitted to go unchallenged. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 91, pt. 13, p. A4359.)

On the 18th of December 1943, the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK] made the following statement:

Mr. Pearson's statement is false and unfounded. . . . an absolute falsehood has been printed in the Pearson article. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 89, pt. 8, p. 10867.)

On the 4th of May 1945, Congressman AUCHINCLOSS, of New Jersey, made the following statement:

The column of Drew Pearson . . . contains references . . . that are cruel, wholly false, and libelous. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 91, pt. 11, p. A2073.)

On the 20th of May 1943, Congressman JAMES H. MORRISON, of Louisiana, made the following statement:

Drew Pearson lied on the radio, and I know he lied on the witness stand, which, down where I come from, is perjury. . . . I have had occasion to check into the record of Drew Pearson to see what kind of reputation he has for telling the truth. I find that United States Senators, Members of Congress, Cabinet members, generals, and even the secretary to the President, in no uncertain terms labeled him as a downright liar and garbage-can collector of filthy manufactured synthetic lies.

But Drew Pearson has not spent all of his time blackmailing, intimidating, and lying about public officials and Congressmen. His vocations describe a thwarted and frustrated man with a warped, twisted, and diseased idea of mankind and life. . . . I want the Members of this House to know that Pearson, who poses as a great liberal, is at heart a money miser and one of the greediest men for cash I have ever met anywhere any time. If he cannot get it honestly, look out for the blackmail. . . .

His contribution to the war effort is based on a low-down, degrading, cowardly, yellow, stinking pen to defame, to vilify, to humiliate, and to attempt to destroy America's No. 1 hero, Gen. Douglas MacArthur. . . .

Seldom do I have the unpleasant task of skinning a skunk. I hope I have

done the job well. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 89, pt. 4, pp. 4722-4724.)

On the 20th of May 1943, Congressman Mott, of Oregon, described Pearson as follows:

Drew Pearson and Robert Allen are a pair of journalistic polecats. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 89, pt. 4, p. 4724.)

Former Senator Nye, of North Dakota, made the following statement:

Pearson is a master of the half-truth. When a direct lie does not suit his purpose because it might be too dangerous, he can lie by inference by merely leaving out qualifying remarks and explanation. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 89, pt. 4, p. 4723.)

On the 2d of April 1942, Congressman O'Connor, of Montana, labeled Pearson as a deliberate liar—CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, volume 88, part 3, page 3290.

The mother of Pearson's former wife had this to say about Pearson:

Drew, rose-sniffing, . . . child cheater, sentimental Drew. Vicious and perverted Drew. . . .

Incidentally, you GI Joes, when you happen to listen to the phony Quaker Pearson of a Sunday night—Bleeding Heart Drew—never forget that although he was 20 and in perfect health in 1917, he managed to "thee and thou" himself out of service in World War I. Then, as now, Drew was a yellow-bellied slacker. . . .

Too many of these zanies are crazy all right, but they're crazy like foxes. . . .

But, to go back again, how can any normal-minded human being choose this filthy work of plotting, planning, sneaking, lying, spying, cheating, stealing, smearing, in the mere hope of one day overthrowing our American form of Government, for that's all it amounts to (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 91, pt. 13, p. A3648).

Columnist Westbrook Pegler had the following to say about Pearson:

James V. Forrestal . . . was . . . a victim of the wanton blackguardism and mendacity of the radio which has been a professional speciality of Drew Pearson. Pearson has become a man of great power and special privilege because other decent men like Forrestal go in fear of fantastic lies to be spread over the Nation by radio, all to stimulate the sale of a brand of hats or laxative. (Appendix to the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 95, pt. 14, p. A3183.)

On February 2, 1944, Congressman RANKIN, of Mississippi, described Pearson as follows:

Drew Pearson, one of the well-known sliemongers of the radio . . . revealed himself as one of the most vicious propa-

gandists in America. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 90, pt. 1, p. 1081.)

On the floor of the United States House of Representatives, February 8, 1944:

\* \* \* those of us who listened in on Sunday night heard Drew Pearson, one of the radio scavengers of America, in a most contemptible manner, falsely attack one of the most elegant ladies in Washington. \* \* \* Every person who is familiar with the incident tells us that Drew Pearson was lying about her in his statement. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 90, pt. 1, p. 1419.)

On the floor of the United States House of Representatives, June 11, 1945:

Drew Pearson \* \* \* went to bat for those saboteurs in the State Department who were exposed by the Dies Committee on Un-American Activities. \* \* \* A high-ranking general in the United States Army told me more than a year ago that if he were to give out the Government secrets that were being broadcast by Drew Pearson \* \* \* he would be court-martialed immediately, and ought to be. \* \* \* Somebody in the State Department, in the War Department, and even around the White House, has been giving out secret information to Drew Pearson \* \* \* to broadcast to the world regardless of its cost in the lives of American boys on the various fighting fronts. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 91, pt. 12, p. A2770.)

Walter Reuther, president of the United Automobile Workers, described Pearson as follows:

Pearson is not only a chronic liar but a fool. (Washington Squirrel Cage, 1948 edition, p. 39.)

He is right about his being a chronic liar; but make no mistake, Pearson is no fool. He is the most cleverly dangerous man in the country. If he were a fool he would not be dangerous.

On the 11th of May 1939, Senator Robert R. Reynolds, of North Carolina, had this to say:

Unfortunately, the only way a public official can avoid vilification by these two men, the authors of the Washington Merry-Go-Round, is to bow to their will and the will of those whom they serve. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 84, pt. 5, pp. 5413-5433.)

On September 1, 1943, the New York Times reported the late President Roosevelt's press conference, as follows:

Mr. Roosevelt called Mr. Pearson a liar. \* \* \* The President continued, he had no hesitation in saying that the whole statement, from beginning to end, was a lie.

But there is nothing in that, he went on, since the man is a chronic liar in his columns. \* \* \*

It is the kind of journalism that hurts the press, the President declared, besides hurting the country. (New York Times, September 1, 1943, p. 4, column 2.)

On the 25th of April 1944, Senator Tom Stewart, of Tennessee, made the following statement:

\* \* \* I do not think this man Pearson has the ability to slander anyone. One must be honest before one can slander another, and one must be able to tell something which at least approaches the truth. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 90, pt. 3, p. 3687.)

On the 11th of March 1948, President Truman in a press conference made the following statement:

First I want to pay attention to a vicious statement that was made by a columnist. \* \* \* I had thought I wouldn't have to add another liar's star to that fellow's crown, but I will have to do it. This is just a lie out of the whole cloth. (New York Times, March 12, 1948, p. 17, columns 2-3.)

On the 7th of July 1941, Senator MILARD TYDINGS, of Maryland, made the following statement:

The spreading of rumors in a whispering campaign is not a crime against an individual; it is a crime against society. \* \* \* And that is the kind of campaign which Drew Pearson has tried, in his nefarious manner, to conduct. \* \* \*

"But he that filches from me my good name robs me of that which not enriches him and makes me poor indeed." This is what Pearson and Allen tried to steal. Where are they now? I have brought all the facts out into the light of day. Where are the skunks now? Down in their hole where they ought to be and where the company suits them. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 87, pt. 6, pp. 5831-5834.)

On the 18th of June 1945, Senator TYDINGS said further:

Washington Merry-Go-Round \* \* \* is written by an individual who names himself Drew Pearson, but most persons who are familiar with his utterances on a variety of subjects generally call him "Few Smearson." \* \* \* Normally, I would pay no attention to such garbage but \* \* \* I am unwilling by silence to see this deliberate lie passed on to the American people.

I fail to find within the limits of parliamentary language words to describe this worm masquerading in the physique and the clothing of a supposed man. In the last war this scoundrel, although away above the draft age, found asylum in an SATC, and the

only powder he ever smelled was in the presence of ladies who might have adorned the windward side of the parade ground, and today, sitting in a comfortable chair far removed from any danger, without any scintilla of fact or truth to support the statement, this supposed purveyor of information besmirches the character of one of the most gallant soldiers.

He was referring to Pearson's attacks upon Gen. Douglas MacArthur at that time.

\* \* \* I would call him a perpetual, chronic, revolting liar, and a few other things that I cannot add in the presence of this distinguished and rather ethical company. This man has engaged, to my personal knowledge, in the gentle art of blackmail, without any success. He has been guilty of attempting to buy public influence. I have the affidavits and the checks in my possession to substantiate what I am saying. He has been affiliated with one of the great gambling rackets of America, according to one who worked with him. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 91, pt. 5, pp. 6213-6214.)

The United States Department of the Army in April 1948 had this to say about one of Pearson's articles:

The implications in Mr. Pearson's statement are not only unfair, but are absolutely without foundation, as proved beyond question in the course of the investigation into the entire situation. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 94, pt. 10, p. A2492.)

On the 15th of March 1945, Congressman EARL WILSON of Indiana described Pearson as follows:

This ruthless, double-barreled, diabolical, puerile liar, Drew Pearson. \* \* \* He is a liar, preceded by many uncomplimentary adjectives and is really everything he has been called and more. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 91, pt. 2, p. 2276.)

On the 13th of July 1950, Representative ANDREW JACOBS, of Indiana, had this to say about a Pearson article:

The statement was made out of the whole cloth. Now I could call him a liar, but I always believe in being a little more original than that. \* \* \*

If we are nothing else in Indiana, we are generally pretty good sports. But that would be something that Mr. Pearson could not comprehend, being the kind of man he is. \* \* \*

Pearson was a dishonorable man for attempting to assassinate his friend. \* \* \* He being a poor sport himself—he just figured that everybody else would be a poor sport. \* \* \*

That, Mr. Speaker, about demonstrates how much confidence you can put in this

fellow Pearson. \* \* \* It is impossible to know whether he is stupid or false, or both. I will bet it is both. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, July 13, 1950, pp. 10112-10116.)

As the Senate knows, one of the prime targets of this man Pearson has always been the head of the House Un-American Activities Committee. Any man who attempts to dig out the unnamed Communists comes in for Pearson's smear. Representative Wood, of Georgia, being chairman of that committee, comes in for the usual treatment.

On the 15th of June 1950, Representative JOHN S. WOOD, of Georgia, made the following statement:

Ignoring the unsupported conclusions spawned in the distorted mind of this scandalmonger, Drew Pearson, as set forth in his column, I desire to make specific reply to his direct statements and insinuations. \* \* \* He uttered a malicious lie. \* \* \* His unsupported statement \* \* \* is a wicked and malicious lie \* \* \* a wicked and gratuitous lie. \* \* \* It ought not to be in the public interest that men in public office should be forced to suffer the slanders and falsehoods of one whose stock in trade consists of a wicked heart, a lying tongue, and a poisonous pen. And so \* \* \* I have deemed it to be my duty to \* \* \* condemn this dirty slander peddled by this arch liar and character assassin. \* \* \*

This rogue \* \* \* has built his name upon the wreckage of the reputations of others that he has wrought. \* \* \* He has been slandering people, high and low, great and small, for years. This is his profession—and he has been condemned by millions of people upon whom he has unjustifiably inflicted injury. \* \* \*

The chief legman and stooge of Drew Pearson today is one David Karr, a former member of the staff of the Daily Worker, of New York, the official publication of the Communist Party in America. \* \* \*

Drew Pearson has consistently misrepresented, slandered, and abused every person—man or woman—who, because of love of country and constitutional liberty, have raised their voices against the spread of alien ideologies and against those who would overthrow our form of government. He has been the most effective weapon that the Stalinists have been able to use in America for the undermining of our whole constitutional system. To him there is nothing under the heavens that is sacred. He befouls and means to befoul everything he touches. He occupies the unique and unenviable position today of standing alone at the very pinnacle of all the slanderers and scandal-mongers in all of America today. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, June 15, 1950, pp. 8653-1655.)

On September 23, 1950, Senator WILLIAM E. JENNER, of Indiana, had the following to say:

I have just had the honor and distinction of being attacked by America's No. 1 keyhole-peeping, muckraking, character-assassinating, propaganda-peddling prostitute of the Nation's press and radio—"P. U. Fear-some" \* \* \*

Mr. Drew Pearson is not an s. o. b. He is only his own filthy brain child, conceived in ruthlessness and dedicated to the proposition that Judas Iscariot was a piker. \* \* \* There is money in this business in 1950 A. D. \* \* \* for, as I intend to prove, this Drew Pearson is a self-appointed, self-made, cross t'd, dotted t'd, double-documented, supersuperlative, revolving s. o. b. \* \* \*

I cannot comprehend why such propaganda-peddling prostitutes as Drew Pearson, who make their living by feeding on the festering wounds of the characters they have stabbed in the back, continue to be supported by so many. \* \* \* Never have I seen any person stoop to such depths of journalistic degradation and character assassination. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, September 23, 1950, p. 15673.)

On September 14, 1950, Congressman CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, of Massachusetts, made the following statement:

This entire article is a complete distortion of the facts. \* \* \* Drew Pearson was fully aware of the true facts. (Appendix to the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, pp. A6525-A6526.)

On May 19, 1950, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] made the following statement:

Mr. Pearson abuses the freedom of the press for political blackmail. \* \* \* It would be impossible for any Senator to attempt to add to Mr. Pearson's stature as the prince of liars. \* \* \* He has been charged \* \* \* again and again of being the creature who long ago wrested away the laurels of Ananias and placed them proudly on his own brow. \* \* \* The Prince of Peace \* \* \* looked down through 2,000 years, and in the eighth chapter of John, the 44th verse, described Pearson when he said: "There is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own; for he is a liar, and the father of it." (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 19, 1950, p. 7306.)

I could go on almost indefinitely citing Senators, Representatives, and other well-known, well-respected men, who have labeled Pearson as a deliberate liar. However, I believe the cross-section of Democrats and Republicans just quoted should give to the country a fairly good picture of the extent to which Pearson can be believed.

I call attention again to the statement by former Representative Jones, of Ohio, now Federal Communications Commissioner, to the effect that the Washington press had voted Pearson as the most unreliable commentator. That really is going a long way.

I would like also to quote briefly from the answer filed by King Features and Westbrook Pegler in the Supreme Court of the State of New York in the case of Pearson against King Features Syndicate, Inc., and Westbrook Pegler. This gives a rather good documentation of the deliberate lying of Pearson.

The said plaintiff (Pearson) formed the design of destroying the late Hon. James Forrestal, United States Secretary of Defense. The aforesaid James Forrestal was an honorable, industrious, high-minded servant of the public, of extraordinary ability, whose services were rendered in vast excess of full measure, without hope of personal regard or for any other motive than patriotism. The said plaintiff (Pearson) schemed the destruction and discrediting of the said James Forrestal by the continuous broadcast and publication of a stream of vicious, false, scurrilous lies, concocted from the venom and pathological virulence of plaintiff's (Pearson's) putrid imaginings or pretended imaginings. \* \* \*

On the 16th day of January 1949, said plaintiff (Pearson) broadcast in the same manner, as hereinabove alleged as follows:

"The White House: Well, President Truman was about to accept the resignation of Secretary Forrestal, when last Sunday he heard Walter Winchell's broadcast about Forrestal's income-tax flogging in the 1930's. Whereupon, Truman sent for a transcript of the Winchell broadcast and literally hit the ceiling. 'I'm not going to let that little so and so,' he stormed, 'tell me who I'm going to keep in my Cabinet.'"

And a day later, he told Forrestal he could stay on, at least for the time being.

"However, the most important aspect of this incident is not so much Forrestal's income tax, though as I reported last year, it is a matter of record that Forrestal did escape paying \$95,000 income tax by a subterfuge company in Canada. But much more significant is the fact that Mr. Truman should let important decisions of state be made or reversed by a radio commentator, no matter who he is. It's probably going to make some of us think twice about criticizing inefficient public officials for fear Mr. Truman will then decide to continue them in office.

"For my part, I personally think Mr. Forrestal is a very nice and charming gentleman, but I agree with Walter Winchell that

a man who avoids taxes by concealing his money in a foreign country cannot command the respect of boys who are drafted into the Army."

This is what I call attention to particularly. Here we have the typical Pearson type of attack.

"And I would go further and state that a man who runs out the back door of his house into the alley, leaving his wife to cope with a jewel robbery alone, would not appear to have the courage or chivalry to be the best Secretary of National Defense."

In truth and in fact the subject matter of the aforesaid broadcast did not originate from the White House as said plaintiff (Pearson) falsely sought to have his audience believe, but originated from the same diseased mentality as hereinabove alleged. The incidents related in said broadcast were wholly false to plaintiff's (Pearson's) knowledge. It was not a fact that the late Secretary Forrestal ever defrauded, or attempted to defraud, the United States of any income taxes owing by the said Forrestal as said plaintiff (Pearson) then and there well knew. The pretense of said plaintiff (Pearson), that he had been admonished for criticism, was likewise a complete fake, inasmuch as the criticism of plaintiff (Pearson) on this and all other occasions was not based on criticism but on deliberate contemptible lying. It is not a fact that Mr. Forrestal ran out the back door of his house into an alley leaving his wife to cope with a jewel robbery alone. The wife of the late Mr. Forrestal was robbed of jewelry on a public street of the city of New York. Mr. Forrestal was asleep on an upper floor of his home and was completely unaware of any such occurrence. Mrs. Forrestal, on that occasion, was accompanied by other persons. There was, and is, no alley adjacent to any back door of the house then occupied by the late Mr. Forrestal. The robbers in the above incident were duly arrested and convicted after a public trial. The facts thereof were fully known to said plaintiff (Pearson) and his statement about the robbery far from being a comment and criticism was a thoroughly vicious, unprincipled, contemptible act of lying and fakery, impossible of accomplishment by anyone but a blackguard.

With respect to the charges of cowardice leveled by said plaintiff (Pearson) against the late James Forrestal, defendants allege that Mr. Forrestal wore the uniform of his country in World War I and served in the United States Navy and performed all such duties as were assigned to him to the complete satisfaction of his fellow citizens. In World War II the said James Forrestal served as Secretary of the Navy and for the purpose of better discharging the functions of said office visited actual combat areas under fire, and subjected himself in excess of anything required by his duties to the same risk of enemy action as was required of noncommissioned soldiers, sailors, and marines. A de-

liberate lie of the same sort concocted by the said plaintiff (Pearson) was uttered by him a few days before the Presidential election of 1944. On that occasion the said plaintiff (Pearson) stated that Thomas E. Dewey, Governor of New York, had obtained an agricultural deferment from the draft with the implication that since Governor Dewey was well known not to be seriously engaged in farming the Governor of New York was probably a coward and a slacker. The aforesaid statement was a characteristic lie of said plaintiff (Pearson), uttered on the eve of an election in which Governor Dewey was a candidate, at such time that Governor Dewey had no adequate opportunity to circulate an answer thereto. In connection therewith one or more of the newspaper clients of said plaintiff (Pearson) forced said plaintiff (Pearson) to admit, as was the fact, that his publication was a fake and a lie, and that he had not even sought to obtain information from Governor Dewey about his draft status. The said plaintiff (Pearson) then and there well knew that governors of States were wholly exempt from being drafted, whether engaged in farming or not, and the blackguard lie of said plaintiff (Pearson) was a part of a deliberate scheme to deprive Governor Dewey of votes in the Presidential election, which he otherwise might have received.

As contrasted with the war records and alleged cowardice as charged by said plaintiff (Pearson) of Messrs. Forrestal and Dewey, the war record of said plaintiff (Pearson) is as follows:

On October 29, 1918, the said plaintiff (Pearson) was a student at Swarthmore College, a Quaker institution of higher learning. At that time the said plaintiff (Pearson) lacked some 45 days of being 21 years of age. The said plaintiff (Pearson) had theretofore registered for the draft, in accordance with the provisions of law, and was in every way completely sound of body and fully qualified physically for induction into the combat or any other branch of the United States Army. On October 29, 1918, said plaintiff (Pearson) caused himself to be inducted into the Students Army Training Corps in which he served for 44 days and from which he was discharged on December 12, 1918, at a time when he was 21 years of age. The said plaintiff (Pearson) continued his college status during the aforesaid brief period and his services consisted of drilling 1 hour a day and his remuneration consisted of the usual pay of a private in the United States Army; board, room, tuition, clothing, and Government insurance. Subsequent to the aforesaid so-called military service the said plaintiff (Pearson) at no time pretended to have been a veteran of World War I until the elapse of approximately 20 years, at which time, and thereafter, he furnished to a reference work entitled "Who's Who in America" a claim that in 1918 he was in the United States Army. The mother-in-law of said plaintiff (Pear-

son), as stated by said defendants, publicly stated that said plaintiff (Pearson) had thee'd and thou'd his way out of World War I—to which defendants' publications related, although in one or more newspapers a misprint of World War II may have occurred—without objection or counterstatement by said plaintiff (Pearson). Likewise in the Congress of the United States the said plaintiff's alleged war record was ridiculed and derided by Senator MILLARD A. TYDINGS, of Maryland, without comment or rejoinder by said plaintiff (Pearson), and statements that said plaintiff (Pearson) was a yellow-bellied slacker were duly inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD without objection. As compared to Messrs. Forrestal and Dewey, whom he accused of cowardice and in the latter case slackerism as well, the war record of said plaintiff was as stated by defendants.

In connection with defendants' allegations that said plaintiff (Pearson) is a habitual, incorrigible, professional liar, as distinguished from an occasional or accidental liar, defendants allege that said plaintiff (Pearson) was publicly designated a chronic liar by the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt, as was the fact. With respect to the veracity of said plaintiff, Hon. Harry S. Truman, President of the United States, stated on the 11th day of March 1948, and stated truthfully:

"I had thought I wouldn't have to add another liar's star to that fellow's crown, but I will have to do it. That is just a lie out of the whole cloth. That is as emphatic as I can put it."

The said plaintiff published and broadcast, prior to the Presidential election of 1948, that one Walter Reuther would be a candidate for Vice President on the same ticket with Senator ROBERT A. TAFT. The aforesaid statement was a deliberate fake and lie, as said plaintiff (Pearson) then and there well knew, and brought forth the statement from said Reuther that said plaintiff (Pearson) was not only a chronic liar but a fool, and that statement of said Reuther was fair and just under the circumstances. The blackguardly purpose of said plaintiff (Pearson) was unjustly to cause the labor union followers of Reuther to believe that said Reuther had deserted their interests and had espoused the cause of Senator TAFT, which said followers for the most part regarded as inimical to organized labor.

The said plaintiff (Pearson) uttered and published a fake lying broadcast to the effect that General MacArthur, at some time before the recent war, had gotten rid of General Eisenhower, who at one time was one of his subordinates in the Philippines. The statement was a fake and a lie, as plaintiff (Pearson) then and there well knew, inasmuch

as General MacArthur had sought and retained the services of General Eisenhower for a period additional to his original tour of duty, and always spoke of him in terms of the highest esteem.

Among the loftier flights of mendacity attained by said plaintiff (Pearson) was a broadcast by him to the effect that Senator McKELLAR had drawn a knife against a fellow Senator on the floor of the United States Senate, and had been disarmed. No such incident ever occurred; plaintiff (Pearson) knew it had never occurred; his statement was a fake and a lie.

The said plaintiff broadcast during the recent war that if the One Hundred and Sixth Infantry Division had held out a few hours longer the Battle of the Bulge disaster would have been largely averted. The said statement was a fake and a lie, as plaintiff (Pearson) then and there well knew. The One Hundred and Sixth Infantry Division held out not for hours but for days and sustained casualties of more than 50 percent. Its heroic efforts beyond the call of duty prevented a far more serious disaster than in fact occurred.

In connection with the medicine show broadcasts of said plaintiff (Pearson), to his knowledge and with his consent and assistance, there were broadcast statements that a patent medicine, peddled on said broadcast was a cure for constipation. The said claim was a fake and a lie, as plaintiff (Pearson) then and there well knew, and the broadcasters were ordered by the Federal Trade Commission to cease and desist from such false representations on or about January 23, 1945.

The said plaintiff (Pearson) broadcast during the recent war that Russian oil was being sent, or was about to be sent, to the United States for storage in worn-out wells in Pennsylvania, which said plaintiff (Pearson) at that time, unless suffering from acute lunacy, must have known was a nonsensical lying fake.

On or about February 13, 1946, the said plaintiff (Pearson) broadcast that Hon. James A. Farley had virtually forced Cardinal Spellman to take said Farley with him to visit the Vatican. The said publication was a fake and a lie and was restricted as such on March 12, 1946.

The said plaintiff (Pearson) published in 1945 a statement that British policies in Greece were motivated by the fact that the Hambros Bank of London, which was interested in the Greek situation and was the chief British creditor of Greece had bailed Winston Churchill out of bankruptcy in 1912. The statement was a fake and a lie, as plaintiff (Pearson) then and there well knew, and the republication thereof by innocent reputable publishers caused them in the British courts to pay the sum of \$25,200, and tender an abject apology and retraction.

The said plaintiff (Pearson) in the course of the recent war broadcast that General Patton would never again be permitted to command troops at a time prior to all the greatest victories won by General Patton and his armies on behalf of the United States. At the time of said publication said plaintiff (Pearson) knew that he had no sources of information whatever as to the future status of General Patton, and his reckless unfounded statement was a fake and a lie.

The broadcast of said plaintiff (Pearson) has consisted for a long time of cheap gossip, partisan propaganda, sneaking innuendo, and malicious, baseless accusations. When such material consisted of other than outright lies and fabrications, it consisted of half-truths and was broadcast in such a manner and with such expression as to convey damaging imputations against those to whom for any reason said plaintiff (Pearson) had conceived malice. Such malice, on numerous occasions, was incurred by persons who declined to furnish said plaintiff (Pearson) with sensational revelations and by those who were frank in the expression of their opinion that said plaintiff was a worthless dishonest scoundrel.

Not trusting my memory or even my old notes, when Pearson charged Forrestal with deserting his wife in the hands of gunmen, I called on Herman Stichman, the chairman of the New York State Housing Authority, who had handled the prosecution in November 1940. Mr. Stichman said there was absolutely no excuse to impugn Forrestal's conduct because he was asleep inside the house at 27 Beekman Place, when the stick-up took place on the street outside at about 2 o'clock in the morning.

Mrs. Forrestal had spent the evening at the Persian Room at the Hotel Plaza with several friends. About 1:45 she and her escort, Richard B. W. Hall, got into Mr. Hall's car, driven by his chauffeur, and drove to Beekman Place. When they pulled up at the curb, Mrs. Forrestal said, "Instead of the chauffeur opening the door, a man jumped in the car in the back with us. He said, 'This is no joke; it's a stickup.' I told him it was a silly way to make a living. He had a gun. The gun was pushed up at Mr. Hall. There was another man with the chauffeur. At one point there were two men in the back of the car. Both had guns."

After they got Mrs. Forrestal's jewelry, valued at more than \$100,000, the men ran to a car that was parked just ahead, leaped in and got away. Mrs. Forrestal saw four men altogether. When they had left, she rushed into the house, notified her husband, and called the police.

Mrs. Forrestal had been "fingered" by a woman named Dorothy Stirrat, alias Dolly Turner, a criminal known as "The Lady Finger." With her own escort, a member of the gang, "The Lady Finger," left the Plaza

when Mrs. Forrestal and Hall left, followed the Hall car in her car, pointed it out to the gunmen who were waiting in another car close by, and wished them luck as they took out after the quarry. The stickup was so quiet that, far from awakening Jim Forrestal, it escaped the notice of a special watchman for the block who, for the moment, chanced to be conversing with a taxi man out of sight around the corner.

"The Lady Finger" got 10 to 20 years; Lomars, 10 to 20 years, and Joseph Weiss, alias Morris Seitchick, 30 to 60 years. Lomars held a union meeting and passed a resolution appropriating \$5,000 for his defense on the ground that he was a labor spokesman and a victim of a Wall Street plot.

The Forrestal house is on the east side of Beekman Place. There is no alley through or behind the block through which Forrestal could have fled if he had been the coward that Pearson said he was.

Only a man as diabolically clever as Pearson could continue to maintain his huge reading and listening audience after being so completely and thoroughly labeled an unprincipled liar and a fake.

It is impossible for me to understand how so many reputable newspapermen can buy the writings of this twisted, perverted mentality which so cleverly sugar-coats and disguises his fiendishly clever, long-range attempts to discredit and destroy in the minds of the American people all of the institutions which make up the very heart of this Republic.

It is difficult beyond words to understand how reputable publishers and editors with such a deep obligation to their readers allow the streams of information to be polluted and poisoned by a man so thoroughly labeled and known to be a prostitute of the great profession of journalism.

So much for Pearson's disregard for truth and honesty and decency. Let us proceed briefly on to the even more dangerous part of this picture.

The heads of any of our intelligence agencies will testify that one of the principal aims of the Communist Party is to gain control of our lines of communication; that is, newspapers, radio, television, motion pictures, and so forth. It, of course, would be a miracle if they had not recognized in Pearson the ideal man for them—an unprincipled, greedy degenerate liar—but with a tremendous audience both in newspapers and on the air waves—a man who has been able to sugar-coat his wares so well that he has been able to fool vast numbers of people with his fake piety and his false loyalty.

Pearson has long had working for him—part of the time officially on his payroll, and part of the time in a slightly different status—one David Karr. The relationship is such that it is difficult to know who is the master and who is the servant. I may say that just what his status is is difficult to know, except that they are still working together today. I will give the Senate a complete picture of Karr's function in a minute.

To give you a picture of this man David Karr, let me quote Martin Dies, head of the Un-American Activities Committee, on page 512 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for February 1, 1943.

This link between Pearson and Karr is the important link:

Here is the case of David Karr who is Assistant Chief of the Foreign Language Division of the Office of War Information at a salary of \$4,600.

That was Lattimore's Division.

For 2 years, Karr was on the staff of the Communist Party's official newspaper, the Daily Worker. There is not the slightest doubt that all members of the Daily Worker staff were required to be members of the Communist Party. Karr was a writer for the Communist-front publication, Equality, whose editorial council was composed largely of well-known Communists and Communist fellow travelers.

David Karr was also public-relations director of the American League for Peace and Democracy, one of the Communist fronts which Attorney General Biddle branded as subversive. Karr was a frequent writer for the league's magazine, Fight.

I also quote from a statement made by Congressman Donadio on the floor of the House, page 9702 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of October 10, 1945.

The ink was hardly dry on the Japanese surrender when a barrage of vilification and slander was launched against General MacArthur, led by the Communist Daily Worker, PM, and Drew Pearson, who is the voice of David Karr, formerly with the Daily Worker. For more complete information on this subject, I refer you to the story in the Washington Daily News of October 8, 1945. Even Dean Acheson, our own Acting Secretary of State, participated in that hue and cry, and it was echoed in London by Soviet Commissar Molotov. It has reached a climax in the Russian proposal to hamstring MacArthur with a four-power control board, the fruition of a well-synchronized and thought-out plan to sacrifice American interests to those of the Soviet Union.

Incidentally, while under questioning by Dr. Matthews before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Karr

admitted under oath that he knew the American League for Peace and Democracy, whose publicity he was handling, was a Communist-controlled organization. Some of the testimony is set forth on page A876 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for February 18, 1944.

I have discussed this man Pearson with practically every former member of the Communist Party whom I have met during my recent and present investigation of Communists in Government. Almost to a man, they were agreed on a number of things—No. 1: That Pearson's all-important job, which he did for the party without fail, under the directions of David Karr, was to lead the character assassination of any man who was a threat to international communism. No. 2: That he did that job so well that he was the most valuable of all radio commentators and writers from the standpoint of the Communist Party. No. 3: In order to maintain his value, it was necessary that he occasionally throw pebbles at communism and Communists generally, so as to have a false reputation of being anti-Communist.

It appears that Pearson never actually signed up as a member of the Communist Party and never paid dues. However, that has not in any way affected his value to the party; nor has it affected his willingness to follow the orders of David Karr, who, of course, is a most active member of the party, and who carries instructions and orders to Pearson.

I ask those who are skeptical as to whether Pearson actually has been doing a job for the Communist Party to stop and review Pearson's record over the past 10 years. You will find that he has always gone all-out to attack anyone who is attempting to expose individual and dangerous Communists, while at the same time he goes through the fakery of criticizing communism and Communists generally. The heads of the House Un-American Activities Committee have always been his targets.

You will find also that he has always consistently and without fail launched a campaign of personal smear and vilification against any man in public life who has stood against any plan of socialization in this country, no matter how good or how bad the plan might be.

One of Pearson's extremely important tasks, assigned him by the Communist Party, through David Karr, was the de-

struction in the eyes of the American people of Chiang Kai-shek. That was one of his No. 1 jobs. There is, of course, no secret about the fact that one of the major aims of international communism was to create a Red China. As Lenin said:

He who controls China, controls the world.

It has never been a secret that Communist imperialistic Russia has always realized that the first step toward the creation of a Communist world was the creation of a Red China, then the creation of an entire Red Asia, and then the creation of a Red Pacific which would wash our western shores. But before the Communists could take over China, the American people had to be fooled into believing that the man who controlled the anti-Communist forces in China was corrupt and wicked to the extent that he should not receive our aid, and that the Russian-directed Chinese Communists were fine people, agrarian reformers, interested only in the welfare of China.

Pearson was assigned the job of leading the cabal of left-wing mocking birds in the destruction of Chiang Kai-shek. He did the job well.

His next major task was to destroy James Forrestal. Forrestal, as we recall, was the originator of the Truman doctrine for Greece and Turkey. It was the direct opposite of the Acheson-Marshall plan for Europe. The Forrestal plan, which Truman adopted, was to provide the necessary shovels of war to Greece and Turkey, so that they could withstand the pressure of imperishable communism. In Europe, of course, the plan was to give economic aid and fatten the goose, in effect, with but little thought to military aid.

So Forrestal had to be destroyed, or Truman might apply the Forrestal plan to Europe. So again, Pearson was assigned the task—assigned it by the Communist Party, through David Karr. Again Pearson and his cabal did the job well—hounding Forrestal to death. He and the Communist Party murdered James Forrestal in just as cold blood as though they had machine-gunned him.

The next intended victim on the Communist Party list is Gen. Douglas MacArthur. As all of us know, Douglas MacArthur is the one man who, above all others, has stood in the way of Communist domination of all of Asia and the islands of the Pacific. So MacArthur must go. MacArthur must be destroyed.

Again Pearson is assigned the job by the Communist Party, through David Karr; and Pearson is setting about that job with the same fervor, the same malice, the same disloyalty to America, the same degeneracy, as he set about the task of destroying Chiang Kai-shek and destroying James Forrestal.

It is up to the American people—and above all, up to the newspapermen who are buying Pearson's column and the radio stations that are carrying his broadcasts—to see that this voice of international communism is stilled.

If the loyal American newspaper editors and publishers and radio station owners refuse to buy this disguised, sugar-coated voice of Russia, the mocking birds who have followed the Pearson line will disappear from the scene like chaff before the wind. The American people can do much to accomplish this result. They can notify their newspapers that they do not want this Moscow-directed character assassin being brought into their homes to poison the well of information at which their children drink. They can notify the Adam Hat Co., by actions, what they think of their sponsoring of this man. It should be remembered that anyone who buys an Adam hat, any store that stocks an Adam hat, anyone who buys from a store that stocks an Adam hat, is unknowingly and innocently contributing at least something to the cause of international communism by keeping this Communist spokesman on the air.

In that connection I should like to quote briefly from the December 12 radio broadcast of Earl Godwin:

And you know, or do you know, that there is no one so timid about America as the average businessman. He wants to stand up and cheer if someone will be the cheer leader \* \* \* but I've known only one stand out in front and attack Communists since I have been on the air \* \* \* One department store sponsor was induced to let me go by a few letters from silly Georgetown pinks who declared that as long as I was on the air under that sponsorship, they would never enter the store. In fact, none of them ever had entered it. But I take this opportunity to call attention to the flimsy pretext of patriotism that many timid Americans have today \* \* \*

I say to the 150,000,000 normal people of America, the chips are down. They are truly down. The time has come for action. It is up to the American people, through their actions, to notify the sponsors of the voices of communism that

have been polluting the airwaves and the newspapers, that they, the American people, are through paying for the soapboxes for those who preach the Communist Party line. I know there will be a great scream that I am trying to impair the freedom of the press, the freedom of these men to speak. I say let them speak where and when they will, but the American people do not have to buy the soapboxes from which they speak. If the American people take action and refuse to continue paying for the Pearson cabal, the Communist Party in the United States will have suffered a death blow.

Some of my colleagues in the Senate and the House who have been working with me on this matter may wonder why I have not touched upon one other important phase of this case. I want to assure them that it is not being neg-

lected; and when all of the details of the documentation are completed, it will be presented to the Senate in detail.

Mr. President, I assume that Mr. Pearson will complain because this documentation is presented under congressional immunity. I think we can take care of that for him all right. If Mr. Pearson wants to waive his own special, self-created kind of immunity—for as Senators know, most of his property has been conveyed away to his wife, I assume, so that it is not subject to judgments for libel or slander—and will take legal action to provide that the property which he has been conveying out of his own name will at all times be subject to judgments for libel and slander, I shall be glad to repeat this, if he will submit the request in writing—and will tell me where and when he wants this repeated off the floor of the Senate.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I have a file which I desire to insert in the Record today, containing photostats of the so-called Karr report, via the Executive Director and Chief Examiner of the Civil Service Commission, dated June 25, 1943. Before doing so, however, I should like to mention the fact that last week I discussed on the Senate floor the service being rendered to the Communist Party by a radio commentator named Pearson. I pointed out that his collaborator and the man through whom he receives orders and directions from the Communist Party is one David Karr, who was and is a very active and important member of the Communist Party.

Pearson, as was to be expected, immediately denied Karr's membership in the Communist Party. He made a statement to the effect that if Karr is a Communist, then the Washington Monument is a hole in the ground. Lest there be any doubt about this particular phase of the Pearson case, I am today reading into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the opinion rendered to the Civil Service Commission from the office of its Chief Examiner. That report should require no comment. Please keep in mind that this is one of those secret reports never supposed to come to the eyes of the American people. I assume Mr. Pearson did not know we had this report when he denied Mr. Karr's membership in the Communist Party.

I believe I fully covered a few days ago the important connection between David Karr and Drew Pearson. As I pointed out at that time, David Karr is the connecting link between Drew Pearson and the Communist Party. He is the man who assigns to Pearson the important task of conducting a character assassination of any man who dares to stand in the way of international communism.

As I pointed out the other day, the first major task which Pearson and his cabal had was to destroy Chiang Kai-shek. The next was to destroy Forrestal. The job now assigned to them is the destruction of Gen. Douglas MacArthur. They are doing that job with the same viciousness, degeneracy, and lack of adherence

DECEMBER 19, 1950

### Statement on David Karr and Drew Pearson

to the truth that he and his group have always followed.

Let me read to the Senate the secret report of the Civil Service Commissioner at the time David Karr was working for the Government. Prior to that time he had been working in the Office of War Information, either under Mr. Lattimore, in the western portion, or under Mr. Joe Barnes, who was in the eastern portion. I do not know which. I think Senators are acquainted with the record of Lattimore. Mr. Joe Barnes also has been named as an active member of the party.

Subsequently Mr. Karr applied for a job as senior liaison officer, CAF-12, \$4,600 a year, in the Office for Emergency Management.

I read from the report:

#### STATUS OF KARR CASE

Mr. David Karr was appointed senior liaison officer, CAF-12, \$4,600, Office of Facts and Figures, Office for Emergency Management, February 5, 1942, subject to investigation.

Mr. Karr has no pending eligibilities or applications and his case has been returned without fingerprint clearance.

Investigation was conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in March, April, May, and June 1942.

I wish Senators would keep in mind that I am reading from the report of the Office of the Executive Director and Chief Examiner of the Civil Service Commission. I continue:

Additional investigation was conducted in April 1943 by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, because Karr was the subject of complaints coming within the purview of Public Law 644, of the Seventy-seventh Congress. He was interviewed twice in connection with the investigation. The first time was on April 21, 1943, and again on May 10, 1943.

In his application, executed January 31, 1942, Mr. Karr stated he was born in New York City August 24, 1918, attended grammar school from 1924 to 1931; high school, 1931 to 1936; New School for Social Research from February to June 1937, and has been attending George Washington University since September 1941.

He lists his employments as February 1935 to January 1938, World-Telegram reporter, paid by assignment on space basis, etc.; June 1937 to January 1938, New York Daily

Mirror, reporter, paid by assignment on space basis, etc.; January 1938 to March 1938, salesman, Fuller Brush Co.; November 1937 to January 1938, H. M. Manheim, office boy; April 1938 to January 1940, the Hour, investigator analyst, writer on foreign propaganda and subversive activities in the United States; August 1939 to present, Trans-Radio Press, reporter, rewrite desk man, and assistant to publisher.

David Karr has had considerable background experience as a newspaperman, doing investigative work. Thirty-five witnesses, including 12 FBI agents and confidential informants testified in this matter. Some of the witnesses expressed opinions favorable to Karr and others expressed opinions unfavorable. It is unnecessary to consider the opinion testimony, in view of the uncontroverted facts adduced in this case. The opinion testimony adds nothing to nor does it take anything from Mr. Karr's record of activities as either admitted by him, or clearly proven by the testimony of FBI agents and informants.

The various FBI reports on David Karr are summarized as follows:

It must be kept in mind that this is not my summary. This is the summary from the Office of the Chief Examiner of the Civil Service Commission. I continue:

While working for the Fuller Brush Co. in and around New York, David Karr formed a close association with the Communist Party, joining it before he was hired by the Communist organ, the Daily Worker. The Daily Worker is the Communist paper which goes generally to all members of the Communist Party and whoever else cares to subscribe. Mr. Karr admitted to several FBI agents and informants that he was doing rewrite work for the Party Organizer.

I call attention particularly to this part:

The Party Organizer is the most confidential of all publications of the Communist Party. It is printed for and issued to only those who are high in the ranks of the party and it contains the latest instructions and decisions of the Communist Party.

That is the FBI analysis of this organ. I continue to quote:

Anyone doing rewrite work for the Party Organizer was of necessity a trusted and powerful member of the Communist Party. Mr. Karr had intimate contact with the high authorities of the Communist Party.

If I may stop quoting for a minute, I should like to call attention to this very important matter. Senators have in mind that if they wish to subscribe to the Daily Worker they can do so, and it will be sent to their home. However, no Senator may subscribe to the Party Or-

ganizer. According to the FBI report, that is the most confidential of all publications. It contains instructions to the top hierarchy of the Communist Party. Therefore, when a man is doing rewrite work for the Party Organizer, he is the last word on the directions and instructions going out in this top-secret publication to the members of the Communist Party. I am reading from the report of the chief examiner, saying that that was the task of Drew Pearson's chief collaborator, David Karr.

Going back to the report:

While he makes no mention of it in his application, Mr. Karr was doing work intermittently for the Daily Worker in 1937-38-39, at which time he was a member of the Communist Party. Each member of the staff of the Daily Worker had to be a member of the Communist Party. Mr. Karr also wrote articles for a magazine called Fight, which was published by the League for Peace and Democracy, which was heavily infiltrated and controlled by members of the Communist Party. Mr. Karr was also a member of the Mirror Unit of the Communist Party, at which time he informed an FBI undercover agent that he had inside tips on the Hearst organization, which he furnished to the party and that he wrote under another name when he wrote articles exposing the Hearst organization.

Mr. Karr was militantly and vociferously against United States intervention in the war until Hitler invaded Russia, after which time he adopted the party line and just as vociferously urged immediate United States intervention in the war.

David Karr was active in the formation of a victory council, sponsored by the Office of War Information. He succeeded in having a very heavy Communist representation on that council. He was also active in assisting the Communist Party to form a united front with several groups which the Communist Party had not in the past been successful in infiltrating and dominating.

The FBI reports also show that while working for the Daily Worker, David Karr freely admitted he was a member of the Communist Party. Mr. Karr was also connected with the Hour, which was headed by Albert E. Kahn, who was also a member of the Communist Party. The Hour had a very definite Communist background.

Mr. Karr wrote vigorous attacks upon the head of the Un-American Activities Committee, referring to the committee's work as "witch hunting" and "a danger to America." He referred to Congressman Dies as a "Witch-Finder General" and "the long-legged southern congressional rabble-rouser."

Mr. Karr did considerable lecturing along the Communist Party line, some of which was under the sponsorship of a Mr. Lowell Wakefield, a reporter for the Daily Worker, who was also a member of the Communist

Party. He collaborated on a number of writing jobs with a Mr. Spivak, a well-known Communist writer, and with Mr. Wakefield.

When interviewed on July 14, 1942, David Karr stated that when he lost his job with the Daily Mirror he made contacts through the left-wing section of the Newspaper Guild and Lowell Wakefield, a Communist reporter of the Daily Worker, who introduced him to a Mr. Spivak, a well-known Communist writer, and that the three of them "did a number of jobs together"; that Wakefield hired him to write articles, among them one on Martin Dies, head of the Un-American Activities Committee.

That, incidentally, is not Larry Spivak, of Mercury.

These are the admissions of Mr. Karr when he was interviewed:

This article was very critical of Congressman Dies. He stated that he was not a member of the Communist Party or the Young Communist League. He claimed that he wrote expositions of the Communist movement in this country, but when asked to produce the same was unable to do so. He admitted having attended meetings of the Young Communist League, but stated he attended less than half a dozen. He also admitted attending meetings of the Communist Party, but stated he did not attend as a member, but as a reporter of the Daily Worker.

I suggest to member of the press who are not members of the Communist Party—and that includes all I can see present, I believe—that they try to attend a meeting of the Communist Party as reporters, and see where they get.

He further admitted that he had lectured at meetings of the League for Peace and Democracy and that he knew it was Communist controlled and also that he had written for the league's magazine Fight. He stated that the League for Peace and Democracy invited him to become public-relations director, but he did not take the job.

This is the conclusion of the chief examiner:

On the entire record, it is concluded that the activities, affiliations, and associations of David Karr, as shown by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's reports and the Commission's hearings, are communistic, and a finding of ineligible is considered necessary in this case. It is recommended, therefore, that Mr. David Karr be rated ineligible for the position of senior liaison officer; that he be barred for the duration; and that his immediate removal from the service be requested.

The date of this report is June 25, 1943.

Mr. President, I should also like to quote from the testimony before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, of Howard C. Rushmore, who is presently on the editorial staff of the New York Journal American. I may say that to the best of my knowledge Mr. Rushmore is one of the most truthful witnesses with whom I have had contact. Rushmore testified that he had been on the staff of the Daily Worker, which is the official organ of the Communist Party. He also testified that he had been a member of the Communist Party for 3 years, from 1937 to 1939, inclusive, and that prior to that time he had been a member of the Young Communist League; that while a member of the Young Communist League he was managing editor of their publication, known as the Young Worker.

On page 798 of the hearings, Rushmore testified as follows:

Question. Does the name, Dave Katz, mean anything to you?

Answer. I knew a person by the name of Dave Katz when I was on the Daily Worker. In fact, I used to give him assignments. He, at that time, was working on one of the New York non-Communist papers and he had to show me his party card to get these assignments. Anyone working for the Worker, even on that basis, had to be a member of the Communist Party. I believe that Katz later became a leg man, as we say, or a reporter, for Drew Pearson. At the time I knew him he was a Communist.

Question. What name does he go under now? Do you know that?

Answer. I believe he uses the name of Karr.

Last week in discussing the extent to which the voice of this political terrorist and character assassin, Pearson, has been damaging America and helping the Communist cause, I pointed out that the Adam Hat Co. is presently responsible for poisoning the air waves with this voice of international communism; that the Adam Hat Co. is responsible for poisoning the well of information from which the families of millions of Americans drink. The Adam Hat Co. made an unusual answer. They said, "We are paying him, keeping him on the air, bringing him into millions of homes, but we are not responsible for what he says."

That defense is, of course, ridiculous to the point of being ludicrous. It is about the same as paying for huge ads in the Communist Daily Worker and having it sent into every American home,

then saying: "Oh, but we are not responsible for what this Communist paper says."

The American people will not be fooled by this phony, senseless excuse. The truth is that Drew Pearson, under the directions of David Karr, of the Communist Party, would not be pouring his poison into millions of American homes every Sunday, if the Adam Hat Co. did not hire him and pay him to do it. He is in their employ. They do not have to hire the Karr-Pearson voice of communism; they could hire some voices of and for America.

The Adam Hat Co. might well take a lesson from the Canadian legal profession, which recently barred Communists from their legal organization on the basis that the Reds were unfit company for decent men and women. They did not want Communists or their propaganda peddlers representing them.

There is an old American saying to the effect that an honest, independent citizen never wears another man's hat. We should remember this today and refuse to touch anything stained with the Soviet foulness that comes from Pearson and Karr. These two are the greasemonkeys of the Communist conspiracy that is trying to conquer us. Everything they touch is smeared with the filth of their hands. The blackness of their lies is mixed with the blood shed by American boys, who are the real victims of the Communist conspiracy which Pearson and Karr continuously promote in America—bought and paid for by the Adam Hat Co.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from North Dakota yield to me?

Mr. LANGER. I yield.

Mr. ANDERSON. Since at the conclusion of the address of the junior Senator from Wisconsin last week I had a word or two to say about David Karr, I desire to say a word now, not with the intention of trying to engage in controversy, but solely to explain that Mr. Karr's name came before a select committee of the House of Representatives chosen from the membership of the Appropriations Committee. The House of Representatives was steadily being torn to pieces by Members rising every time an appropriation bill was about to pass and moving that no part of the funds appropriated by the bill should be used to pay the salaries of certain persons, and then reading a full list of those

whom the Dies committee had charged, in the particular division of government whose appropriation was being considered, with being Communist sympathizers or members of the Communist Party. There would be a long argument about it, and the House was unable to transact business.

The problem was solved, I think to the satisfaction of the House, by the suggestion that the then chairman of the Appropriations Committee [Mr. CANNON] of Missouri, and the ranking Republican member [Mr. TABER] of New York, select five Members in whom they both had confidence, and empower those five men to conduct an investigation of the charges to see if there were names which should be stricken from the payroll. Judge Kerr of North Carolina was selected as chairman of that committee, and I was selected as one of its members. We certified to the House of Representatives the names of certain persons who we felt ought to be left off Federal payrolls. In addition to that, suggestions were made to members of various departments. While the record was not particularly clear in certain cases, it was of a nature that would certainly indicate that the person might very well not be employed.

I must say that in the case of David Karr nothing like the testimony which the Senator read to the Senate was presented to the committee by the FBI. There was nothing that I saw—and I believe my memory is reasonably good—in the FBI report that even approximately approaches what has just been read.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a minute?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes.

Mr. McCARTHY. If the Senator from New Mexico had had in his possession the photostats which I will be glad to hand him, photostats of the recommendation of the chief examiner for the Civil Service Commission; if he had had before him the testimony which is set forth in this report which I hold in my hand—a report, the Senator understands, not prepared by McCARTHY, but prepared in the office of the chief examiner of the Civil Service Commission, then certainly he would have recommended that David Karr's name be removed from any Federal payroll, and that he be removed from any Federal job? Am I correct?

Mr. ANDERSON. No, not necessarily because—

Mr. McCARTHY. Oh, well, then—  
Mr. ANDERSON. Let me explain that, if I may. In every FBI report I saw there were both sides of every question. There would be one line of witnesses who almost without exception would say that they saw this man going in and out of Communist meetings. "We have seen him steadily engaged in this sort of activity." Then further along would be a long series of careful investigations by the FBI pointing out that there was in their opinion no truth in the charge that he had been a member of the Communist Party. I am not trying to say that there was anything of that nature in the file of David Karr, because I recall nothing of that nature. I merely point out that with all this information in front of the members of the committee, David Karr was subsequently certified as eligible for Federal employment.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield again?

Mr. ANDERSON. After I finish one brief statement.

I am trying to explain to the junior Senator from Wisconsin that I am not endeavoring to discuss the controversy at issue. I do not know the facts at this late date. I went over the Karr case in 1943 or 1944. I went carefully into a great many cases and at that time read files long into the night for weeks and months at a time, and I make no pretense to being able to remember what was in every file.

Mr. McCARTHY. May I ask the Senator from New Mexico this question? If he had had before him at that time this report in which appears the fact that Karr admitted to a man within the Bureau, first, that he worked for the Daily Worker—and it must be remembered that in order for one to work for the Daily Worker he must be a Communist; second, that he worked for the party organizer as a rewrite man; if the Senator had had before him the report which shows that Karr admitted that he had attended meetings of the Communist Party; that he had joined the Young Communist League; that he had admitted considerable lecturing along the Communist Party line, some of which was under the sponsorship of Lowell Wakefield, and had collaborated on a number of writing jobs with Mr. Spivak, both well-known Communist writers; if the Senator were to find that Karr had admitted having been given the task of smearing Martin Dies, head of the Un-

American Activities Committee—if the Senator knew he had admitted all that, would not the Senator have believed that this man, regardless of how many persons said he was a nice young man, under no circumstances was qualified to work for this Government?

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, I did not so understand the testimony that was read. I thought it was a statement by an examiner of the Civil Service Commission that one FBI agent had testified that he had received certain information. I should want to read the whole file before passing judgment on it. That is all I say. And when one reads the whole file one may get another impression.

For example, this is close to Christmas, and I know everyone would like to do something nice for the American Red Cross. Mr. David Karr has addressed to me a letter under date of December 18, thanking me for the few brief words I put into the RECORD, and then says with reference to the charges made against him: "(1) I will pay \$10,000 to the American Red Cross, or any other charity he"—meaning the Senator from Wisconsin—"designates, if he can prove I was ever on the staff of the Daily Worker for 2 minutes, let alone 2 years."

I think there is a chance to pick up \$10,000 of easy money for the American Red Cross, and so far as I am concerned, that would clear up the situation.

Mr. McCARTHY. May I ask the Senator from New Mexico, would it satisfy him if he knew that Karr worked for the Daily Worker? Would it satisfy the Senator if we had Karr's employer, Howard C. Rushmore, come over here and swear under oath, as he has, that he employed Karr, "and I could not have employed him unless I had seen his party card"? Would it satisfy the Senator if in addition to that the Senator had in his hand page 5 of this secret report in which it appears that when interviewed by the Civil Service Commission on July 14, 1942, Mr. Karr admitted that he was a reporter, that he worked for the Daily Worker, and admitted that he attended Communist meetings? He, of course, said he was not a member of the party; that he merely went to the meetings as a reporter, but he admitted that he attended meetings of the Young Communist League. Would it satisfy the Senator if in addition to that he had in his hands reports to the effect that Karr admitted that he was a rewrite man for the party organizer? Is there anything further I

can do to qualify the Red Cross for that \$10,000? Must I have his picture receiving the party card—

Mr. ANDERSON. No.

Mr. McCARTHY. What more can we show than his own admission to the Chief Examiner of the Civil Service Commission that he is a Communist? He is not only a Communist but he is high in the Communist Party organization. I ask the Senator what more proof I can give him?

Mr. ANDERSON. I tried to answer that; that is to see all the evidence, when the FBI file is not here, sir. The Civil Service file is not here. If all the FBI file or all the Civil Service file were here, that would reveal why the Civil Service Commission listed him eligible for Federal employment. That is what I am trying to say.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one more question?

Mr. ANDERSON. I am glad to. First, I will say I have tried my very best to state that this is a matter upon which, some years ago, I spent weeks and months, to the detriment of my health, and I do not intend to spend additional weeks and months upon it to the detriment of my health. I only was trying to explain how it was possible for a group in the House of Representatives, presented with certain information to decide that there was nothing quite so bad about this young man as had been represented by witnesses. I am not trying to go into all the material the Senator from Wisconsin presents. I am not going to be qualified to pass upon it, and I do not desire to pass upon it. I only say that every time one of these cases came in I spent hours trying to study the information, and the only cases that we certified—we would have certified more of them if the matter had continued—were the Dodd, Watson, and Lovett cases. Now it comes down to some very fine hair lines. I admit that the line between Goodwin and Frederick Schumann was very close. Yes, the committee, Republicans and Democrats alike, cleared Frederick Schumann by unanimous vote and we condemned Goodwin Watson by unanimous vote, Republicans and Democrats alike.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for two more questions?

Mr. ANDERSON. I yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. First with relation to Frederick Schumann. Was the Senator aware at the time he cleared Frederick Schumann that Frederick Schumann had belonged to 35 organizations which had been officially labeled either by the Attorney General or by a congressional committee as front-support organizations doing the work of the Communist Party? Was the Senator aware of that, No. 1? And, No. 2—

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes; and not only was I aware of that, but the Republican members of the committee were aware of it when the matter was presented to the leading members of the Republican Party of the House of Representatives, including JOHN TABER, who is as far from the Communists as anybody could ever be. I was aware of it.

Mr. McCARTHY. One more question. The Senator is talking about this investigation of Karr. Did the Senator ever see the complete FBI files on David Karr?

Mr. ANDERSON. I think not.

Mr. President, I have read through the letter from David Karr to me. I do not think it says anything in an unkind fashion toward the junior Senator from Wisconsin. If it had, I would not want it printed in the RECORD, because I do not think it is proper so to use the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the letter printed in the RECORD at this point. I will say to the Senator from Wisconsin that if there is anything in it which he thinks in any way is a reflection on him, I want that taken out, because I do not wish to use the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD as a medium of talking about my fellow Members of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, although I shall not do so, let me say to the Senator that I have been called rather descriptive names on the floor of the Senate. If one or two more are added in that letter, they will not bother me at all.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the letter will be printed in the RECORD.

The letter is as follows:

NEW ROCHELLE, N. Y., December 18, 1950.  
Hon. CLINTON P. ANDERSON,  
United States Senate,  
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: I have noted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD your gracious reply to Senator McCARTHY's statements concerning me. I well recall the fair-minded way in which you disposed of these charges after careful investigation by the Kerr committee, of which you were a member in 1943. At that time, every statement now reechoed by the Senator from Wisconsin was fully answered. As I recall it, the full records of the Un-American Activities Committee, the FBI, and the Civil Service Commission were placed at your disposal. The full security clearance you gave me further stimulated my eagerness to work for the democratic process.

As to the Senator from Wisconsin's rehash:

(1) I will pay \$10,000 to the American Red Cross, or any other charity he designates, if he can prove I was ever on the staff of the Daily Worker for 2 minutes, let alone 2 years.

(2) In 1938 I wrote a number of articles on Nazi activities in the United States. As

a free-lance writer I sold these wherever I could. Several appeared in *The Fight* and several in *Equality*. They attacked the German-American Bund and the Ku Klux Klan. As I recall it, a number of prominent writers, including Members of Congress, Dorothy Thompson, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, and many others wrote for these magazines at the same time. It was not until several years later that it was revealed that these magazines had been converted into Communist-controlled fronts. I had long since severed my association with them.

On Friday, I challenged Senator McCARTHY to repeat his charges off the floor without immunity so that they could be tested in the courts. It seems to me that an attempt to hash over these discredited charges, item by item, in these critical days is a waste of the United States Senate's valuable time. As for my own situation, I believe it would best be handled in the courts. The greatest service that could be done for me at this time, while at the same time serving the best interests of the Senate and the Nation, would be to get McCARTHY to meet me in court.

Very sincerely yours,

DAVID KARR.

JANUARY 5, 1951

## Statement on Drew Pearson and Violation of United States Espionage Laws

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I should like to invite the attention of the Armed Services Committee, the Justice Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to what would appear to be one of the greatest breaches of security that perhaps we have ever witnessed during wartime. I read a story in a local paper last Saturday which, if true—I repeat, which, if true—means that we have a man in the decoding room in the Pentagon who is guilty of high treason. If this story is true, it means that we have had a breach of security which endangers the lives of millions of American young men and which endangers the very life of this Nation. Before going into the facts, I should like to recite a bit of history.

One of the outstanding military men in Japan was Admiral Yamamoto. He it was who did much of the planning for Pearl Harbor, at which Japan from a standpoint of destruction of shipping won the greatest battle against a navy of all times.

It will be recalled that Yamamoto bragged that he would dictate the terms of the peace treaty from Washington. In the spring of 1943, Yamamoto was making a survey of what then appeared to be the impregnable Japanese chain of island defenses strung across the Pacific. As Yamamoto's very heavily escorted and guarded plane took off from the airfield at Kahili on April 7, 1943, a few American fighter planes dropped out of the clouds and headed directly for Yamamoto's plane. The American fighters were outnumbered more than 10 to 1. They did not waste any time on the Japanese fighters, but headed right through them and tore Yamamoto's plane to shreds and within a matter of seconds it exploded in the air. This was possible only because we knew exactly the time his plane was taking off, exactly the type of protection it would have, where it would be in the formation, and so forth.

Because of the brilliant planning of Yamamoto many Americans had already died. Had this brilliant strategist lived, many American boys who are living

today would be dead. Had he lived many Japanese who are dead today would undoubtedly be living.

At the time, of course, we could not notify the American people just how this brilliantly successful attack upon and destruction of Japan's most valuable military man could have been timed to the second. Since then, however, it has been made public knowledge that we had broken Japan's code and from radio messages picked up and decoded we could plot his trip all through the Pacific and decide the ideal time for his destruction.

The Senate will recall the Battle of Midway at which time we once and for all broke the back of Japan's seapower. Since then many papers and periodicals have carried the story, which, of course, could not be made public at the time, namely, that we had broken the Japanese code and that this breaking of the code contributed vastly to this great victory over the Japanese Navy, which marked perhaps more than anything else the turning point of the war.

Some of the unsung heroes of the war were the men who worked night and day in our decoding rooms. Those unsung heroes saved the lives of a vast number of American young men. To them should go substantial credit for the crippling of the Japanese Fleet at Midway and for destroying a substantial part of the brains of the Japanese military when Yamamoto's plane disintegrated over the Kahili Airfield, and also for a great number of other American victories.

It is not necessary to tell this Senate or the country how inconceivably painstaking, almost beyond words, is the job of breaking the enemy's code. The young men who work at this task are called cryptanalysts. One of the greatest helps that can be given them in finding the key to a code is possession of at least one of the enemy's messages, both encoded and decoded. If one of our cryptanalysts can be handed the same message in code and also decoded, a long and important step is taken toward breaking the enemy's code. For that reason the strictest possible rules of top secrecy are imposed upon the handling

of any message which has been sent in code. Our military realizes that if even the most unimportant message which has been sent in code falls into the hands of the enemy after it has been decoded that may well break our code, which during wartime would undoubtedly result in military disaster as it did for the Japanese.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from Connecticut?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield for a question only.

Mr. McMAHON. I desire to ask a question. Does the Senator recollect how the story of the breaking of the Japanese code was made known during World War II?

Mr. McCARTHY. I frankly do not. But I wish the Senator would allow me to finish. I think this is too important a story for us to go back and get into a discussion of the question of how it was made public. The fact is that we can safely talk about it now. It has been made public. It is public information now, that we were eminently successful because of having broken the Japanese code; and we all know now that many American boys are living today because we broke that code. We know that if the code had not been broken, thousands and perhaps hundreds of thousands of American boys would have died. I merely mention that to point out why it has been made such a grave crime to assist the enemy in breaking our code.

Now, as I say, if one of the young men who work in the decoding room, one of the unsung heroes, can get the enemy's message, both in code and decoded, he has then won a tremendous victory; he is then well on the road toward breaking the code.

In our entire area of combat operations only two officers were entrusted with the important task of encoding and decoding. If either of them had made a decoded message available to anyone except the commander to whom it was directed, he would have been subject to immediate court martial and the most severe penalty. In fact, I cannot think of any document which was guarded more carefully and destroyed more quickly when it had served its purpose than a decoded message.

Any man who would sneak from our decoding rooms at the Pentagon secret messages that have been decoded and then make those messages available to the enemy would be guilty of the most reprehensible moral and legal crime against the United States. Under our laws he would be guilty of treason.

In that connection I would like to call the Senate's attention to an article appearing in the local Daily Worker, the Washington Post, on December 30, 1950, an article written by the great smear artist and mouthpiece of Moscow, Drew Pearson. In it he gave the dates upon which top secret coded messages were sent from MacArthur's intelligence headquarters to the Pentagon. Then he gives what he claims to be the messages decoded and verbatim. For example he states:

On December 6, just 2 days after MacArthur had announced his million-man Chinese army estimate, General Willoughby cabled as follows:

"Units believed to be on Eighth Army front are, west to east: Elements Fiftieth CCF (Chinese Communist Field) Army; elements Sixty-sixth Chinese CCF Army; Thirty-ninth CCF Army; Fortieth CCF Army; Thirty-eighth CCF Army; Forty-second CCF Army."

Again he states:

In mid-December, General Willoughby cabled the following description of Chinese arms equipment: "Battalion CCF Army with three grenades and rifle or Russian sub-machine gun per man and 300 North Korean Army stragglers crossed Taedong."

And again he says:

Another of Willoughby's intelligence cables to Washington about mid-December is interesting: "Lack of CCF on Eighth Army front. Due to deep withdrawal executed by Eighth Army, it is evident that enemy, lacking any great degree of mobility, has been unable to regain contact."

And another quote:

Another of General Willoughby's reports at about the same time states: "Those well versed in Chinese military operations stress an inherent lack of elasticity in planning and similar inelasticity in staff and command structure. Such deficiencies can only result in stereotyped campaigns, and hold offensive action to slow succession of limited objectives."

"It follows, then," continued General Willoughby, "that CCF high command, being unable to predict degree of success for his initial offensive of November 28, was confronted by the problem of immediately realigning his forces for the continuation of the offensive; or of continuing to objectives according to their set schedule."

If Pearson is telling the truth and correctly quoted top secret messages which go from General MacArthur's headquarters to the Pentagon, he is rendering the enemy a service of untold value and is endangering the lives of every American boy either in our Armed Forces or about to be drafted. If he is telling the truth, it means that someone in the Pentagon is stealing top-secret messages and passing them to the enemy and is thereby guilty of high treason.

This is a matter which should receive the immediate attention, not only of the Army but of the Armed Services Committees of both Houses and of the Justice Department. This Congress cannot stand idly by and allow a traitor access to the files in the decoding room in the Pentagon.

One of two things is true—either this man is telling the truth, and I should hate to have to accuse him of that—either he is telling the truth, in which case it means that we have in our decoding room a man guilty of high treason, a man who should be court-martialed instantly and be subjected, of course, to the most severe penalties which are provided; or, if he is lying—if again this is the work, I may say the typical work, of a degenerate liar, then that also must be exposed, because by printing the alleged verbatim intelligence reports in this attempt to destroy a great intelligence officer, General Willoughby, he is attempting to sap and destroy the morale of our Army, which, again, during wartime, certainly approaches treason.

I would like also to call attention to another aspect of this article. Let me quote again from the local "Daily Worker," the Washington Post:

If all these six Chinese armies were of full strength with no casualties—which is doubtful—the total Chinese force which sent the UN Eighth Army into a 120-mile retreat in less than 2 weeks was only 96,000 men.

This is, of course, a deliberate falsehood, one which can easily be detected by any man who knows the first thing about the organization of an army, but the type of falsehood which can greatly disturb the American wives and mothers who are not expected to understand the make-up of an army. Pearson, who has known not one hour of war, claims, however, to be a military expert. Therefore, he should know that the "type" army contains 3 corps and that each corps contains 3 divisions; that a divi-

sion contains 15,000 to 18,000 men. In other words, an army would contain from 135,000 to 162,000 men, which would mean that 6 armies would run close to a million men, rather than 96,000. There is, of course, considerable indication that when the Chinese refer to an army they actually are referring to an oversize corps. Pearson, however, sets a Chinese army at 16,000, which is less than the size of an American division, which even a private in the Army can tell you is ridiculous to the point of being ludicrous.

The purpose of this lie is obvious as you read the article. It is to create the impression that actually our young men outnumber the Chinese and that, therefore, there is something wrong with our fighting forces, or they would not be retreating before inferior numbers of Chinese.

This is a part of the Communist Party line attack upon General MacArthur. General MacArthur must be destroyed if international communism is to win out in Asia. They know that MacArthur must be destroyed before they can create a Red Pacific—hence this deliberate, degenerate type of lying.

Now I assume that this additional exposure of this man, who claims to be working with someone who is stealing American secrets from the decoding room at the Pentagon—a man who is then making those secret messages available verbatim to the enemy so they may break our code—I assume this exposure will be referred to by some of the bleeding hearts of the radical wing of the press as interfering with freedom of the press.

It is high time that the American people distinguish between freedom of the press and license to poison and pollute the waterholes of information at which 152,000,000 American people drink. It is time to quit confusing freedom of the press with prostitution of the press.

Freedom of the press never did carry the right to bring into the readers' homes the mouthings of an exposed, degenerate liar. Two weeks ago, I quoted to the Senate the highest type of witnesses we could find who had exposed this man as a deliberate liar on 45 different occasions. Those witnesses ranged all the way from two Presidents to outstanding men in the Senate and House from both sides of the aisle.

Does it interfere with freedom of the press to call the attention of the publishers and editors throughout the coun-

try to the fact that when they carry this man in their papers, they are in effect stamping with approval deliberate lies.

To my good friends who say "we must present both sides of the question," I say, "Yes, both sides of the question, but that does not involve presenting lies and serving them up as the truth."

Freedom of the press, perhaps, is the greatest bulwark in a democracy. I certainly hope we have freedom of the press in this Nation for all times to come.

The quickest way to lose that freedom of the press is to prostitute it. The best way for editors and publishers to endanger that freedom of the press is to carry in their columns the work of an exposed, known, deliberate liar. The 45 Senators and Congressmen and the 2 Presidents who went out of their way to expose that liar, so that editors and publishers would know what they were buying, have actually rendered a great service toward assuring freedom of the press. Removing deliberate, degenerate liars from the

news columns does not endanger freedom of the press, it protects it.

Mr. President, I wish to say something else now for Mr. Pearson's benefit.

The other day he sent a man to me to ask me not to use certain photostats which somehow he found I had in my files. He explained why he did not want them used.

I desire to assure him that he is wasting his time sending anyone to me, that if I do not use those photostats, it is only because I refuse to sink to his level in exposing to the American people exactly what type of man this individual is. I intend to continue to expose him, to continue to show he is the mouthpiece of Moscow. I intend to continue showing what a great danger he is to freedom of the press. But I tell him here and now that if he sends another man to my office, either with threats or promises in regard to the use of those photostats, then on the next day those photostats will all be presented to the Senate.

MARCH 14, 1951

## American Foreign Policy

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, while I hesitate to differ with the great minds which have been participating in the great debate, the thinking seems to have fallen principally into two definite grooves. I certainly do not intend to question that each of the two lines of thought has much to recommend it, but I feel very strongly that basically both schools of thought fall into one extreme fatal error. I should like to discuss that area of error at this time.

### SUDDEN AND SECRET CHANGE IN CHINA POLICY

During World War II, much of which I spent in the Pacific with the Marine Air Corps as a combat intelligence officer—a Pacific which I came to know better than my own backyard—I was more and more impressed with the wisdom and farseeing intelligence of those great statesmen who long ago disappeared into the caverns of history, but who in their time initiated one of the most long-standing and most successful phases of our foreign policy. Our foreign policy for the East has until recently been as unchangeable as this Nation's belief in justice. It was the policy of maintaining a neutral friendly China at all costs. This was based on the theory that if the vast teeming millions of China were friendly to the United States and remained neutral, no power from Asia or the Pacific could threaten our western shore. Those statesmen of the past and their successors down to the ill-fated years of the late 1930's had one major aim in all the Pacific—a neutral and friendly China, both for the protection of America and for peace in the Pacific.

### PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN

When the war ended and I got back to this country, I was very forcibly impressed by the fact that this foreign policy was being changed without the knowledge, consent, or approval of the American people, and was being changed without either of the major political parties having ever advocated the change which was taking place. I, and countless other Americans, discovered a traitorous and insidiously clever campaign of propaganda to persuade us the

Americans, that our friends were our enemies and our enemies were our friends. It was a campaign to persuade us on the one hand that all the leaders friendly to America and to our way of life were corrupt, greedy, degenerate men, and on the other hand that every enemy and every potential enemy represented the new forces of democracy, the new reformers, the new party of land reform, and so forth, ad infinitum.

One of the promises which I made to the people of Wisconsin during my campaign for the United States Senate was to try to do something about this Washington-spearheaded propaganda which threatened the life of America.

When I came to the Senate I found that this attempt to sell out our friends to our enemies was not unnoticed, nor was it going unchallenged. Men like Senator WILLIAM KNOWLAND, Senator STYLES BRIDGES, Congressman WALTER JUDD and others were calling attention to the situation in a most clear-cut and intelligent fashion. It was clear, too, however, that their efforts were getting but scant attention from the American press and the American people. In fact, men like Senator KNOWLAND were having difficulty even getting the courtesy of an answer to their letters directed to the Secretary of State.

While it looked like a hopeless task, I had no choice but to devote my efforts to help those who were fighting against this betrayal of our Nation.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from Nebraska?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I do not wish in any way to detract from the high compliment paid to the Senator from California, the Senator from New Hampshire, or to Representative JUDD, or to the others mentioned by the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin, but his remark, "While it looked like a hopeless task," reminds me that certain of us, prior to the time the Senator came to the Senate, were doing our level best to accomplish what the Senator says he

attempted to do when he first came to the Senate, and we, too, were pretty lonesome at times before the Senator arrived. One of the occasions which I remember very distinctly was when the junior Senator from Nebraska and former Senator Chandler, of Kentucky, attempted to resist the confirmation of the then appointee to the office of Secretary of State because of his having attempted to force a coalition government in Japan. I do not desire to refer to it over and over again, but the vote on that afternoon was a pretty lonesome one, when it came to the fact that we could not resist the nomination of that Secretary of State, who, to my mind, is the architect of the foreign policy which got us into the situation to which the Senator is referring and which existed when he first came to the Senate of the United States.

Mr. McCARTHY. I may say that in mentioning the Senator from California, the Senator from New Hampshire, and Representative Judd, I was not intimating that they were the only ones who were taking a major part in the fight.

Mr. WHERRY. I understand.

Mr. McCARTHY. I was merely mentioning them as typical of the outstanding men on both sides of the aisle who were calling attention to the situation. I should like to compliment the Senator from Nebraska—

Mr. WHERRY. I merely meant to indicate that before the Senator came to the Senate an effort was being made. I did not in any way wish to detract from the efforts which were made by the Senator from Wisconsin at the time he came to the Senate, but to say that time, and prior even to the time that some of those mentioned by the Senator came to the Senate and to the House, this fight was being made against the architect of our foreign policy, who, I think, was responsible then and is responsible now for the position in which we find ourselves, not only at home, but among the other nations of the world.

Mr. McCARTHY. I may say that I certainly want to compliment the Senator from Nebraska for having recognized in Dean Acheson, long before some of the rest of us, the dangerous man that he is. I shall forever be ashamed of the fact that I voted for the confirmation of Dean Acheson.

#### TRACHERY OR INCOMPETENCE?

The first question which naturally occurred to me—as it would to most Americans—was, Why do the men who are attempting to betray us act thus? Why do men who have been given the highest positions this Nation has to offer, plot the downfall of this Nation? The question is: Do they surreptitiously and cleverly plan to sabotage what has so long been a successful American foreign policy in the East? Do they do that because they honestly think it would be good for us to have an unfriendly China or is it because their loyalties are other than with America? In other words, are their actions the result of treachery or incompetence? I decided then it was a combination of the two, plus, in some cases, opportunism.

#### BEACHHEAD ALREADY ESTABLISHED IN THE COUNTRY BY THREE COMMUNIST DIVISIONS

In searching for the answer to why there are traitors high in this Government, it must be remembered that communism has already the equivalent of three Communist military divisions in this country. The authority for this statement is none other than our Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover. He estimates the number of Communists in this country to be around 55,000. Those are the Communists carried by the FBI in its files as members of the Communist Party—in other words, the equivalent of three military divisions. Every one of the 55,000 has taken an oath of loyalty to Stalin which is an oath of disloyalty to the United States. Each one of those 55,000 works for the same things that the head of the Chinese Communist Party, the head of the Russian Army, and the men of the Kremlin are working for.

#### REDS AIM FOR TOP GOVERNMENT JOBS

That the members of those three divisions would aim for the highest places in this Government is not the exception, but the rule. It follows as the night follows the day that high Government positions are their most logical targets. Some of them succeeded as we well know, in arriving at the very highest level of Government. This is attested to by the convictions of the Hisses, the Remingtons, and the Marzanis.

Most of the 55,000 Communists remain unnamed and unknown to the American people. Once they are known, once they are publicly labeled as the traitors they are, they cannot then do too much damage any longer. However, one does not need to know the name and card number of a Communist to know of his presence.

For example, when the Yalta agreement was drafted by Hiss, he had not at that time been exposed publicly, though he had already been exposed to the Secretary of State 5 or 6 years before. For example, when the Yalta agreement was drafted by Hiss, he had been exposed to the Secretary of State by the FBI, in a report which went to the Secretary of State in 1943, but he had not been exposed publicly. When the Yalta agreement became known to our Ambassador to Poland, Arthur Bliss Lane, he recognized that America had been knifed in the back and that treason had been committed, even though he did not know that Hiss was a Communist. At that time, it will be recalled, Arthur Bliss Lane said of the agreement: "Every line speaks a complete surrender to Stalin."

Likewise, when one sees the phony planning—and I use these words advisedly, Mr. President—for phony resistance to communism in both Europe and Asia, he does not need to have the names of the Communist planners in order to know that they are there. One knows that traitors are at work. One sees the political fingerprints of the Communists on every document drafted. One can see the footprints of Communist betrayals down every path they travel.

As I named those who left a trail of Communist fingerprints, Communist footprints, and Communist calling cards wherever they went, I was accused of smearing innocent people because I could not swear that I saw them attend Communist meetings or that I had attended such meetings with them. That is the hue and cry that the three divisions and their camp followers always raise when they are in danger of being exposed. Remember when J. Edgar Hoover says that there are 55,000 actual active members of the Communist Party in this country, he is not indulging in any speculation or guesswork. And remember, too, that for each of the sworn party members of the three Communist divisions, there are at least 10 camp followers with varying degrees of

loyalty to the party. Those camp followers in the press, radio, and motion pictures have done deadly damage to this Nation in aiding the conspiracy of the three active Communist divisions at work in America.

#### EXPOSING THE ARCHITECTS OF DISASTER

As we know, while some of our very able Senators and Congressmen were attempting to focus attention upon our disastrous foreign policy, I was attempting to focus attention upon the individuals in the three Communist divisions who were responsible for this foreign policy—on their motives, their activities, and their backgrounds—with the hope that in this way their treachery could be unmistakably spotlighted and a halt called to their evil machinations.

#### NECESSITY OF NEW FOREIGN POLICY

Today, rather than discuss those individual traitors or incompetent individuals, I would like to deal briefly with the broad picture of what I feel should be our foreign policy, if America is to live. This, Mr. President, may well be our last chance. Unless we chart a foreign policy which is truly by and for America and free civilization, there may well be recorded in the corridors of time the epitaph of all western civilization.

We cannot intelligently chart the future without keeping an eye on the past.

In charting our foreign policy, a few simple facts must obviously be kept in mind: One, that the only threat to the freedom of America today or in the foreseeable future is international communism; two, that the leaders of the Communist Party of 1951 have publicly dedicated themselves to the conquest of the world, including America. The only thing indefinite about their aims is the time schedule. That is the only part of their aims which has not been made public.

#### COMMUNIST STEPS TO CONQUER AMERICA

There is nothing secret about the final aim of international communism, namely, the conquest of the world. There is nothing secret about their intermediate aims. There is nothing secret about the preliminary steps which they contemplate as a prelude to the conquest of America. Those preliminary steps are set forth just as clearly as were Hitler's aims set forth in Mein Kampf.

Anyone charting our foreign policy obviously must be acquainted with all possible details of the Communist program.

One cannot fight something unless he knows what he is fighting.

In this connection it is rather interesting to note that in April of 1947, Senator STYLES BRIDGES wrote that the then head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, John Carter Vincent, was following the plans of the Comintern and that his objectives were identically the same as the publicly stated objectives of the Communist Party. That fact was called to the attention of the Secretary of State. The answer to that letter by Dean Acheson was disturbing in the extreme. Here is what Dean Acheson said: "My top adviser on Chinese affairs advises me that he has never read the two Communist documents under reference. I have never read them myself." Incredible. Incredible.

TWO MAIN COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED WITH STATE DEPARTMENT ASSISTANCE

Let us briefly review the main objectives of the Communist Party as proclaimed to all its loyal members. The first objective, as we know, was the creation of a Red Poland. The next objective was the creation of a Red China. As Lenin said, "He who controls China will control the world."

ACHESON LOAN TO COMMUNIST POLAND

Mr. President, I will not take the time of the Senate to dwell upon how we aided Communist Russia to obtain those two objectives. Recent history of this sordid picture is too fresh in our minds. There is no need to go over the fact that while the battle was touch and go between the Communists and anti-Communists in Poland, Dean Acheson, against the vigorous opposition of Arthur Bliss Lane, approved a \$90,000,000 loan to the Communists in Poland. There is no need to dwell upon the fact that \$50,000,000 of that \$90,000,000 went to arm the secret police in Poland and was the major factor in the creation of a Red Poland. There is no need to dwell upon the fact that Acheson's old law firm represented Communist Poland in this deal, while the great red dean of fashion, himself, was Assistant Secretary of State passing upon the loan.

There is no need to mention that Donald Hiss, who had been named as a Russian spy at the time Alger Hiss was named, had been taken into the Acheson law firm and that he, Donald Hiss, represented the Communists in Poland. There is no need to dwell on the fact that Dean Acheson appeared

before a committee of the Senate a year ago last January and said that as Assistant Secretary of State he had the power to approve or disapprove the loan. There is no need to dwell upon the fact that he admitted at that time that his old law firm received a cut of more than \$50,000 from the Communists when the loan was made. In fairness to Dean Acheson it should be stated that he said he had gotten no part of that fee himself. His name was on the letterhead and his name was on the office door, but he said he was no longer a member of the firm.

HISS GUIDING LIGHT AT YALTA

No need to point out that at Yalta a dying President had at his right hand as his guiding genius, the traitor, Alger Hiss. No need to remind you, Mr. President, that at Yalta the sell-out to Communist Russia was so great that the President's own Ambassador to Poland had this to say about the Yalta agreement: "As I looked at the document, I could not believe my eyes. Every line spoke a complete surrender to Stalin."

HISS TREASON KNOWN TO ACHESON BEFORE YALTA

At this time, Hiss had not been publicly exposed as a Communist agent. He had, however, been named by Whitaker Chambers 7 years before as a member of his Communist-spy ring and the FBI had furnished to the State Department a rather complete report on Hiss' Communist activities. The Assistant Secretary of State, Adolph Berle, testified under oath that before Hiss was sent to Yalta he called Acheson's attention to the fact that Hiss had been named as a Communist spy. Despite this—or perhaps because of this—Hiss was selected by the State Department Yalta crowd to sit at the right hand of and exert what has been referred to as a Svengali-like influence over Secretary of State Stettinius, who shortly thereafter died.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. Was that language used by a State Department employee who was skilled and who knew what was going on in the Department?

Mr. McCARTHY. It was.

Mr. FERGUSON. That has been put into the record, has it not?

Mr. McCARTHY. It has.

STATE DEPARTMENT ADOPTS COMMUNIST POLICY

No need to review the clever shift of our foreign policy to conform with the Communist objectives in Asia. It is perhaps sufficient to note that Earl Browder, long head of the Communist Party, on page 687 of the record of the hearings before the unlamented Tydings committee, stated:

The policy—

Senators should listen to this—

which we (the Communists) had advocated was substantially incorporated into the policy of the United States Government—

Commencing in October 1942.

MARSHALL UNDER STATE DEPARTMENT ORDERS AIDS CHINESE COMMUNISTS

No need to remind the country that when Marshall was sent to China with secret State Department orders, the Communists at that time were bottled up in two areas and were fighting a losing battle, but that because of those orders the situation was radically changed in favor of the Communists. Under those orders, as we know, Marshall embargoed all arms and ammunition to our allies in China. He forced the opening of the Nationalist-held Kalgan Mountain pass into Manchuria, to the end that the Chinese Communists gained access to the mountains of captured Japanese equipment. No need to tell the country about how Marshall tried to force Chiang Kai-shek to form a partnership government with the Communists.

There is no need to tell the Senate that when Pat Hurley came back from China he testified that he had documents to show that at the time Marshall was saying to Chiang Kai-shek, "Unless you take the Communists into partnership, you will not get another ounce of gunpowder," the same State Department crowd was saying to the Chinese Communists, "Don't enter the partnership unless you have complete control of the Chinese Government." That is the most weird and traitorous double deal that I believe any of us has ever heard of.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. Is it the Senator's view that Secretary Marshall was pro-Communist in his point of view?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am not concerned with the workings of General Marshall's mind. I am concerned with his acts. I am concerned with the fact that Mar-

shall went to China under State Department orders. At the time he went there, there was a badly riddled Communist army of 300,000. When Marshall left China, as a result of the orders which Marshall put into effect, the Communist army had grown from 300,000 to 2,000,000 men. As I say, I am not concerned with delving into the mind of General Marshall. I am concerned with the results of his action.

One of the things he did was to force the Chinese Nationalists to open up Kalgan Mountain pass into Manchuria. The end result was that the Chinese Communists were able to go into Manchuria. They were then given, as a gift from Russia, mountains of captured Japanese equipment.

There is no question about the fact that Marshall himself said, "As Chief of Staff I armed 29 anti-Communist divisions in China. Now, with the stroke of the pen, I disarm them." Those are Marshall's own words. The stroke of the pen to which he referred was the placing of an embargo upon all arms and materials going into China.

At the time the war with Japan ended we had stored in India vast mountains of arms and equipment, and vast mountains of ammunition. Some of it had been earmarked as lend-lease to China. A part of it had not been, but it was all available to our Chinese allies.

What happened? Under State Department order, arms and ammunition were prevented from going to China. There was a provision that ammunition could be shipped to China if it was first demilitarized. The method of demilitarizing gunpowder is to explode it. In other words, they could ship the bombs from India to China if they were first exploded.

What happened? The Army set about the task of demilitarizing a vast amount of ammunition which had been paid for by American citizens. They did not have sufficient experienced personnel. The explosions were so great that nine American soldiers were killed, together with 54 or 55 Indians.

The Army then loaded the remaining ammunition into Liberty ships, and dumped 120,000 tons of ammunition into the Bay of Bengal. That was ammunition which was easily available to our allies in China. It was dumped into the Bay of Bengal, instead of going to our allies in China, because of the State De-

partment's order put in force by General Marshall.

Mr. MORSE. Irrespective of what might have been in General Marshall's mind, about which the Senator from Wisconsin says he is not expressing any opinion here today, is it the Senator's opinion that the effect of the Marshall program was to be helpful to the Communists?

Mr. McCARTHY. Tremendously so. The effect of what Marshall did in China under State Department orders—I am not today discussing whether he obeyed those orders as a good soldier, or whether he believed in what he was doing—was to put the Communists in control of China. I should not say that that was the result of what Marshall did. It was the result of what the State Department did. Marshall was a servant of the State Department, and he followed out its orders.

Mr. MORSE. Is it the Senator's viewpoint—

Mr. McCARTHY. I may say further that before Marshall went to China the Pentagon drafted proposed instructions which Marshall was to follow. There were three copies drafted. Two of them were sent over to the President, one of which was then sent to the State Department. At that time, from all the information we can obtain, the order contained none of the vicious provisions which the order ultimately contained. The order was redrafted by two men, John Carter Vincent and Dean Gooderham Acheson. We have been attempting to obtain the original order before the redrafting in the State Department. Mysteriously, it has disappeared from the Pentagon. We hope that it may show up some time in the not too distant future. Mysteriously, the other two copies have also disappeared.

I mention this so the Senator may be aware of the fact that while the original order was drafted in the Pentagon, the final order is not the result of the thinking of our military. The final order was the result of the planning in the State Department, principally by two men, Dean Gooderham Acheson, and John Carter Vincent.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. Is it the Senator's viewpoint that the present military program, in its relation to the American foreign policy which General Marshall is so

strongly advocating, is pro-Communist in nature?

Mr. McCARTHY. I intend to discuss that question as I go along. Let me say, first, that the military program in the east—and I do not think we should call it a military program; we should call it what it is, a State Department program—under which Gen. Douglas MacArthur's hands are tied, so that he cannot bomb the enemy until they cross a certain line, a program which denies Douglas MacArthur the use of 500,000 troops on the island of Formosa, certainly is a great aid to the Communists in China; and when we aid the Communists in China, we are aiding international communism. I intend to discuss that particular phase of the program as I go along.

Mr. MORSE. I think the Senator from Wisconsin knows that the junior Senator from Oregon has always taken the position that it was a mistake to try to work out a coalition in China between the Communists and the Nationalist forces, because any coalition with Communists anywhere in the world is simply a program which permits them to take over. That is the only kind of coalition I could imagine with Communists.

The reason I have asked these questions is that I have a little difficulty in my own thinking, and I hope the Senator will clear it up as he goes along. I have a little difficulty in reconciling my thinking with any implication that George Marshall is pro-Communist, when I think of the stand which he takes as Secretary of Defense, in opposition to everything that is Communist, and the warnings he gives us on the Armed Services Committee, that if we do not proceed to strengthen ourselves to a position of maximum security, we run the risk of losing our security from Communist aggression. I know that the Senator wants to be fair, and I want to be fair to these people. We may have differences with them in matters of policy, as I do with General Marshall on certain matters of policy, as I demonstrated last week on the floor of the Senate. But I have great difficulty in believing that General Marshall does not hate communism just as much as does the Senator from Wisconsin, the junior Senator from Oregon, and other Members of this body.

Mr. McCARTHY. I am not going to try to delve into George Marshall's mind. I do intend to recite some of the

actions upon his part, and on the part of others in the State Department, actions which have been disastrous to America and have been eminently successful for Communist Russia.

I know that the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH], one of the most able Members of this body, has difficulty reconciling the fact that a man named Phillip Jessup may be a traitor to this Nation; but as the picture develops, as each day goes by, eminent Members of this body will have less difficulty reconciling themselves to the fact that Jessup and others of the sacred cows are extremely dangerous to America.

It is a very popular thing to condemn communism in general. I have heard people do that all the way from the Atlantic to the Pacific. It is easy to get up and damn communism in general. It is popular to damn exposed Communists. It is easy to make speeches against Alger Hiss, Earl Browder, and Frederick Field. But those people do but little damage to the Nation once they are exposed. The difficult task, the unpleasant task, is to dig out the sacred cows. Men like KARL MUNDT, DICK NIXON and others who dug out Alger Hiss were condemned from hell to breakfast for smearing that poor innocent liberal. Those men were doing the Nation a great service.

I am not speaking now of General Marshall. I know that the Senator from Oregon and other Senators find it difficult to believe that men in high positions in the Government are traitors to the country; but all they need to do is to look at the record. We find Hiss, Marzani, and Remington, three brilliant men who had all the advantages this country could afford. They turned out to be traitors. The Senator and I know that the Hisses, the Remingtons, and the Marzanis do not do their conspiring alone. We know that for every Hiss who is exposed, dozens or hundreds remain unexposed. Exposing those sacred cows is one of the difficult jobs we have to do, and one of the jobs which I have high hopes the McCarran committee may do. I think this Nation can thank God that we have a committee with membership such as it has and with such a chairman as the one who heads that committee, I have high hopes that the McCarran committee may succeed in exposing some of the dangerous sacred cows.

Mr. WELKER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. WELKER. Before the Senator from Oregon addressed some questions to the Senator from Wisconsin the Senator was discussing the destruction of 120,000 tons of ammunition in the East. Am I correctly advised by one of the leading newspapers of the State of Wisconsin that the Senator is in gross error in the statement that 120,000 tons were destroyed; that it was another big lie, and that merely 120 tons of ammunition had been destroyed.

Mr. McCARTHY. That is a very good question. The Senator is correct that the opposition press for some time had quite a bit of fun with the 120,000 tons. It was the result, incidentally, of what was an innocent act upon the part of a Washington correspondent. The Washington correspondent, Peter Edson, a competent young man, checked with the Army and received an answer from them to the effect that only 120 tons had been destroyed. On the basis of that he wrote a story to the effect that McCARTHY was in error; that he multiplied 120 tons by a thousand. Then some of the opposition press, which has been screaming to high heaven since I have been trying to expose Communists, picked up the story and editorialized on it for months.

However, we had the Senate subcommittee under the chairmanship of the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. HOBY] investigate that subject and go into it in detail, and the Army—and this is all a matter of record—wrote that instead of 120,000 tons being an overstatement it was an understatement. They gave us the information as to the number of Liberty Ships that had been used, each carrying 10,000 tons, and that they dumped 120,000 tons of ammunition in the Bay of Bengal; and gave us the additional information about the unfortunate death of about 9 American boys and some 54 or 55 Indians who were exploding the ammunition before they dumped it into the bay. There was in addition other equipment than ammunition which was destroyed.

When we called this to the attention of Peter Edson he had the decency and showed the integrity which a newspaperman should have; he corrected his story, and very frankly admitted that it was an error. An error which apparently was not his fault. That, I might say, differs greatly from the Pearson type of columnists who try to compound error when it is called to their attention.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I desire to thank the Senator from Wisconsin for the historical data given by him. He is calling the attention of the Senate to historical incidents. I believe Senators quite generally will remember them as the Senator sets them forth.

I should like to ask the distinguished Senator if it is not true that the one thing it is needful to point out continuously is the fact that the mission headed by General Wedemeyer, which went to the East in 1947, came back with certain recommendations. The report of the mission, as has been brought out so many times by the Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND] and which the Senator from Wisconsin has mentioned in his speech, contained recommendations which, had they been made public at that time, and had they received the support of the administration, instead of being suppressed, might have averted at least in part the disastrous situation we face today? Is that not true?

Mr. McCARTHY. I think the Senator from Nebraska is 100 percent correct.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator knows, does he not, that the reason the Wedemeyer report, relating to the situation in China and our relations to China, was suppressed was because of the reaction it would have on the "liberal" and the Communist influence in China? Is that not correct?

Mr. McCARTHY. There can be no question about it. I may say that in addition to suppressing the Wedemeyer report, other actions were taken. They were not taken blindly. Consider, for example, when the State Department was getting all set to turn Formosa over to Communist China. Prior to that time the military had recognized that it was very important for us to have Formosa in friendly, or at least, in neutral hands, and had so stated. I believe it was the Senator from California who brought to public view the fact that the State Department sent orders to all personnel, which stated in effect, "Do everything humanly possible to create the impression that Formosa is of no military significance to the United States."

When the officials of the State Department drafted those secret orders—and I believe I am correct in saying that they first refused to make them public when

the Senator from California demanded that they be made public—they knew exactly what they were doing. They knew that they were having a part in the Communists taking over into the Communist camp, 400,000,000 of our allies.

Mr. WHERRY. Is it not true that regardless of the Wedemeyer report, and regardless of what the country should have been told at that time, the policy of the Secretary of State was, as has been said many times, to let the dust settle in China, and that the Department continued that policy until we drifted into the present situation?

Mr. McCARTHY. The policy was, as we know, to turn over all of China, Formosa and Korea, to the Chinese Communists. As the Senator knows, the Secretary of State said publicly on three or four different occasions that neither Korea nor Formosa fell within our defense perimeter, even though he should have known that if Korea and Formosa fell, undoubtedly then all of Asia, including Japan, would fall, which meant all the Pacific area would fall within the Communist orbit.

I had not intended today to discuss whether what has been done was the result of treachery or incompetence, but let us touch upon that briefly.

To show that this was not done blindly, that the Secretary of State knew what he was doing, he appeared before the National Press Club a year ago last January at an off-the-record discussion. Luckily someone was taking down what was said, so it was not off the record. He was discussing the Communist victory in China. These are his words:

A new day has dawned in Asia.

Here is the man who has been hired to lead the fight against international communism, when the Communists have taken over 400,000,000 of our allies. He said:

A new day has dawned in Asia.

Just a month before that his top adviser in the East, his great and good friend Owen Lattimore, had this to say, referring to the Communist victory:

It represents the opening of limitless horizons of hope.

I think we should keep those things in mind when wondering whether the sell-out was the result of treachery or incompetence.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. They cannot complain about ignorance. They cannot claim they did not know the facts. The Secretary of State knew all about what was happening. Even though he knew all the facts, though he had the reports and had the necessary contacts, yet he pursued the policy that has led us into the difficult situation we are now facing.

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes. The same thing holds true with respect to Poland. One of the two major aims of international communism was to get a Red Poland pointing like a dagger at the heart of Europe before undertaking to pick off the rest of Europe. The Communists needed that broad military highway into Europe. When Donald Hiss, representing the Acheson law firm, which in turn was representing the Communist element in Poland, was applying for the \$90,000,000 loan, Arthur Bliss Lane sent back repeated statements to the State Department. I believe I can quote him almost verbatim. He said:

With the greatest earnestness with which I am capable, I beg the State Department not to loan American dollars to the Communists in Poland at this time.

He said:

If and when freedom of the press is restored, if and when the activities of the Communist secret police come to an end, if and when Americans are released from Communist jails, then and only then should we even remotely consider loaning American dollars to Poland.

But Acheson, who would not turn his back on Alger Hiss, did not turn his back on Donald Hiss' request. The result was the loan was made to Poland, and Arthur Bliss Lane, who could not stomach the sell-out, resigned and wrote a story which is extremely interesting, a story of the secret betrayal of Poland. It is entitled "I Saw Poland Betrayed."

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. The Senator has raised certain points with respect to the Far East. The Senator from Michigan has knowledge of two particular facts which he thinks fits in at this point in the RECORD. I wonder whether the Senator from Wisconsin will yield long enough to let me put them into the RECORD? I will use the shortest amount of time I can.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I shall be glad to yield to the Senator from Michigan for that purpose, with the understanding that I shall not lose the floor by doing so.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOLLAND in the chair). Is there objection to the Senator from Wisconsin yielding to the Senator from Michigan without losing his right to the floor? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. FERGUSON. The Senator from Wisconsin has related that the Secretary of State announced on the 18th of January, or some time in the first part of last year, that Formosa was not in the sphere of strategic bases or places for the United States of America to defend. I ask the Senator whether it is not true that on the 5th day of January the President announced that, so far as the United States is concerned, we were not going to help Formosa militarily in defense of that island. I ask the Senator whether he knows that as a matter of fact on or about the 25th day of October the previous year the Government of the United States notified the Nationalist Chinese Government, in a secret message, that we were not going to do anything, so far as military aid was concerned, to help the Nationalist Government of China defend Formosa?

The Senator from Michigan feels at this time that he can give this information to the Senate of the United States. He obtained these facts personally from the Vice President, then Acting President Li, of the Nationalist Government, while he was in the hospital in Hong Kong. There is no doubt about the secret message having been sent. Of course, the Nationalist Government could not give it out at that time, because its officials were fearful that if it was learned by the Communists it would be an invitation—as it in fact was—for an attack to be made upon Formosa.

I do not know whether anything concerning that message has been placed in the RECORD up to this time, but it should be a part of the RECORD, because it is a fact. It is an important fact, because it proves the State Department document, which came to light some months later and which purported to discount Formosa's strategic importance, actually had great significance despite the Department's attempt to dismiss it as unimportant and without design. Further it proves how grossly the bipartisan foreign policy was being breached because

most certainly there had been no consultation with Congress on this very important matter.

I want to preface my second fact, briefly. The Senator has indicated that it is not a question of what was in the mind of General Marshall, personally, as his personal thoughts, when he carried to China the message that the Chinese Nationalist Government was to cooperate with the Chinese Communists and that the two governments were to be consolidated. My point is material to the question of whether or not the United States was attempting as a matter of policy to combine the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists, and to the very vital question of whether that possibly could have succeeded in our interest, having had knowledge that any attempt to combine one government, no matter what it might be, with a Communist government, would only result in the coalition government becoming a Communist government, because there can be no cooperation between the two. Bitter experience in Eastern Europe was enough to provide that knowledge.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, let me interrupt at this point to state to the Senator, in that connection—and this is a matter of record, although of course it was secret then—that when, as the Senator knows, General Marshall was saying to Chiang Kai-shek, "You must take the Communists into partnership; if you do not do that, we will make it impossible for you to fight the Communists in China," at the same time, according to our Ambassador Hurley, in China, the same State Department groups were advising the Chinese Communists, "Do not form a partnership unless you have sufficient numbers in the"—I do not remember the name of the law-making body—"to exert a veto power over the Chinese Government." In other words, while they were saying to Chiang Kai-shek, "We will make it impossible for you to resist communism unless you form a partnership with the Chinese Communists," at the same time those groups in our State Department were saying to the Chinese Communists, "Do not form a partnership with the Chinese Nationalists unless you have control of the government." So in either case the Chinese Nationalist Government would lose; in one case, they would lose militarily; in the other case, they would lose in connection with the government.

Mr. FERGUSON. I heard the Senator say that. However, when General Marshall went there, he was carrying a message as a general.

The fact I want to bring out as possibly undisclosed heretofore, is that President Rhee, of the Republic of Korea, stated to four United States Senators, including the Senator from Michigan, in the drawing room of his home in Korea, that when General Hodges went to Korea—and I wish to digress for a moment, to say that there never was a more loyal, patriotic general or citizen than General Hodges—he went there with a message from the United States State Department and the Government of the United States of America that President Rhee had to take into the Government of Korea the Communists who then were representing the Kremlin of Russia. President Rhee said he argued with General Hodges that that could not be done, that the minute the Communists were taken in, the Republic of Korea would be destroyed. President Rhee said that General Hodges then told him "Do not argue with me. I am merely a general in the United States Army. The orders have come, and I am but delivering the orders to you that my Government demands that you take the Communists into your Government of the Republic of Korea."

President Rhee said to us, "I had to argue with him. Finally there was nothing else to do but to say, 'Let us invite them in, and see what we can do.'" Three were named by our Government as persons whom the Government of the Republic of Korea had to take into a coalition.

The Government of Korea found it could never get all three of them in because they could get at the conference table only one at a time while one would appear the other two were leading revolts and killing the citizens of the Republic of Korea in various parts of that country.

President Rhee said that finally he was able to convince the United Nations that it was impossible to take the Communists into the Government of the Republic of Korea, because if that were done, the entire Republic inevitably would be turned over to the Communists. At that point the South Koreans were able to secure an intervention by the United Nations which resulted in preserving the independence at least of the southern part of Korea, that is the part

which became the Republic and which is now engaged in war, having been attacked by the satellite government established in North Korea.

I wonder whether the Senator and other Senators know of those facts, which I think clearly corroborate the proposition that General Marshall had orders that were part of a master plan, and that as a good general he simply carried them to China, just as General Hodges carried his orders to Korea.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, in commenting upon the statement of the Senator from Michigan, let me say that what he has said confirms the long-established, insidious official policy of the State Department, if you please—namely, to allow our friends to fall, but not let the American people know that we shoved them.

In that connection, I call the attention of the Senator to an article appearing in the Sunday Compass, for July 17, 1949—a publication which is not exactly a conservative newspaper, as the Senator knows. It is an article written by the State Department's architect, Owen Lattimore; and in the article he praises the State Department for having allowed China to fall to the Communists without letting the world know that we pushed her. I think I can quote his exact words, he said: "The thing to do now, therefore, is to also let South Korea fall, but do not let it be known that we pushed her; hence the request for a parting gift of \$150,000,000."

What the Senator has placed in the Record certainly is more confirmation, if any were needed, of the policy we have had in the east—the policy of allowing our allies to fall, but not letting it be known that we pushed them. The same policy, which I intend to discuss, is now being urged by the State Department as the one which our country should pursue in dealing with the nations of Europe, namely, "Let them fall, but do not let the world know we pushed them."

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at this point?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Because I think it fits in with part of the jigsaw puzzle mentioned by the Senator from Michigan, I believe that at this time perhaps a little more history should be stated for the Record.

When I was in Korea in November of last year, and when I was in the Hungnam-Hamhung area, which has since

fallen to the Communist, and when I was in what then was the former North Korean-Communist capital, and now is again the North Korean-Communist capital—Pyongyang—I received information that under the directives which had been in force during the entire period of time when the United Nations forces were north of the thirty-eighth parallel, we were not permitted to allow the currency of the Republic of Korea to circulate north of the thirty-eighth parallel, and therefore we were required to continue to use Communist currency, even behind the United Nations' lines in Korea.

Naturally, Mr. President, the Korean farmers, who presumably had been liberated from Communist rule, and who, being reasonably wise persons, to borrow the British expression, took a very dim view of being paid for their rice in Communist currency, refused to sell their rice under those conditions. It was only as a result of the pressure from the local, indigenous population, which refused to accept the Communist currency which we were trying to get them to take for foodstuffs, that finally a change was brought about, so that the currency of the Republic of Korea could be used in the liberated area.

But, Mr. President, to me what is more shocking than that is the fact that the United Nations' directives which have been issued to our forces in Korea provided that the officials of the Government of the Republic of Korea, which had been established under United Nations' auspices, could not go north of the thirty-eighth parallel, even after the United Nations' forces were almost up to the Yalu River; and on several occasions the Government of the Republic of Korea, in response to appeals from local citizens who wanted to have adequate civil protection and civil police forces sent there, were prevented from sending their police forces to help police the areas north of the thirty-eighth parallel.

And the United Nations' directives been strictly adhered to, it is entirely possible that the Secretary of National Defense of the Republic of Korea would not have been permitted to go north to inspect some of his own troops who then were operating north of the thirty-eighth parallel. However, apparently the directives were not closely adhered to—or, at least, not that closely adhered to.

I merely cite that because I think it is a part of the history of this matter which has not yet been fully told. I hope at the proper time, in the proper committee, to request that those United Nations' directives, which were in existence at that time, be brought before the proper committees of the Senate of the United States, because I know of nothing that was done that more undermined the prestige of the Government of the Republic of Korea in the newly won territory than to say, in effect, "We do not recognize their currency, and therefore it cannot be used. We do not recognize their public officials, and therefore they cannot come north to assume their governmental functions."

I think that at this point in the RECORD that fact might be stated. At a later time I intend to develop it more fully.

Before resuming my seat, I should also like to call to the attention of the Senator from Wisconsin and of the Senate to page 692 of the so-called China White Paper. My authority in this case is the President of the United States, Mr. Truman, who issued a statement on December 18, 1946. It is apropos of the statements which are made from time to time, that large quantities of surplus military supplies were turned over to the Republic of China, the benefit of which they had, and therefore, the question is asked, How did it happen that they lost the war in spite of that? Here is a paragraph which I believe should for all time answer that question. I quote the President of the United States:

China agreed to buy all surplus property owned by the United States in China and on 17 Pacific islands and bases with certain exceptions. Six months of negotiations preceded the agreement finally signed in August. It was imperative that this matter be concluded in the Pacific as had already been done in Europe, especially in view of the rapid deterioration of the matériel in open storage under tropical conditions and the urgent need for the partial alleviation of the acute economic distress of the Chinese people which it was hoped this transaction would permit.

Here is the key sentence:

Aircraft, all nondemilitarized combat material, and fixed installations outside of China were excluded.

I emphasize the word "excluded."

Thus, no weapons which could be used in fighting a civil war were made available through this agreement.

That should clear up much of the misunderstanding on the part of the American people, who thought that large quantities of combat arms and equipment had been sent to the Republic of China by which the Government might have offset the equipment turned over to the Chinese Communists in Manchuria by the Soviet Union. The material made available to the Chinese Communists by Russia was good combat equipment which had been possessed by the Japanese Kwangtung army, and which it has been estimated was sufficient to arm an army of a million men for a 5-year period. It was then turned over to the Chinese Communists during precisely this same period, when, as a result of the instructions given to our Ambassador to China, the embargo was being laid against the Republic of China, and we were refusing to send them any arms and equipment.

I think the Senator from Wisconsin for his courtesy. I should like to have included at this point in the RECORD, if the Senator will permit, an article which appeared in the Washington News of Monday, March 12, by the very well known and able foreign correspondent, Mr. Clyde Farnsworth, dealing with the situation on the island of Formosa; and also an editorial which appeared in the Washington News of the same date, dealing with the same subject.

There being no objection, the article and editorial were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FORMOSA'S ROLE IN UNITED STATES POLICY NOT CLEAR

(By Clyde Farnsworth)

TAIPEH, FORMOSA, March 12.—Chinese Nationalists believe that new American planning which promised a pivotal position for Formosa in a new far eastern line-up against Communists has been snagged by the State Department.

At any rate, Formosa is still a missing piece in the jigsaw shape-up of Washington policy.

The Truman administration's difference with Gen. Douglas MacArthur over his concept of a broad, bold front in the western Pacific is thought to have been whetted by the State Department.

Some Chinese Nationalists say they are the victims of the State Department's efforts to save face by clinging to the Department's old misjudgments of Chinese communism, of the Nationalists' will to resist, of Formosa's strategic value, and of the compatibility of American and British foreign policy.

#### PROFIT MOTIVE

Their reasoning goes like this:

Having written off the Nationalists as a lost cause, the State Department fell for Britain's idea that peace and profits were possible with Red China and that Peiping might even throw off Moscow's influence.

When this failed, Britain continued to influence American policy against the Chinese Nationalists by stressing the necessity of European defense, the enormity of communism's hold on Asia and the possible failure of any countermeasures.

British self-interest has obscured the fact, which is clear to General MacArthur and others, that the Communist threat to the United States is greater in Asia than Europe and might be relieved in both areas by a strong stand in the western Pacific.

The Nationalists believe Britain's recognition of the Chinese Reds was undertaken with the agreement, or at least with the advance knowledge, of the State Department, a natural conclusion considering Washington's and London's claim to being together on major international issues.

The Nationalists also believe Britain is chiefly responsible for confusing the UN and American approach to the Communist challenge in Korea, and that further appeasement is still more likely than a UN crack-down, despite the Chinese Reds have been declared aggressors.

They believe that a compromise in Korea would mean a compromise on Formosa, which likely would be glanced over by declaring United Nations authority over Formosa's future.

#### COMMON SENSE?

They believe that military common sense dictates American support and use of Formosa's half million troops not merely to counteract Communist aggression in Korea but as a good bet to unseat communism in China before it is entrenched.

All this Britain opposes, and the United States has not seen fit to disagree openly.

At the same time the Nationalists have reason to suppose that General MacArthur isn't alone in seeing things their way, and even has minority support in the State Department itself.

They believe most American officials reporting from Formosa in the past 6 months have justified their cause. The cause is, of course, a return to the China mainland in a counteroffensive against the Communists, preferably with American help but not necessarily so.

#### [Editorial]

#### THEIR DARKEST HOUR

The Chinese Nationalists on Formosa take a gloomy view of the United States Government's apparent apathy in deciding whether to make full use of Chiang Kai-shek's forces in the war against Asiatic communism.

They believe British influence is restraining us; that British self-interest dictates an appeasement line which our State Department accepts to cover up its past mistakes on Chinese communism.

Scripps-Howard Staff Writer Clyde Farnsworth reports today from Formosa on the preceding page that the Nationalists fear a compromise settlement is in the making for Korea, which may mean a compromise on Formosa's future status—completing the write-off undertaken by our State Department before Korea.

The Chinese Nationalists may be overly pessimistic. If they have a kindred adage that the darkest hour is just before the dawn, they might invoke it now.

For there are growing indications that, regardless of previous errors, we are coming around to some realistic views on the Korean stalemate.

The simple facts are these: We can't win the war in Korea, militarily—we have General MacArthur's word for that. The United Nations is doing nothing to win it politically. There is no chance of the UN authorizing a wider scope of operations for General MacArthur, and there is little chance that any other country is likely to contribute more troops or military aid.

Chiang Kai-shek has on Formosa the largest anti-Communist land force in Asia. These forces are now immobilized by President Truman's order neutralizing Formosa—a policy that was laid down before Chinese Red intervention in Korea.

It is only common sense that Asians willing and eager to fight communism in their own behalf should not be denied that privilege. The original contention that employment of Chiang's troops would broaden the war by bringing in the Chinese Communists was dissolved when the Peiping regime launched its own broad-scale offensive 4 months ago.

Whatever misgivings President Truman and the State Department had about the availability and effectiveness of Chiang's troops undoubtedly have been offset by recent reports from their own observers on Formosa. Both diplomatic and ECA representatives have pictured Chiang as resolute and determined, wielding a stronger hand, and newly consecrated to his aim of upsetting communism in his homeland before it solidifies.

His chief needs are arms and ammunition and planes—in small amounts compared with what we are futilely pouring into Korea—plus the green light for his build-up on the mainland. This would force Mao Tse-tung to stop sending his hordes of Red troops into Korea.

We have already started a substantial flow of military aid to Formosa. Surely there is no intention that this shall remain unused while American casualties pile up in Korea.

If, as the Nationalists contend, President Truman and the State Department have

been swayed by British thinking, it's hard to see how this can go on much longer. You can credit the administration for being wary enough not to fall into the trap of recognizing Red China, along with Britain, a year ago. Surely it is not likely to succumb to continued British pressure now.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from Michigan?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am very glad to yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. If the Senator will yield, I should like to correct the RECORD.

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me first point out something to the Senator from California, in connection with what he has stated. We know we have been getting figures from the State Department as to the military equipment which the United States gave to Nationalist China following the end of the war. If I may have the Senator's attention, I know this will interest him. The 120,000 tons of ammunition which I just mentioned, which were dumped in the Bay of Bengal, were valued by the administration at \$1,000 a ton, and there was charged to China \$120,000,000, the value of the ammunition which we dumped in the Bay of Bengal. So when the Senator gets any figures from the administration as to military equipment given to Nationalist China, let him please keep in mind that this sort of item is included. I trust the Senator follows me on that point. We charged China with the lend-lease equipment which we took and dumped into the ocean.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. The Senator from Michigan desires to correct the RECORD. Instead of four Senators having attended the Rhee conference held in Seoul, in November 1949, there were three. The Senator from Indiana was ill and unable to attend the conference.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator.

The two objectives—the creation of a Red Poland and the creation of a Red China, have been attained by Russia. Let us briefly examine the next aims of international communism.

#### PRELUDE TO CONQUEST OF AMERICA

The next steps are no more secret than were the last.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from South Dakota?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. MUNDT. Before getting away from China, I think it should be pointed out, to the all-time credit of the Generalissimo, that, of all the then leaders of the world, he alone had the foresight to understand that to form a coalition government with the Communists meant the loss of freedom to China, without even putting up a fight. He knew, better than any other leader of the Western or of the Eastern World, what was going to happen when, in Rumania and in Hungary, there were formed coalitions with the Communist Government, and the Communists subsequently took over without even having an election. Certainly the Generalissimo stands very astute compared to the record of a man like President Benes, of Czechoslovakia, who permitted a coalition government with the Communists to be formed there, and Czechoslovakia was taken over by the Communists without firing a shot. So the Generalissimo stood up, against the pressures of the world and against the direct pressure of our Government. When he resisted the world pressure and the pressure of this Nation, the Communists could not take China by undermining a free government and by conquering a government without a war. Had we supported the Generalissimo then instead of aiding his Communist enemies China would still be free and we would not be in war in Korea. I think that should be said to the credit of the Generalissimo and to those in China who still love freedom.

I think the Senator from Wisconsin is aware of the fact that there is an important desideratum which the Communists always insist upon, every time they form a coalition government. They do not ask that they have half of the Cabinet members, they do not ask that they have a third of the Cabinet members; but they have never yet gone into a coalition without conceding to the Communist Party the all-important office of the Minister of the Interior, because the Minister of the Interior is, in other countries except English-speaking countries, the minister in charge of the secret police, and the Communists know

#### DISASTER IF EUROPE FALLS

that if they get the secret police, they do not care who has the rest of the cabinet, because they can do there what they did in Hungary, where the anti-Communist Small-Holders Party had won an election, with 77.4 percent of the vote. Without a vote, in the meantime, the secret police were able to drive out of the country and place in jail and exterminate, by one device and another, enough of the freedom-loving Hungarians, so that they were able to establish a Communist dictatorship, after the opposition had won with that tremendous majority.

I think the world owes a salute to the Generalissimo by reason of the fact that he saw so clearly that to follow the advice of General Marshall and Secretary Acheson and the administration was to surrender the freedom of China without firing a shot.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator from South Dakota very much for his comment.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield further, along the line of the remarks of the Senator from South Dakota, I may say that in November 1949 I was in Chungking, just 2 days before the city fell to the Communists, and while there I met an American missionary who had been in China for over a quarter of a century. He said to me, "Senator, I wish you would explain something to me. How is it that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who is the No. 1 target of communism in all of Asia, at the same time can be the No. 1 target of our own State Department?" It is a question which has not yet been satisfactorily answered.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator.

#### PRELUDE TO CONQUEST OF AMERICA

The next steps are no more secret than were the last. The next and final steps are a necessary prelude to the enslavement of America. The next and final aim is the control of the manpower and the industrial potential of Japan and Western Europe.

I know there are those who say we can survive as an island in a communistic sea even if Russia attains those next two aims. With this I heartily disagree. If Japan falls, the entire Pacific falls, and we will have a Red Pacific washing our western shores with its communistic, atheistic erosion.

If Europe falls that means transferring to Soviet Russia the additional productive capacity for 62,000,000 tons of steel a year, which is nearly double Russia's present capacity. It will mean transferring to Communist Russia the entire industrial fabric of Western Europe, which is second in capacity only to this Nation. It will mean transferring into Communist slavery 200,000,000 people who are related to us—200,000,000 people who have the industrial and technical know-how which the Russians presently lack, the technical know-how necessary to create a powerful war machine. It may well mean the shift to the Communist orbit of vast areas of the world which have a political and economic dependency upon the European powers, areas of the world from which we draw vital materials without which our war machine would grind to a stop. It will mean that South America either would fall within the Russian orbit or suffer economical collapse, because where else could she get rid of all the exports essential to her economy which she now sends to Europe? Where would South America get rid of her farm products which Europe now absorbs, but which we could not possibly absorb without creating poverty for our farmers? We would be an island in a Communist sea, and lacking a vast number of the basic materials without which we could not build and maintain even a semblance of a war machine.

Many great and loyal and serious-minded men of both parties who differ very vigorously on what our course should be have joined in the great debate. I have carefully gone over their speeches. I think each has contributed greatly to the thinking on this subject, and that each deserves the thanks of the country for the extent to which his contribution will have helped pave the way for an American foreign policy that is really an American foreign policy.

While there is much in a great number of the speeches I have read that is clearly thought out and well worth the attention of all the American people—and much that goes to the basic problems faced by our civilization—unfortunately practically the only part of those speeches which has been receiving attention in the press is the question

of whether American troops shall be sent to Europe; if so, how many and in what ratio to European troops; and whether the President has the constitutional power to send them without the approval of Congress.

While these questions are important, I feel the infinitely more important question—the question upon which the life or death of this Nation hangs—is the question of what steps we shall take now immediately, to marshal on our side of this fight the manpower and resources of those nations not yet behind the iron curtain.

In examining how this should be done, we must closely scrutinize what has been done in the recent past.

#### TWO-SIDED CONTRADICTIONARY WAR IN PACIFIC

Last week we voted to draft 18-year-old American boys. Some of those young men will be sent to the Seventh Fleet, which is patrolling the waters between Formosa and China. Some of their brothers, will be sent to fight against the Communists in Korea.

When this vote was taken I was in the hospital undergoing a minor operation. Had I been here, I could not and would not have voted for that draft before certain preliminary steps were taken by those in charge of our foreign policy.

#### AMERICAN DRAFTEE FIGHTING AMERICAN DRAFTEE

Let me give one reason. The young man who goes to the Seventh Fleet has the job, under Presidential orders drafted in the State Department, of protecting the Communist mainland from any invasion by our allies, the anti-Communists.

Mr. President, I wish to repeat that statement. The young man who is sent to the Seventh Fleet has the job of protecting the Communist mainland from any invasion by our allies, the anti-Communists. There is nothing secret or involved about this. The order to the Seventh Fleet very simply states that it shall immobilize Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa and prevent any landings by him on the China coast.

#### AMERICA BREAKS BLOCKADE OF COMMUNIST COAST

Another part of the orders to the Seventh Fleet provides that it must break Chiang Kai-shek's blockade of the Communist ports. Prior to the entry of the Seventh Fleet upon the scene, Chiang Kai-shek had been doing a fairly good job of blockading the main Communist

ports of China. Since the Seventh Fleet broke the blockade, a vast amount of British and some American war materials are flooding into Communist China and are being used today, were used yesterday, and will be used tomorrow, to kill the draftees we send to Korea—brothers of the men we send into the Seventh Fleet whose orders protect the flow of war materials into Communist China.

#### SEVENTH FLEET PROTECTS COMMUNIST COAST

The orders to the Seventh Fleet, of course, also were to prevent the Communists from landing on Formosa. However, at that time, and for weeks thereafter, the weather was such that it was, according to all military men, completely impossible for the Communists to attempt any Formosan landing with the type of craft they had available on the China coast.

#### SEVENTH FLEET FREES REDS FOR KOREAN FIGHT

Before the Seventh Fleet was ordered to keep China from attacking the China coast, there were roughly a quarter of a million Chinese Communist troops immobilized on the China mainland opposite Formosa.

#### SUMMARY OF AID GIVEN CHINESE COMMUNISTS BY ORDERS TO SEVENTH FLEET

Let me sum up briefly what the order to the Seventh Fleet, the most fantastic order I have ever heard of, has accomplished to date:

First. It has protected the entire exposed coast of China from landings thereon by our allies, and has released vast numbers of Chinese Communist troops for service elsewhere.

Second. It is endangering the freedom of Indochina by freeing Chinese Communists otherwise immobilized on the China coast so that they may go to the aid of Ho-Chi-Minh in Indochina.

Third. This in turn has impaired the defense of Western Europe by keeping the great majority of the French professional military forces from training duties at home.

Fourth. It has posed the additional threat to Hong Kong by freeing Red Chinese soldiers to concentrate against Hong Kong who would otherwise be immobilized on the China coast. Our myopic British friends seem to blind their eyes and close their ears to this fact.

Fifth. It has, in effect, given complete freedom of action to the Chinese Reds by having our Navy protect their long

and very vulnerable southern flank from our allies, the anti-Communists. This in turn means more Chinese Communists hurled against American forces in Korea, more American dead and wounded, a greater percentage of the American Army tied down in Korea, less arms and ammunition to rearm Western Europe, and an additional and almost unbearable burden upon the American taxpayer. Such is the result of our two-sided, contradictory war in the Pacific, in which the Seventh Fleet is ordered to fight on one side and the United States Army on the other. It seems impossible, but it is happening.

#### BROTHER FIGHTS BROTHER UNDER STATE DEPARTMENT ORDER

It must be puzzling indeed for an American young man to be drafted and sent to Korea to fight communism, when his brother is sent to the Seventh Fleet to protect the same Communists whom he is fighting—the result of the most fantastic order that has ever existed in war or peace, an order which cannot be justified by even the most tortured reasoning, an order which bears the fingerprints, the very bloody fingerprints, if you please, of Communist treason.

#### FORMOSA TROOPS REJECTED

As the Senate knows, while we were badly outmanned in Korea and taking an awful kicking around because of the tremendous weight of numbers of the opposition, our ally, Chiang Kai-shek, who has about half a million troops on Formosa offered to supply badly needed troops in Korea. Incidentally, remember that Nationalist China is a member of the United Nations and all members of the UN were called upon to send troops to Korea and that Chiang made the first offer and the only sizable offer of troops.

#### A MILLION GUERRILLAS

He also offered the use of 1,000,000 guerrillas in China, if he were merely given the light automatic weapons to equip them—a million fighters as a diversionary force to drag the Chinese Communist armies back out of Korea. But the group in power in the State Department, the same group which has been slowly gaining more and more power since the early 40's, the group which was in power during the sell-out of China and the sell-out of Poland, in answer to the offer of Chiang Kai-shek, said, "No; we won't use your troops, because if we did, we might make the Chinese Communists mad."

#### DEATH WARRANT OF AMERICAN BOYS SIGNED IN STATE DEPARTMENT

At this point I am not going to discuss whether the actions of that group are the result of treachery or incompetence. I intend to discuss the treachery within the next week or 10 days. Anyone with eyes to see and ears to hear and a mind with which to think can but agree that whether it is treachery or incompetence, those actions have been awfully bad for America and awfully good for the cause of international communism. No one can deny that when they refused the use of these Chinese nationalist soldiers they signed the death warrants of thousands of American boys, and decreed that vast numbers of American mothers and wives would again go deep into the valley of darkness and despair.

#### ARCHITECTS FOR DISASTER IN ASIA NOW PLANNING DISASTER FOR EUROPE

Just for a moment I should like to shift from China to the other half of the world. I realized that some of my good friends feel that the problem in Europe can be settled merely by the decision of whether we shall send an additional 6 or 8 or 10 American divisions to Western Europe. Would that it were that simple. In examining the problem we must keep in mind that the group which is doing the planning for Western Europe is the identical group which has been doing the disastrous planning for Asia—the same group which did the planning for the sell-out of Poland and China. Again without concerning ourselves over whether their actions are the result of treachery or incompetence, let us look at the unquestioned facts. Those facts speak for themselves. The planning has been disastrous for America and good for Soviet Russia.

#### EISENHOWER'S HANDS TIED

Those of us who have confidence in General Eisenhower as a great soldier should realize that Eisenhower's hands are also tied by the same crowd that has tied the hands of MacArthur in the east; and if good-natured Ike is not careful, he is going to be taken for an awful ride. A good soldier such as Eisenhower does not have time to learn the ways of crooked, backroom diplomacy; and if a man has spent enough time soldiering to be the good soldier Eisenhower is, he is not equipped by experience to cope with unprincipled, crooked, clever diplomats. It is difficult for a soldier of integrity who has not had time off to study ways of

traitors to bring himself to believe that people in high positions in this Government could be actually disloyal to the Nation.

**FAILURE TO MAKE WEST GERMAN TROOPS AVAILABLE FOR DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE**

The Senate will recall that when General Eisenhower appeared before the joint session of the Congress, he said that he was unable to discuss the use of German manpower until the politics of the situation were cleared up by the diplomats. For 5 years these diplomats have done nothing to clear up the situation. Periodically our State Department talks of rearming Western Germany to counter the powerful army built up by the Russians in East Germany. But there is nothing but talk—words apparently planted to lull the American people into a sense of security that we are about to do something in West Germany to counter the threat of what Russia has been doing in East Germany. This is clever administration of sleeping tablets to the American people.

**TWO WELLS OF MANPOWER FOR DEFENSE OF EUROPE**

When Eisenhower went to Europe to plan the defense of Western Europe, he was not even allowed to accept the invitation from Spain to visit the greatest potential source outside Germany, of manpower for a Western European Army, a country which has long been dedicated to fighting communism—namely, Spain. I am not going to argue that Spain has or has not the kind of government of which we would or should approve. The point is that we cannot make over the Spanish Government. I am not going to argue that we should or should not love the 48,000,000 people of Western Germany. But it takes no argument—it follows as the night follows the day—to show that there is no way on God's earth to defend the richest prize for which Communist Russia is aiming—the industrial heart of Europe—unless we use the two great wells of tough anti-Communist manpower—Western Germany and Spain. The talk of doing otherwise is either the talk of those who know not what they say or the talk of traitors planning a phony defense.

**LET THEM FALL, BUT DO NOT LET THE AMERICAN PEOPLE KNOW WE PUSHED THEM**

When I hear administration spokesmen urging that the solution to the whole problem lies in drafting and send-

ing to Europe another 4, 6, 8, or 10 American divisions, there is called vividly to my mind an article which appeared in the Compass on July 17, 1949. The Compass, incidentally, is not exactly a conservative paper. It contains an article by that great expert on the Far East, the adviser to two Presidents and the man long referred to as the architect of our far-eastern policy, the man who was called upon to give secret advice to our Roving Ambassador Philip Jessup before he started to rove.

Let me read it to the Senate and see if it does not give us an idea of what may be happening insofar as Western Europe and Asia are concerned.

Mr. Lattimore, the State Department's adviser, praises the State Department for having succeeded in allowing China to fall to the Communists without letting it appear to the world that we had shoved her. It is almost incredible, but it is a matter of record. He then goes on to state:

The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall but not to let it look as though we pushed it. Hence the recommendation of a paring grant of \$150,000,000.

The picture in Western Europe, Mr. President, is much the same. We are preparing to allow Western Europe to fall without having it appear that we pushed her. It matters not whether we send 1 American division or 10 or 20. It matter not whether Eisenhower is the most brilliant military genius the world has ever produced. We cannot defend Western Europe without the manpower of Spain and Western Germany. It just is not in the cards.

**COMMUNIST VICTORY INEVITABLE UNLESS IMMEDIATE REVERSAL**

If we continue with the same type of planning and arguing over whether 6 divisions or 10 or 20 American divisions should be sent to Europe and neglect the important question of utilizing the manpower of our allies, then Communist victory in Western Europe is just as certain as Communist victory was in China.

**AMOUNT OF TIME LEFT TO REARM WESTERN EUROPE**

There are those who say that if we start to rearm Western Europe and Western Germany the Russians will promptly move in. This may well be. However, there is one condition which exists today which discourages a military move on the ground on the part of Russia—a condition which may not exist

a few years hence. As of today our long-range bombers using the atomic bomb could wipe Russian industry off the face of the earth. I do not believe Russia will move while that condition continues.

We also know, of course, that Russia, with a vast number of captured German scientists, is working feverishly to perfect a guided missile of the air, a missile which will track and destroy planes in the air. If and when this is accomplished—and it is being accomplished as of this moment—our atom-carrying bombers will no longer act as a deterrent to Soviet Russia. Our atom-carrying bombers will then be useless.

My estimate of the situation is that we have a limited time to rearm Western Europe—the time during which it will take the Russian scientists to perfect a defense to our atom-carrying bombers, and not one day longer. When they have that defense—and they are working on it today—they will be able to move on the ground unless, in the meantime, we have built up in Europe ground forces and a tactical air force of sufficient power to deter them.

**ARMIES OF WESTERN EUROPE POTENTIALLY STRONGER THAN SOVIET RUSSIA**

There are those who say that it is impossible for Western Europe to compete with the land armies of Russia. Mr. President, this just is not true. Remember that German armies nearly destroyed Russia in the last war and now, with the exception of the 10,000,000 Germans under Russian domination, we have not only Germany but also Spain, France, the other small European nations, and England.

So we have a much greater well of potential military force to fight against Russia on the land now than we had when the last war started. In addition, Russia's steel-making capacity is roughly only 35,000,000 tons a year. The steel-making capacity of Western Europe is 62,000,000 tons a year. Our steel-making capacity is nearly 100,000,000 tons a year.

It seems that the time is long past due to build up in Western Europe not an American Army but a Western-European army for peace. If this is done, peace may well be prolonged for another 15 or 20 years. In the meantime communism may rot from the inside out, to the end that a peaceful world will then be possible without world war III.

With the manpower of our friends in Asia and the manpower of our friends in

Europe and the industrial capacity of this Nation, we are far more powerful still as of today than the Communist countries. But we may not be more powerful tomorrow or the next day. If the Communists take over Western Europe, if they take over Japan, then they will be far stronger in productive capacity, in raw materials, and in manpower.

**AGGRESSOR IN CAUSE OF FREEDOM AND JUSTICE**

There are those who say we should do nothing aggressive. This just does not make sense. There is no reason on God's earth why free men should not be aggressive in the cause of freedom and justice.

Mr. WELKER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. WELKER. After listening to the Senator's remarks, I take it that, as of this moment, he looks with favor upon sending American troops to Europe.

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me interrupt the Senator at that point. I say that any troops we send to Europe will be condemned either to death or to live out their lives in some Siberian slave-labor camp unless we decide to use the two wells of manpower which the State Department, as of today, plans that we not use. Unless we use the manpower of Spain and the manpower of Western Germany, regardless of whether we send 1 division, 4, 10, or 20 divisions to Western Europe, the American divisions simply cannot defend Western Europe.

If we decide as of now to make an about-face—and we cannot make an about-face while we have the old Yalta crowd running the State Department—if we clean house in the State Department and make an about-face, and do the logical thing, the wisdom of which can be seen by any man who can add two and two, and say we will use all available manpower in Europe, yes, then I say, send all the American divisions needed as a stop-gap until we can arm our friends in Europe. I hope I make myself clear to the Senator, that we will be committing to death or slavery every American we send to Europe unless we make an about-face and decide to use the manpower of Western Germany and Spain. If we decide to use the manpower of Western Germany and Spain, then if Eisenhower thinks it is necessary to send American divisions, let us send them.

Mr. WELKER. Then I take it the Senator is not in favor of sending American boys to Europe until we have an alliance with Spain and with Western Germany, a working alliance, whereby we get their manpower and their help?

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes and no, Mr. President. I am not so concerned with a formal alliance. I am concerned principally with a reversal in the thinking of our administration so that we will know that our State Department is not tying the hands of our military leaders, so that we will know that the administration is working toward bringing into the defense of Europe Spain and Western Germany.

Let me also say this: We cannot separate the defense of Europe from the defense of Asia. Therefore, I would also want the assurance that the administration makes an about-face with respect to China and says, "We will use all the available manpower of our allies in China, the 500,000 men on the island of Formosa, the 1,000,000 guerrillas in China."

I propose to submit an amendment to the measure which will be brought to the Senate authorizing the sending of additional troops to Europe, to provide that as a condition precedent to sending any American troops to Europe we say to Gen. Douglas MacArthur: "General, you use your own judgment in fighting the Chinese Communists. Hit them where, when, and how you think it is militarily necessary, just so long as in so doing you can save the life of one American boy." I suggest that we say to him, "General MacArthur, whenever the time is right you can authorize Chiang Kai-shek to make landings on the China coast." I suggest that we say to him also, "We will give our allies in China, the 1,000,000 guerrillas there, the necessary weapons so they can act as a military weapon against the Chinese Communists."

Mr. President, I am not concerned with any alliance; I am concerned with some positive assurance that our administration is working toward the use of the Spanish and the Western Germany soldiers. Perhaps a public alliance might defeat some of the purposes to be attained, but so long as we have the Yalta crowd in the State Department, the crowd that has always been found at the time and place where things are done that are so good for international communism, so good for Communist

Russia—so long as we have that crowd there, the crowd which is always found where things happen that are so disastrous for America—then I just do not want to trust to that crowd the life of even one American boy in Western Europe or any place else in the world.

Mr. WELKER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes.

Mr. WELKER. The Senator was in the hospital last week, I believe—

Mr. McCARTHY. I was.

Mr. WELKER. When the junior Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT] made the statement on the floor of the Senate that he had inquired in the Capital City, Washington, D. C., of the most important man in Government, as to whether Spain would join in rearming and in resisting Russia, and that he was informed that Spain did not want any part of our enterprise, can the Senator enlighten me with respect to that statement?

Mr. McCARTHY. I shall be glad to. Regardless of where the gentleman from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT] got those facts, they are not true.

Mr. BUTLER of Maryland. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. BUTLER of Maryland. Has the junior Senator from Wisconsin explored the problem that maybe Western Germany would not be willing to join in such an enterprise with the United States?

Mr. McCARTHY. I think that is a good question, Mr. President. I think Western Germany would not be interested in joining the enterprise under the terms and conditions offered her. As the Senator knows, we had men like George Shaw Wheeler over there, in charge of de-Nazification of Germany, a man who passed the tests of the Loyalty Board in our State Department, but finally went behind the iron curtain and said he was seeking refuge from American type of democracy, and proclaimed his communism. Men like him have been publicly stating from time to time that we are trying to work out a deal whereby we can rearm Western Germany to balance off the rearming of Eastern Germany by Russia. However, up until now we have not offered to allow them to do any fighting under conditions agreeable to them. At first they suggested German elements of platoon strength. I believe that has finally risen to battalion strength now. The Senator

and I know that the 48,000,000 people in Western Germany are not going to put their platoons and battalions under a Communist-infiltrated ground army in France. They simply are not going to do it.

Incidentally, from all the information we can obtain the French Air Corps is rather clean of Communist influence. We do know that Western Germany hates and fears communism just as much as the average American fears communism. They have just as much reason to fight, and there is no reason on God's earth why they will not if we give them a chance to do so.

Mr. BUTLER of Maryland. Is it not true that there is some antipathy on the part of certain elements in Western Germany to have their country become the battleground which may be subject to the scorched-earth policy or some such policy?

Mr. McCARTHY. There is no question about it. Europe has a possible unhappy future to look forward to. There is no question about that. There is no question about the fact that many people in France, Germany, Spain, Denmark, all those European countries, very much hate the thought of making of their homes a battleground. But the decision unfortunately, is not theirs. The decision already has been made in the Kremlin, and publicly proclaimed, as I say, just as publicly as were Hitler's aims as set forth in Mein Kampf; that they are going to rule the world, and that the next objective is the industrial heart of Europe and the industrial heart of Japan. The only way that Western Europe can avoid being made a battleground is to build up her forces strong enough so that Russia will not dare to move.

Mr. BUTLER of Maryland. Yes. I thank the Senator.

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. MALONE. The junior Senator from Nevada is extremely interested in the statement made by the junior Senator from Wisconsin that we should secure the wholehearted cooperation of Spain and Western Germany; with which I agree. But I believe there are complications existing in Germany now, after partially putting into effect the Morgenthau plan and after other individuals have had their say, through the years since World War II. These com-

plications will have to be overcome. The obvious markets now for Germany's thrift and manufacturing and processing of materials are in Russia and in Communist China. They need not, however, be the only markets, if some understanding can be reached with the United States and certain countries in Europe. All that can be overcome even after this long period of the subversive influence the Senator has so accurately described.

Let us assume, for a minute, that we can secure wholehearted cooperation of England, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and all the 16 Marshall plan nations—with respect to which there seems to be some question now. Would the Senator agree then with the junior Senator from Nevada that with all the soldiers available in Western Europe, including Western Germany and Spain, and by arming these soldiers to the extent that our economy would support, together with building an air corps, a long-range bombing air force of tens of thousands of planes, if necessary, in this country to control the air over any area in Europe or Asia that is important to us, and submarines to blockade any nation that might seek to move into these areas, most of the defense of Europe and Asia could be done from the Western Hemisphere? Does the Senator agree that the areas could be defended, with the foot soldiers largely furnished by the countries which we are defending?

Mr. McCARTHY. I believe I understand the Senator's point. Although I do not claim to be a military expert—

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, the Senator served in the Air Corps, and probably he has a better capacity for understanding these matters than do many other persons who have already rendered judgment.

Mr. McCARTHY. I strive to keep abreast as much as possible of all new developments in both offensive and defensive weapons. I think I have a fairly good knowledge of what we in this Nation are accomplishing in the way of the development of new weapons, both offensive and defensive. I think I have some knowledge of what the potential enemy—Russia—is attempting to perfect.

One of the things which I believe the Senator may overlook when he states that sufficient long-range bombers may keep Russia under control, is the likelihood that in the fairly near future

our long-range bomber will be useless. We know that the Russians, with the assistance of captured German scientists—and they have some great minds over there—are working on the guided missile of the air, the type of guided missile which can track down bombers and destroy them, just as we now have a guided missile for use under water. When the Russians develop a guided missile for use in the air—and any military experts with whom we talk now concede that the Russians will develop it—our long-range bombers will be useless, and will not deter Russia from aggression.

As we know, today Russia is not building very many long-range bombers, and at this time we are building very little by way of a tactical air force. However, today Russia is concentrating on the development of a tactical air force, and almost nothing else in the air. That may be one indication that Russia has progressed much farther along the road toward the development of the guided missile for use in the air than we realize.

When the day comes that Russia has perfected the guided missile for use in the air, our bombers will not be worth a tinker's dam; and on that day, unless we have in Europe an army with a tactical air force to support it, Russia will cut through to the English Channel just as easily as a knife can cut through butter.

My hope is that in the short time which is left to us—whether it be months or years, we do not know—we shall make an about-face, and shall cease this argument about preparing for a "phony" defense of Western Europe. The State Department's plan for the defense of Europe, as I am sure the Senator will agree with me, is a "phony" plan of defense, because we cannot defend Western Europe unless we use those two great wells of manpower. It simply is not in the cards that Western Europe can be defended in any other way.

If you sit down with any military man who can add two and two, he will tell us that there simply is not enough American manpower to defend Europe without using the manpower of Europe.

The Senator also asked me whether I believe that if we built up the armies of Europe, using the men in Germany and in Spain, it would be necessary to send American troops to Western Europe.

The answer is, no; but it may be necessary that we send some American divisions to Europe as a stop-gap measure, while we are building up the armies of Western Europe.

However, the trouble now is that while we talk about sending American divisions to Western Europe as a stop-gap measure, at the same time we do absolutely nothing about using these two great untouched wells of manpower.

In other words, the present plan is strictly a "phony" plan for a "phony" defense—a case of those in the back rooms, where the planning is done by the same crowd that did the planning for China, saying the same thing they said about China, namely, "We will let them fall, but we will not let it appear that we pushed them."

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield further, I should like to say that I agree with both the answers he has given.

However, when he makes the point that it may be necessary to send a few American divisions to Western Europe as a sort of bait to get the people of Western Europe to enlist in their own armies, I do not agree.

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me interrupt there, to say that I think a great error is being made by those who urge that course. It is not a question of the European nations being unwilling to help themselves, and that therefore we should send our forces there as a sort of bait to persuade them to help themselves and to enlist in their own army; but the question is whether our planners should be permitted to plan a "phony" defense around 16 nations which simply do not have enough manpower to defend Western Europe.

We speak of coaxing the European people there to defend themselves. There is no question but that the Spaniards and the 48,000,000 people of Western Germany are willing to defend themselves, if we make it possible for them to do so. However, we control their production of arms and equipment, and thereby control their ability to create an army with which to defend themselves.

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, if I correctly understand the answer the distinguished junior Senator from Wisconsin has given, I agree with him.

#### MUST WE URGE SELF-DEFENSE ON EUROPE?

However, to clarify the situation, let me say that it seems entirely impossible to defend people who do not want to be defended and who will not defend themselves. Therefore, the argument that we must send two or three or four divisions—amounting to practically nothing, under the circumstances, of course—to Western Europe, merely to constitute a force to be built around, and to impress—as has been emphasized in the course of some of the arguments—upon those people our earnestness and our willingness to help defend Europe, after we have spent \$100,000,000,000, and now have enacted a measure for the recruitment of a large army, and are continuing to send arms and supplies there, seems silly. In other words, we are the ones who need defending—

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, let me interrupt the Senator from Nevada at this point.

Mr. MALONE. I should like to complete stating this point. I agree with the Senator from Wisconsin that we have had a phony set-up from the beginning—commencing with the Morgenthau plan for Germany; and then continuing with Yalta, where we gave away Manchuria without providing any defense whatever for China, and thus robbing China of her breadbasket; and then when we allowed the establishment of a plan in regard to Korea which would permit that nation to fall, but did so in a way by which we hoped it would not appear that we were responsible.

#### CHINA COULD RISE AGAINST COMMUNISM

It took the administration nearly 4 years following World War II to turn the Chinese civil war into a war between China and the United States of America, although the United States is the old, tried-and-true friend of China. It is my opinion that the Senator from Wisconsin is entirely correct when he states that if we turn Chiang Kai-shek loose, under the direction or at the instigation, when the time is ripe, of General MacArthur, Chiang Kai-shek would turn the present war into a Chinese civil war, and would do so rather quickly, and that would be about the end of the fighting in Korea.

#### OVER DETAILS WE FORGET THE ESSENTIALS

Nevertheless, let us go back to the general idea. I fully agree with the Senator from Wisconsin that we allowed ourselves to engage in discussion and

debate over the details—for instance, whether the draftees should be 18 years of age or 18½ or 19 years of age, and whether we should send 1, 2, 3, or 4 divisions to Europe—when the real problem has been obscured.

One of the real problems is this: What areas are we going to defend?

The next problem is: How are we going to defend them?

The next problem is this: How many men do we need to do it, and who will help us?

Now the Senator has reached the heart of the problem.

#### OUR SUPPORT OF COLONIALISM ONLY GAINS US ENEMIES

It is currently my opinion, based on the information I can obtain—and the debate with the junior Senator from Wisconsin further confirms my opinion—that we can handle this situation only if we take advantage of the friendly peoples of the world—the people in Turkey and Pakistan and Spain, and if we also take advantage of the friendly peoples of Western Germany—if it is not now too late for us to do so—and the friendly peoples of Asia, and turn more of them into our friends. We shall do that if we stop supporting slavery—for instance, slavery in Indochina, in the Malayan States, in Indonesia, and in various parts of Africa. If we do that, perhaps then we shall find that suddenly we have a great many friends we did not know about before, whereas as long as we support the hopeless colonial slavery system, which is deadlier than Caesar at this moment, and probably has been for several years—probably we would be defeated in trying to do so—despite all our power. We shall incur the bitter enmity of the peoples upon whom otherwise we could depend, as the Senator has so ably described. As he has said, we are bringing that about by the policy we follow.

#### UNITED STATES IS SHORT OF MANPOWER, EUROPE IS NOT

I understand the Senator's point about the guided missiles; but on the other hand, we should be as far along in our research as the Russians are in that respect, with the result that the Russian bombers would not be able to injure us. If we have the guided missiles—and I understand that probably within a reasonable period of time that will be possible—our own security would be a lot better off. Still, there are in Europe to-

day 25 percent more people than can ever make a living there again, without having someone—probably ourselves—feed them. It is a silly policy to send American troops into foreign countries with tremendous amounts of manpower, instead of arming the populations there. This applies equally to Western Europe as to the friendly nations of Asia.

We should keep our soldiers here in the United States, so as to have enough of them here to be able to handle anything which might develop here. Also, many of them would then be available to our industrial plants, which today are short of manpower, and will continue to be short of manpower if we continue the draft.

Furthermore, I am sure the Senator remembers what Mr. Churchill said at the beginning of World War II, namely, that "All we need is money; we will take care of the rest of it."

Later he said, "Give us the tools"—lend lease and all the rest—"and we will finish the job."

Later he said, in a dramatic speech which was carried by almost every newspaper in the world: "We are losing the seed of England. You must send the men."

Finally we ended up with having so many of our men in Europe that they constituted about three-fourths of the Allied forces there. It looks now as if we could be caught in that trap again.

Therefore, we come back to what the able Senator has said, namely, that we should cooperate with our friends in Europe and then should determine the areas in Europe and Asia which are to be defended; and then we should find out what will be required if we undertake that job.

Does the Senator agree as to that?

Mr. McCARTHY. I must disagree with one statement the Senator made. He said that we should not help people who will not help themselves—the intimation being that the people of Europe would not help defend themselves.

Mr. MALONE. No; I meant if they would not help themselves by putting their own men into the army.

Mr. McCARTHY. Let us examine that question for a moment. That is a question with which we are confronted almost every day, namely, the question of whether the people of Western Europe are willing to defend themselves.

Mr. MALONE. I did not raise that question.

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me raise it. I think that the Europeans are just as willing to defend themselves against international communism as we are willing to defend ourselves. The Chinese, obviously, are willing to defend themselves; otherwise there would not be 1,000,000 guerrillas in China—

Mr. MALONE. And we would not be fighting our State Department all this time.

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me conclude, if I may. Otherwise we would not be reading every day about the Chinese being willing to risk their lives with practically no apparent chance of success.

Mr. MALONE. That is, without our help.

Mr. McCARTHY. So I do not approve of the propaganda that the Chinese are not willing to defend themselves against communism. The Senator and I know that, during the first 2 or 3 days of the Korean War, the columnists who normally have been the apologists for our State Department and publicists for it were already laying the groundwork. They were screaming to high heaven that the South Koreans were unwilling to fight against communism. They said, "They do not have the heart. Their government is too corrupt, and the Communist government represents something clean and wholesome." They set forth the figures from the State Department to show that we had dumped into South Korea all the arms and ammunition which those South Koreans needed in order to fight a war. It looked pretty good because the figures showed that we sent them hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of equipment, as I recall.

However, when our correspondents got over there, and discovered that the South Koreans did not have any airplanes, except one or two old AT-6's, I believe, that they had only a few 3-inch bazookas, with no ammunition for them, and that they had no ammunition for their rifles, it was only then that we discovered how phony this propaganda was—the propaganda that the peoples of the earth are unwilling to fight against international communism.

We found the same thing was said of China. We got the phony figures about lend-lease equipment which had been given to China. We now know, for the information which has been developed

since then—for example, certain information given by the Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND] on the Senate floor today—that the lend-lease military equipment, to the extent of millions of dollars' worth, given to China, was largely imaginary equipment and where it was real it was demilitarized equipment—equipment which they could not use for the purpose of fighting a war. But we heard that great propaganda which was built up, that the anti-Communists in China were not willing to fight. We now know that they were willing to fight but were betrayed. The people of Western Europe are also willing to fight. The people of Spain are willing to fight. The people of Germany are willing to fight. The people of China are willing to fight. But our old Yalta crowd in the State Department says, "No, we are in charge of the plans." And they are, Mr. President. They are in charge of the pocketbook. They are in charge of the equipment. They are in charge of the weapons of war, and they can make it impossible for those people to fight. So I do not think we should fall victim to the propaganda that the people of Europe are unwilling to fight the Communists.

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I desire to make one further point. The point which the junior Senator from Nevada is making is that we should let them build an army. That is what we want them to do, and they are able to put anywhere from 1,000,000 to 10,000,000 men into the army, without an overly serious drain on their manpower. We can bring the Spanish into the North Atlantic Pact with 2,000,000 more men, or 1,000,000 more, and, if we have not gone too far with the Morgenthau plan and with Germany's ostracism by the other nations of Europe—if we could get a united Europe, in some manner, either by way of a customs union or through a United States of Europe, the ability of Europe to defend itself would be in no doubt.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator very much, and I am not sure that I am making my position clear. I hope I shall make it clear to the Senator and to the country. It is that we should not waste our time now and divert the attention of the country to a phony issue. The question is not, Should we send 3 divisions, or 4, or 6, or 10 divisions to Western Europe. The question is, Are

we going to make an about-face, as of today, and get rid of the phony planners, and begin, as of today, to use the manpower of the rest of the world which is available? Unless we do that, we cannot fight international communism.

There are today three great wells of manpower—wells of manpower willing to be used: anti-Communist China, Spain, Western Germany, and, of course, the manpower of Japan becoming increasingly important.

Mr. MALONE. And then, of course, the Philippines and Indonesia, if the Senator will yield further, and New Guinea, Australia, and all the rest. There is no question of manpower. I fully agree with the Senator that, if it were possible, we should impeach all these people who are handling this matter; but that has proved to be impossible. I say, "Why send 1 division, 2, 3, or 4 divisions to Europe, to keep General Eisenhower company, when in a month or 6 weeks or 2 months they should be able to get 30 divisions together in Europe, and we could start sending them the necessary arms?" Why put any foot soldiers in a place where they are so crowded with manpower that they are starving to death?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am not going to argue the question of whether we should send 3 or 4 or 5 divisions to Western Europe. I think too many of us have been trapped into arguing that phony issue.

Mr. MALONE. We shall be trapped into sending 10,000,000 men if we keep this up.

Mr. McCARTHY. I do not intend to argue the question, because, whether we send 1 division, or 5, or 10, we are doomed to failure under the present State Department planning. We simply cannot send enough manpower to defend Europe unless we make full use of Europe's manpower.

Mr. MALONE. Of course, we cannot.

Mr. McCARTHY. The question which should concern us is, Are we going to use the manpower available? Then, if needed as a stopgap, we may send 1, or 2, or 5 divisions—well and good. But that is not the issue before us today. That is not the issue upon which the life or death of civilization hangs. The issue upon which the life or death of civilization hangs is whether we are going to start to do some intelligent planning, and start to use those people of the world who are

willing to fight with us against international communism. As I say, the four great wells of manpower are anti-Communist China, Spain, Germany, and Japan.

Mr. MALONE. Let us use them all. I agree thoroughly with the Senator.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator very much.

NECESSITY OF RE-CREATING A FREE DEMOCRATIC CHINA

There is no reason why every man should not be aggressive in the cause of justice and freedom. We should be aggressive in giving all-out aid to Chiang Kai-shek, to the end that China may again be a free and friendly and neutral nation, that the peace of the Pacific may be assured.

NECESSITY OF CREATING A FREE DEMOCRATIC POLAND

Aid should be given to anti-Communist forces in Russian satellite nations—that is, whenever the opportunity presents itself—especially the anti-Communist forces in Poland, to the end that there may again be in Europe the stabilizing influence of a free, independent, democratic Poland, and so that there shall not exist a broad highway from Russia into Western Europe by way of Poland. I do not propose to send any American troops into China or Poland. But I do propose that we give the anti-Communist forces in those countries the necessary aid when the opportunity presents itself, so that they themselves can strike the chains from wrists and anklets that should never have borne them except for the actions of our planners.

SUMMARY: PHONY PLANNING FOR PHONY DEFENSE

In summary, I propose that we stop the phony planning for a phony defense of Western Europe and American interests. I propose that we restate our aims and then follow through with policies that will achieve those aims rather than what we have been doing in the past—namely, stating great and desirable aims and then putting into effect policies designed to accomplish the direct opposite results of those aims.

We must recognize that communism has made great strides in the last 5 years, that if it accomplishes its next major aim—namely, the conquest of Japan and Western Europe—then unquestionably the world will lose to international communism, that this may well be our last chance.

MUST MAKE USE OF FOUR GREAT UNTOUCHED WELLS OF MANPOWER

I propose that regardless of whether we send two or six or ten or twenty American divisions to Europe, we are doomed to fail unless we promptly make use of the four great wells of manpower which we are now deliberately ignoring—namely, the manpower of Japan, the manpower of the anti-Communist Chinese, the Spanish, and the 48,000,000 West Germans. We ought to make a peace treaty with Japan, to the end that we may aid the Japanese, also, in defending themselves.

COMPARISON OF TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT IN GREAT DEBATE

While I know I cannot do justice to the deep and intelligent thinking of both schools of thought on this great debate—not at least in a few paragraphs—in trying to restate their positions, and I know I shall leave much of the details of their positions unsaid, nevertheless in order to draw a comparison with the position I take, I shall take the liberty of restating the positions of both schools of thought.

First. There is the school of thought to the effect that we must defend Western Europe in order to defend the free world and that the problem, therefore, is solved by sending a stated number of American divisions to Western Europe and giving General Eisenhower the power and the obligation to build a defense force in Western Europe—a defense force exclusive of the manpower of Western Germany and Spain.

Second. The other school of thought, in essence, is that it is up to Western Europe to first show her ability and willingness to defend herself by creating a strong army, and that if she does not do so we can live without Europe by making a fortress of America. This school of thought places the stress upon the willingness of Western Europe to defend itself, and as far as I can find, it has failed to recognize the fact that it is not a case of Western Europe's willingness to defend herself, but a case of those in power in this Nation preventing the two great potential sources of anti-Communist manpower from being used to create a force in Western Europe, namely, the manpower of Western Germany and Spain.

I wholeheartedly and completely disagree with both schools of thought. I feel that regardless of which school of

thought prevails, if we continue to refuse to use the great sources of manpower in Western Europe and in Asia as we have refused to use the great source of manpower in Asia, namely, the anti-Communist Chinese, then we are doomed to defeat at the hands of the Communist half of the world as certainly as that the sun will rise in the east tomorrow.

USE OF AMERICAN TROOPS

In closing let me make it clear that I do not object to using American divisions in Europe. America has a heavy interest in keeping Western Europe from falling under Communist control. I do not object, that is, if we plan a real defense of Western Europe, and not a phony defense, under which the American troops

sent over will be condemned to death or permanent slavery in some Siberian prison camp.

Before we send more American troops into Western Europe we must reverse the administration's virtual ban upon the use of Western German and Spanish soldiers in defense of Western Europe. We must reverse the State Department's ban on the use of anti-Communist forces in the East. We must reverse the thinking of the planners who are in absolute control of the administration, to the effect that only American boys can fight and die in the struggle against international communism. When that is done, Mr. President, then and only then can we hope for a real and not a phony defense of Western Europe.

JUNE 14, 1951

## America's Retreat From Victory; the Story of Gen. George C. Marshall

Mr. McCARTHY obtained the floor.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield so that I may suggest the absence of a quorum?

Mr. McCARTHY. I will if the Senator insists, but would rather not yield for that purpose, because I have informed many Senators that in view of the fact that this speech is approximately 60,000 words, I do not expect them to sit and listen to it as I deliver it, but I hope they will read it when I have concluded.

While I normally will yield for questions at any time, I hope Senators will refrain from interrupting until I have developed a part of the evidence in this matter.

Mr. President, in closely following the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD testimony before the Joint Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, sitting jointly, which is conducting an investigation of the dismissal of Douglas MacArthur, I have become more and more impressed by two inescapable facts:

First. That it is impossible to develop the facts in the MacArthur inquiry without at the same time bringing to light some of the facts which bear on the question of why we fell from our position as the most powerful Nation on earth at the end of World War II to a position of declared weakness by our leadership.

Second. That it will be equally impossible to obtain the answers to the above without uncovering a conspiracy so immense and an infamy so black as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man. During the Marshall testimony, one of the Senators obviously troubled by the odor of the conspiracy which was commencing to rise as a result of the constant probing by the members of the committee—troubled by the fringes of the conspiracy which were commencing to show—came to my office and asked me for information on a subject which was troubling and puzzling him greatly. While I cannot quote him verbatim, the questions he asked were substantially as follows:

First. Who was close to Marshall and succeeded in deceiving this great Amer-

ican at Yalta when his military advice was that we turn Manchuria over to Russia, thereby signing at least the first section in the death warrant of the Republic of China?

Second. Who twisted and perverted the thinking of this great American and misguided him into the folly of his disastrous mission to China?

Third. Who, of tortured disloyalty to America, succeeded in deceiving this great general during the course of World War II to the end that he always sided with Stalin and against Churchill when history's great decisions were being made—decisions which turned out so bad for the free world and so good for international communism?

Upon searching for the answers for the Senator, I found to my surprise that Marshall, who, by the alchemy of propaganda, became the "greatest living American," and the recently proclaimed "master of global strategy" for the party in power, has never had his record subjected to the searching light of any historian. In view of the fact that the committee, the Congress, and the American people are being called upon either to endorse or reject Marshall's global strategy, I felt that it was urgent that such a study be made and submitted to the Russell committee.

### MARSHALL'S RECORD FROM FRIENDLY SOURCES

I decided that the record of Marshall's unbroken series of decisions and acts, contributing so greatly to the strategy of defeat, should be given not from the pens and lips of his critics but from sources friendly to him. In view of the fact that the archives of this Nation and other nations are not available to me, I have been unable to document all of the important details of his record. However, sufficient evidence is available to give a picture which is complete in its general outline. I have drawn on the written record; on the memoirs of the principal actors in the great events of the last 10 years; I have drawn heavily from the books out of which the history of these times will be written for the next 500 years; I have drawn from the pens of Admiral Leahy, Winston

Churchill, Mark Clark, Robert Sherwood speaking for Harry Hopkins, Henry L. Stimson, James F. Byrnes, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Sumner Wells, Cordell Hull, General Arnold, General Deane, General Chennault, and Jonathan Daniels. No one of them alone was trying to or did give anything remotely approaching a complete record of Marshall. The picture emerges, however, as we piece together their recollection of the events in which he figures—often-times fragmentary, never directly uncomplimentary, but when fitted together, pointing unerringly to one conclusion.

It is from those sources, plus the State Department's record taken from Marshall's own files, that the picture becomes generally complete.

It is needless to tell you that this was a monumental task, but one which I felt had to be done, for unless we understand the record of Marshall it will be impossible to even remotely grasp the planned steady retreat from victory which commenced long before World War II ended. Unless we carefully study the records of Marshall and Acheson, who have worked together so closely, it will be impossible to foretell the next move on the timetable of the great conspiracy.

I realize full well how unpopular it is to lay hands on the laurels of a man who has been built into a great hero. I very much dislike this unpleasant task, but I feel that it must be done if we are to intelligently make the proper decisions in the issues of life and death before us.

#### ELEMENTS OF AMERICA'S STRENGTH

Before embarking upon the documentation of the history of Marshall, let us first briefly review the elements of our strength. Primarily, of course, we have the great industrial potential of this the mightiest of industrial lands—a potential which during the late hostilities poured forth the weapons of war to such an extent that in the closing months the enemy was hopelessly overmastered. That is one element we may take for granted unless the Russians by, among other things, gaining command of the western Pacific could successfully threaten it from air bases in Alaska and northern Canada. We may assume our industrial potential for the time being.

The other great constant factor is the will of the American people to resist. I think that will is not weakened, and I am proud, as other Senators are, of the

magnificent evidence of that will which we have seen in Korea. And yet will and arms are not in themselves entirely sufficient. The mountains of materials which we may produce and the valor of American arms, as it has been demonstrated on a thousand battlefields in every corner of the globe from King Philip's War to the current engagements in Korea, are not enough.

The variable factor in all this is politics and military strategy. What is strategy? Webster tells us that it is "the science or art of projecting and directing great military movements." In our case those military movements must be projected on a world-wide scale.

It is here that we come to the enigmatic, powerful figure of General Marshall. Why should we seek, as we shall, to understand General Marshall's strategic decisions in World War II? Because we are asked today to accept General Marshall as the paramount strategist of the present and the oncoming wars. The issue of these times has been partly framed in terms of the widely contrasted personalities and judgments of General MacArthur and General Marshall. We are asked to make the choice between MacArthur and Marshall. The issue in the great controversy that ensued upon the dismissal of General MacArthur by President Truman "in the dead, vast, and middle of the night" is at bottom a strategic issue.

#### THE STRANGE WAR OF 1951

As a backdrop to the investigation being conducted by the joint committee there is being waged a strange war, an undeclared and unacknowledged war; a war such as never before has been seen on sea or land. It is a war into which we were launched on the impulse of a President in the name of the United Nations, which has been striving ever since to disavow its paternity. If we are to believe the administration's spokesmen, it is a war without point or objective, a war without meaning except in the high personal and tragic sense in which it appears to the men who are consecrating the hills and valleys of Korea with their blood and to the wives and families of those men.

There is a nightmare quality about this war. In the eyes of the distinguished General Bradley it is a war fought against the "wrong enemy." The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is clear, has succumbed to the general

confusion, and while it is not given to General Bradley to know that in Korea we are fighting the Russian Empire, we in this Chamber may be supposed to know better. This being an unacknowledged war, we endure all the disadvantages of war without any of the advantages. We are powerless to exercise the political or military initiatives customary to a belligerent.

In everything that concerns the deadly and ruinous aspects of war—the casualty rolls, the immense cost in treasure, the domestic strains, the fears—we are at war. In everything that has to do with the constructive, hopeful aspects of war—for war has those aspects too—we are not at war. Because of the maddening ambiguity of the administration's policy, we cannot pursue intelligent policies that would bring victory, nor can we make use of sound military principles which might minimize bloodshed and prevent the appalling destruction of Korea. We are in a war of alliance, yet our allies are at best of nominal assistance and at worst a conflicting hindrance. When they could really support us, then we and we alone are at war. Nor are we willing to make use of true friends, such as the Chinese Nationalists, who never have swerved in purpose.

#### WHO IS RUNNING THE WAR?

As the hearings progress, the question of what power is making decisions is becoming more and more confused. In one breath we hear that we, as the agent of the United Nations, can do all that is necessary to bring the war to a speedy and victorious conclusion. In the next breath we hear that actions which our military leaders consider necessary cannot be taken because the United Nations is running the war. The best example is found in the testimony of the Joint Chiefs and Acheson in regard to the hot pursuit of enemy planes. It was the unanimous opinion of General MacArthur, General Stratemeier, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs that our Air Force be allowed to engage in hot pursuit. The testimony was that Acheson was instructed to take the necessary steps to get the consent of our 13 "allies." He testified, however, that he only contacted six of them. When asked why he did not present this question to the United Nations in view of the fact that the United Nations is allegedly the final authority in the operation of this war, he stated—and listen to this—

that could not be done because Russia as a member of the United Nations would veto this military action. From this it would appear that we are in the fantastically incredible position of supplying a vast majority of the manpower (outside of Korean manpower) and the weapons of war, while at the same time we are in the position of having the war run by an organization in which our principal enemy, in the words of our Secretary of State, can veto any action which would promise us victory.

There will be found among us, Mr. President, many views regarding the United Nations. Some may see it with the infatuated and cloudy vision of President Truman and Secretary Acheson, as the only hope of mankind. Others, taking a moderate view, may see in it a still hopeful instrument for future peace and world order. Still others look upon the United Nations, so hastily improvised by the late President Roosevelt, the late Secretary Stettinius, and the presently incarcerated Alger Hiss, as a misbegotten fraud. All must admit that it is sown with our enemies and with false friends. It is, nevertheless, in the name of the United Nations that our sons and brothers are committed to the carnage of Korea.

#### DANGER OF A SUDDEN SELL-OUT

Worst of all, we cannot be sure as we sit here that suddenly behind the screen of chicanery and evil purpose we may not be committed to an ignominious peace. In January the Messrs. Truman, Acheson, and Marshall were ready to negotiate a truce that would have rewarded the Chinese hirelings of the Kremlin with a seat in the United Nations and the island bastion of Formosa. As recently as last March, these same gentlemen, in collaboration with the British, with the impudent National Socialist Nehru, and their tools and minions throughout Europe and the Middle East, were on the verge again of surrendering to the Asiatic power drive of Moscow. It is not a pleasant sight to see Uncle Sam, with purse in one hand and hat in the other, begging on bended knee for the things which are ours. But it was to be done cleverly, so that we would appear to be opposing what by our actions would have been inescapable results. Let me explain that the future of our allies on Formosa and the question of unseating the Republic of China in the United Nations and replacing her

with Red China was to be settled by a jury composed of Red China, Red Russia, Socialist Britain, and the United States—a packed jury, if I ever heard of one.

There was no question about how three of the four would vote. There was no possible question about how the Attlee government's representative would vote, because they have long stood 100 percent with Red China in her claims to Formosa and her claims to a seat in the United Nations. Our State Department had instructed our delegate to the United Nations to vote to settle the fate of our friends by a fixed jury—a jury stacked with the enemies of the Republic of China; a jury which had the whole-hearted and publicly expressed approval of the great Marshall, of course.

We are told that only the prompt action of General MacArthur in issuing a field ultimatum to the bloody pawns of Peiping forestalled that disaster. The President of the United States has explained that it was this act of General MacArthur that precipitated his dismissal. If that is indeed true, this single deed of MacArthur's, preserving for yet a little while our vital position in the Western Pacific, may well be regarded by history as the foremost among his many services to his country.

We cannot rest secure today in the confidence that this administration will not again put our security in the Pacific to the hazard of its muddy and perverted purposes. Certainly Dean Acheson will not forsake the high-minded executioners of the Kremlin who are turning the public squares of Chinese city after Chinese city into charnel houses. The administration, which procured the surrender of China to Russia, is obviously well pleased with the results of its endeavors and has no desire to disturb the Russian Empire in its possession of the mainland of China. And among the journalistic voices that invariably echo the administration's will, we have had fresh evidence within recent days of their eagerness that Russia be not molested in Asia. Many of those journalistic satraps have been demanding the punishment of Dean Rusk for his belated and partial acknowledgement that American policy has been betrayed in China.

I hope the press will understand that I am only referring to the left-wing, bleeding-heart elements of the press, be-

cause, thank God, we do have essentially a good press in this Nation.

#### POLICY OF FEAR

This administration, which has given us this caricature of a war, is now bent on an even worse horror—a phony and fraudulent peace. It is planned by Secretary Marshall and the elegant and alien Acheson—Russian as to heart, British as to manner. We even hear cries for a fraudulent peace within this Chamber. In support of their campaign for a fraudulent peace, its advocates wage a campaign of fear.

The President threatens us with the destruction of our cities by Russian bombs unless we continue to pursue his empty, defeatist strategy in the Far East. The President's only answer to the splendid counsel of General MacArthur is that we must on no account offend the Soviet Union. One of the administration's two principal spokesmen on this matter seeks to frighten us with the admonition that unless we mind our P's and Q's in Korea, "This very Capitol Building, this very Senate Chamber may be blown to smithereens next week or the week after." Mr. President, that is not the great heart of America speaking.

I do not think we need fear too much about the Communists dropping atomic bombs on Washington. They would kill too many of their friends that way.

I never thought that I would live to see the day that Senators representing sovereign States would rise on the floor of the Senate and actually debate and argue to the effect that we should not protect the lives of our young men, whom we ourselves have sent into battle, merely because, if we were to fight back, we might make someone angry.

In my boyhood in Wisconsin, we had a deep pride in our country, in its strength as well as its wealth, in its high destiny as a great free society as well as in its opportunities for individual riches or position. We were simple, uncomplicated Americans, not above dying, if need be, for the land we love. We had self-assurance, too, and we assumed that whenever our security, our way of life, and our ideals were threatened by a hostile force, we would have the physical strength, and also the strength of character, to defend those values by force of arms, and to the utmost, regardless of consequences. We were not misled and enfeebled by abstractions such as collective security and by the tortured, twisted

reasoning of men of little minds and less morals who for the first time in the history of this Nation argue that we should not vigorously fight back when attacked and in every way possible protect the lives of our men for fear of making an enemy or potential enemy mad, and that we dare not win a war. We hear the President in a Nation-wide broadcast saying, "Even if we win," Mr. President, listen to those words—"even"—"even if we win." When before in the history of this Nation has a President been so craven? Imagine George Washington, when he was leading this small, physically weak Nation against mighty and powerful England, saying to his troops, "Even if we win." Imagine Lincoln, in even the darkest days of the Civil War, saying, "Even if we win." Imagine Churchill, in England's darkest days during World War II when invasion was imminent, saying, "Even if we win." Imagine what might well have happened to England if those had been his words instead of his immortal words, "We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender." Imagine Roosevelt, when he addressed the Congress on that fateful December 8, saying, "Even if we win."

As I listen to the debates in this Chamber and hear the testimony of the President's spokesmen, it makes me sick down deep inside. But when I get out of Washington into the United States, it is a healthy feeling—for then is answered the question: Where stand the people? Not with the Gospel of fear which is being preached to us. Not with the craven fears of the President and his spokesmen but rather with the wholesome American view regarding the integrity and self-reliance of America.

#### WHY ARE WE WEAK?

The administration explicitly announces to the world that we are too weak to resist the Soviet Empire.

When World War II ended, the United States had the most powerful military machine the world has ever witnessed. It could have rolled across Asia, over the Ural Mountains, and on to the Pacific Ocean, and Korea would not have even been considered a minor mopping up operation by one of Patton's armored divisions. Since then the administration has been given every cent that it has asked, and more; to maintain a

powerful military machine. Yet during the hearings, Chief of the Air Force General Vandenberg testified—page 3630 of the MacArthur hearings—that the United States is operating a shoestring air force, and Secretary Marshall testified—page 880 of the MacArthur hearings—that we had almost nothing in the summer of 1950 in the way of available troops in this country other than one airborne division and a part of a Marine division.

This is the same administration which, as we shall again demonstrate today, deliberately—and I use the word "deliberately" advisedly—assisted the Russian conquest of China—a conquest that General Marshall conceded in his recent testimony had taken place—and in so doing reversed the American policy toward the Far East that had been maintained by every President, Republican or Democrat, for the last half a century. This is the administration which has sheltered the friends and puppets of the Russian Empire high in its own councils and, when challenged, has turned the batteries of its anger and its camp-following propaganda agents, not upon the enemies of our country in its ranks but turned them upon the enemies of those enemies.

This is the administration that has allowed priceless atomic secrets to slip through its dubiously loyal fingers—stolen by spies who, according to the President, never existed, and to make the very bombs with which it now threatens us. Moreover—and this is a fact of equal significance which I propose to reveal if you will forgive the lengthy exposition required by the evidence—the administration preceding this one, by its pursuit of a fateful high strategy in World War II itself produced the might of the Russian Empire which General Marshall now so greatly fears.

#### MARSHALL'S ROLE IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN CHURCHILL AND STALIN

In order to draw clearly the picture of Marshall, it is necessary to sketch in some detail the vast, history-making struggle between Churchill and Stalin and the decisive role which Marshall played in that struggle. During those wartime days, Marshall sometimes overbore Churchill; he was sometimes overborne by Churchill. Each was striving to guide the decisions of Roosevelt, who, because of the great weight of American military and industrial power, had the last word.

The President moderated between these two men, as we shall see, but I think it entirely fair to say that in those procedures General Marshall more often than not swayed the historic decisions.

That estimate may strike some of us as novel. It does not accord with the accepted and popular view of those times, which places Roosevelt as the all-powerful voice, only modified, often to America's hurt, by the strong desires of Churchill. We have not been properly instructed. The truth is that among the three great powers of that day, Stalin had a policy, Churchill had a policy, and we operated between the two, almost invariably in support of the Russian line rather than the British.

If Senators will bear with me I shall document the fact in detail. We had no discernible policy except the superficial one of defeating the enemy in battle as fast as possible. This will become more manifest as we proceed to review the high strategy of World War II.

#### THE NATION'S PERIL

The history of those events would not deserve extended treatment in this Chamber at this time unless its lessons afforded us insight into our present perils. I think we are in the greatest danger ever faced by this Republic. I think that for the first time in our history we are in a danger from which we may not be able to escape as a distinguishable, a free, and a hopeful society. The continued existence of this country has never before been called into question. Even had the Confederate States succeeded in establishing their independence we would be today two countries instead of one, but they would be countries of a common civilization and way of life.

The danger we face today is different not only in its magnitude but in its intrinsic nature. If the Communist empire, which alone threatens us and which alone is the only power able so to do, were to accomplish the objective it seeks—and which so many Americans in high places either consciously or unconsciously assist—we will not only cease to be the country we have known and loved, but those of us who are allowed to stay alive will no longer be allowed to exist as civilized men.

While the peril is great, the great and shining hope of ultimate victory for the free half of the world lies in the fact that the people of this Nation do not sub-

scribe to the craven, whining, whimpering policy of fear of those who, because of an accident of history, are in a position of leadership.

What the Communist Empire is trying to do, of course, is so to arrange world events, and through her stooges to shape American policy so that in the not distant future they will feel themselves strong enough to destroy us. Lest there be any doubt about the aims of world communism let me quote the leader of world communism, Stalin himself. Here are his words, spoken not 10 years ago, not before World War II, but in 1947. Listen:

The existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with capitalistic states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end.

His words represent no new thought on the part of the leader of communism. It was part of the Communist credo since the days of its founder. It was the principle which guided Stalin during all of his titanic struggles with Churchill, in which Marshall played such an important part.

#### THE MASTER OF GLOBAL STRATEGY

Let us, therefore, discuss for a time what is perhaps the most significant aspect of our situation as we face this Communist public promise to enslave us. Let us, therefore, discuss the history of Marshall as the master of our world-wide strategy. I do not myself so describe him, although I have no doubt that he is one of its architects. He has recently been so described in a partisan sense. Recently a Democratic Party gathering at Denver, laying the groundwork for the campaign of 1952, summed up what it believed to be the party's assets in a resolution with which they were prepared to enter that campaign. These assets included the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. They termed the Secretary of State a man of "broad vision and knowledge of world affairs." It is not so much that I disagree with what they said; it is that I would question what they left unsaid. I do not doubt Acheson's vision and knowledge. I pause to observe in passing that his conduct of his high office serves the interests of Russia, not the interests of the United States.

We come to that other political asset of the Democratic Party, Secretary Marshall. Him they describe as a "master

of global strategy." It is, therefore, both as a professional military man and as a partisan that we must view Secretary Marshall. Were he merely a professional soldier who had given his lifetime to the service of his country, I should hesitate to lay hands on his laurels. We cannot too much honor the men who have dedicated their lives to our military services. We can afford to deal lightly with their mistakes of judgment, but not with their lapses of honor. Had General Marshall been content at the end of World War II to rest upon his laurels, instead of assuming command of our military and political decisions and ranging himself with stubborn zeal at the side of the old Acheson-Hiss-Yalta crowd, we might never have found occasion to audit what he did in World War II.

It is now necessary in the public interest to examine with care and detail the record of General Marshall in the recent war. I myself am a little handicapped in this examination because during the events of those days I was segregated in a small area of the Pacific Ocean. I was not here in Washington where I might have passed judgment as the scene unfolded. Had I been, it is unlikely that I would have been admitted to the august circles where the great decisions of the war were made.

So, lacking first-hand access to those meetings where the great decisions were taken, I have had recourse, as could anyone, to what has been written of them by the principals. I have consulted the memoirs of the associates of General Marshall in that war. They are voluminous and revelatory. Those sources I might remind you, are friendly. None of the great leaders of the English-speaking peoples who have written of the war have been noticeably unfriendly to General Marshall.

Mr. President, there are various ways in which to arrive at an estimate of a wartime figure. It is helpful if he will write his own recollections, but that General Marshall has declined to do, giving, as I understand it, the explanation that to do so would injure certain reputations. If all public figures accepted that thesis, I may remark in passing, the public would be even less enlightened than it is at present. In pursuit of an estimate, one may also gain information from official records. The records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

and the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff are not open to my perusal. In the end the inquirer will also find in the archives of the enemy, when they become available, evidence regarding the behavior of his own leaders. If the archives of the Kremlin are ever open to us, we shall have even deeper insight than we have today concerning the conduct of our current leaders. But as matters now stand, I have been forced to rely upon the memoirs and upon some other contemporary sources. I repeat that all these are friendly sources, and cannot be charged with attempts to injure General Marshall.

1941 TO 1942

I have begun my review with the winter of 1941 and 1942, when the comprehensive outlines of Anglo-American strategy were drawn. I must ask my colleagues to go back with me to those days. During the Christmas holidays of 1941, we recall that Winston Churchill, attended by his military advisers, came to Washington and held a series of conferences at the White House with President Roosevelt and his military advisers. Japan had struck at Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December. Our fortunes were then joined with those of the British and the lesser powers engaged against Japan and Germany. We faced for the first time in our history, global responsibilities. We were everywhere on the defensive. The British occupied a precarious foothold in Egypt. We still held Corregidor and Bataan, although the end there was in sight. Singapore had not yet fallen, but the Japanese were well advanced in their southward drive. Germany, master of the Continent as far as the Pyrenees and the North Cape, was still marching toward the east into Russia.

#### THE SECOND FRONT NOW

The President and the Prime Minister, with their military counselors, agreed then upon a strategic plan embracing the globe. Included in this plan was a provision for the invasion of the mainland of Europe at some time during 1943. It was rightly considered that we would lack the men and the equipment to cross the Channel before 1943. What came to be known as the second front was allotted the appropriate place in the world-wide scale as this conference came to a close in the middle of January. It was at this time that the enormously destructive battle of the Atlantic

began—the ruthless submarine warfare aimed at our shipping, which was to hamper our war effort far more than the conferees at the White House had expected.

The Soviet Union, its armies reeling back, had been beseeching the British since the preceding summer to attack Germany in Europe as a means of relieving their dire pressure. After the White House conference, known as the Arcadia Conference, ended, the efforts of the Russians to promote a diversion in Western Europe were redoubled. The pressure was not alone maintained against our governments; it took the form of public propaganda, in which the Communists both of England and America, and their friends and well-wishers, took a leading part.

Sometime between the end of the Arcadia Conference and the 1st of April General Marshall, who was then, as you will recall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, had prepared in the War Department Planning Section a plan for the invasion of Western Europe in 1942. This planning section was under the command of Col. Dwight D. Eisenhower. I might say, parenthetically, that at the Arcadia Conference in a closed session among the President, the Prime Minister and Ambassador Litvinov, the President had, with characteristic impulsiveness, given Litvinov some cause to hope that the western allies might find it possible to mount this invasion in 1942. At Arcadia the President had proposed an intermediate attack in North Africa for the purpose of gaining command of the Mediterranean and threatening Europe from the south. It was over these two projects that the violent disputes of the next 3 months were to wage, disputes largely hidden from the public at the time, but in which General Marshall and the Prime Minister played the leading roles.

**MARSHALL AND STALIN VERSUS CHURCHILL ON QUESTION OF SECOND FRONT**

The plan for a "second front now" has been described by the late Secretary Stimson as "the brain child of the American Army." There can be no doubt but that it was General Marshall's plan. He fought for it with the utmost vigor, a vigor, bespeaking an interest that went far beyond the call of duty of a purely military adviser. As Mr. Churchill once put it in a cable to Mr. Roosevelt, the matter was "a political, more than a

military issue." The text of this cable may be found on page 43 of Mr. Churchill's book, *The Hinge of Fate*. By March 9, 1942, we are told by Mr. Sherwood, the President had fallen in to some extent with the Marshall plan, cabling Churchill on that date:

I am becoming more and more interested in the establishment of a new front (on the European continent) this summer.

By the first of April, Mr. Roosevelt had been induced, as Sherwood explains on page 521, by Stimson, Marshall, and Hopkins, to supersede the North African venture known as *Gymnast* in favor of the transchannel operation. By then, as Sherwood puts it, "Roosevelt was attaching great importance to the political importance of this in relation to Russia." Hopkins and Marshall were sent to London to persuade Churchill. The Americans found Churchill reluctant. With his customary eloquence, the Prime Minister explored the difficulties of the operation. They lacked the landing craft necessary, they lacked the air cover, and the naval support. The venture would be costly, the Prime Minister believed, and he foresaw the channel turned into a "river of Allied blood." Should it fail, said Churchill, it would not only expose our friends on the Continent to great disappointment, it would hearten the Nazis and prejudice subsequent attempts to invade the Continent. However, the British agreed to give the matter careful study, which they did.

The American strategists continued hurriedly and confidently to plan for a "second front now" until early in June, when disquieting news reached Washington with the arrival of Lord Louis Mountbatten. He reported to the President that the British military experts could find no feasible method by which the invasion could be mounted. By this time the invasion bore the name *Sledgehammer*. Churchill followed Mountbatten to Washington, and under his representations of the difficulties, the President weakened, returning to his predilection for *Gymnast*. When the President sought to moderate Marshall's views, "he met with," as Mr. Stimson put it, on page 424 of his book, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, "a rather robust opposition." The general quickly submitted a new paper in support of the "second front now" and against *Gymnast*.

On July 10, as Stimson reports it, Marshall returned from a White House conference "very stirred up and emphatic over a British War Cabinet paper vetoing *Sledgehammer* and calling for *Gymnast*." Still following Mr. Stimson's version of the occasion, Marshall "proposed a show-down which I cordially endorsed. As the British will not go through with what they agreed to, we will turn our back on them and take up the war with Japan."

Although Stimson in retrospect was "not entirely pleased with his part in this venture," he went along with Marshall at the time. The Army Chief of Staff acquired the support of his colleagues, Admiral King and General Arnold. This is the appropriate time to point out that during the war Admiral King's preoccupations were almost wholly with the Pacific theater. He had little or no interest in the strategy of the war in Europe and Asia and only exercised himself there when the claims of those theaters infringed on his own supply of ships and men. I find no evidence in the sources I have consulted that General Arnold ever took a leading part in these strategical questions. To all intents and purposes it is quite clear that General Marshall spoke the voice of the Joint Chiefs in matters of over-all strategy. Returning to the *Sledgehammer* quarrel, Marshall submitted to the President a paper, signed by all three chiefs, proposing that we withdraw from the war in Europe unless the British acceded to his plan. Here I quote Mr. Stimson, page 425:

The President asserted that he himself was absolutely sound on Bolero (*Sledgehammer*) which must go ahead unremittably, but he did not like the manner of the memorandum in regard to the Pacific, saying that it was a little like "taking up your dishes and going away."

Mr. Roosevelt was not persuaded and the bluff was never tried. It would not have worked in any case, for there was no real intention of carrying it out and Stimson supposed that the British knew this as well as he did.

Furthermore, Stimson knew that the President had a "lingering predilection for the Mediterranean," and the Prime Minister had shown on his last visit that he, too, knew the President's feeling; back on June 21 he "had taken up *Gymnast*, knowing full well I am sure that it was the President's great secret baby." The quotation is from Stimson.

Mr. Sherwood, in commenting on these events—page 594—recalls that Roosevelt described the Marshall showdown as "a red herring," a phrase that has a familiar ring. Sherwood does not agree with Stimson that it was a tactical maneuver in the struggle between Marshall and Churchill, saying, "It is my impression that the plan was far more than a bluff in General Marshall's mind and certainly in Admiral King's. Indeed, the first step in it—the assault of Guadalcanal was approved on June 25, the last day of Churchill's stay in Washington."

The President resolved the crisis by dispatching Marshall, Hopkins, and King to London to have it finally out with the Prime Minister and his advisers. They advised in Scotland on a Saturday, finding the Prime Minister's train and an invitation to Chequers, the Prime Minister's country place, awaiting them. Rather mystifyingly Marshall, who was so obviously the guest of the Prime Minister, bluntly declined his invitation to stop at Chequers and insisted on proceeding directly to London. Churchill protested this "rudeness" in talks with Hopkins. Marshall, it was clear, did not want to put himself under the persuasive fire of Churchill. Sherwood testifies that those were tense days for the Anglo-American Alliance both at the White House and in London. The administration found heavy going in London. Before long Admiral King had been alienated from Marshall by representations of the Royal Navy that the French coast would become a lee shore in September and hence difficult to invade.

**CLARK SIDES WITH CHURCHILL AGAINST MARSHALL AND STALIN**

What was perhaps the most crushing argument against *Sledgehammer* was dealt by a general who was taking no sides in the political question, Mark Clark. Clark was then in command of all American Army forces in the British Isles. Rather belatedly, it seems, he was called before the combined Chiefs of Staff and asked by Marshall what American forces could be contributed to a "second front now." I quote from page 34 of Clark's book, *Calculated Risk*, his version of that occasion:

I pointed out that all we could count on using would be the Thirty-fourth Division then in North Ireland. . . . The Thirty-fourth, however, had little amphibious training, it lacked antiaircraft support and it had no tanks. The First Armored Divi-

sion also in Ireland, was not yet fully equipped, nor would any other units scheduled to arrive before September 15 be prepared for battle. \* \* \* There would be a difficult problem getting the men and equipment together and \* \* \* there seemed to be no possibility that invasion boats would be ready by midspring—to say nothing of bad weather conditions prevailing at that time of year \* \* \* the American forces will be ready to contribute comparatively little until spring of 1943.

With Clark's report it at once becomes evident that Marshall had virtually nothing to contribute in support of his plan. What he was, in effect, doing was calling upon the British to execute an operation in which they firmly disbelieved with scarcely any support from his own forces.

I leave it to you to characterize the general's zeal. We were to learn later that as late as the spring of 1943, the Nazis had 1,300,000 troops in France and the Low Countries.

#### MARSHALL'S TRAINING OF TROOPS

It should also be noted that the first troops that we sent abroad in 1942 were, as we discovered in north Africa, insufficiently trained for combat. It is no reflection upon them to say that in the first weeks of the American Corps' venture into battle they did not behave as hardened veterans. Indeed, General McNair, who, as you know, unhappily lost his life by misdirected American fire in the Normandy invasion, observed to General Clark after a visit to the north African front, "The American soldiers are not fighting in Tunisia." This may be found on page 168 of General Clark's memoirs. He qualified that in favor of the First Division. McNair attributed their lack of battle stability to the failure to inculcate discipline in their training here at home.

It is noteworthy that we have been assured times without number that General Marshall's greatest achievement in World War II was the organization and training of our armies. When our forces in north Africa had become battle-hardened and General Clark and General Patton had put them under advanced training, they, as you all know, behaved in the best tradition of the American Army. But what would have happened had we thrown the green troops of Kasserine Pass against Hitler's Panzers in the fall of 1942? We find a curious retrospective glance at that incident in Sherwood's recollections,

where, on page 807, he quotes Hopkins to this effect:

In trying to figure out whether we could have gotten across the channel successfully in 1942 or 1943, you have got to answer the unanswerable question as to whether Eisenhower, Bradley, Spaatz, Patton, Bedell Smith, and also Montgomery and Tedder and a lot of others could have handled the big show as they would if they hadn't had the experience fighting Germany in North Africa and Sicily.

So at London in July of 1942, the plan of the "master of global strategy" went awry and the Combined Chiefs settled on Gymnast. Sherwood recalls that "General Marshall had firmly opposed it and so had General Eisenhower, who is quoted as having described the day when the decision was made by Roosevelt as possibly the blackest day in history."

#### HANSON BALDWIN'S ESTIMATE OF MARSHALL'S PLAN

If I may, in this connection, I should like to summon as a witness Hanson W. Baldwin, the distinguished military critic of the New York Times, whose strategic insights are universally recognized.

I think it goes without saying that Marshall's fervent determination to cross the Channel in the fall of 1942 or the spring of 1943 is open to grave doubts. It was, in fact, the first of a series of grave decisions made by this "master of global strategy," some of them producing consequences which today increasingly threaten the well-being and survival of the West. In his book, *Great Mistakes of the War*, Baldwin says on page 33, "In retrospect it is now obvious that our concept of invading Western Europe in 1942 was fantastic; our deficiencies in north Africa, which was a much-needed training school for our troops, proved that. The British objection to a 1943 cross-channel operation was also soundly taken militarily; we would have had in that year neither the trained divisions, the equipment, the planes, the experience, nor (particularly) the landing craft to have invaded the most strongly held part of the Continent against an enemy whose strength was far greater than it was a year later." Baldwin's estimate goes far to support Churchill's objections that a disaster on the French coast due to a hasty, reckless invasion might have proved "the only way in which we could possibly lose

this war." That Churchillian remark appears on page 590 of Sherwood.

It was at this time, whether or not because of the unmitigated fervor with which Marshall pushed his plan, that Roosevelt superseded him in the military circle around the White House. The President chose Admiral Leahy, a naval officer of eminent achievements and the saltiest of common sense, as his personal Chief of Staff. Leahy became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and thus, nominally, Marshall's superior, although, as we shall see, Marshall overcame him at several of the most critical junctions. Although Leahy came on the scene, having been our Ambassador at Vichy, too late to participate in the discussions of Sledgehammer, he was familiar with their general setting. He wrote on page 110 of his valuable book of memoirs, *I Was There*, his own judgment of that sorry and provocative incident. Leahy wrote:

The Russians could not have been more disappointed than our own Army people. \* \* \* There was much grumbling about Britain and much criticism of Winston Churchill. The Prime Minister was convinced that England was not ready to undertake such a major effort and I did not think that we were either. He [Winston Churchill] wanted to have much more assurance of success than General Marshall could give him.

Our subsequent history would have been happier had Leahy, rather than Marshall, prevailed at Yalta—a chapter which we shall soon open.

#### THE OPPOSITION OF MARSHALL AND STALIN TO THE MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS

It became evident with the Sledgehammer quarrel that Marshall intended to make his mark on the political and strategic decisions of World War II. The next assertion of his will came late in August when, without advance notice, the American Chiefs of Staff—meaning Marshall—served notice on the British that they opposed the hitherto agreed upon plans to invade north Africa by way of the Mediterranean as well as the Atlantic coast of Morocco. "The Army," as Admiral Leahy wrote in the above connection, "was not well disposed toward the adventure." The north African expedition had by now been christened Torch. The news reached Churchill on the 25th of August. Until that moment plans had been proceeding full speed ahead for landings at Casablanca on the Atlantic, Oran, which is the west-

ern end of the Mediterranean coast of Algiers, and a point or points farther east toward Tunisia. Suddenly the American chiefs notified the British that they now believed the Mediterranean landings too hazardous to undertake.

Stalin had been vigorously opposed to the Mediterranean landings, urging a second front in France.

Upon receipt of the advice from Washington that Torch had been ditched by Marshall and his associates, Churchill wrote a disparaging letter to Hopkins. This was on the 4th of September and the text of the letter appears on page 540 of the volume of Churchill's memoirs known as *The Hinge of Fate*. He wrote Hopkins:

Frankly, I do not understand what is at the back of all this. I thought there was agreement with Marshall and that King had been paid off with what he needed for his Pacific war. But now it seems there is a bad comeback from the professional circles in the American Army and I have a deep and growing fear that the whole of the President's enterprise may be wrecked bit by bit. With it will fall the brightest hope of the Allies and the only hope this year.

When Churchill refers in his book to the professional circles of the Army, he is generally denoting Marshall and his principal strategic planners of that time.

#### ROOSEVELT SIDES WITH CHURCHILL

The Prime Minister's letter was never mailed. Before it could reach the letter box he had a cablegram from the President announcing that he had overcome the opposition of his staff and that the bell could again be rung for full speed ahead on Torch. Had Roosevelt not overruled Marshall at this critical time, undoubtedly Russia would enjoy the same complete domination over the Mediterranean area which she now enjoys over the other unhappy areas behind the iron curtain. As early as the White House conference known as Arcadia, the President had given his full support to north Africa, saying at that time, as quoted by the late Gen. H. H. (Hap) Arnold in his memoirs, *Global Mission*, "We must get into north Africa before the Germans." In this connection it may be mentioned that Stimson remarked in his book that "The Mediterranean Basin always fascinated Roosevelt." Sherwood likewise recalls the President's strong preference for this operation, basing it upon Roosevelt's "naval mindedness," and his knowledge

that by ridding north Africa of the Nazis we would free the lifeline to the Middle East and the Far East by way of Suez thus obviating the long voyages around the Cape and providing for ourselves a whole new theater from which the assault against the Nazis could be carried out.

It is an interesting speculation as to the future of World War II had we abandoned Torch or curtailed it by landing on the Atlantic alone. There was strong British sentiment to land in Tunisia as well as Tangiers at that time. A proposal from British quarters suggested that several thousand soldiers could be flown from Malta into Tunisia, which was only weakly garrisoned by the French, to coincide with the landings in Morocco and Algiers. This was vetoed. As it turned out, Hitler was able to send more than 100,000 of his best troops into Tunis. These forces, with Rommel's army retreating before Montgomery, made a formidable opposition, and it may be assumed that without the overpowering strength in the air which the Allies were able to command the war in north Africa might have dragged on indefinitely. Suppose we had not landed in Algeria, suppose that the battle of north Africa had continued for months on end and engaged ever larger numbers of our forces, in whose interest would that have been? By winning the war in north Africa and by our subsequent conquest of Sicily and Italy—enterprises which were unflinchingly opposed by Marshall—we, instead of Russia, were able to hold postwar command of at least the Mediterranean away from the Red armies. The European picture as of today would have been far different if the Red armies had themselves received the surrender of Italy. As it stands, we have Italy and a foothold on the opposite shore of the Adriatic at Trieste, a foothold which is no doubt today a reassurance to Tito.

We are all familiar with the developments in the north African war. No sooner had it been launched than Marshall again began to press his views in opposition to what Churchill called the exploitation of the prospective victory. In spite of Churchill's most eloquent pleading, Marshall only very reluctantly agreed to the attack on Sicily and with even greater reluctance to the further assault on the Italian mainland as a possible step toward the Churchill aim of invasion through the Balkans. In all these attitudes, Eisenhower, who had

become commander in chief in north Africa, was Marshall's firm supporter.

#### STALIN WINS EASTERN EUROPE

We now come to what was without question the most significant decision of the war in Europe: the decision by Marshall, which was made against Roosevelt's half-hearted wishes and Churchill's bulldog determination, to concentrate on France and leave the whole of Eastern Europe to the Red armies. This was a strategical struggle in the classic manner. It was pursued with great vigor, sometimes becoming very violent on both sides. It only reached its terminal point at Tehran, as we shall see, where the great combined weight of Stalin and Marshall defeated Churchill. I cannot dwell too urgently on this great decision. Its military effects were of no very great importance, although the unnecessary invasion of southern France, enjoined by Stalin and Marshall, gave Kesselring a welcome breathing spell in northern Italy and protracted Mark Clark's campaign for the Po with an attendant greater loss of American lives. It is the political consequences of this controversy which stand forth in all their stark implications for us today. I will attempt to summarize the debate briefly.

The British, from the beginning of the Italian strategical discussions, had been intent on carrying the war into the Mediterranean. Their motives were mixed. Foremost perhaps was their desire to relieve their forces in Egypt, which had suffered several crushing blows. Secondly, they wanted the use of the Mediterranean for very obvious purposes of communication. Thirdly, the British have had for many generations a paramount position in the eastern Mediterranean and had wide interests both in those lands and in the Suez Canal as a gateway to India and their great possessions and dependencies in the Orient and the Southern Seas. There was a further and personal factor, which Marshall frequently characterized as the Prime Minister's preoccupation with eccentric operations, such as the ill-fated Dardanelles' campaign in World War I with which Churchill's name will be forever associated. Over-shadowing and of much more importance, of course, as we see it now and as we get glimpses in the writings of the principal actors of those times, was a steady desire on the part of the British

to reach Eastern Europe and the Balkans before the Red armies.

#### HANSON BALDWIN LABELS OUR DESERTION OF CHURCHILL AND SUPPORT OF STALIN AS SHORT-SIGHTED

I think there can be no question that Hanson Baldwin is correct when he stigmatizes our military planning in this connection as short-sighted. Churchill, with his intimate and profound knowledge of the continuing drama of Europe, knew that a war is only a phase of history. Victory is one thing; where you stand at the end of war is another. He had the ability to foresee what Europe would look like as a result of certain policies.

#### THE GREAT BLUNDER OF THE WAR IN EUROPE

My own feeling, and I believe the Senate will agree with me, is that our failure to place ourselves in a position of strength in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and the Balkans was perhaps our greatest single blunder of the war in Europe. The Allied debate on this question has further significance for us. Marshall triumphed over Churchill at the First Quebec Conference in August 1943 with reference to this question.

#### CHURCHILL'S SWAY ENDED

That conference marked the end of Churchill's sway over the great decisions of war—a sway always modified by Marshall. Thereafter, Mr. President, the policy of the United States in the European war was wholly and without deviation the policy announced by Joseph Stalin. There was a break in the relations between the two English-speaking powers, which were carrying the brunt of the war, and the United States thereafter was found always on the side of Stalin. To obtain this result, Marshall bore down on British preoccupation with the Mediterranean. I have enumerated some of the reasons which led to the British position. Marshall ignored all of these except the one addressed to British self-interest. He minimized and derided the British position, ridiculing the Prime Minister's strategical judgment by frequent references to the Dardanelles.

#### THE FATAL RUPTURE

I cannot help believing that the rupture of interest between the United States and Great Britain signified by this decision was one of the most fateful ruptures between allies in modern times. It embittered our relationships at the first Quebec meeting, at Cairo, and at

Tehran. I intend, if I am not exhausting the Senate's patience, to go into these matters in detail.

At the moment let me generalize that the year 1943 was by all odds the critical year of the war, casting its shadow over the whole postwar period in which we now find ourselves convulsed by anxiety and doubt. It was in February of 1943 that the Russians achieved victory over the Germans at Stalingrad. In fact, it can, I believe, be safely stated that world war III started with the Russian victory at Stalingrad. Thereafter, they opened their diplomatic war against the West when they gave every evidence of turning upon the Polish armies, the Polish people, and the loyal and devoted Polish government in exile in London.

#### ONE OF THE WAR'S MOST IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS

The Kremlin's treatment of the Poles, beginning in the spring of 1943, has been the touchstone of this whole period, and it was at the Quebec Conference that the whole dangerous policy of the United States toward the Soviet Union was forecast and prefigured. At Quebec the decision was made to invade southern France and keep the weakened American Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army indecisively engaged in Italy. It was at Quebec also that the most amazing and indicative document that has so far emerged from the voluminous records of World War II was brought to bear. This document, a memorandum entitled "Russia's Position," affords us clear insight into our subsequent surrenders at Tehran and Yalta as well as at Potsdam. The document appears and only there, in Sherwood's book about Hopkins. It appears on page 748. The memorandum is ascribed there to "a very high-level United States military strategic estimate." Sherwood reports that Hopkins had it with him at Quebec. Can it be doubted that this document emanated from General Marshall, whoever drafted it? The question of its authorship is extremely important, and I hope that some day this body, or some other, will be able to fix that authorship.

No document of World War II was more controlling on our fate. I am going to read it in full as it appears in Sherwood's book. I read:

Russia's postwar position in Europe will be a dominant one. With Germany crushed, there is no power in Europe to oppose her tremendous military forces. It is true that Great Britain is building up a position in the Mediterranean vis-à-vis Russia that she

may find useful in balancing power in Europe. However, even here she may not be able to oppose Russia unless she is otherwise supported.

The conclusions from the foregoing are obvious. Since Russia is the decisive factor in the war, she must be given every assistance and every effort must be made to obtain her friendship. Likewise, since without question she will dominate Europe on the defeat of the Axis, it is even more essential to develop and maintain the most friendly relations with Russia.

Finally, the most important factor the United States has to consider in relation to Russia is the prosecution of the war in the Pacific. With Russia as an ally in the war against Japan, the war can be terminated in less time and at less expense in life and resources than if the reverse were the case. Should the war in the Pacific have to be carried on with an unfriendly or negative attitude on the part of Russia, the difficulties will be immeasurably increased and operations might become abortive.

Sherwood, himself, while passing no adverse judgment on the conclusions therein, did understand its great significance. He wrote, "This estimate was obviously of great importance as indicating the policy which guided the making of decisions at Tehran and, much later, at Yalta." What this document is, in effect, is a rationalization of the whole policy of submission to an appeasement to Russia during the remainder of World War II and, most notably, in our relationships with China thereafter. What it said was that as a result of the utter destruction of Germany which we had erected into a policy at Casablanca with the phrase "unconditional surrender," Russia would be the unquestioned "top dog" in Europe after the war, and that it behooved the great, enlightened, and truly progressive English-speaking peoples therefore to cater to, to placate, and, in fact, to submit to the will of the Kremlin thereafter. It said unmistakably that the British endeavors in the Mediterranean, which Marshall had succeeded in blocking, were aimed at balancing power in Europe vis-à-vis Russia. This Marshall did not want.

That, Mr. President, is bad enough. The document went further. It insisted that we must carry this attitude of solicitude and deference beyond the European situation. We must bow to Russia in the Far East as well. It is here that we find the first explicit delineation of the policy which produced the shameful betrayal of China at Yalta, the

blackmail paid by Roosevelt to get Russia into a war which she had already announced her eagerness to wage.

#### STALIN'S GREAT VICTORY

The debate over Mediterranean policy had reached a focus at the White House late in May of 1943 when Churchill again crossed the Atlantic in pursuit of a common objective. He found Marshall opposed to any action in the Mediterranean beyond taking Sardinia after the occupation of Sicily and that then all of our subsequent efforts be devoted to what the late Sir John Dill, who was Chief of the British Military Mission in Washington, once referred to in a letter to Churchill as "Marshall's first love"—the transchannel invasion. Roosevelt was pulled and hauled on this issue as much as any in the war. His inclinations, based upon a great knowledge of geography, and his adventurous strategic desires were toward expanding the war into eastern Europe. Ultimately, however, Marshall again won out and Roosevelt went along with him.

So determined was Churchill at the White House in May to have his views prevail that he induced Roosevelt to send Marshall with him to north Africa for a further discussion with military leaders in that theater. I gather from the Hinge of Fate that it was at this point that Churchill realized that his great antagonist in the war was Marshall, that he and Marshall were virtually contending for the mastery of their views over the impulsive will of the President. It was in connection with that journey by Churchill and Marshall to north Africa that the Prime Minister wrote in his book, pages 812 and 813, a tribute to the general as a "statesman with a penetrating and commanding view of the whole scene." It may be noted that Churchill did not ascribe to Marshall a correct and trustworthy view of the whole scene and it may be wondered, in the light of their great conflicts, whether the Prime Minister was not perhaps indulging his rather frequent taste for irony.

In Tunis, Churchill brought to bear upon Marshall and Eisenhower, who invariably sided with Marshall, the whole battery of persuasion of himself and his military subordinates. The views of the British were made more persuasive by the fact that they had carried the major burden of the war in north Africa. Marshall resisted, remaining, as Churchill comments, "up 'til almost the last min-

ute, silent or cryptic." The upshot was that Marshall insisted upon deferring the decision until Sicily had been made secure and "the situation in Russia known." The quotation is from Churchill's report of the conference.

We recur to the Quebec Conference of August 14, as Admiral Leahy reports it on page 175 of his book:

General Marshall was very positive in his attitude against a Mediterranean commitment.

Churchill did, however, temporarily prevail, and we invaded Italy; but Marshall and Stalin won out in the end when Roosevelt sided with them at Tehran, where there was thrown away the advantage of the Italian campaign. We are indebted to Mr. Sherwood for the fullest account of the Stalin position at Tehran. This account was obtained, of course, from Hopkins' oral and written recollections. At one point, quoted on page 780 of Sherwood's book, Stalin urged that the "entry of Turkey into the war—a development to which Churchill was passionately committed, and which the Russians had been previously urging—might be helpful in opening the way to the Balkans, but the Balkans were far from the heart of Germany, and the only direct way of striking at that heart was through France." Here Roosevelt suggested that it might be useful if the Americans and British marched east in conjunction with Tito's Partisans into Rumania and joined with the Reds at Odessa. Stalin inquired if that would affect the 35 divisions earmarked for the transchannel invasion of France. Churchill replied that it would not. Sherwood comments, however, that "nothing could be further from the plans of the United States Chief of Staff." It was then that Stalin brought his powerful guns to bear to conclude the controversy. I am quoting from Sherwood—and he wrote:

Stalin then expressed the opinion that it would be unwise to scatter forces in various operations through the eastern Mediterranean. He said he thought Overlord (the name given to the cross channel invasion) should be considered the basis of all operations in 1944 and that after the capture of Rome, the forces used there should be sent into southern France to provide a diversionary operation in support of Overlord. He even felt that it might be better to abandon the capture of Rome altogether, leaving 10 divisions to hold the present line in Italy and using the rest of the Allied

forces for the invasion of southern France. He said it had been the experience of the Red army that it was best to launch an offensive from two converging directions, forcing the enemy to move his reserves from one front to the other. Therefore, he favored simultaneous operations in northern and southern France, rather than the scattering of forces in the eastern Mediterranean.

We may be sure that Stalin's didactic observations fell upon Marshall's ears with the authority of revelation. It was made abundantly evident at Tehran, by his labors in behalf of Russia's military desires, that he had earned the warm approval of Stalin. On page 783 of the Sherwood record, the author notes that both Stalin and Voroshilov obviously recognized Marshall as the supreme advocate of Overlord and therefore their friend.

In this same connection Sherwood notes that after Marshall had discussed the difficulties of Overlord, Voroshilov turned to him and said admiringly, "If you think about it, you will do it."

On page 791, in discussing the moot question at that time of who was to command Overlord, Sherwood repeats a report that Stalin in discussions with Roosevelt, made evident his conviction that no wiser or more reassuring choice than Marshall could be made.

It is noteworthy that the brusk, cynical Stalin exhibited fondness for no other American at Tehran with the single exception of Hopkins, with whom he had a personal acquaintance dating from Hopkins' visit to Moscow in August of 1941 upon an errand which must have gratified the tyrant's heart. It was then that Hopkins offered the bountiful support of the United States to the Kremlin's resistance of the Nazi invaders without stint, quid pro quo, or any reservations whatsoever.

Stalin's exposition of the policy we should follow in Europe awakened the ardent support in far-off Washington of General Marshall's nominal superior, Secretary Stimson as well. Upon hearing that Stalin had vetoed the operations in the East, Stimson hurriedly called a press conference in which he commented guardedly on the results at Teheran. His comment may be found on page 440 of his memoirs. He said, and I am quoting from the book—

The presence of Premier Stalin and his companion at the conference, Marshal Voroshilov, had contributed mightily to the success of the conference. Marshal Stalin's

power of lucid analysis and the fairness of his attitude contributed strongly to the solution of several long-standing problems.

The strategical fate of the Soviet Union and the United States had been so inextricably linked in Europe, the British done in, and Secretary Stimson was happy over that result. General "Hap" Arnold, who was not present because of illness, at Tehran, himself commented on the reports as he received them. His comments will be found on page 465 of *Global Mission*. Said Arnold:

Apparently Uncle Joe had talked straight from the shoulder about how to carry on the war against Germany and his ideas, it seems, were much more in accord with the American ideas than with those of the British.

Admiral Leahy, who was there, adds his comment after giving his own version of the Stalin speech I have quoted from Sherwood. He wrote, and this is on page 204 of his book:

The Soviets and Americans seemed to be nearly in agreement as to the fundamental strategic principles that should be followed.

THE BALKANS ARE STAKED OUT FOR THE RED ARMY

Tehran took place, as all know, in November of 1943. The projected invasion of southern France was given the name Anvil. Although Churchill and his advisers continued to fight for the eastern operation it was manifestly a losing struggle. Churchill himself employed his stormy eloquence on Mark Clark, as that great American general was fighting his way up the Italian peninsula, assuring Clark that, given his way, the Western Powers could "silt this soft under-belly of the Axis." The Prime Minister was pursuing a lost cause. After the capture of Rome, the Fifth Army which had become, as Clark proudly asserts, "a tremendous fighting machine" with "horizons unlimited," was disrupted. Over Clark's strong protest, he lost the Sixth Corps and seven crack French divisions, all withdrawn from Anvil. Clark was compelled to abandon his drive to the Po, giving Kesselring respite, a decision that puzzled the German high command as we were to discover after their surrender. Writes Clark on page 371 of *Calculated Risk*: "It was a decision that was likely to puzzle historians for a much longer time." In considering his impression of that period when he sat down to write

his memoirs after the war, Clark says, on page 368, and I am quoting him:

Stalin, it was evident throughout the Big Three meeting, and negotiations at Tehran, was one of the strongest boosters of the invasion of southern France. He knew exactly what he wanted in a political as well as a military way; and the thing he wanted most was to keep us out of the Balkans, which he had staked out for the Red Army. If we switched our strength from Italy to France, it was obvious to Stalin . . . that we would turn away from central Europe. Anvil led into a dead-end street. It was easy to see why Stalin favored Anvil at Tehran and why he kept right on pushing for it.

I come to a most significant passage which deals specifically with what lay before Clark and was denied him by Marshall in collaboration with Stalin. Says Clark:

After the fall of Rome, Kesselring's army could have been destroyed if we had been able to shoot the works in a final offensive. Across the Adriatic was Yugoslavia . . . and beyond Yugoslavia were Vienna, Budapest, and Prague.

At this point may I remind you that wherever the Russian armies came to rest, there they stayed and there they remain to this day. The Red armies have not relinquished one inch of the soil upon which they stood at the defeat of Germany. General Clark continues:

There was no question that the Balkans were strongly in the British mind, but so far as I ever found out, American top-level planners were not interested. It was generally understood that President Roosevelt toyed with the idea for a while but was not encouraged by Harry Hopkins. After the fall of Rome, we "ran for the wrong goal," both from a political and a strategical standpoint.

There is a note of poignancy in Mark Clark's reflections of the frustration of his great victory in northern Italy.

He has, moreover, a vantage point from which to judge the consequences because he served with the utmost distinction as the American military governor of Vienna after the war. It was there that he felt the iron determination of the Russian Empire to prevail over eastern Europe. It was there that he had ample opportunity to consider how different things might have been had we proceeded east from the valley of the Po instead of turning our forces into the trivial and wholly unnecessary operations in southern France. General Clark concludes on page 3 of his book—

and I here summon him as the most highly qualified witness in this matter:

Yet, I believe our mission was fulfilled and, save for a high-level blunder that turned us away from the Balkan States and permitted them to fall under Red army control, the Mediterranean campaign might have been the most decisive of all in postwar history.

At another place, expressing his frustration over the enfeeblement of his campaign in Italy—and this is on page 368:

A campaign that might have changed the whole history of the relationships between the Western World and Soviet Russia was permitted to fade away. . . . The weakening of the campaign in Italy . . . was one of the outstanding political mistakes of the war.

I ask Senators, where today is Gen. Mark Clark, a man still in his military prime, a man of great achievement in Italy, and of outstanding political and diplomatic accomplishment in Austria? Since World War II, General Clark has been relegated to secondary commands. We now hear that he intends to resign from the Army at the very height of his powers and at an urgent point in our military situation.

After hearing the sentiments I have quoted from Clark, can you wonder why there is no place for him?

So also is this true of General Wedemeyer, likewise in his prime, likewise a soldier of great brilliance and great devotion to his country. Both Wedemeyer and Clark dare to oppose the judgment of General Marshall in his history making decisions—Clark in Europe, Wedemeyer in Asia.

Where is Lucius Clay? Like MacArthur and Clark, a great proconsul; young as generals go, brilliant and steadfast in devotion not to party but to country. Clay insisted on resisting the Russians at Berlin.

Where, too, is Louis Johnson? Where is Admiral Denfeld? The lessons must be plain as a pike staff to the military leaders of our establishment. A prudent officer looking forward to his continued career and his pension, certainly has to think twice these days before he can express an objective and disinterested opinion of strategy, or the conduct of our military operations, which are so often complicated with political considerations.

General MacArthur is not the only monument to the determination of Mar-

shall with Acheson at his elbow to rule our policies now as he ruled our policies in World War II.

NO AMERICAN POLITICAL POLICY AT TEHRAN

The evidence, Mr. President, is overwhelming that at Tehran we had no political policy. It so appears in the recollections of General Deane. After observing, on page 43 of his book, *The Strange Alliance*, that "Stalin advocated the American point of view in our differences with Britain" and again that "Stalin's 'position' coincided with that of the American Chief of Staff and every word he said strengthened the support they might expect from President Roosevelt in the ultimate decision," Deane continues:

Stalin appeared to know exactly what he wanted at the conference. This was also true of Churchill, but not so of Roosevelt. This is not said as a reflection on our President but his apparent indecision was probably a direct result of our obscure foreign policy. President Roosevelt was thinking of winning the war; the others were thinking of their relative positions when the war was won. Stalin wanted the Anglo-American forces in Western and Southern Europe; Churchill thought our postwar position would be improved and British interests best served if the Anglo-Americans, as well as the Russians, participated in the occupation of the Balkans. From the political point of view, hindsight on our part points to foresight on Churchill's part.

We have not in the past educated our soldiers and sailors in the fine points of international politics. At the present we are so doing through the National War College, but I would like to interpolate a query in that regard.

Are we teaching the future high-level admirals and generals to look with favor and respect upon our political-military strategy in World War II? This might be a subject for inquiry by the Armed Services Committee of the Senate at some future time. The political immaturity of our generals, mentioned by Hanson Baldwin in his study of the great mistakes of the last war, was never so glaringly manifested as at Tehran—if, indeed, it was political immaturity and not the consequences of some hidden, and so far undisclosed, influence binding us to Stalin's world policy.

Could it be that like children, our military advisers at Tehran dwelt only in the pleasures and tasks of the day with no thought for the morrow? Could they not envisage what was so clear to

many other minds that after the conclusion of hostilities the Soviet Union, conscious of its vast and violent world mission, might be ranged against us in every quarter of the globe? Or did Marshall and his supernumeraries on the Joint Chiefs at Tehran think of England instead of Russia as the future enemy?

Before quitting this question of the Marshall-Churchill conflict over the most important phases of the recent war may I cite another example of the ruthlessness with which Marshall prosecuted the rift. It should be noted that Churchill, who is an indomitable adversary in the House of Commons and elsewhere, fought on against ANVIL long after his was a lost cause.

**MARSHALL THREATENS TO RESIGN IF STALIN'S VIEW NOT ACCEPTED**

At Malta, where the Yalta conferees on the Anglo-American side met before proceeding to that Black Sea Conference, the British chiefs still persisted in the hope of accomplishing some Mediterranean operations while preparing for the attack across the Channel. In Sherwood's book, page 848, is a revealing passage concerning those discussions of the combined chiefs, and I am now quoting Sherwood:

The arguments reached such a point that Marshall, ordinarily one of the most restrained and soft-spoken of men, announced that if the British plan were approved by the Prime Minister and the President, he would recommend to Eisenhower that he had no choice but to be relieved of his command.

Again, as in the case of the ultimatum over the "second front now" Marshall was threatening summary action unless his will prevailed. Why was it so important to Marshall that the British, as a full partner in the Anglo-American war effort, should be prevented from creating that balance of military power in the Mediterranean spoken of in the memorandum circulated by Hopkins first at Quebec?

Why—we return to this question—was Marshall so determined to follow Stalin and oppose Churchill?

Marshall has found fault with MacArthur's independence. It is clear from the Malta episode, as well as other incidents, that as Chief of Staff in World War II he was always ready to overrule the judgment of his superiors up to the point of defiance.

Why did he insist upon ruling the political strategy of that war? We may find the answer before we are through documenting this record.

Before we proceed to other matters of political strategy let us consider instances in the management of American military affairs where Marshall's actions were so bad for America.

**GENERAL DEANE'S UNUSUAL INSTRUCTIONS**

General Deane is an uncommonly friendly witness for George Marshall. He was Marshall's protégé, having served as secretary of the combined chiefs in Washington until Marshall selected him and sent him in the fall of 1943 to go to Moscow as chief of our military mission in Russia. It should be noted that we had withdrawn our military and naval attachés from Moscow because in fulfilling the time-honored and expected duties of military attachés, they had aroused the resentment of the Kremlin. Those duties include discovering and reporting to the home government all information that can be obtained legitimately regarding the armed forces of the country to which the attachés are accredited. The information thus sought has to do with weapons, tactical programs and methods, and the size, training, and disposition of that country's military forces.

Before General Deane departed for his mission in Moscow, he had a long interview with General Marshall, in which the Chief of Staff cautioned Deane to seek no information about these matters for fear that he might "irritate" the Russians. I remind Senators that we were then devoting a substantial part of our military production to Russia's war effort, and doing so in entirely good faith. It was not long after General Deane reached Moscow that he began to be impressed with the extraordinary contrast between the Russian attitude and our own. He describes his feelings on this subject on page 49 of his book. General Deane writes:

We had thousands of Soviet representatives in the United States who were allowed to visit our manufacturing plants, attend our schools, and witness tests of aircraft and other equipment. In Italy, and later in France and Germany, Russian representatives were welcome at our field headquarters and allowed to see anything they desired of our military operations. Our policy was to make any of our new inventions in electronics and other fields available to Russia

• • • each month I would receive a revised list of secret American equipment about which Russia could be informed in the hope that if it could be made available, it might be used on the Russian front. We never lost an opportunity to give the Russians equipment, weapons, or information which we thought might help our combined war effort.

The head of the American military mission in Moscow encountered the iron curtain long before Churchill coined the phrase. Toward the end of the war, when our always excessive solicitude seemed to him no longer warranted, he advised a more resolute attitude toward the Russians. Each time he suggested that we demand a fulfillment of an agreement—and they broke virtually every agreement we made with them—he was called off in Washington. By whom? Senators' guesses are as good as mine, but Deane's reports went directly to General Marshall.

**WHO FAILED TO PROVIDE AN AMERICAN CORRIDOR TO BERLIN?**

Why have we not had, and do not have at this moment, an American, or at least an allied, corridor to Berlin? Why are we at the mercy of the Russians in our access to the joint capital of the occupying powers? Why was it possible for the Russians to produce the blockade of Berlin with a simple set of instructions with which General Clay found it impossible, as a man of honor and a great American soldier, to comply?

It has been the fashion to place the blame for this lack of foresight upon the late John G. Winant. As our Ambassador to London he sat on the European Advisory Commission, which worked out under the direction of the respective governments the zoning of Germany for occupation purposes. Winant cannot answer our questions now. In his report on his great career as the American governor in Germany, Decision in Germany, General Clay accepts the version that shoulders the blame onto Winant. Subsequently, on page 26, he himself takes the final blame. He was in Berlin in late June of 1945 arranging with Marshal Zhukov for the entry of American forces into their occupation position in Berlin.

I pause to say to my colleagues on the floor of the Senate that it is certainly not necessary for them to stay in the Chamber to listen to a documentation which is bound to be very lengthy. Frankly, Mr. President, I do not expect my col-

leagues to remain in the Chamber, although I welcome their presence. I know they have other work to do. My presentation will consume many hours.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCCARTHY. Gladly.

Mr. LANGER. I am sure that every colleague of the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin who is on the floor is very much interested in what he has to say. I hope that more of his colleagues will come to the floor of the Senate, because I consider the Senator's speech one of the most important speeches that has ever been made on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. MCCARTHY. I thank the Senator from North Dakota very much. I may say that I have notified many of my colleagues that I would supply them with a copy of my address. Certainly I do not want them to miss the ball game this evening.

Mr. HENDRICKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. HENDRICKSON. Mr. President, the junior Senator from New Jersey wishes to associate himself with the comments of the distinguished senior Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER].

Mr. MCCARTHY. I thank the Senator very much.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. Certainly the junior Senator from Nebraska, who represents the Republican side as minority leader, wishes to associate himself with the very able remarks made by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER]. I wish to say that several committee meetings are being held at the moment. I know that it would be the desire of those who feel they must attend such hearings to be present to hear the Senator's speech. I will say to the Senator that his speech will be read by many Senators who are not present, as he well knows.

What we need is the kind of speech which the Senator from Wisconsin is making today. We need such a thoroughly documented speech. It states the historic background and leads up to the present moment in our foreign relations. I not only wish to corroborate what the distinguished Senator from North Dakota has said, but I wish to express my deep appreciation for the

work which the Senator from Wisconsin has done in compiling such a lengthy speech. It is lengthy because it contains so much historical data, to which all of us can turn for documentation when we need it in discussing the chain of events which have led us into our present position.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank my three colleagues very much. I deeply appreciate what they have said. It has been a monumental task. We have been working almost around the clock for about a month.

At this point I should like to pay high tribute to what I believe to be the most loyal and efficient office staff that any Senator can possibly have. I believe most of them are in the gallery today. I salute them; they worked 18, 19, and 20 hours a day in getting the document together.

The Russians were, as usual, hard to deal with. Clay was eager to get his occupation going and to have American forces on guard in Berlin. Instead of pressing the matter of a corridor under American rule, guarded by American troops, with supply and communication beyond the reach of Russian interference, he accepted an oral understanding with Zhukov that nothing would ever occur to impede American access to Berlin. Our zonal border as you will recall, had been set at a distance of 100 miles from Berlin.

The legend which saddled the late Winant with the responsibility for this tragic blunder in postwar arrangements has been vigorously challenged by Hanson Baldwin. I have his book, in which he fixes the responsibility not on Winant but squarely on the War Department. War Department at that time meant George Catlett Marshall. From the fall of 1939 until the fall of 1946, Marshall was, in effect, the War Department. I cannot find in Mr. Stimson's memoirs any occasion on which he opposed the will of General Marshall.

I now read from page 47 of Baldwin's book, where he expresses his conviction "that the blame for Berlin cannot be laid—exclusively, or even to a major degree—upon the shoulders of Winant." Two pages later in reviewing the background of this deplorable situation, Baldwin notes that the State Department at the end of 1943 proposed that the zones of postwar occupation "be so drawn as to bring each into contact with

Berlin." I hasten to remind you that Cordell Hull—not Marshall or the Red Dean, Acheson—was then the Secretary of State.

I go on with Baldwin:

For some reason that defies logical understanding now, the War Department rejected this suggestion, which would have solved nearly all our postwar Berlin difficulties, so that it was never even broached in the EAC.

In February 1944, the British informally suggested that a corridor to Berlin be established and defined, but the War Department again objected stating that this was not a subject for the EAC, but that the entire question of access to Berlin was a military matter which should be settled at the proper time by military representatives.

And this eventually was the solution, but the military representatives made a botch of it. In May 1945 our allies stood deep on German soil. The zonal occupation agreements for Germany \* \* \* placed Berlin in the Russian zone \* \* \*. In May 1945 ECA's work was done and SCAEF was briefed as to its accomplishments.

The military were told the history of the problem, according to Baldwin. They were told that the War Department had blocked any consideration of it by EAC and were advised that the EAC staff believed we should have an indisputably American corridor under our own military supervision and guard. As we have seen neither Marshall nor Eisenhower made provision for a corridor. General Clay concluded his improvised agreement with Zhukov, and the fat was in the fire.

Why did the War Department, meaning Marshall, leave us at the mercy of the Russians in Berlin? Why did not our forces march first into Berlin? Why was General Patton not allowed to take Prague? We have only glimpses at the inner reality behind these questions. We gather from General Bradley's memoirs that Eisenhower's decision not to reach Berlin first was conditioned to some extent by the flagrant quarrel that had arisen between Bradley and General Montgomery. In his version of the matter, appearing on page 69 of the Life magazine of April 30, 1951, Bradley relates a discussion with Eisenhower wherein it was decided not to allow Montgomery the forces with which to push on to Berlin. Eisenhower was principally concerned at the moment lest the armies of Russia and the English-speaking powers should meet in a head-on collision somewhere in Germany. I quote

Bradley on how Eisenhower solved the problem:

Five days before Hodges and Simpson closed their trap around the Ruhr, Eisenhower radioed Stalin through the United States Military Mission in Moscow of his plan to push east with a powerful force in the center to the line of the Elbe.

The Elbe line was where Eisenhower proposed to Stalin that he would bring the American armies to rest. Eisenhower fixed this highly important point, be it noted, with Stalin. It is clear from Bradley's recollections that Eisenhower acted on this highly political question without consulting with Churchill. Whether he consulted Roosevelt and Marshall is not mentioned by Bradley. Certainly he must have consulted Marshall. I continue to quote Bradley:

Although Churchill protested Eisenhower's radio to Moscow as an unwarranted intrusion by the military into a political problem, he reserved his angriest vituperation for the plan Eisenhower had proposed. The Prime Minister, according to Eisenhower, was greatly disappointed and disturbed, that SCAEF had not reinforced Montgomery with American troops and pointed him toward Berlin in a desperate [sic] effort to capture that city before the Russians took it.

We gain another bit of insight into this situation—which provides a somewhat more startling example of command discretion than any displayed by MacArthur in Japan—from Edward Ansel Mowrer in his book, *The Nightmare of American Foreign Policy*, in which he relates having been personally told by the White House that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Truman to let the Russians take Berlin." The Joint Chiefs of Staff, of course, meant Marshall.

THE OBJECT OF WAR IS NOT MERELY TO KILL  
THE ENEMY

We have been reviewing General Marshall's record as it applies to the war in Europe with an eye to his competence and the extent to which he backed up Stalin in political decisions. The Democrats in Denver proclaimed him "a master of global strategy." The term, of course, implies much more than purely military planning. As we have seen, when you reach the upper levels of command inhabited during the recent war by Marshall, Churchill, and Roosevelt, the military decisions blend everywhere with the political. They cannot be disassociated. A war is not conducted merely as a means of killing the enemy, although

during the late war Mr. Roosevelt expressed so much joy over Russia's accomplishments in that line that it might be questioned if he always understood the nature of war. We have seen recently in Korea where, beggared of any respectable and intelligent war purpose, our forces have been led to believe from Marshall's testimony that the only objective of that war is to kill the enemy. I leave aside the ethical considerations raised by such an attitude and point out that the enemy's extermination is not enough. Of course, it is necessary to have the enemy's submission. But also, great powers must have some understanding of what that submission portends and what they intend to do with the world over which they will exercise sway once the enemy is defeated.

We have observed what calamities might have befallen the allied cause had Roosevelt accepted Marshall's persistent demand for a "second front now." We have seen the equivocal and dangerous nature of his counsel with reference to the North African invasion. We have observed how closely he fitted his views into those of Stalin over every major issue of the war. We have seen further how in his instructions to General Deane, his refusal to exercise foresight over the corridor to Berlin, and his wish that the Russians might first enter that great and shattered city, General Marshall's decisions paralled the interests of the Kremlin.

The Democrats at Denver may have been correct in their appraisal of General Marshall's attainments as a strategist. The question that arises, after examining the facts we have enumerated and those we shall enumerate, is, in whose interest did he exercise his genius? If he was wholeheartedly serving the cause of the United States, these decisions were great blunders. If they followed a secret pattern to which we do not as yet have the key, they may very well have been successful in the highest degree.

I DEAL WITH MARSHALL'S ACTS—NOT HIS  
MOTIVES

I do not at this time discuss the question of whether General Marshall was aware that he was implementing the will of Stalin in these matters. I do not propose to go into his motives. Unless one has all the tangled and often complicated circumstances contributing to a man's decisions, an inquiry into his mo-

tives is often fruitless. I do not pretend to understand General Marshall's nature and character, and I shall leave that subject to subtler analysts of human personality.

**YALTA—CHINA FOR SALE**

We turn now to the Pacific side of the recent global war and an examination of General Marshall's behavior in that vast theater. However, before doing so, I should like to refer to another phase of Marshall's activities.

On Friday, June 16, 1948, when Marshall was Secretary of State, a Mr. Robert C. Alexander, in the visa division of the Department of State, testified under oath in regard to what he thought the truth was. He told about the number of Communists who were being allowed to enter the United States under the aegis of the United Nations. Senators will recall the facts in that connection. Let us see what Marshall, who then was Secretary of State, did. We should remember that Alexander testified under oath about the entry of Communists into the United States.

On September 9, 1948, Alexander, who had honestly testified before the committee, received from the State Department a notice informing him that he was to be disciplined, but let me read the first paragraph of the letter:

The Department proposes to take appropriate disciplinary action against you . . . for misconduct in office and dereliction of duty.

Note those words, Mr. President.

I read further from the letter:

The intended action grows out of your testimony and inferences arising from your statements made before the staff of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN] wrote to Admiral Hillenkoetter sometime later—in fact, it was quite sometime later, being on June 30, 1949. I read from his letter:

DEAR ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER: There is attached to this letter a list of the names of 100 persons.

Of course, Mr. President, those were names given by the witness, Alexander.

I read further from the letter:

This is a partial list of those persons to whom visas have been issued for admission into the United States either as affiliates of international organizations or as officials or

employees of foreign governments, and their families—

And so forth. The Senator from Nevada asked Admiral Hillenkoetter to inform him whether those persons were Communists.

Admiral Hillenkoetter, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, replied to the Senator from Nevada by means of a letter in which the following is stated:

Thirty-two of the individuals named in your attached list have reportedly or allegedly been engaged in active work for the intelligence services of their respective countries.

Mr. President, listen to this:

Twenty-nine of the individuals named in your attached letters are high-ranking Communist Party officials.

I wonder whether Senators get the awfulness of that picture. The witness Alexander, under oath, says, in effect, Communists are being admitted to the United States. Here are their names. Marshall says, "We will take disciplinary action against you for telling the people of this country the truth," and then the head of our Central Intelligence Agency is given a list of 100 names of individuals named by Alexander, whom Marshall would discipline, and the head of Central Intelligence Agency says that 29 of them are high-ranking members of the Communist Party. That was Marshall as Secretary of State.

Let us examine Marshall's behavior in the vast Pacific theater. We must first consider what went on at Yalta. If, as Hanson Baldwin observes, we lost the peace because of great military mistakes in World War II, then it is clear that those mistakes culminated in the controlling decisions made at the conferences of Tehran and Yalta. It is my judgment, Mr. President, that we lost the peace in Europe at Tehran. It is even clearer that we lost the peace in Asia at Yalta. At Tehran, Marshall's will prevailed in concert with that of Stalin regarding the Mediterranean. At Yalta, Marshall's will prevailed with that of Stalin regarding Russia's entry into the far-eastern war as a full-fledged partner entitled to the spoils of such participation.

What happened at Yalta had enormous consequences for every American, especially for the men who are upholding the honor of our country in Korea. As we all know, Yalta is a former resort

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE  
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION,  
June 30, 1949.

Rear Adm. ROSCOE H. HILLENKOETTER,  
United States Navy, Central Intelligence  
Agency, Washington, D. C.

DEAR ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER: There is attached to this letter a list of the names of 100 persons. This is a partial list of those persons to whom visas have been issued for admissions into the United States either as affiliates of international organizations or as officials or employees of foreign governments, and their families.

Without disclosing the name or indicating the identity of any such person, and without revealing the sources of information contained in the files of the Central Intelligence Agency, you are respectfully requested to furnish me an answer to each of the following questions, for inclusion in the public record of the Senate Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee.

1. How many of the persons whose names appear on the attached list have been engaged in subversive activity prior to their assumption of official duty in the United States as affiliates of international organizations or as officials or employees of foreign governments? The term "subversive activity" as used in this question denotes active participation in foreign intelligence organizations or active Communist organizational work, rather than mere membership in the Communist Party.

2. Describe a typical pattern or typical patterns of such subversive activity and a typical background or typical backgrounds of such persons who have been engaged in such subversive activity.

3. Describe in general terms the extent to which foreign governments are utilizing their officials and employees in this country, and their membership, in international organizations, for active intelligence work against the United States.

4. Describe in general terms the extent to which foreign governments are utilizing their officials and employees in this country, and their membership in international organizations, for active direction of and participation in subversive organizations in the United States.

I should be obliged if you will cause your answers to the foregoing questions to be transmitted to me as soon as possible.

With kindest regards, I am,

Sincerely,

PAT McCARRAN,  
Chairman.

of the Romanoff czars on the shores of the Black Sea. Yalta is where Roosevelt, already suffering from the enfeeblement that brought his death 4 months hence, went to meet again with the bloody autocrat of all the Russians and the Churchill with whom he had signally differed at Tehran.

The President, bearing the marks of his approaching dissolution, traveled the thousands of weary miles by plane, by ship, and, at the end, by motorcar, to treat with the tyrant, to seek accord with him, and to make the bargains over Poland and China that today plague and shame us all. The principal, the most utterly damaging of these bargains was over China in the bribe he paid to Stalin for his eleventh-hour participation in the war against Japan.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CLEMENTS in the chair). Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from North Dakota?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield to the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. LANGER. In view of the interpolation of the Alexander matter and the reference to the letter of the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN], does the Senator from Wisconsin mind placing in the RECORD the letter of the Senator from Nevada and the reply thereto, in which it was stated that 29 of these top men were Communists?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is an excellent idea. I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD at this point in my remarks a letter written under date of June 30, 1949, by the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN]. It appears on page 357 of the hearings before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, in regard to Communist activities among aliens and national groups. I also ask to have printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks the reply thereto of Admiral Hillenkoetter, dated July 13, 1949, which appears on pages 358-360 of the same volume.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,  
Washington, July 13, 1949.

The Honorable PAT McCARRAN,  
Chairman, Senate Committee on the  
Judiciary, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 30, 1949, requesting answers to certain questions contained therein for inclusion in the public record of the Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

I wish to point out that section 102 (d) (3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253, 80th Cong.), which established the Central Intelligence Agency, specifically provides that the Agency shall have no police, law-enforcement, or internal security powers and functions. For this reason our answer to question 1 of your letter, concerning the list of 100 foreigners which you attached, is restricted to our knowledge of the activities of these persons abroad and not to their activities in the United States. The latter information is completely within the jurisdiction of other agencies of the Government.

Similarly, our answer to question 2 of your letter is based on typical patterns and backgrounds of subversive activity engaged in by Soviet and satellite diplomatic officials abroad.

In view of the reasons set forth above, we have not given detailed answers to your questions 3 and 4. However, the patterns set forth in our answer to question 2 may well be duplicated in this country. The extent to which it is being done, however, and the details of this apparatus lie completely within the jurisdiction of the FBI of the Department of Justice, and detailed answers, if available, must come from them in view of the legal limitations on CIA as to internal security functions.

Question 1. "How many of the persons whose names appear on the attached list have been engaged in subversive activity prior to their assumption of official duty in the United States as affiliates of international organizations or as officials or employees of foreign governments? The term 'subversive activity' as used in this question denotes participation in foreign intelligence organizations or active Communist organizational work, rather than mere membership in the Communist Party."

Answer. In view of the definition of "subversive activity" contained in this question, we have organized our answer in accordance with this definition:

(a) Thirty-two of the individuals named in your attached list have reportedly or allegedly been engaged in active work for the intelligence services of their respective countries.

(b) Twenty-nine of the individuals named in your attached list are high-ranking Communist Party officials. It must be assumed that by virtue of their positions they are

working ardently for the benefit of their government. This activity, by definition, and in the light of known Communist methods, must be considered to be subversive and against the interests of the United States.

(c) Twenty-one of the individuals named in your attached list have reportedly or allegedly been engaged in active Communist organizational work of an underground or subversive nature outside their homelands.

(d) Fifteen of the individuals named in your attached list are not included in our files with data pertinent to the questions asked.

(e) Three of the individuals named in your attached list reportedly show definite pro-American sympathies and/or disaffection with Communist ideology.

Question 2: "Describe a typical pattern or typical patterns of such subversive activity and a typical background or typical backgrounds of such persons who have been engaged in such subversive activity."

Answer: Typical pattern. (a) Reporting on political, economic, industrial, and military conditions of the country concerned. This activity is carried out both through the collection of overt information from newspapers, periodicals, or radio, and through agents placed within strategic installations. As a corollary to this activity, an attempt is made to recruit and place agents against the time when the diplomatic official is required to his homeland.

(b) Arrangement of communications facilities through which agents can make their reports either to Soviet or satellite diplomatic installations within the country, or directly to the homeland. In this connection, reports have been received of attempts of these officials to organize Communist Party cells among seamen serving on vessels sailing to the homeland. These seamen are then utilized as couriers.

(c) Surveillance of, and controlling, the activities of Soviet and satellite diplomatic personnel assigned to the country concerned as well as the activities of delegates from the homeland who enter the country to attend conventions or meetings, assuring that such personnel do not defect or become politically unreliable through contact with western influences.

(d) Disseminating party line propaganda within the foreign country. Also sending propaganda about conditions in the country back to the homelands in the form of articles designed to encourage unfavorable sentiment against this country.

(e) Work with immigrant groups who have settled in the country from the homeland or with citizens with former homeland connections. This activity is apparently regarded as particularly important. Attempts are made to activate Communist groups within immigrant elements. Immigrants are encouraged to send the more stable currency of the country back to the homeland where, when exchanged at an official rate, it repre-

sents a considerable income for the homeland government. Efforts are made to recruit immigrants to work for the homeland government and to use their established businesses, such as shipping or export-import firms, as a cover for the intelligence activities of the homeland. Networks are organized within immigrant groups in order to check native personnel abroad, to control immigrants and former natives and indoctrinate them in the party line. Strong efforts are made to break up an anti-Soviet or anti-satellite sentiments among immigrant groups. Attempts are also made to establish financial and commercial contacts with the immigrant groups for the benefit of the homeland.

(f) Act as intermediaries between the Communist Party of the foreign country concerned and the Communist Party of the homeland. Maintain communications and often procure funds for the homeland Communist Party.

(g) Organize pressure groups within the foreign country concerned in order to combat certain political or military measures being considered by that country which are deemed unfavorable toward the Soviet-satellite axis.

Typical background: Soviet and satellite diplomatic officials who have been selected to carry out espionage or subversive activities in foreign countries vary widely in their backgrounds, qualifications, and training. A study, however, of available background information has disclosed certain characteristics which it may be of interest to note.

Primarily, the official chosen is an individual in whom the Communist regime of his homeland places the greatest confidence as to political reliability. He is often an old line Communist who has served the party faithfully over a period of years. Many of these satellite officials have spent some time in the Soviet Union and some have served in the Soviet Army. Others have gained their position in the Communist hierarchy through their services with partisan guerrillas during the war.

Many of the officials have records of long-time diplomatic careers in the service of their countries. These often are described as unscrupulous and opportunistic individuals who find it to their advantage to serve faithfully the regime in power. That they serve well is implicit in the confidence which the Communists apparently place in them.

It is of interest to note that many of these officials have had legal training and have practiced as lawyers. Quite a few also have journalistic backgrounds. Not much mention is made of technical espionage training, although it may be assumed that many, particularly the old-line Communists and those who have visited the U. S. S. R., have received indoctrination of this type.

It is of further interest that the wives of many of these men are ardent Communists in their own right and occasionally even act as agents themselves. They are mentioned

as exerting strong influence on their husbands.

In conclusion, these officials do not appear to be, in most cases, men of high moral standards or idealistic motivation. Many of them are described as clever, unscrupulous, opportunistic, ambitious, and given to shady financial deals or occasional black marketing.

I hope that this information may be of value to you in connection with your subcommittee's investigation. If there is any further assistance which I can render, please feel free to call upon me in this connection.

Sincerely yours,

R. H. HILLENKOTTER,  
Rear Admiral, USN, Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. McCARTHY. I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks, a letter dated September 9, 1948, written by Arch K. Jean, Chief, Division of Departmental Personnel, of the Department of State, to Robert C. Alexander, Assistant Chief, Visa Division, Department of State; and also two newspaper articles, one, bearing the headline "Marshall Naming Committee To Investigate UN's Aliens," which was published in the New York Sun, on July 28, 1948; the other, an article entitled "Alexander Refuses To Attend 'Secret' Trial by State Department," published in the Washington Post of October 6, 1948.

There being no objection, the letter and newspaper articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, September 9, 1948.  
MR. ROBERT C. ALEXANDER,  
Assistant Chief, Visa Division,  
Department of State.

MY DEAR MR. ALEXANDER: The Department proposes to take appropriate disciplinary action against you, in accordance with the provisions of Public Law 623, Eightieth Congress, and civil-service regulations issued in conformance therewith, for misconduct in office and dereliction of duty. The intended action grows out of your testimony and inferences arising from your statements made before the staff of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.

The testimony in question appears on the following pages of the stenographic transcript of hearings before the aforementioned subcommittee as reported by the official reporters (Hart, Alderson, McCabe, and Harkins); Thursday, July 15, 1948, volume 1, pages 96 to 105 inclusive, and pages 129, 130, 134, and 135; Friday, July 16, 1948, volume 2, pages 154 to 167, inclusive.

Specifically, the Department charges that this testimony was irresponsibly made and at variance with the facts. In the opinion of the Department, this testimony consti-

tuted an indiscriminate reflection on the United Nations and other international organizations, and consequently embarrassed the Department.

The Department further charges that you failed to make serious and persistent efforts to acquaint the responsible policy-making officials of the Department on a matter of high policy relating to a condition which you felt should be corrected in the interest of our national security.

As provided in Civil Service Regulations Nos. 9.101 and 9.102, you are hereby given 10 days from the date of this letter to reply in writing to the charges mentioned above.

If you wish, an informal hearing will be conducted to enable you to present facts and any extenuating circumstances which you consider may have a bearing on the disciplinary action to be taken against you.

Please advise this office within 3 days of the receipt of this letter whether you desire a hearing in addition to the opportunity to reply in writing to the charges. Following the receipt of your reply and at the conclusion of the hearing, should one be held, a decision will be made as to the disciplinary action to be taken against you.

Copies of hearing transcript and other material pertinent to your reply will be made available to you upon request.

Very truly yours,

ARCH K. JEAN,  
Chief, Division of Departmental  
Personnel

(For the Secretary of State).

[From the New York Sun of July 28, 1948]

**MARSHALL NAMING COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE UN'S ALIENS—APPOINTING THREE DISTINGUISHED CITIZENS TO DETERMINE WHETHER FOREIGNERS WORKING FOR AGENCY ENDANGER UNITED STATES SECURITY**

WASHINGTON, July 28.—Secretary of State Marshall announced today that he is creating a committee of three citizens to investigate whether the United Nations is bringing persons into this country who are a danger to American security.

Marshall declined to announce at a news conference the names of the three citizens, but he promised that they would be given out later. He described the three as distinguished citizens.

The investigation will cover all classes of persons associated with the United Nations, Marshall said, including foreign delegations and their staffs, newspapermen, and other reporters, members of specialized UN agencies, and the staff of Secretary-General Trygve Lie.

[At Lake Success, Arkady A. Sobolev, Acting Secretary General of the United Nations, declared that neither the United States nor any other nation has a legal right to investigate UN officials or conduct an inquiry on UN property. He added, however, that the UN had nothing to hide.]

The investigation grows out of testimony of two State Department officials before a congressional committee that hundreds of secret agents from Europe's Communist countries may be using UN credentials as a means of getting into the United States to stir up trouble.

#### INITIAL INQUIRY FRUITLESS

Marshall reiterated today what he said a week ago after this testimony came out: that he knew of no instances in which any person here on United Nations credentials had actually jeopardized the security of the United States by actions outside his official duties. Since then, he said, he has been having what he called a very careful check made of all records. That inquiry has developed nothing so far, he said.

Then he announced that he had started the setting up of a committee of distinguished citizens to investigate the whole issue and determine whether the United Nations or related agencies, such as the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, have provided means of entry into this country for people whose actions are against American security.

#### SAYS UN WELCOMES INQUIRY

Arkady A. Sobolev, Acting Secretary-General, said at Lake Success today that the United Nations had nothing to hide. Commenting on an announcement in Washington by Secretary of State Marshall that he is setting up a committee of three citizens to investigate United Nations personnel and delegations, Sobolev said:

"The United Nations welcomes any public discussion of this matter. We have nothing to hide."

He would not comment further. He added that he could not speak for UN delegations.

Sobolev returned yesterday from a vacation at home in Russia. He is acting Secretary-General while Trygve Lie is in Europe on a tour of UN centers.

[From the Washington Post of October 6, 1948]

#### ALEXANDER REFUSES TO ATTEND "SECRET" TRIAL BY STATE DEPARTMENT

A secret "trial" of State Department Officer Robert C. Alexander on charges of misconduct had to be called off yesterday when the accused official refused to show up.

Alexander, Assistant Chief of the Department's Visa Division, boycotted the scheduled hearing and in effect, challenged his superiors to convict him without a public review of the charges.

Alexander said he would not submit to a secret cross-examination by Arch C. Jean, the State Department personnel chief who was to have decided his case.

The charges stemmed from Alexander's testimony to a congressional committee last summer that subversive aliens were getting into the country under the protection of the United Nations.

His testimony was contradicted by his Department superiors all the way up to Secretary of State George C. Marshall. A committee of three private citizens appointed by Marshall to investigate denounced Alexander's allegations as irresponsible and untrue.

Alexander, who claims immunity for his congressional testimony, has denied in writing that he was guilty of misconduct and has threatened libel action against the three investigators.

#### BACKGROUND OF MANCHURIAN DEAL

Mr. McCARTHY. I beg leave to remind you, Mr. President, of the history of those parts before proceeding to the terms of this bargain. Manchuria, as you know, Mr. President, is the richest part of China. In terms of area and natural resources it may be described as the Texas of China. But Manchuria has not been China's to enjoy for many years. It must be recalled, and this is a key to much of China's fearful history during the last generation, that the age-old empire of China came to its end in the years before World War I. The causes of that event need not take up too much of our time. The imperial court, presided over by the aged dowager empress, was beset by western ideas, western-trained Chinese reformers, notably Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, by the incompetence of the empress' advisers and by the conflicting and greedy claims of the Great Powers. And so it fell, and for a generation China has known neither peace nor freedom from foreign invasion.

Manchuria itself has been the scene and occasion of wars for more than half a century. Japan and Russia alike have fought for its mastery since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. When, after that war, the Japanese were prevented by the European powers from enjoying the fruits of victory in Manchuria, Russia lunged down from the Maritime Provinces of Siberia to fill that vacuum.

By the year 1904, Japan felt strong enough to challenge Russia over Manchuria. That was what the Russo-Japanese War was about, a war in which Theodore Roosevelt backed Japan by deed and sentiment, out of a fear of the growing might of Russia in eastern Asia. Theodore Roosevelt was solely pursuing American interest and when he saw that Japan, if it won too conclusive a victory, might succeed to Russia's mantle and advance farther into China, Roosevelt intervened. He brought the Japanese and Russians to-

gether at Portsmouth, N. H., to negotiate a peace which checked Japanese ambitions even as it also ended Russian sway in Manchuria.

The intervening years saw a steady encroachment by Japan over Manchuria, an encroachment viewed with alarm by the single-minded Americans who then conducted our foreign policies, until the climax was reached in 1937 when Japan launched full-scale war against China for undisputed control of Manchuria and northern China. Korea, which is a geographical dependency of Manchuria, had, of course, been sacrificed to Japan's imperial ambitions along the route and had long since been integrated into the empire of Nippon.

The historic route of the invaders of China has been from the north. During many centuries China has mounted guard on its northern frontiers against the peoples of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Siberia, who have, for as many centuries, been regarded as barbarians by the civilized Chinese. Manchuria has been the key to the security of China since the Manchu conquest now nearly four centuries ago. This fact we should remember and consider, as we remember Yalta.

#### CHIANG KAI-SHEK EXCLUDED FROM YALTA CONFERENCE

It was a rich, highly developed Manchuria that was at stake at Yalta. It was Manchuria which Roosevelt thrust upon the Russians, who had plotted the gift; it was, moreover, conferred upon the new barbarians with full understanding that the United States was thereby satisfying an old imperialistic design of the Kremlin. The very language of the secret protocol which sealed the bargain at Yalta recognized this fact. What Roosevelt ceded to Stalin at Yalta, without the knowledge or consent of the Chinese, whose sovereignty there we always had upheld, was, and I quote from the work of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians, page 93, in restoration of "the former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904." The testimony before the Senate committee shows that Chiang Kai-shek was not invited to the Yalta conference and that the terms of the agreement selling out Chinese interests were kept secret from him. That at the Cairo conference it was solemnly agreed with him that China's rights—which were sold out to Stalin at Yalta—would be fully respected and protected. When

Wedemeyer appeared before the Russell committee, he testified that when Ambassador Hurley informed Chiang Kai-shek of the Yalta agreement which sealed the doom of the Republic of China, Chiang was so shocked that he asked Hurley to repeat it before he could believe it.

The project was not disguised. It was a nakedly imperialistic aggression over the prostrate body of China. What Roosevelt sealed and delivered in the protocol agreed upon by him and Stalin in a secret parley consuming only 11 minutes, and thereafter kept locked away in a White House safe for many months, were what he conceded to be the historic levers of power over China—the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur and the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railways. It was through those ports and along those railways, with their armed guards and command of all the communications, including the telegraph lines, that first Russia, then Japan, and now again Russia, with her satellite, exercised mastery over Manchuria.

According to the terms of the bribe, drawn up in Moscow by that elusive statesman of the half world in which our relations with Russia dwell, Dairen was to be "internationalized," the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union being safeguarded, and "the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U. S. S. R. restored." I have quoted from the protocol as published by Stettinius. I again quote, "the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provides an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria." There were other provisions. Russia's long-standing protectorate over Outer Mongolia was ratified, the southern end of Sakhalin, of which Russia was deprived by the treaty of Portsmouth, was restored to her and, as if by boot, the Kuriles were handed her. The Kuriles had been Japanese, never Russian.

What shall we say of Roosevelt's cynical submission to Russian imperialism in that deal? This was the Roosevelt, mark you, who is represented to us in Sumner Welles' book, *Seven Decisions That Shaped History*, as the high-principled opponent of imperialism in

Hong Kong and India. This is the Roosevelt who steadfastly through the war sought to persuade Churchill to get out of India and surrender the British leasehold of Hong Kong. This was the Roosevelt who proposed to Stalin at Yalta, and I find this in Sherwood on page 866, that Hong Kong be handed to the Chinese or internationalized and that colony turned over to a United Nations trusteeship. This was the Roosevelt who suggested that French Indochina be placed under a trusteeship. He broached this idea to Sumner Welles.

#### THE HYPOCRISY OF THE PHONY LIBERALS

What does this whole sordid transaction teach us about the good faith of the advisers of Roosevelt and the assorted liberals, Communists, Communist sympathizers, and agents of the Kremlin—the Achesons, the Lattimores, the Phillips Jessups, and the Institute of Pacific Relations—the whole sorry crew who have for so long been insincerely befuddling the people with talk of imperialism and people's rights in Asia?

Why, merely this, Mr. President, that in their minds the imperialism of the west, that decaying instrument of European expansions is wicked and must be opposed. The imperialism of Russia is not only commendable but must be advanced by every means of diplomacy and war at whatever cost to the United States. That is the liberal-leftist doctrine on imperialism. Have we heard one liberal voice raised in this Chamber or elsewhere in condemnation of Roosevelt's surrender to Russian imperialism at Yalta? This is the test, and by it we may measure the monstrous hypocrisy of the self-proclaimed liberal elements in this Chamber and in the country which have assisted in and applauded the surrender of all China to Russia without the firing of a single Russian shot.

The record of our betrayal of Poland, of our friends in Yugoslavia and, in truth, of all eastern Europe, is shameful enough but the pages of our history have never been blackened by a more immoral, a more illiberal, sell-out of a friendly nation which put its unjustified trust in us.

The apologists for Mr. Roosevelt have attempted to palliate his offense. Robert Sherwood suggested that Roosevelt was tired. I quote him, "Had it not been that the Yalta conference was almost at an end and he was tired and anxious to avoid further argument,"

Roosevelt, in his opinion, might have refused to sign the protocol. This is on page 867 of Roosevelt and Hopkins. Yet on the preceding page he nullifies the argument of fatigue by conceding, I quote, "It is quite clear that Roosevelt had been prepared even before the Teheran conference in 1943 to agree to the legitimacy of most if not all of the Soviet claims in the Far East, for they involved the restoration of possessions and privileges taken by the Japanese from the Russians in the war of 1904." And Sherwood elsewhere reports Roosevelt offering Stalin the "warm water port" of Dairen as early as Teheran. Mr. Sherwood is, as all know, a fervent and practicing "liberal." He sees nothing wrong in restoring the imperialistic "possessions and privileges" which had been wrested from a dying Chinese empire by the forces of Czarism. The insincerity, the speciousness, the nonlogical workings of the liberal mind when it comes to deal with Russian ambitions are clearly manifested by Mr. Sherwood. Mr. Welles presents a better case. He, too, is a "liberal" but with a higher sense of responsibility to history. I need not introduce Mr. Welles to you. He served in the Department of State until the fall of 1943, when his long-standing feud with Cordell Hull brought about the termination of his public service. Mr. Welles was Under Secretary of State when dismissed. His book, *Seven Decisions That Shaped History*, is an apologia for his late chief, Roosevelt, and a justification for certain events in his own career.

Mr. Welles insists that Roosevelt's betrayal of China and the United States at Yalta is excusable. On what ground? "The ground of military necessity." When Roosevelt acted, according to Welles, he did so because he believed that we must entice Stalin into committing what we see as a plain act of self-interest, namely, getting into the war against Japan before it was too late. The President made that judgment because he had been advised by his military advisers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that we had a long, hard row to hoe with the Japanese and that without Russia's help we might not achieve victory.

That is the Welles doctrine. It is likewise the Marshall-Acheson-State Department line. Where Welles differs is that he exposes that the military advice upon which Roosevelt acted was false and misleading. And where does the

pursuit of this rationalization lead us? As we might suppose—to Marshall.

#### FALSIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO MISLEAD ROOSEVELT

It was Marshall who stood at Roosevelt's elbow at Yalta urging the grim necessity of bribing Stalin to get into the war. It was Marshall who submitted intelligence reports to support his argument, suppressing more truthful estimates, according to Hanson Baldwin on page 81, and keeping from the stricken Roosevelt knowledge that the Japanese were even then feeling for peace in acknowledgment of defeat.

Was this a sincere endeavor by the master of global strategy to advance American interest? Did we sorely need Russian assistance? Or was it another in the baffling and frightening pattern of General Marshall's intervention in the course of the great war which conduced to the well-being of the Kremlin? I leave you to judge after I have traced out this development in the detail it deserves.

It should be remembered that major portions of the Yalta agreement were drafted by three men working together—Alger Hiss, Gromyko, and Jebb. In that connection, there should be recalled the words of Arthur Bliss Lane, our Ambassador to Poland, when he first read the agreement. He said:

As I glanced over the document, I could not believe my eyes. Every line spoke a complete surrender to Stalin.

Hiss alone should not bear the odium of this agreement because he, Gromyko, and Jebb drafted it. Marshall was much blinder in the councils of Roosevelt, and unless he approved the document it would not have been signed. Certainly he and Hiss discussed details of the agreement.

The desire to have Russia's help in the Far East arose with Marshall and was embodied, as we know, in the fateful appeasement memorandum of the first Quebec conference in August of 1943; the document which charted our course of appeasement, at Teheran and Yalta, and thereafter. The desire to entice Russia into the Japanese war was officially embodied in a combined Chiefs of Staff doctrine which I have previously discussed and which was presented at second Quebec, in September of 1944. Back in the fall of 1943 the President sent Averell Harriman to Moscow as his Ambassador and Marshall sent General

Deane, their "prime objective," as Deane describes it on page 25 of his book, being "to induce Soviet participation in the war with Japan."

Were inducements necessary? Was it in the Kremlin's interest to become a full-fledged combatant in the war in the Far East, to take part in the defeat of Japan and have a seat at the peace table where the spoils of war would be divided? Was it to the Kremlin's interest to march its armies into Manchuria, from which they had been barred since 1905 by the Kwantung army, and to be in possession there when the war ended? If some Americans did not grasp the strategic importance of Manchuria, there is certainly abundant evidence that the Kremlin, faithful to Lenin's dictum that "He who controls China controls the world," never lost sight of it. To ask these questions is to answer them, even if we lacked the indications of Stalin's determination to be in at the far-eastern kill, which we have. I ask any of my colleagues if they do not know the answers for certain. Of course they do. Any intelligent American, after giving the matter sufficient thought, would know that the aim of Roosevelt and Marshall at Yalta should have been not how to get the Russians in, but how to keep them out.

I have evidence here of four occasions before Yalta on which Stalin indicated to American officials his desires in this respect. The first such suggestion was made to Averell Harriman when, in August of 1942, he went to Moscow with Churchill to deliver the word that the operations in north Africa had been substituted for the second front now so exigently demanded by Stalin and Marshall. The occasion is reported by General Deane on page 226 of his book, where he says:

Stalin told Harriman then that Japan was the historic enemy of Russia and that her eventual defeat was essential to Russian interests. He implied that while the Soviet Union's military position at that time would not permit her participation, eventually she would come in.

Roosevelt knew of this; so, presumably, did Marshall. It should be noted that Stalin ascribed Russian interests as his motive for fighting Japan.

The Red czar next informed Gen. Patrick J. Hurley of his intentions. And in April of 1943 Hurley so reported to Admiral Leahy. The reference is on page 147 of Leahy's book, and I quote him:

Hurley saw Stalin . . . and the Marshal told him that after Germany was defeated, he would assist America in the war against Japan. . . . The [our] army, in its plans for the defeat of Japan, was anxious to have the help of Russia. It was my opinion that we could defeat Japan without Russian assistance.

The stouthearted old sea dog Leahy held to that opinion throughout, being overborne always by Marshall. The history of the war in the Far East and our postwar loss of China, with the resultant war in Korea, would have been far different had Leahy been, as his rank prescribed, the principal military adviser to Roosevelt. That was not to be. The iron will of Marshall prevailed over Leahy, as it did over Roosevelt and after the invasion of Italy over Churchill.

I digress to give Senators the substance of Leahy's opposition to asking the Russians in, because it bears so pertinently on the issue and because Leahy's qualifications were so high, his reasoning so sound and so soundly American. In the record of World War II, where Leahy occupies an honorable place, no question can arise at any time as to where his loyalties lie.

#### MARSHALL AND MAC ARTHUR DISAGREE ON NECESSITY OF LAND INVASION OF JAPAN

In the strategical discussions about how to end the war with Japan, Marshall urged that a land invasion was necessary; an invasion beginning in the southern islands of the Japanese home lands and proceeding north; an invasion requiring upward of 2,000,000 riflemen and entailing, according to Marshall's estimates, casualties of a half million.

Leahy reports a conference at the White House on the 10th of July, 1944. This is on page 245 of his book. Wrote Leahy,

It was my opinion, and I urged it strongly on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that no major land invasion of the Japanese mainland was necessary to win the war.

Far more impelling even than Leahy's own judgment was the agreement he reported, page 251, between General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz at Honolulu on that point. Leahy accompanied Roosevelt, it will be recalled, on that excursion, which coincided with the Democratic National Convention of 1944. He attended the conversations at which the President and the Army and Navy commanders in the Pacific projected victory over Japan. These—Nimitz and MacArthur—were the true experts on the

#### RUSSIAN INTENTIONS

I return to the indications of Russia's intentions in the Far East. Cordell Hull was the unexpected and extremely gratified recipient of the third such proffer of help in the Far East. The venerable Secretary of State, an upright and proud man, although he did not wholly understand the currents of high policy that swirled about him, went to Moscow in October of 1943 to attend a conference of the Allied foreign ministers. It was a momentous occasion, for Mr. Hull, the crowning accomplishment of a lifetime devoted to public service. At that time Mr. Hull suffered from the current credulity about Russia's good faith in the highest American circles. He was insisting, to the annoyance of subtler minds, that Russia was one nation, Britain another, equal in merit as in menace, and that we must treat them with equal and exact consideration. A fair-spoken man himself, Mr. Hull assumed that he was dealing with men of like scruples.

On the final night of his stay in Moscow, Mr. Hull attended the usual state banquet with which the master of the Kremlin regales his visitors. The banquet took place in the Hall of Catherine the Great at the Kremlin. They dined upon gold plate and drank innumerable toasts from heavy crystal.

Mr. Hull felt himself honored at being on the right of the prime author of world misfortune. After having suitably flattered Stalin, Hull was "astonished and delighted" when the marshal turned to him and said, as recorded on page 1309 of Mr. Hull's Memoirs:

Clearly and unequivocally that, when the Allies had succeeded in defeating Germany, the Soviet Union would then join in defeating Japan. Stalin had brought up this subject entirely on his own . . . He finished by saying that I could inform President Roosevelt of this in the strictest confidence. I thanked him heartily.

The Secretary of State lost no time in cabling the promise to Roosevelt, using both the Army and Navy ciphers in the hope of keeping the news from the British. It was Mr. Hull's belief, a belief too often verified, that the Foreign Office in London leaked secrets.

In his reflections over Yalta—Hull had by then resigned—he seemed to think it passing strange that Roosevelt had had to acquire Stalin's assistance by means of "numerous territorial concessions." He

Pacific. Let us have their judgment and Leahy's conclusions thereon:

The agreement on fundamental strategy to be employed in defeating Japan and the President's familiarity with the situation acquired at this conference were to be of great value in preventing an unnecessary invasion of Japan which the planning staffs of the Joint Chiefs and the War Department were advocating, regardless of the loss of life that would result from an attack on Japan's ground forces in their own country. MacArthur and Nimitz were now in agreement that the Philippines should be recovered with ground and air power then available in the western Pacific and that Japan could be forced to accept our terms of surrender by the use of sea and air power without an invasion of the Japanese homeland.

There we have the strategy of MacArthur, Nimitz, and Leahy for winning the war in the Pacific—but not Marshall's. Who was right?

#### MARSHALL INSISTS ON LAND INVASION OF JAPAN OVER OBJECTIONS OF MAC ARTHUR AND NIMITZ

Yet despite this expert advice Marshall persisted. At the staff discussions before second Quebec, 2 months later, Leahy had this to report on page 259:

By the beginning of September, Japan was almost defeated through a practically complete sea and air blockade. However, a proposal was made by the Army [meaning Marshall] to force a surrender of Japan by an amphibious invasion of the main islands through the island of Kyushu. . . . The Army did not appear to be able to understand that the Navy, with some Army air assistance, already had defeated Japan. The Army not only was planning a huge land invasion of Japan, but was convinced that we needed Russian assistance as well to bring the war against Japan to a successful conclusion.

This willingness on Marshall's part to sacrifice hundreds of thousands or millions of American boys in an invasion of Japan which MacArthur and Nimitz, who were in charge, considered unnecessary, when coupled with his frenzied attempt to obtain the Stalin-requested cross-channel invasion of Europe in 1942, despite the inevitable, using Churchill's words "English Channel of blood," makes doubly significant his willingness to conduct an endless war of death and destruction on both sides in Korea rather than run the risk of offending Soviet Russia by winning a quick victory as suggested by MacArthur in Korea.

So much for the strategy of the matter.

added, "When Stalin made his promise to me it had no strings attached to it."

The fourth assurance from Stalin regarding the Far East came at Tehran where he observed that once peace came in Europe, "by our common front we shall win" in that quarter. But by that time, recognizing that Harriman and Deane had come to Moscow to ply him for his assistance, Stalin was, quite naturally, thinking of his price. The price was not cheap. In October of 1944, during Churchill's second visit to Moscow, Harriman got Stalin on the subject of the war against Japan. Deane noted, page 247 of his book, that Stalin agreed that—

The Soviet Union would take the offensive after Germany's defeat, provided the United States would insist on building up the necessary reserve supplies (for 60 divisions in Siberia) and provided the political aspects of Russia's participation had been clarified. His latter proviso referred to the recognition by China of Russian claims against Japan in the Far East.

At this sitting Stalin agreed that the United States Navy might have Petropavlosk on the Pacific as a naval base and our air forces the sites for heavy bomber bases in the Maritime Provinces, but denied us use of the Trans-Siberian railroad to haul in supplies.

Thus was the gun pointed at Roosevelt's head. If we wanted Russia in, we had to supply her armies and force Chiang Kai-shek to accept the loss of Manchuria, which had been solemnly promised him by Roosevelt and Churchill at Cairo. Marshall insisted, again beyond the call of duty, that we needed Russia. Roosevelt believed him. The cost of supplies was fairly heavy, the Russians stipulating what amounted to 860,410 tons of dry cargo, 206,000 tons of liquid cargo. All this in addition to the supplies for the war in Europe called for under the fourth protocol. The Russians got 80 percent of their far eastern requirements. One item was 25,000 tons of canned meat. That would provide at least 50,000,000 meat courses, at a pound each, for Red soldiers.

And as one result of the political deal we have suffered over 140,000 casualties in Korea.

#### NO NECESSITY FOR THE STALIN PAY-OFF

I return to Yalta, where Stalin got his price in full, the conference which is described by Hanson Baldwin as, "the saddest chapter in the long history of

political futility which the war recorded."

What was the war situation in the Pacific in January of 1945? Leyte was ours, the Japanese fleet was defeated, Manila fell during the Yalta Conference, Okinawa lay ahead, but the Air Force was daily raining destruction and fire on Japanese cities. Gen. Bill Donovan's Office of Strategic Services was reporting from China that the Kwantung army had been dissipated and depleted. In any case, said the OSS, what was left could not be moved to the Japanese home islands because of the lack of shipping. Nor could the Japanese troops in China be moved. Everywhere the story was the same. The Japanese merchant marine was beneath the sea. The blockade was strangling Japan. Admiral Leahy wrote on page 293 of his book concerning his own views of the situation at this time:

I was of the firm opinion that our war against Japan had progressed to the point where her defeat was only a matter of time and attrition. Therefore, we did not need Stalin's help to defeat our enemy in the Pacific. The Army did not agree with me and Roosevelt was prepared to bargain with Stalin.

Hanson Baldwin, writing after the event, endorsed Leahy's conclusions, saying, on page 79 of his book, that—

At the time of Yalta, Japan was already beaten—not by the atomic bomb which had not yet been perfected, not by conventional bombing then just starting, but by attrition and blockade.

#### MARSHALL'S PRESSURE ON ROOSEVELT

Yet at Yalta, General Marshall redoubled his endeavors for Russia's entrance with all the indomitable persistence he had applied to the "second front now" and to blocking Mark Clark and the British over the Eastern European strategy. The late Edward Stettinius, who, as Secretary of State, played a hand at Yalta, recalled on page 90 of "Roosevelt and the Russians," that—

I knew at Yalta . . . of the immense pressure put on the President by our military leaders to bring Russia into this far-eastern war.

Before Stettinius left Washington he saw a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs to the State Department, saying, "We desire Russia's entry at the earliest possible date."

In support of his urgent demand, Marshall used what Baldwin calls on page

30 of his book, "a pessimistic intelligence estimate," which placed the strength of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria at 700,000, a total of 2,000,000 Japanese forces on the Asiatic mainland—"all first-rate troops and well trained," according to Marshall. Far worse than this, Baldwin exposes the fact that more realistic intelligence estimates, corresponding to the facts as brought out after the war and held at that time by Leahy and others, "never reached the top echelon at Yalta." Even the Washington Post, that Communist camp-following paper, that pillar of leftism and scuttle in Asia, felt moved on September 9, 1948, to declare that the Chiefs of Staff "made a blunder, to advise Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta that Japan would last 18 months after VE-day."

Just how that got into the Washington edition of the Daily Worker I do not know. Nor is this the end of this dismal story.

#### JAPANESE PEACE OVERTURES

Rear Admiral Zacharias, in his book, Behind Closed Doors, declares that a Japanese peace feeler had been received and transmitted to Washington by General MacArthur before Roosevelt departed for Yalta. So at the time we sold out China to Russia to induce Russia to come into the Japanese War, we already had Japan suing for peace, according to Admiral Zacharias. The peace overtures were to come thick and fast from Japanese sources after Yalta and by the time of Potsdam they were so authentic that the Declaration of Potsdam was put forward to answer them.

Yet late in April of 1945 Marshall was still intent upon wooing the Russians into the far-eastern war. As Stettinius reports it on page 97:

At a top level policy meeting in the White House just before the San Francisco conference opened on April 25, President Truman, the military leaders and I discussed the failure of the Soviet Union to abide by the Yalta agreement on the Balkans. At this meeting the United States military representatives pleaded for patience with the Soviet Union because they feared that a crack-down would endanger Russian entry into the far-eastern war.

Who advised patience with Russia? Marshall? At Potsdam in July Marshall's determination to have the Red Army equipped by us and moved into Asia had not abated. Stettinius reports, with some perplexity on page 98, that—

Even as late as the Potsdam Conference, after the first atomic bomb had exploded at Los Alamos on July 16, the military insisted that the Soviet Union had to be brought into the far-eastern war.

Japan, as I have said, already had sued for peace.

In his endeavor to exculpate Roosevelt of blame for the shame of Yalta, Welles saddles the blame on the combined Chiefs of Staff. We know that it was Marshall who formed and carried through those decisions. Welles attributed Marshall's desire to have Russia in, to "a basic misapprehension of existing facts." This appears on page 153 of his book.

Is that the answer? Or was Marshall's insistence that Russia should be allowed to serve her own interest—not ours—in eastern Asia a part of that pattern which has been emerging with ever greater clarity as we trace his career: a pattern which finds his decisions, maintained with great stubbornness and skill, always and invariably serving the world policy of the Kremlin? I ask the question. You answer it. Marshall can.

#### ALGER HISS AT YALTA

The President had another adviser at Yalta, Alger Hiss, that impudent, execrated, and unrepentant traitor. Was it upon the advice of Hiss, who served on the Far Eastern desks and was deep in the China plot, that Roosevelt, chatting companionably with Stalin, assured him that "the blame for the breach [in China] lay more with the Comintern and the Kuomintang than the rank and file of the so-called Communists." The quotation is from page 868 of Sherwood's revelatory book. It will be noted that the Communists, the Kremlin lackeys who sent their armies against our own in Korea, were to Roosevelt only "so-called" Communists, and pretty good fellows at that, more reasonable, the President may have gone on to say, than Chiang Kai-shek's bunch or even your own fellows, Generalissimo, in Moscow! We shall encounter that view of the Chinese Reds as agreeable innocents again when we examine Marshall's ill-fated mission to that ill-fated country.

Let me assume for the moment that Marshall's judgment in World War II was clouded by no ulterior objective, no hidden thread of purpose which could not reach the light of day. What kind of a "master of global strategy" would have made the mistake of Yalta? What kind of strategic genius does that dis-

play? The whole array of Marshall's strategical endeavors, from Sledgehammer, or the "second front now", through his timidity over invading Algiers by way of the Mediterranean to his downright insistence upon invading southern France 2 months after D-day in Normandy, is unrecrassuring in this present situation. We inevitably contrast Marshall's competence with MacArthur's during MacArthur's grand march from New Guinea to Tokyo. In the circumstances, how could we take Marshall's word on strategy? If he so overestimated the Japanese as to believe they could fight on for a year and a half after the Germans quit in Europe, how can we place any reliance upon his estimate of the strength of the Russian empire and its Chinese satellite in eastern Asia at this moment?

So the A-bombs fell on Japan and the war was over, although so careful a military critic as Hanson Baldwin believes that the bombs hastened the end of the war, if at all, by only 1 day. Japan's fate had been determined long, long before. And with the end of the war Yalta's chickens came promptly home to roost. The Red army after a bloodless campaign of 6 days took over all Manchuria; it stood also in North China. The Reds were there by right, ceded them at Yalta.

#### MARSHALL DIVIDES KOREA

And so we come to the question of Korea. Who divided that unhappy land at the thirty-eighth parallel, ordering that Russia should receive the surrender of Japanese forces above that line, the United States below it? Here we have one of the major mysteries of that time. At Yalta, Stalin had agreed with Roosevelt on a four-power trusteeship for Korea, the powers to be the United States, China, Russia, and Britain—a decision which he ratified when Harry Hopkins visited Moscow in the late spring of 1945. The trusteeship called for a unified administration of all Korea with a government of Koreans to be freely elected and governing the whole peninsula. What happened to the trusteeship? When Japan quit, there arose the problem of accepting the surrender of the forces in the field.

Welles covers the situation on page 167 of his book, *The Seven Decisions That Shaped History*. I quote him:

Some subordinate officers in the Pentagon hastily recommended that the Russians ac-

cept the Japanese surrender north of the thirty-eighth parallel in Korea, while the American troops would accept it south of that line.

I am told that this line was fixed because it was convenient. Certainly it was fixed by officials with no knowledge of what they were doing, and without consulting any responsible members of the administration who might have had some regard for the political and economic considerations which the decision so lamentably ignores.

There the matter rested until the able senior Senator from Maine [Mr. Brewster] brought to light the fact that the thirty-eighth parallel has historic significance. I had wondered why the War Department in August of 1945 chose to divide Korea for purposes, as was said, of receiving the Japanese surrender, along the thirty-eighth parallel. Why not the thirty-seventh, or the thirty-ninth parallel? Why had it to be the thirty-eighth parallel?

The Senator from Maine [Mr. Brewster], in delving into United States Relations, which is the continuing history of American foreign affairs as published periodically by the Department of State, found that the Russians had fixed the thirty-eighth parallel, nearly a half century ago, as the dividing line. They were negotiating with Japan over the division of Korea between the two imperial systems that had designs upon China then. So the Tsar's diplomats proposed to those of the Emperor of Japan that the thirty-eighth parallel be the border between the two empires.

I refer to the testimony before the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees on June 8, when Secretary Acheson was being questioned by the Senator from Maine [Mr. Brewster] on this point. Acheson disclosed that the decision was taken by the Secretary of War, was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee, and by the President. This was not, as Sumner Welles—who has excellent sources of information—was forced to conclude, a decision made by "subordinate officers at the Pentagon." This was a high-level decision, initiated by the Secretary of War. Who was, in effect, the Secretary of War during the later incumbency of Mr. Stimson? I think no one who was in touch with the inner workings of those adjoining offices at the Pentagon, who has read the late Secretary's explicit memoirs, who knows the inner relationships between the two men, can doubt

that in matters of this sort it was Marshall who made the decisions, Stimson who rubber-stamped them.

It was Marshall who selected the line for the division of Korea which was chosen by the Russian Foreign Office and General Staff nearly 50 years ago. We restored their pre-1904 claims on North Korea at the Pentagon in August of 1945.

I refer you particularly to this colloquy, the Senator from Maine asking, Secretary Acheson answering the questions:

Senator BREWSTER. Isn't it rather interesting to note the thirty-eighth parallel in Korea was proposed 45 years earlier by Russia as a means of dividing the spheres of influence of Russia and Japan incident to the episodes around the Russo-Japanese War?

Secretary ACHESON. I am not familiar with that, Senator.

I content myself with noting further that a Secretary of State unfamiliar with the complex of imperial ambitions in the Far East during the days when the United States played a humane, a creditable and an intelligent part in those affairs can scarcely qualify as an expert on the diplomacy of the Far East.

#### RETREAT FROM VICTORY

The war was over, millions of Americans, mistakenly thinking that their international troubles were over too, had a 24-hour celebration only to awaken before long to find that, even as we were spending vast amounts of flesh and blood and steel to win the fighting part of the war, there was being conducted what appeared to be a planned loss of the peace. Hanson Baldwin refers to that disastrous planning as the follies of World War II. I am reminded of a wise and axiomatic utterance in this connection by the great Swedish chancellor, Exenstierne, to his son departing on the tour of Europe: He said, "Go forth my son and see with what folly the affairs of mankind are governed."

#### GENERAL STILWELL'S ROLE IN CHINA

Before we plunge into the Chinese situation as it developed, with Japan defeated but Russia replacing her in Manchuria, let us have a brief look at what had been happening in China that bears on the career of General Marshall. We come at once to the contentious figure of Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, known as "Vinegar Joe." Stilwell was Marshall's protégé. Marshall had him

appointed the American military representative and chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek in 1942.

I shall not detain Senators with a study of "Vinegar Joe's" personal eccentricities, his self-assurance verging on arrant egotism, his contempt for Chiang Kai-shek, who was to him always "The Peanut," and for all the Chinese leaders except the Reds of Yenan. The dismaying chronicle of Stilwell is known to all of us. It was this twisted and tortured soldier who was set up by Marshall as our supreme military representative among the 450 million Chinese, who had for years been bearing the brunt of Japanese power, retreating and fighting, moving ever inland, but refusing with honor and dignity to make peace with the invader.

Stilwell spoke Chinese. He spoke that language in a halting, stilted way, I am assured by old China hands, and the complaint of the educated Chinese was that, because of his unfamiliarity with the inflections and nuances of their language, he often insulted them when he thought he was uttering matter-of-fact phrases.

#### STILWELL'S ADVISERS

The greatest barrier to cooperation between Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell was not, however, his own unaccommodating spirit. Stilwell was surrounded in China by a clique of young Foreign Service officers supplied by the State Department, headed by John Paton Davies as his political adviser. Stilwell and Davies had been friends since 1938, when both were in Hankow, Stilwell as American military attaché, Davies as consul general. Those were trying days in the war between Japan and China. They were days also of the common front, when the Communists were fighting alongside the Nationalists and all ranks presumably were closed. The American colony at Hankow likewise included Capt. Evans Carlson, later a brigadier general in the Pacific.

I pause to remind you that Stilwell and Carlson are the Communist heroes of our war in the Far East, that both were and are honored in the *Daily Worker* and throughout the Communist movement in this country.

Dominating the intellectual life of the American colony in Hankow, according to Freda Uteley, who was also there, was that effective agent of Russian imperialism, Agnes Smedley. That Miss Smed-

ley, a recreant American, was a Russian spy throughout her long career in China, is doubted by no Americans outside of perhaps Owen Lattimore and his camp-following friends. I quote from Miss Utley's new book, *The China Story*, a scholarly and temperate account of how the Hiss - Acheson - Lattimore - Marshall group and their accomplices converted the Chinese civil war of 1945-49 into the present Chinese-American war. I quote from pages 106 and 107:

Agnes [Smedley] \* \* \* not only captivated "Vinegar Joe," but also completely won over the British Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, subsequently Ambassador to Moscow and later, as Lord Inverchapel, appointed to Washington. "Archie" Clark Kerr was another benevolent friend of the Chinese Communists for many years. He told me he thought Agnes was "the greatest woman" he had ever met and their close friendship was continued in America. \* \* \* Davies was also a great admirer of Agnes Smedley, whom he called one of "the pure in heart." He used to invite us all to excellent dinners at the American consulate, at which he expressed both his admiration and affection for Agnes. \* \* \* Together with Edgar Snow and other journalists I knew in Hankow, he [Davies] became one of the most potent influences in the Department [of State] furthering the cause of the Chinese Communists.

Davies, as Stilwell's political adviser, surrounded himself with young men of his choice and ilk—John Stewart Service, Raymond P. Ludden, and John Emerson. We have heard of Service before. I do not ask you to believe upon the sole authority of my word that the full weight of Stilwell, of Davies, and these young men were thrown in the balance of the conspiratorial, subversive Chinese Reds and against our ally, the Government of China. You have read the State Department's insincere and dissembling White Paper on the China question. I bid you read again, study, and mark the reports sent back to Washington by Stilwell's clique; read them with this in mind, that except for the reports of the naval attaché in China, these were the only advices the administration had to go on regarding the situation in that huge and distressed land.

The Army and the State Department were suffused with pro-Red propaganda emanating from Stilwell's circle. It is one of the few benevolent dispensations of fate in this situation that Admiral Leahy had a clear stream of information. Apart from his influence, and the word of honest travelers and finally the blunt

advices of Gen. Pat Hurley, I honestly believe that Stilwell would have been kept in China and the Reds have been able to conquer that land several years before they finally accomplished it.

Davies has been suitably rewarded by Dean Acheson for his sell-out of an ally. Davies serves in Washington as a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Committee, where he is strategically placed to help further the betrayal he began in Chungking.

It was the constant endeavor of the Davies people in China to assure the Departments of War and State that the Chinese Communists were moderate reformers, simple agrarians in the style of Thomas Jefferson, with no subservience to Moscow.

We find an excellent example of this in report No. 34, document No. 109A7, dated September 28, 1944, a document signed by John Stewart Service and sent to the State Department:

Politically, any orientation which the Chinese Communists may once have had toward the Soviet Union seems to be a thing of the past. The Communists have worked to make their thinking and program realistically Chinese, and they are carrying out democratic policies which they expect the United States to approve and sympathetically support.

We find the following in report No. 10, dated March 13, 1945, again signed by John Stewart Service:

The Chinese Communist Party, on the other hand, is the party of the Chinese peasant. Its program—reduction of rent and interest, progressive taxation, assistance to production, promotion of cooperatives, institution of democracy from the very bottom—is designed to bring about a democratic solution of the peasant's problems. On this basis, and with its realization of the necessity of free capitalistic enterprise based on the unity, not conflict, of all groups of the people, the Communist Party will be the means of bringing democracy and sound industrialization to China. These are the only possible guaranties of peace and stability.

This friendliness toward the Communists in Asia extended also toward the Japanese Communists. Luckily, General MacArthur was in Japan. The State Department's advice was not followed there. But let me quote again from a John Service document S. 187, with "Q" number 524:

The Japanese Communist Party is still small (Mr. Okano himself does not claim more than a few thousand members), but it has the advantages of strong organization and loyal, politically experienced member-

ship. If its policies, as claimed, seek to achieve our own hopes of a democratic, non-militaristic Japan, we may wish to consider the adoption toward it of an attitude of sympathetic support.

The Stilwell-Davies group took over in China in 1942. Soon thereafter Lauchlin Currie, at the White House, and John Carter Vincent and subsequently Alger Hiss, at the State Department, were exercising their influence at the Washington end of the transmission belt conveying poisonous misinformation from Chungking. The full outlines of Currie's part in the great betrayal have yet to be traced. That it was an important and essential part, I have no doubt. In this connection it should be recalled that Currie issued an order on White House stationery depriving the Republic of China of 20,000 German rifles.

STATE DEPARTMENT ADOPTS COMMUNIST POLICY ON CHINA, ACCORDING TO EARL BROWDER

What bearing did Stilwell's assumption of command in China in 1942 have on the following answers made by Earl Browder before the unlamented Tydings subcommittee?

MR. BROWDER. I could not name specific instances, but now that you raise the question, I assume that that was done. It was our purpose to stir up all sorts of political expressions of opinion in support of the Communists in China and support of unity in China; to influence the Government in every possible way.

MR. MORGAN. To influence the Government, you say, with respect to unity in China; unity between whom?

MR. BROWDER. And to take a different attitude toward specific Communists—

MR. MORGAN. What attitude did you want to project, Mr. Browder?

MR. BROWDER. Abandonment of the previous policy in which the influence of the United States Government was largely instrumental in maintaining and intensifying Chiang Kai-shek's war of extermination against the Chinese Communists. We wanted that influence of America removed and this influence to be exercised, on the contrary, in favor of unification.

MR. MORGAN. I believe you have answered for us the principal matter in which we are concerned, Mr. Browder. At least you have given your testimony with respect to it—

MR. BROWDER. I would say that further, in 1942, it became unnecessary any longer to bring such pressure upon the Government of the United States because the officially declared policy from that time until 1948 was the United States pressed upon China the coalition of the Kuomintang, the Communist, and all the democratic mass forces in one united government.

From 1942 to 1946 that was the official policy of the American Government, and it was, therefore, no occasion for the Communists—I would say from 1942 to 1945, the only period of which I can speak—there was no occasion for the Communists to press for a change of policy in the United States Government at that time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But, nevertheless, the views advocated up to 1942—at least, the substance of the important views advocated by the Communist Party up to 1942—were in fact adopted by the State Department toward the Communists in China at about 1942—is that correct?

MR. BROWDER. In October 1942.

Is this mere coincidence? I do not think so.

CHENNAULT DESCRIBES STILWELL'S LOVE AND ADMIRATION FOR COMMUNISTS

Before coming to the denouement of this sorry state of affairs, I give you another view of the activities of Stilwell and Davies in Chungking. This testimony comes from an eyewitness, a valorous retired major general of the United States Army Air Force, Claire Lee Chennault, who won undying fame with his Flying Tigers. I am referring to Chennault's recorded experiences in China, *Way of a Fighter*, where he reviews Stilwell's behavior in unsparing detail. Chennault describes how Stilwell in the spring of 1944 sent a mission to his friends in Yen-an. I quote from page 317 of *Way of a Fighter*:

The American mission to Yen-an was hardly established before Stilwell's Chungking staff began to proclaim loudly the superiority of the Communist regime over the Chungking Government. Contents of secret reports from the Yen-an mission were freely discussed over Chungking dinner tables by Stilwell's staff. No secret was made of their admiration for the Communists, who, they said, were really only "agrarian reformers" and more like New Dealers than Communists.

Incidentally, this, too, was the burden of Agnes Smedley's propaganda line at this time. I return to Chennault:

The hue and cry charging the Generalissimo with "hoarding lend-lease arms" to fight the Communists was raised with renewed vigor along with the claim that China's best troops were being used to blockade the Communists instead of fighting the Japanese.

The American propagandists for Red China—men paid by you and me, by all taxpayers—were mendacious as well as disloyal to our alliance and to American interest. I quote further:

After Stilwell was removed, Wedemeyer conducted an exhaustive survey of all Chinese Army equipment and reported that not a single American gun or bullet had gone to Chinese armies east of Yunnan with the exception of 500 tons belatedly delivered to Kweilin and Liuchow. The generalissimo did keep a sizable army at Sian, the gateway to Communist territory, and they did maintain a patrol on the main communication lines to Yen-an. That they were also defending the Tungkwang Pass, one of the three vital gateways to west China, was conveniently ignored by Stilwell's staff. Late in 1944 many of these troops were withdrawn to bolster the sagging Salween offensive, and the Japanese promptly began an offensive aimed at Sian. Only a sudden and cold winter halted the Japanese offensive short of its goal.

I have quoted General Chennault at this length because these passages go to the heart of the means by which the American people were misled and Government policy distorted during World War II to bring about our present disasters. I continue to quote Chennault:

The Yen-an Communists shrewdly tickled Stilwell's vanity with many flattering appreciations of his military prowess and clinched him as an ally by shrewdly letting it be known that they would be delighted to have him command their armies. Stilwell never gave up his hopes of commanding the Chinese Red armies. . . . Since it was still official American policy in the summer of 1944 to support the Chungking government, it was a common joke (in Chungking) that Stilwell's headquarters were developing a private foreign policy with John Davies as secretary of state.

During this period there was a strong group of left wingers in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department who used Stilwell's sympathy for the Chinese Communists and his violent antipathy to the generalissimo as a lever to shift American policy in favor of the Communists. Had Stilwell been retained in his China-Burma-India command their chances for success would have been brightened. The situation was so bad that when Wedemeyer arrived he found it necessary to make all American officers in China sign a formal statement saying they understood clearly their duty in China was to execute official American policy, not to make it.

STILWELL EXPRESSES DESIRE TO FIGHT WITH COMMUNISTS AGAINST OUR ALLY

Before I leave the subject of Stilwell, I want to refer to a photostatic copy of a page from the New York Daily Worker of January 26, 1947. Represented on this page is a handwritten letter of General Stilwell's to a friend. The letter appears under the letterhead of the Com-

manding General, Headquarters Sixth Army. Stilwell was then commanding the Sixth United States Army. The letter was addressed to a friend whose identity the Daily Worker did not see fit to disclose. Stilwell wrote, and I quote:

Isn't Manchuria a spectacle? But what did they expect? George Marshall can't walk on water. It makes me itch to throw down my shovel and get over there and shoulder a rifle with Chu Teh.

At that moment the forces of the Republic of China were successful in Manchuria, they had reached the peak of their efforts at pacification at about this moment. This was, of course, displeasing to Stilwell.

What Stilwell is saying is that even Marshall, unable to perform miracles, had not yet been able to deliver Manchuria to Chu Teh. This passage will grow clearer as we proceed with this narrative. Stilwell wanted also to give his assistance to the man who had carried support of him almost to the point of defying President Roosevelt. Need I remind you that Chu Teh, the heir of Agnes Smedley, was then, and is now, the commander in chief of the Chinese Red Armies who are at war with us in Korea?

MARSHALL FIGHTS TO KEEP STILWELL IN CHINA

Where does General Marshall stand in all this? After all, we are reviewing his career, not Stilwell's. Stilwell was his friend. He had nominated him for this job. What did Marshall do about this field commander who was, as we have seen, so disloyal to American policy, so flagrantly perverting our purpose in China, so grievously failing both as a soldier and a diplomat, and who, in the end, would avow his desire to take up arms with the Communists against America's ally?

Demands for Stilwell's removal from his disastrous command reached such a pitch in June of 1943 that President Roosevelt directed Marshall to recall him. Stilwell and Chennault, at loggerheads over the land-air strategy in China, had been brought back to Washington just previously, where they appeared before the combined Chiefs and advanced their respective positions. Chennault won the decision. Thereafter, Stilwell's strategy, his disposition, and his good faith were under constant and steady suspicion in the minds of all the American leaders save only Marshall's and the old gentleman who had

been captivated by him, Secretary Stimson.

Did Marshall yield to the President's wishes that Stilwell, who was proved to be supporting the Chinese Reds, be recalled? He did not. I quote from Mr. Sherwood's book, Roosevelt and Hopkins, on page 739, where he recalls that incident, saying that General Marshall said:

He realized that Stilwell was indiscreet but that he is the only high ranking officer we have that can speak Chinese and that while obviously, he does not like Chinese officialdom, he has a great regard for the Chinese people.

Mr. President, I believe that we have in the clause I have just quoted a clue to Marshall's regard for Stilwell and his obstinate determination to keep him and his bevy of Communist propagandists at Chungking. If Marshall had been entirely candid, I believe the words would have been, "He has a great regard for the Chinese Reds." As we all know, "people" in Communist parlance has a special meaning. It does not mean all the people in our sense. It is a catchword, an occult word, clear to the initiates, meaning Communists. They use it in a special sense to designate all their political organs. We all recall the various people's fronts organized to promote the Communist cause throughout the world. More specifically the Chinese Communist army was referred to in Communist parlance as the people's army. We shall find, as we pursue this subject, further evidences of General Marshall's affinity for the Chinese Reds.

Not only did Marshall brook the President's will in this instance; he risked a quarrel with Hopkins, the man who, as Sherwood elsewhere reports, had been his principal supporter for chief of staff when Marshall was unexpectedly jumped over many more highly qualified and experienced major generals and brigadier generals to that post in 1939. Sherwood is recording a conversation with Marshall, also on page 739, when he says:

Marshall has told me that his only serious difference of opinion with Hopkins in the entire war was over this issue between Stilwell and Chennault. . . . Hopkins was on the side of Chennault, who was close to the Fascist-tinted Kuomintang.

I beg you note the use of Communist term "Fascist-tinted" to describe the Kuomintang. It is significant. The false and meaningless epithet "Fascist" was on the lips of every apologist and

propagandist of Russian imperial designs in those days from Smedley to Alger Hiss and their journalistic echoes in the United States. I suggest also that you check the accuracy of Marshall's views regarding the superior fighting value of the Chinese Reds with Chennault's plain, unvarnished opinions, with those of General Wedemeyer, and with a host of other loyal Americans who know whereof they speak. The legend that the Reds were genuinely fighting the Japanese was another of the big lies with which American opinion and judgment was corrupted and subverted at that time.

Roosevelt did not press for Stilwell's recall. Sherwood gives a partial explanation of why he did not do so in a continuation of the foregoing passages, saying:

Roosevelt had high regard for both Stilwell and Chennault, as fighting men, but his overriding concern was to keep China in the war and to hold the friendship of the Chinese people for the United States and he had those objectives in mind in every decision he made.

I think it is evident that Roosevelt did not know what we know. A great deal of water has gone over the dam; we are better informed and more vigilant now. We know that Stilwell and his gang were a nest of anti-American activity at the Chinese capital; that they did us unmeasured harm, both in injuring the faith and credit of Chiang Kai-shek in America and in deceiving us concerning the minions of the Kremlin at Yen-an. Chennault supplies us with other insights into Roosevelt's attitude toward China at this time. During his visit to Washington in the spring of 1943, Chennault saw the President three times. It was evident that the President had a due appreciation of Chennault's gallant services in China; that he respected and liked him. On page 225 of his book, Chennault reports Roosevelt assuring him that—

His policy was aimed at creating a strong pro-American China to emerge from the war as a great stabilizer among the oppressed peoples of the Orient. I have a deep conviction that had he lived and maintained the faculties which he had at his prime, the debacle of our postwar floundering in China and the incredible folly of the Marshall mission would never have occurred.

However that may be—and I sometimes feel that some have too indiscriminately charged Roosevelt with the blame for what has happened in China—Mar-

shall remained at the President's elbow, a trusted adviser able to overshadow the loyal and foresighted counsel of Admiral Leahy, and, as we have seen, the tide of reports from the field, serving the great conspiracy, still flowed into Washington.

The impatience of Leahy with Stilwell and all he stood for breathes through a brief entry in his book, page 172, when he notes that "the problem [of the China command] was not to be solved for more than a year, however, when Stilwell was finally relieved of his command in October 1944."

And, on page 271, that great American, Leahy, observes that even after Stilwell's insults had moved Chiang Kai-shek to demand Stilwell's head at the price of remaining in cooperative wartime relations with America, "Marshall made repeated efforts to induce the President to retain 'Vinegar Joe' regardless of Chiang's objections." Leahy observes drily that the President had to give "direct and positive orders" to Marshall before Stilwell was at long last called home.

How does that compare with Marshall's attitude toward the great proconsul of Japan? What accounts for the difference? Stilwell played with the Reds in China; MacArthur, on the other hand, made no secret of his wish to break their power over Asia. In whose cause was Marshall enlisted when he fought with such bitter obduracy to retain at Chungking the friend of the stooges of Moscow? How does it compare with his present and successful insistence for MacArthur's head? Was he then serving American interest in China and the Far East, the interest delineated by Roosevelt before he yielded to Marshall's scare pictures of the war in the Pacific at Yalta? I leave the answer to you.

And so Stilwell finally came home to be succeeded by that great American soldier, Albert Wedemeyer. Wedemeyer has not enjoyed the friendship and patronage of the powerful Marshall since the day he brought home his wise and effective report on China in 1947 and since the further day when he refused, putting his career in peril, to sign a doctored version of his report which Marshall, by then Secretary of State, wished to issue in further delusion of the American people.

Wedemeyer does deserve the fullest confidence and esteem of the American people and I look forward to the day

when, please God, this country may again have the full use of his talents, his judgment, and his unalloyed devotion to his country and her interests. Wedemeyer redeemed our situation in China, he forged a fighting instrument out of Chinese conscripts, he reestablished good relations with our long suffering and loyal ally, Chiang Kai-shek, and he conducted the affairs of America in the interests of America.

THE COMMUNIST ENEMY OF CHINA SELECTS THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO CHINA

Before quitting Wedemeyer I wish to call your attention to another telltale incident of General Marshall's mission. I refer to Marshall's veto on the appointment of Wedemeyer as Ambassador to China in the summer of 1946. I call your attention to pages 6097 to 6100 of the Russell committee transcript, wherein General Wedemeyer is testifying on that incident; pointing out that Marshall, having originally recommended his appointment, is now opposing it on the ground that the Yen-an Reds were violently opposed to Wedemeyer.

Let us run over rapidly Wedemeyer's testimony concerning Marshall's suggestion to the general in January or February of 1946 that he be named ambassador. Marshall, according to Wedemeyer, observed, "The Communists may not like you, but they respect you." Already Marshall was evincing tenderness to Communist views. In July, Wedemeyer, home on leave, was awaiting the appointment, his commission being on the President's desk, when he was called to the State Department. I quote Wedemeyer's testimony:

The then Under Secretary of State Acheson sent for me in July and showed me a telegram as I recall it stating that the appointment of General Wedemeyer has leaked, that is the prospective appointment of General Wedemeyer as Ambassador to China has leaked, and was militating against "my delicate negotiations between the Communists and the Nationalists. The Communists are protesting violently."

The telegram was from Marshall. I go on with the testimony, quoting Wedemeyer:

Dean Acheson said, "I'm sorry about this Wedemeyer," and I told the Secretary, "Well, I'm not sorry at all about it. There are two factors that I don't like about it. One, I don't think that the Communists should determine who should be appointed by our Government in positions of responsibility,

and two, I bought a trousseau, as it were, an ambassadorial trousseau to the tune of \$800 or \$900."

So he disregarded my first remark.

Would Wedemeyer, or anyone else, suppose that Dean Acheson would object, as did Wedemeyer, to the Communists dictating the appointment of an American ambassador? Of course, Acheson disregarded that comment of the general. To Acheson it is perfectly all right for the Yen-an Reds, the Moscow Reds, or any other Reds, or the British Pinks for that matter, to interfere in an American ambassadorial appointment. I resume quoting:

And Acheson said, "The State Department will take care of the clothes." And I sent the clothes to the State Department along with the bill, and the State Department did pay the bill and the clothes were sent back to me and they are in mothballs.

This is not the end of this fantastic picture. The truth is that Wedemeyer asked to see the full text of the telegram from General Marshall but Acheson declined to show it to him.

This I have not documented but the information was given to me by one of Washington's most reliable correspondents who discussed the matter with Wedemeyer over luncheon shortly after the episode in question. I have obviously never seen that telegram but the best information we can get is that the wire recommended the appointment of Dr. Leighton Stuart. That this was upon the recommendation of Chou En-lai, who was with Marshall at the time and who had vetoed the appointment of Wedemeyer seems obvious. Dr. Stuart, as you know, had been the president of a university in Peking. One of his many Chinese students was Chou En-lai. I urge that the Russell committee obtain a copy of that wire and find out whether it is true that Stuart was selected as American Ambassador to the Republic of China upon the recommendation of one of the greatest enemies of the Republic of China, Chou En-lai, the foreign secretary of the Yen-an Reds.

Mr. President, a very interesting article on this point, entitled "A Surrender to Communists," has been written by Constantine Brown, one of the outstanding columnists, and appeared in last night's Washington Star. I ask unanimous consent to have that article printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Evening Star of June 13, 1951]

A SURRENDER TO COMMUNISTS—ANXIETY OF STATE DEPARTMENT SHOWN IN CANCELLATION OF WEDEMEYER'S APPOINTMENT AS ENVOY TO CHINA

(By Constantine Brown)

The matter related by General Wedemeyer last Monday, concerning the cancellation of his appointment as Ambassador to China, is more than a mere routine incident.

It shows the anxiety of the State Department and of General Marshall, who at the time was on a special mission to China, to bring about a coalition between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists, to leave no stone unturned to placate the Reds.

It amounted, in fact, to administration surrender to the wishes of the Communists, who did not want a man of General Wedemeyer's personality representing the United States in China. The result was appointment of Dr. J. Leighton Stuart, an American scholar, to the post at the suggestion of Chou En-lai, No. 2 Chinese Communist.

The appointment of General Wedemeyer had been proposed to President Truman by James F. Byrnes, then Secretary of State. Mr. Truman approved it. The former commander in China was selected not only because of his intimate knowledge of conditions in that country, but also because he enjoyed the complete confidence of Chiang Kai-shek and knew the top Chinese Reds personally and well.

There seemed to be no conceivable opposition to this appointment. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had indicated its unanimous approval as soon as Mr. Truman sent the nomination for consideration.

Mr. Byrnes informed General Wedemeyer that he would have to have a complete new civilian wardrobe—top hat, cutaway, pearl gray vest with pretty mother-of-pearl buttons and silk hat. He suggested to the general, who had always bought ready-made civilian clothes, the name of a good New York tailor. The bill amounted to \$900.

Mrs. Wedemeyer gave up her apartment in Washington and made reservations on the train to San Francisco, where she expected to join her husband for the flight to Nanking.

Forty-eight hours before she was to leave, the then Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, sent a rush call to General Wedemeyer, and asked him to come to the State Department to see him at once. General Wedemeyer believed it was a matter of additional instructions.

Mr. Acheson was embarrassed and broke the news to him that General Marshall, then still in China, had sent a top-priority cable urging the cancellation of General Wedemeyer's appointment because of strong ob-

jections voiced by the Communist spokesman, Chou En-lai.

General Wedemeyer wanted to read the telegram, but the interview was short because Mr. Acheson was in a great hurry to see the President. The general did have time, however, to mention his expense for the useless ambassadorial rig and received the assurance that the State Department would take care of that promptly.

Soon it became known that Chou En-lai had suggested to General Marshall that Dr. Stuart, aging president of the American University in Peiping which Chou had attended before the war, be considered for the job.

Dr. Stuart was practically unknown in America. The Far East Division of the State Department knew about his educational activities in China. Officers on the Chinese desk in the Department pointed out that with the help of an able staff, headed by a good counselor of embassy, Dr. Stuart would be able to do the job. He was immediately appointed and confirmed by the Senate.

Dr. Stuart settled himself, his Chinese personal secretary, and his American staff in the former German Embassy in Nanking—the best building available in the Chinese capital—which Chiang placed at the disposal of the American Government.

He was a mere flurhead as Ambassador. There were no representatives of the Communists left in Nanking when the new envoy assumed his post. He marked time and frequently was as uninformed as Americans back home about what was going on between the American Government and both Chinese factions.

In fairness to the distinguished scholar, catapulted in spite of himself into an ambassadorial post, it must be said that while he never complained officially or attempted to act with the energy displayed by men like Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, his predecessor, he did frequently and privately express his disappointment at the role which he was called on to play in Nanking.

After all General Marshall's efforts failed General Wedemeyer was ordered to go to China in 1947 on a special mission to report on the situation and to suggest whatever remedy he possibly could. Before leaving Nanking General Wedemeyer was urged to make a public statement for the press. He prepared it, and at Dr. Stuart's suggestion, the draft was sent to Washington for approval.

General Marshall at this time was Secretary of State. The draft was returned to Nanking approved. But it was such a changed and watered-down version that General Wedemeyer hesitated to release it. He felt that it did not fully express his views. Dr. Stuart and his State Department co-workers urged, however, that it be given to the press and General Wedemeyer agreed.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, the war came to an end with the Russian armies firmly entrenched in Manchuria

and the northern provinces of China, thanks to Marshall's endeavors at Yalta, but with Wedemeyer at Chungking still able, if left alone, to salvage something out of the situation. In Moscow Stalin ungratefully proclaimed his joy over the bloodless victory in the Far East, giving no thanks to his benefactors, Marshall, Roosevelt, Harriman, and the crimson clique that is still entrenched in the State Department and omitting any reference to Agnes Smedley and her disciples:

The defeat of the Russian troops in 1904 left bitter memories in the minds of the people. It lay like a black spot on our country. Our people believed and hoped that a day would come when Japan would be smashed and that blot effaced.

Forty years have we, the people of the old generation, waited for this day.

The Kremlin has its revenge, it had the historic base of conquest over China in Manchuria and never perhaps in all human history had so much been obtained for so little. Stalin's proclamation is quoted from page 166 of Welles' book.

#### POSTWAR CHINA

The war was over and the Chinese people might at last have hoped to be free from the great troubles which had torn and vexed their land since the last days of the old Empress Dowager. But no. The Reds at Yenan, determined as always on acquiring all China in the service of the Kremlin, launched into guerrilla warfare. By October the conflict had assumed the scope of a civil war. Chiang Kai-shek was in a position to deal with the situation. He had 39 American-trained divisions, he had equipment, he had a high morale among his forces, although he lacked the air forces that had been promised him and withheld by the War Department. The situation was not too difficult. Back in March Pat Hurley and General Wedemeyer, with Commodore Miles, of the Navy, had assured the Joint Chiefs in expectation of the trouble that would ensue upon the end of the war that the "rebellion in China could be put down by a comparatively small assistance to Chiang's central government." I have quoted from Admiral Leahy's veracious record, on page 337.

The Government at Chungking was our ally. We had come through a long, hard war together. It was we who had encouraged Chiang to resist, to treat with scorn the entreaties of the Japanese that China fall out of the war so that the

combined forces of Asia could fall upon the Americans in the Pacific and the Far East. We owed much to Chiang.

Roosevelt was dead. He had been swayed up to a point by Marshall. We now had Truman, who, in these matters, was to become the pliant tool and instrument of Marshall and of the Acheson whose every endeavor is to deliver our foreign policy into the hands of London and our eventual fate into the hands of Moscow. In explaining to the new President how the Russians had got into Manchuria, Leahy gave Truman his "jaundiced view" of the situation, adding, and I quote from page 385, that the Army, meaning Marshall, had won the argument and the "decision had been ratified at Yalta." The exposition of the admiral fell upon uncomprehending ears. From that day forward Truman has never wavered in support of the forces that were intent upon delivering China to the Kremlin. The one manly and courageous act of his administration, however illegal it was, the only act that put a spoke in the wheel of the Hiss-Acheson-Lattimore-Marshall China policy was his decision to fight in Korea. This decision, from all the information available, was taken against the advice of Acheson and at a time when, by what I feel sure was a dispensation of Providence, Marshall was out of office and not at his side.

#### WHY DID TRUMAN ORDER MAC ARTHUR INTO KOREA?

This decision was made by Truman even after Acheson had informed the world on three separate occasions that neither Formosa nor South Korea fell within our defense perimeter—a notification to Russia that she could have her minions attack and overrun either of those areas without any interference from the United States. The question arises: Why did Acheson allow Truman to double-cross international communism at this point? The answer is clear if we merely hark back to that fateful 26th of June 1950. For months previous to that time the headlines on the front pages of every paper from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from New Orleans to St. Paul, carried day-to-day stories of the unsuccessful, bumbling attempts of the ill-famed Tydings committee to cover up, protect, and whitewash Communists in Government. The American people were at long last awake to the fact that this administration was subscribing to the

destruction of this Nation by a combination of the slow death of socialism and the quick dagger death of communism.

Some of the administration's men up for election that fall were tottering upon the verge of political oblivion. Something had to be done—a bold stroke was necessary to convince the American people that this administration was really anti-Communist. So the administration which would not fight communism at home undertook to prove to the American people that it was willing to fight communism abroad. But even before the ink was dry on the order to MacArthur to help our friends in South Korea with American troops—an order of which he had not even a moment's previous notice—Hiss' friends in the State Department were drafting the orders which would make victory for us impossible.

#### TREASONABLE ORDERS

Let us briefly examine the first one of those orders—the most fantastic that this Senate perhaps has ever heard of in war or peace time—the order to the Seventh Fleet. Among other things this order provides that American men in the Seventh Fleet have the job of protecting the Communist mainland from any invasion by our allies, the anti-Communists. Nothing secret or involved about this. The order to the Seventh Fleet very simply states that it shall immobilize Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa and prevent any landings by him on the China coast.

Another part of the orders to the Seventh Fleet provides that it break Chiang Kai-shek's blockade of the Communist ports. Prior to the entry of the Seventh Fleet upon the scene, Chiang Kai-shek had been doing a fairly good job of blockading the main Communist ports of China. Since the Seventh Fleet broke the blockade, a vast amount of British and some American war materials are flowing into Communist China and are being used to kill the men we send to Korea—brothers of the men we send into the Seventh Fleet whose orders are to protect the flow of war materials into Communist China.

The orders to the Seventh Fleet, of course, also were that it prevent the Communists from landing on Formosa. However, at that time, and for weeks thereafter, the weather and other circumstances were such that it was, according to all military men, completely impossible for the Communists to at-

tempt any Formosan landing with the type of craft they had available on the China coast.

Before the Seventh Fleet was ordered to keep Chiang from attacking the China coast, there were roughly a quarter of a million Chinese Communist troops immobilized on the China mainland opposite Formosa. When the order went into effect, however, those troops started to move northward to Manchuria—to the Yalu River—and are now killing American men in Korea. It will be recalled that General MacArthur stated that two entire Chinese armies were freed in this manner and elements of those armies have been identified in Korea.

Let me sum up briefly just what the order to the Seventh Fleet has accomplished to date:

First. It has protected the entire exposed coast of China from landings thereon by our allies and has released vast numbers of Chinese Communist troops for service elsewhere.

Second. It is endangering the freedom of Indochina by freeing Chinese Communists otherwise immobilized on the China coast so that they may go to the aid of Ho Chi-Minh in Indochina.

Third. This in turn has impaired the defense of Western Europe by keeping the great majority of the French professional military forces from training duties at home.

Fourth. It has posed the additional threat to Hong Kong by freeing Red Chinese soldiers to concentrate against Hong Kong who would otherwise be immobilized on the China coast. Our myopic British friends seem to blind their eyes to this fact.

Fifth. It has in effect given complete freedom of action to the Chinese Reds by having our Navy protect their long and very vulnerable southern flank from our allies, the anti-Communists. This in turn means more Chinese Communists hurled against American forces in Korea, more American dead and wounded, greater percentage of the American Army tied down in Korea, less arms and ammunition to rearm Western Europe, and an additional and almost unbearable burden upon the American taxpayer. Such is the result of our two-sided, contradictory war in the Pacific in which the Seventh Fleet is ordered to fight on one side and the United States Army on the other. It seems impossible, but it is happening.

#### BROTHER FIGHTS BROTHER

It must be puzzling, indeed, for an American young man who is drafted and sent to Korea to fight communism and whose brother is sent to the Seventh Fleet to protect the same Communists whom he is fighting—the result of the most fantastic order that has ever existed in war or peace—an order which cannot be justified by even the most tortured reasoning; an order which bears the fingerprints—the very bloody fingerprints, if you please—of Communist treason.

#### ONLY AMERICANS ARE ENTITLED TO FIGHT AND DIE

As the Senate knows, while we were badly outmanned in Korea and taking an awful kicking around because of the tremendous weight of numbers of the opposition, our ally, Chiang Kai-shek, who has about 600,000 troops on Formosa, offered to supply badly needed troops in Korea. Incidentally, remember that Nationalist China is a member of the United Nations, and all members of the UN were called upon to send troops to Korea, and that Chiang made the first and only sizable offer of troops.

He also offered the use of 1,000,000 guerrillas in China if he were merely given the light automatic weapons to equip them—a million fighters as a diversionary force to drag the Chinese Communist armies back out of Korea. But the group in power in the State Department, the same group which has been slowly gaining more and more power since the early 1940's, the group which was in power during the sell-out of China and the sell-out of Poland, said, "No; we won't use your troops because, if we did, we might make the Chinese Communists mad."

No one with eyes to see, ears to hear, and a mind with which to think can but agree that this action on the part of the President's Communist camp-following advisers signed the death warrant of vast numbers of American young men. It would be noted, also, that Marshall has apparently endorsed these orders—lock, stock, and barrel.

#### UNDISCLOSED WEDEMAYER REPORT TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

Who really created the China policy, the policy which has consistently been administered to run down the United States flag in the Far East and surrender China to the Kremlin? We have a new and most significant clue in a re-

port of General Wedemeyer to Chiang Kai-shek made on the 10th of November 1945 upon his return from an official mission to Washington. I do not believe that this report has ever before seen the light of day, although the joint committee may have received it—but I have no information that they have. General Wedemeyer was the chief of staff to the Generalissimo and, in effect, the commander in chief of all the Chinese Government forces as he was supreme commander of American forces in that theater. Wearing these two hats it was his duty to mediate between the Generalissimo and the American authorities.

It was his duty also to report in detail upon the American official attitude toward the crisis in China. This he did and I quote first the section of his report dealing with what he learned in what he described as his "consultations with the President." Wedemeyer wrote, and I quote in paraphrase: (a) The President wanted me to convey his greetings. (b) He was well satisfied with the accomplishments of this theater. (c) He emphasized the necessity of the early withdrawal of American Army, Navy, and Air Forces from China, stating the pressure on this point, the withdrawal of American personnel from China, is strong.

From whence did this pressure arise? Was it from the great peaceable masses of the American people, eager to have the war over and peacetime conditions reestablished, eager to have their sons, husbands, and brothers back home but in nowise eager to have our forces out of China? The answer, and you know this as well as I, came from the friends of the Russian Empire in America.

The message of the President to the Generalissimo was not discouraging. It remained for the Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which, of course meant Marshall, to deliver the coup de grace to Chiang Kai-shek's hopes for American support, moral, economic, and military, in putting down what Leahy had called the rebellion in China. It was evident from the Wedemeyer report on his talks with Secretary Byrnes that the China policy had already been set: No help to the Government of China in case it undertook to put down the Reds. The State Department made it clear to Wedemeyer—it quoted the President, although Truman himself had not mentioned the matter to Wedemeyer:

That the United States would not permit herself to be involved in the conflict between

Chinese forces, and that she would also not facilitate the activities of the central government vis-à-vis the rebellious forces within Chinese territory.

The Joint Chiefs—again meaning Marshall—were even more explicit and disheartening. It remained for Marshall to state the larger policy: not only would we view a suppression of the rebellion adversely, withdrawing our aid in case Chiang Kai-shek proceeded forcibly, but we would demand a government of unity in China. Chiang must bring the Communists into his government. Already we had the example of Poland and of Rumania before us. We were now embarking on that same disastrous road in China. The Joint Chiefs, and I quote the Wedemeyer report:

Solemnly declared that American forces could not be involved in the civil war in China and that the United States would remain aloof in relations between the Chinese Government and Britain, France, the Soviet Union, or any other country.

Who was this, declaring diplomatic policy? The President, the Secretary of State? No. It was the Chief of Staff of the Army. I digress to explain the significance of that utterance. At the end of the war this Government had brought its overwhelming influence to bear to induce Chiang Kai-shek to yield to the betrayal at Yalta. Chiang had therefore, a treaty with the Kremlin respecting the sovereignty of Manchuria, a treaty which the Russians had steadily violated from the day of the Japanese surrender, stripping Manchuria of what Edward Pauley, the Reparations Commissioner, estimated was at least \$800,000,000 of movable assets under the specious claim that it was "war booty." "War booty" from a bloodless, 6-day war.

The declaration I have quoted from the Wedemeyer report to the Generalissimo served notice in unmistakable language that the United States, having coerced China into accepting the sell-out at Yalta, was washing its hands of China's relations with Russia. We were abandoning the lamb to the lion. I doubt if the history of nations exhibits another such cynical declaration nor one which made the intentions of its author clearer. And who was the author of it? Not the President or the Secretary of State, who constitutionally speak for the United States in such matters—but the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a

term, which, as we have abundantly discovered, was merely a euphemism for George Catlett Marshall.

I go on reading from this incredible document:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff clearly stated that American military aid to China would immediately terminate if the United States Government became convinced by facts that the Chinese forces benefiting from American aid were serving a government unacceptable to the United States, were engaged in civil war, or were employed for aggressive purposes. The degree of political security obtained under a unified government completely representative of the people would be regarded as a fundamental condition for the consideration of American economic, military, and other forms of aid to China. The United States Government would consider the above-mentioned condition, i. e., a unified government, as the criterion in determining whether or not to continue such aid.

There you have it spelled out in all its blunt and terrifying implications: The China policy, which ever since that date has operated to deliver China into the hands of the Kremlin acting through Mao Tse-tung and his accomplice lackeys—the China policy that inhibited Chiang at every turn from suppressing the Reds, setting his country in order, and proceeding with the great internal reforms to which he was committed and which he has always given every indication of pursuing in entire good faith. There it is: The China policy that brought about the war in Korea and which turned 450,000,000 friends of America into 450,000,000 foes.

#### AUTHOR OF CHINA POLICY

And who was the author of it? Had this directive to Wedemeyer been dictated by the master strategists of the Kremlin themselves it could not more accurately have represented their will and wish. And where does this China policy leave the vital interests of the United States in the Far East, interests which we had just indicated at the end of a 4-year war fought in good faith with the aid of our Chinese allies and at the cost of many thousands of lives and uncountable treasure? What of the men, the flower of American youth who died in the air and over the waters and islands of the Pacific to sustain American honor and support American interest in Asia? Every mother's son of them was betrayed by this policy as surely as were our Chinese Allies.

The paternity has been denied, but finally from the conflicting testimony taken before the Russell committee, it is clear that the named authors were Marshall, Acheson, and John Carter Vincent with the balance of Hiss' friends in the background. It will be recalled that originally Marshall brushed off the drafting of the document with the statement that he was tied up in the Pearl Harbor investigation and indicated that he only knew about the instructions after the draft had been completed. Finally, it became clear, however, that Marshall, with the aid of Acheson and Vincent, himself drafted the instructions and presented them to the President for the President's approval.

I do not care to take the Senate's time in giving a picture of the third man, John Carter Vincent, at this time. Suffice to say that he has been repeatedly named as one of those who is always found helping to do the planning where disaster struck America and success came to Soviet Russia. Vincent it was who, with Owen Lattimore, guided Wallace on his mission through China. At the conclusion of this trip, Wallace made a report to the State Department in which he recommended the torpedoing of Chiang Kai-shek.

In his book, *Soviet Asia Mission*, Wallace states—page 172—that while he, Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, were traveling through China, Sergei Godlize, a high Soviet official—president of the executive committee of Siberian territory—and an intimate friend of Stalin's, toasted Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent at a dinner as the men on whom rests the responsibility for the future of China.

We need not dwell at this time on why Marshall under oath in 1950 was so anxious to disavow knowledge of the formulation or paternity of this infamous document. His faulty memory in this respect, however, should be borne in mind as one of the keys to the mystery of Marshall. At first blush the policy as set forth in the above document would appear disorganized and without clear point. It was not pointless, however. Those who drafted it understood very clearly the over-all plan being advanced.

On the 2d of December, 2 weeks before Marshall departed for China, William Z. Foster, the chairman of the Com-

munist Party in the United States, assured a meeting of the American Politburo in New York of what had been for long a truism of Communist world strategy. He put it in a new time frame, however, saying, the civil war in China is the key to all problems on the international front. The problems of Europe, in other words, depended upon the issue in China. The next great expansive moves in the Kremlin's plan for world conquest waited upon victory in China. Those were the plain meanings of his words.

#### ACHESON'S MESSAGE TO THE KREMLIN

Two weeks earlier, on the 14th of November, Dean Acheson gave what was perhaps an unconscious explanation of why he and Marshall were determined that Russia must have China. On second thought, perhaps what he said was not veiled to the Kremlin. I believe now that he intended it as an official assurance to the Kremlin, and its friends in America concerning our intentions in China. Acheson was speaking—he was Under Secretary of State—on the platform with the Red Dean of Canterbury, Dr. Johnson, with Corliss Lamont, the prospective quisling, with Paul Robeson and Joseph E. Davies, who assisted as much as any American in the corruption of the American mind regarding Russia and the nature of the Kremlin during World War II.

First Acheson indulged in some dishonest history, saying that American and Russian interests never had clashed anywhere in the globe; forgetting in his zeal for Mother Russia the fears of Russian designs on the west coast of North America that helped to occasion the Monroe Doctrine and forgetting also how this Government under Theodore Roosevelt gave aid and comfort to Japan in the war of 1904-5 because the President thought Russian aggressions upon China were harmful to our interests in Asia.

At the moment Acheson spoke the Red armies were giving every manifestation that they intended to treat Manchuria not as a part of China but as their own colony, which, they have, in truth done to this day, to the utter ruin of the Open Door Policy of John Hay. They were showing every sign of annexing Northern Korea to their Manchurian colony. They were violating the spirit and text of the treaty we had extorted in their interest from Chiang Kai-shek.

Yet the Under Secretary of State, abasing himself before Russian imperial power, found no objective reason to suppose that we ever would have a clash of interest with what, with infinite hypocrisy, he called the Soviet peoples, identifying the subjected masses of Russia, the first victims of bolshevism, the faceless serfs of the Kremlin, with the tyrants themselves. We find that utterly fraudulent identification throughout the public utterances of that prince of deceivers, Acheson. He added, while the Red Dean, Quisling Lamont, Robeson, and Davies applauded, "We understand and agree with them—the Soviet peoples—that to have friendly governments along her borders is essential both for the security of the Soviet Union and the peace of the world."

The peace of the world. That was the specious moral reason given by the deluded and duped Truman for insisting upon Chiang Kai-shek's capitulation to the Chinese Reds.

I think it is clear what Acheson was signaling to his masters in Moscow. He was saying, "You have seen that we delivered Manchuria and Northern Korea to you. That task is completed. You have set us another task, to see that you have a friendly government on your Manchurian and Mongolian borders. Never fear, rest assured, we will see to that, too. Only give us time and you will have a friendly Asia and then we can have world peace."

It could not have been spelled out more explicitly. And, as we shall see, Acheson and Marshall performed up to the very limit of their capacity, stinting nothing, withholding nothing of their country's interest, brooking no opposition to see that the Kremlin had a friendly government in China and we had a bloody and pointless war in Korea.

#### MARSHALL CHANGES HIS STORY

So the instructions were put into final shape by Marshall and Acheson and John Carter Vincent and, no doubt Alger Hiss, who was by then in the Far Eastern Division and who was then, as now, the trusted friend of Acheson's. Marshall has recanted his false testimony of September 1950 wherein he sought to make it appear that he had no hand in the China policy and was a mere messenger of the President's. He has acknowledged the truth which was staring him in the face from the pages of Jimmy

Byrnes' book, where Byrnes wrote on page 226:

The Sunday before I left for Moscow, Under Secretary Acheson, General Marshall, and members of his staff met in my office. By the end of the morning's discussion, we had agreed upon the statement of policy that subsequently was approved by the President and released to the public on December 15.

Thereafter, the President made no change in that policy except upon the recommendation of General Marshall or with his approval.

The disastrous China policy, as we now see, was given birth to by Marshall with Acheson and Vincent acting as sympathetic and helpful midwives.

#### MARSHALL'S MEMORY

In this connection it should be remembered that Millard Tydings, of whitewash fame, wrote Marshall about the part that Lattimore had played in the formulation of the State Department's disastrous and treasonable far-eastern policy. Marshall answered that he had never met Lattimore—apparently had never even heard the name. It developed, however, that Lattimore had attended a 3-day, round-table discussion called by the State Department on far-eastern policy. Some of those who attended have since pointed out that Lattimore sat next to Marshall for 3 days and engaged in a rather constant interchange of ideas with Marshall—another reason why, perhaps, V. M. I. should add a memory refresher course to its curriculum.

#### STALIN PROCLAIMS HIS ADMIRATION FOR MARSHALL

There is an interesting footnote to this situation, recounted in all innocence by Byrnes in his discussion of the ill-fated mission to Moscow which he was undertaking at the same time that Marshall went to China. On page 228 "Speaking Frankly," Byrnes draws aside the curtain upon a talk with Stalin at the Kremlin regarding the China matter. I quote Byrnes:

He [Stalin] paid a compliment to General Marshall, saying that if anyone could settle the situation in China he [Marshall] could.

As Stalin might have added with entire accuracy, settled it to my satisfaction.

#### MARSHALL WAS WRONG, SAYS LEAHY

This was only a few days after the stormy scene at the White House described only sketchily in Jonathan Daniels' hero-worshipping biography of Truman. Marshall had appeared to get

Truman's approval of his policy and Admiral Leahy, who was present, emphatically admonished him that his China policy was wholly at variance with President Roosevelt's attitude toward China and the Far East. The discussion became acrimonious and resulted in a permanent breach of the friendship between Leahy and Marshall.

Daniels quotes Leahy, page 317, saying:

I was present when Marshall was going to China. He said he was going to tell Chiang that he had to get on with the Communists or without help from us. He said the same thing when he got back.

I thought he was wrong both times.

The admiral only refers obliquely in his own memoirs to this passage, which took place in the uncomprehending presence of the Chief Executive, Mr. Truman, and which disposes of his fraudulent claims to having administered Roosevelt's world policies as a faithful heir. Concerning this, Leahy wrote on page 104 of *I Was There*—and I quote him:

In the postwar period General Marshall and I disagreed sharply on some aspects of our foreign policy.

#### THE CHINA QUESTION

I pass over the moral aspects of the Marshall policy for China, a mere statement of which should bring the blush of shame to every conscientious American. I turn to the clear and easily understood question of our national interest. I am not, Mr. President, reluctant or shame-faced when I speak of the interests of America. They are the interests of a great, decent, peaceable human society, a society long-suffering and patient, bearing no malice to any people anywhere, a society which has distributed its surplus bounty with a generosity and on a scale undreamed of in all the centuries of men to this time. I speak of American interests in the Far East with pride, not with embarrassment. What was our interest in China in the fall of 1945? What was the stake as between the United States and the Russian Empire? Which was to have sway and influence over China? That is the kernel of the situation which we describe as the China question.

#### ONE STAKE AT YALTA—OUR WEST COAST

It is not necessary to outline where we would stand if Russia controlled all the Pacific shores of Asia and the islands pertaining thereto—Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, and the rest.

Our flank would be most grievously exposed. Not only would Hawaii be rendered extremely insecure and our Pacific coast brought into danger, but, most significant of all, the road to Alaska and northern Canada would be open to the air forces of the Russians, who have been for so long perfecting the arts of Arctic warfare. The Russians can reach Alaska over their own land mass. Given command of the western Pacific, they can supply and refresh their forces in eastern Siberia by sea and ward off our attempts to interdict their supply. And from Alaska, as I have said, Pittsburgh—to say nothing of the west coast with its enormous war plants—is brought within range of Soviet long-range bombing and of guided missiles.

The command of the coast of Asia is part of the stake for which Russia was playing at Yalta and before. They may be called the oceanic aspect of the strategic problem. There is also the continental—and this bears upon Russia's defense from us in case of war. I do not profess to be expert on this subject and so I turn to one more proficient. I summon as a witness General Chennault, an airman, who, besides distinguishing himself in command of air forces during the war in China, has had long service in the leadership of civil aviation in Asia. I quote from General Chennault's book, *Way of a Fighter*, in his foreword where he says:

China is the key to the Pacific \* \* \*. The United States attitude toward China should be based on a thoroughly realistic appraisal of China's value to the United States.

And again:

The Russians understand the role of China.

I again quote:

I seriously question that Russia will make anything more than probing skirmishes in Europe until her Asiatic flank is secure.

Chennault goes on to explain why this is so, and I quote:

From air bases built for America during the last war at Chengtu, Sian, and Lanchow in northwest China, all of the vast Russian industry east of the Ural Mountains is open to air attack. From these same bases and dozens of others in northern China the slender thread of Russian communications between eastern and western Siberia could be snapped by even a small air force.

Chennault published all this in 1949 before our China policy had finally borne its bitter fruit, but what he says remains true. I quote:

If China remains friendly to the United States, the Russians will not dare move deeper into Europe, leaving their vitals exposed on their Asiatic flank. If the Asiatic flank is secure and American airpower is pushed out beyond critical range, then the way will be open for new and more powerful ventures in Europe.

At this point, perhaps we should recall the words of Lenin—"He who controls China, controls the world."

I commend those observations regarding our strategical problem in the Far East and its relationship to the security of Europe to the baffled but arrogant statesmen of Westminster and the deluded gentlemen of this administration who say, whatever they may believe, that what happens in Korea is of no matter to the safety of Europe.

#### PREVARICATION

I have established by means of the Wedemeyer report to Chiang Kai-shek that Marshall, with the aid of Acheson and the rest of the old Hiss crowd, is the author of our China policy. What bearing does this revelation have, you may ask, upon Marshall's testimony before the Armed Services Committee of this body on September 19, 1950, when, by what I take to have been a deliberate equivocation, he contrived to give the impression that he had not participated in drafting the instructions he bore when he departed on his mission to China. He was being questioned by a Senator who is no longer among us, Millard F. Tydings of Maryland, chairman of that committee at that time.

This is General Marshall replying to a question which had been asked in a very friendly fashion by the chairman:

While I was in this room for a week undergoing the Pearl Harbor investigation, the policy of the United States was being drawn up in the State Department, and that was issued while I was on the ocean, going over there.

This was, mark you, in September 1950. The war which Marshall had helped to produce was being fought and he was under the scrutiny of the Armed Services Committee with reference to his nomination as Secretary of Defense. The China policy was not as popular as it had been. The people had been awakened by the events in Korea to a livelier interest in the factors that had brought on the war. Marshall was eager to get that job. I leave his motives to your conjecture.

And so he indulged that piece of barefaced, if indirect, prevarication. For a few days he was believed, for a time sufficient to have his nomination confirmed in what was one of the most monumental blunders ever committed by the Senate of the United States. This prevarication was even too strong for the stomach of the Washington Post, which has a strong stomach where the betrayal of American interest in the Far East is concerned, and it took the Secretary to task for it. I shall not dwell further upon this disgraceful episode. General Marshall's veracity, or lack of it, would be apropos; the incident would brand him as unworthy of high office under ordinary circumstances. However, the issues with which we are now dealing far transcend the question of his truthfulness.

The questions now before us concern his share in a series of events which go to the very heart of our existence as a free, self-governing people. Our survival is at stake in the present war in the Far East and what shall grow out of it and upon the wisdom and the loyalty of the men at the head of our Government depend decisions of life and death. We are now concerned with reviewing the record of General Marshall with a view to ascertaining his trustworthiness in that larger sense.

I had often wondered, until I read the Wedemeyer report from which I have quoted, why General Marshall, a man of advancing years, undertook the ardors and discomforts of a sojourn in wintry, war-ravaged China at the behest of the President in December of 1945. His laurels were fresh and undimmed. As one of the leaders of the sweeping Allied victory he had worldwide prestige. So far as the public knew he deserved the respect of his countrymen and the honor due an old soldier who had apparently fulfilled one of the greatest duties ever entrusted to an American. To go to China, to enter into that vexed and complicated situation as a mere emissary of the President would be a thankless task. Furthermore, it represented a come-down in status. It was a good bit like sending Churchill to govern India, if India had still remained subject to the Crown.

I think it is now transparently clear why Marshall went to China. Having, with the Acheson-Vincent crowd, framed the China policy, he was intent on executing it down to its last dreadful clause and syllable and it is, I think, significant

that he tarried in China for 13 arduous months, and when he left it was obvious to all beholders that China must fall to the Russian Empire. What was his mission?

First. To restrain the Government of China from subduing the Red forces which were sworn to bring all China within the orbit of Moscow.

Second. To deny the Chinese Government American assistance if it attempted to master the Communist minority by force.

Third. To insist at all times, in defiance of the lessons of Europe and the plain evidences of Russian imperial ambitions in Asia, that Chiang Kai-shek must accept the Communists into his government.

The surrender of Yalta had to be concluded and perfected.

#### WEDEMEYER'S SOLUTION

But there was a final act to perform, an act calculated to put the quietus on the only sane, sensible formula for settling the civil war in China that came out of this whole deplorable period. General Wedemeyer had sent such a formula to the War Department, whence the plan was circulated through the Navy and State Departments. It was so simple and workable, so in conformity with American interest and all the ideals which had been uttered by the late President, that only in treason can we find why evil genius thwarted and frustrated it.

What General Wedemeyer proposed was that the Government of China, with the backing of the United States forces under his command, offer the Chinese Communist leaders full political rights and full status as a national political party. The rights and security of their leaders and the status of their party was to be underwritten by the United States and its forces, providing only that the Communists disarm their forces and surrender their arms. The Wedemeyer proposal included the promise of national elections to be supervised by the forces of the United States, to be held soon, with full electioneering rights to be guaranteed. Further, General Wedemeyer proposed that if the Communist leaders refused this offer, which rested on the good faith of the United States, the forces under his command would then forcibly disarm them and return their troops to civilian status. In that case, however, the full political rights

of the Communist leaders and party would still be safeguarded as in the former case and their security guaranteed by the United States.

The Reds, one may be sure, would not have accepted the offer. They did not want peaceful collaboration but unrest, guerrilla warfare, and finally conquest backed by their neighbor in Manchuria and deviously abetted by the United States Government. And that was what they got.

What fairer solution could have been found? What better solution in the interest of the United States? We professed to want a unified China operating under democratic procedures. But did our Government want that? General Wedemeyer's plan died in the files of the executive agencies concerned and we heard no more about it until the Russell committee forced it into the open.

And so General Marshall departed for China. His instructions as we have seen were written by himself and by other enemies of our friend and long-time ally, the Republic of China. I beg leave to express doubt that President Truman understood what the instructions were all about. He perhaps thought he was furthering a pious objective. I beg leave to doubt that Secretary Byrnes, then departing on a fruitless errand of quasi-appeasement to Moscow, fathomed the purport of the China project.

I believe that if Byrnes had studied the thing, if he had familiarized himself with all its implications and the complex circumstances surrounding it, he would have rejected the Marshall plan for China. Unquestionably Dean Acheson understood it, and helped draft the open instructions with pleasure and endorsed its every aspect. In the days since then, Acheson has never deviated from the sheer intent of the policy, which was the surrender of China to Russia.

Why was it so impossible for the Marshall mission to reach any conclusion that served the interests of China and the United States? To begin with we had served notice on Chiang Kai-shek in Wedemeyer's report of November 10, that we would oppose and obstruct any attempt by him to come to realistic terms with the rebels who were in arms against him. We were, under all the verbiage, in the rebels' corner.

#### MARSHALL'S DECISION AIDED THE REDS

It has been said that every decision made by Marshall in China helped the

Reds, harmed the Nationalists. That is true and the study of the expurgated and biased white paper which I shall lay before you, will prove it beyond any shadow of a doubt. I shall cite an example of the partisanship with which the Marshall policy worked in an incident that happened within a few days of his arrival in China. The situation which then was most roiling the relationships between Nationalists and Reds was the surrender of the Japanese forces. General Wedemeyer, with commendable dispatch, had set about moving the Nationalist armed forces from the west and the south of China where the defeat of Japan had left them, to the east and north so that they could implement the capitulation arrangements imposed upon Tokyo. The Communists, in violation of those arrangements, as they were always in violation of all arrangements that did not suit them, were forcing the surrender of Japanese forces in territories which they controlled. This was by express order of Gen. Chu Teh.

The purpose was to fasten the Red hold on territories and to acquire the Japanese arms and equipment given up when they surrendered. It was this confused and illegal situation in northern China which had prompted the Generalissimo and General Hurley to work out plans for a so-called political consultative conference to be held in January at which plans for the future welfare of China, including a national assembly of all parties, were to be discussed. Marshall arrived after both the Kuomintang and the Yen-an Reds had agreed to a meeting of a Chiang Kai-shek representative, Chou En-lai for the Reds and a third party, which should complete the plans for the conference. Marshall was asked to be the third party. He agreed. It was a hopeful moment. Conditioned on the functioning of the consultative conference was a cease-fire or stand-by agreement, to end the fighting and regularize the surrender of the Japanese. The committee held its first meeting on the 7th of January. Marshall had arrived on the day before Christmas, December 24.

#### THE MARSHALL MISSION'S FIRST GIFT TO RED CHINA

At the last moment the Communists threw a monkey wrench into the program. On the eve of the consultative meeting, the Communists demanded control of two cities in the north before

signing the truce agreement. The cities were Chihfeng and Dolun. They were gateways from north China into Manchuria. Possession of them would make it impossible for the Reds to move their forces from the west into Manchuria and there effect junction with the Soviet armies. The basis upon which Chou En-lai demanded these cities was that Communist Chinese already were in possession of them. This Chiang Kai-shek, relying upon his advices, disputed, saying the Russians, who had reached that point in northern China, held the cities under agreement to turn them over to the Central Government. A. T. Steele, the correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune in the Chinese capital, quoted Chou En-lai in a dispatch at this time as saying that "the Communists would never agree" to the Nationalists having those cities. Chou En-lai threatened to derrick the whole cease-fire arrangement and the consultative conference unless Chiang yielded. Chiang on his part was firm. Marshall offered several compromises which Chou En-lai rejected.

Thereupon, acting upon Chou En-lai's representations that Chihfeng and Dolun already were in Chinese Red hands, Marshall forced Chiang Kai-shek to yield.

He went to the generalissimo's house at 10:30 o'clock on the night of the 9th. He stayed until midnight bringing to bear all the power which he held as the representative of the United States Government, and in the end Chiang Kai-shek gave up. Marshall sent for Chou En-lai the next morning, and at 8 a. m. issued a statement saying:

Last night I had a very good talk with the generalissimo and he agreed to the conditions regarding the towns of Chihfeng and Dolun.

Whereupon, Chou En-lai signed the cease-fire agreement. I take this incident in part from Miss Utley's book, in part from other sources. This was the first but not the last of Marshall's surrender to the Reds. The fat was in the fire after that first test of his strength. The fact is, and it has bearing on the incident, that the cities were not in the hands of the Chinese Reds. That was a lie out of whole cloth. They were occupied at that time by the Russians, who did not evacuate them until the 23d of January. Chou En-lai knew it to be a lie.

So did Chiang Kai-shek. What Marshall had done was to force Chiang to abandon those cities upon the basis of a fraud which all China soon knew about.

I have in my hands the official report of a conversation between General Torochenko of the Russian Army, and Gen. Tung Yen-ping, deputy chief of staff of the Chinese Nationalist headquarters in Manchuria, at Mukden, on the 29th of January, which utterly disproves the lie that moved Marshall to impose his will upon Chiang. I did not obtain the transcript of that talk from Russian sources. Torochenko was reporting to Tung upon the Russian withdrawal from Chihfeng and Dolun, expressing his surprise that the Chinese Nationalist forces had not arrived at Chihfeng on the 16th as expected. He said:

Up to 2 a. m., January 23 there were no signs that the Chinese troops were advancing toward the city. Since we had no way of knowing why Chinese troops hesitated in entering the city, and since the Soviet troops were due to withdraw on January 23 from Chihfeng, the Soviet garrison commander, Colonel Shalenko, could only adhere to the withdrawal plan which had already been communicated to the Chinese authorities and ordered all Soviet troops to withdraw from the city. At the time of the Soviet withdrawal, the administrative machinery of the city remained intact . . . it was the same set of administrative machinery that we found when we entered the city in August 1945.

That ends the quotation. The city administration was non-Communist. I again quote the Red General Torochenko:

The responsibility for the failure of Chinese troops to enter Chihfeng should be borne by the Chinese alone. From January 16 to January 23 we were waiting for Chinese troops to enter the city. According to my own estimation, this is probably due to the fact that the Chinese troops had received orders from President Chiang Kai-shek preventing them from advancing as of January 13.

We have seen why they did not advance on the 13th. Marshall had on the 9th given them to Yenan. The consequence was that these gateways to Manchuria passed to the Reds and that fact was highly significant in future operations. So began the dreary tale of the Marshall mission to China and it was so that General Marshall began executing the Yalta policy in China.

We must never lose sight of the overwhelming influence of the surrender to

Russia at Yalta in the subsequent history of China. In his letter transmitting the White Paper on China to the President, Secretary Acheson perpetrates two astonishing untruths. The first is his denial that the refusal of ammunition to the Republic of China by the United States from August 1946 to August 1947 helped bring about the downfall of the Republic.

This is the repetitious lie which has been amply refuted, if nowhere else, in the dispatches of Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart, published in the annexes of the White Paper.

#### THE MASTER OF THE HALF-TRUTH

The second falsehood is less tangible. It deals with speculative matters. Dean Acheson is a master of the half-truth, of the artful deception calculated to deceive the people. There is a sinuosity to Acheson's public utterances which makes it always advisable to place them under close analysis. He excused the demoralizing effects of Yalta on China's postwar circumstances by suggesting that, in any case, Russia could have moved into Manchuria and accomplished what she did in the way of turning that treasure house over to the Chinese Communists. Acheson repeated this barefaced fraud in his testimony before the Russell Committee the other day. That is plainly not true. When the deal was made at Yalta, the Russians had something like 30 divisions in eastern Siberia, according to General Deane's report. For these they lacked equipment. They were not prepared for offensive operations. Under the terms of the bribe negotiated by Harriman and Deane at Moscow, we gave Russians 800,000 tons of equipment for their far-eastern forces. They moved a number of divisions from the west into Siberia and when they opened their bloodless march across Manchuria, at our invitation, they were a well-equipped army.

#### IF THE BELL-CURF HAD NOT OCCURRED

Suppose, and this is a reasonable supposition, we had not implored Russia to enter the war in the Far East, had not equipped her army, had not given her the right to take Manchuria—where would the sudden collapse of Japan on the 10th of August, 1945, have found the Russians? Certainly not established in force throughout Manchuria and the northern provinces of China. Had we followed the advice of Admiral Leahy, instead of Marshall, the war with Japan

would no doubt have come to its abrupt end with the Kremlin dickering with us for the bribe which they obtained with such miraculous ease at Yalta. The situation in the Far East—then and today—would have in that case looked something like this:

The surrender of the Japanese Kwantung army in Manchuria would have been made to the Americans and Chinese. The Americans would have held Manchuria—and all Korea for the Koreans—until the armies of the Republic of China would have been moved unimpeded there to take over. There were no Communists in Manchuria on VJ-day except for secret agents. The Japanese had refused to allow such enemies within their lines. Given a peaceable transfer of Manchurian sovereignty from Japan to China, the great industrial plant of Manchuria would have remained intact instead of being looted and wrecked by the Russians, the surplus agricultural products of Manchuria could have been organized for relief of hunger in China proper and the problems that aggrieved the Republic of China from 1945 to its fall in 1949—military and economic—would have been well on the road to solution. With the Red army of Russia confined behind the Siberian-Manchurian border, the threat of Russian assistance to the Yenan Communists would have been negligible.

Given an uncontaminated American policy in Washington, we could have applied the same rule we were to apply to Greece—arming the government which we recognized; affording it military guidance to put down a Communist rebellion. Had we followed Leahy with respect to Yalta and Wedemeyer in the immediate aftermath of VJ-day in China, we would not, in all human likelihood, be at war in Asia today. China would have become a progressive, hopeful democratic society instead of a slave state in subjection to Moscow and 140,000 young Americans would not have been called upon to explode Yalta and the Marshall mission—with how many more to come, God alone knows.

I have emphasized the overshadowing importance of Yalta in what is to follow because Manchuria was the rock upon which China broke in the postwar years. It was Chiang Kai-shek's effort to claim Manchuria against the will of the Russians and their Chinese stooges and against the restraints imposed by Mar-

shall that first cracked the great military machine which he had on VJ-day.  
COMMUNISTS IN UNITED STATES WRECK CHINA  
MONEY SYSTEM

Chiang was beset by the monetary and inflation difficulties which were partly the result of a lengthy war, but to at least some extent planned for him in the United States. In that connection, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at this point an article by a man who, perhaps better than any other, has an insight into and grasp of the problems of China. While I know it is unnecessary, permit me to mention also that he is one of the greatest American I know—George Sokolsky.

In this article he points out that ruinous inflation for China was planned and perpetrated by the agents of the Kremlin working high in our Government.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that this article appear in the body of the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Journal-American of September 3, 1950]

THESE DAYS—THE GHOST DOTH RIDE  
(By George Sokolsky)

These two events are not unrelated:

1. The controversy between President Truman and Gen. Douglas MacArthur over Formosa.

2. The admission of Lee Pressman that he, John Abt, Nathan Witt, Charles Kramer, and others had been members of the Harold Ware cell of the Communist Party, designed to infiltrate the highest position in Government.

The connection is that were it not for the machinations of these intellectual Communists in the State Department and the Treasury Department, it is unlikely that Nationalist China would have collapsed and Soviet Russia would not so readily have been able to add China to the federation of Soviet Socialist Republics. Had China not been conquered, General MacArthur would not today be leading an army in Korea, and he would not have become involved in a controversy with the President over Formosa.

Therefore, a full congressional investigation might be made, now that Lee Pressman has opened the door, into the destruction of China's currency by the Treasury Department of the United States. Such an investigation might go into the activities of Harry Dexter White, Harold Glasser, Charles Kramer, and Frank Coe.

Chiang Kai-shek was a popular leader among his people since 1924 until the currency of his country became so depreciated as to be worthless. The beginning of this was the Silver Purchase Act of 1934, passed by the Congress of the United States.

China's currency was based on a silver standard. When the United States raised the price of silver from 30 cents an ounce to \$1.29, the silver of China flowed to the United States. One of the arguments in favor of the Silver Purchase Act of 1934 was that it would aid the economy of China. Anyone familiar with the economy of China knew that it could only do damage, particularly to China's exports.

China sent commissions and representatives to this country to plead against this madness, which did them so much harm and did us no good. An K. P. Chen, manager of the Shanghai Commercial Savings Bank, once said:

"The rise of the silver price brought in its wake, as far as China is concerned, falling prices, shrinkage of currency, destruction of industries and business, a greater deficit in the government's budget, and increasing chaos in society."

This is a mild description of what happened. Then President Roosevelt began to give China advisers. Some, like Lauchlin Currie and Owen Lattimore, actually went to China; others drew ornate plans in the Treasury Department. Loans were made to China to help her off a bad spot, but these loans always involved an agreement to reform something in that country, and after the reform was introduced, the currency situation became worse.

It would be vitally important, if we are to get at the facts, to study not only the activities of the United States Treasury, but also of the RFC. In connection with these various loans and credits and stabilizations, it would be advantageous to note which Americans acted as counsel for the Chinese borrowers. It might also be of advantage to study the role of that amazing Pole, Ludwic Rajchman, who is no longer attached to the Chinese, but is a representative of Communist Poland in the United Nations.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who knows how vital Formosa is to the defense of the United States on the Japan-Okinawa-Philippines line, has really issued a warning to the American people. In 1947, before it was too late, General Wedemeyer reported:

"The situation in Manchuria has deteriorated to such a degree that prompt action is necessary to prevent that area from becoming a Soviet satellite. The Chinese Communists may soon gain military control of Manchuria and announce the establishment of a government. Outer Mongolia, already a Soviet satellite, may then recognize Manchuria and conclude a "mutual support agreement" with a de facto Manchurian government of the Chinese Communists. In

that event, the Soviet Union might accomplish a mutual support agreement with Communist-dominated Manchuria, because of her current similar agreement with Outer Mongolia. This would create a difficult situation for China, the United States, and the United Nations. Ultimately it could lead to a Communist-dominated China."

The warning was not heeded and we are now at war in Korea. If General MacArthur's warning that Formosa is vital to our national defense is not heeded, we may soon be fighting again in the Philippines.

CHIANG'S PROBLEM IN MANCHURIA

Mr. McCARTHY. The campaigns in Manchuria, added to the harassing and vexatious necessity of fighting the guerrilla warfare of the Communist Chinese in north China strained the logistics of the Republic unendurably, as General Wedemeyer had predicted they would when, in his November 10 report to the generalissimo, he advised deferring the attempt to subdue Manchuria until north China had been pacified.

That advice Chiang Kai-shek was unable to accept. The sentiment of his people reminded him that the 8-year war with Japan had been over Manchuria. Manchuria was his nominally by a treaty which he hoped, in spite of all examples to the contrary, Russia would honor. Furthermore, and this was a clinching fact, Manchuria, the workshop of Asia, contained until looted by Russia four times the industrial capacity of China proper, three times its power capacity and four times its railroad mileage in proportion to area. The great plains of Manchuria, moreover, were and are the granary of the Far East.

What was the diplomatic situation when Marshall began his mission? The August treaty, signed by T. V. Soong and Molotov, bound Russia "to render to China moral support and aid to be given entirely to the National Government as the Central Government of China." You will remember that this treaty pledged to recognize Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. Did Russia live up to this treaty? The question answers itself. Did Bolshevik Russia ever live up to a commitment made with the world outside its hostile battlements? General Wedemeyer reported to the War Department as early as the 20th of November 1945, and noted on page 131 of the White Paper, and I quote:

Russia is in effect creating favorable conditions for the realization of Chinese Com-

munist, and possibly their own plans in north China and Manchuria. These activities are in violation of the recent Sino-Russian treaty and related agreements.

Wedemeyer added a warning with reference to the fatuous policy—a policy that never made sense from the American and Chinese viewpoint but made the highest type of sense from that of the Kremlin—of attempting a Nationalist-Red coalition in China. He said:

It appears remote that a satisfactory understanding will be reached between the Chinese Communists and the National Government.

As Wedemeyer reported this in November of 1945, the State Department was daily receiving advice from its embassies and legations in Eastern Europe to the effect that collaboration with Communists in the succession governments of those States was an evil dream, impossible to maintain in good faith, conducive only to the conquest of those lands by Moscow.

One American diplomat who was so notifying the Department in the most urgent and explicit terms was Arthur Bliss Lane, the postwar Ambassador to Poland, who protested when Dean Acheson's law firm wangled a \$90,000,000 loan for the Red government at Warsaw and received a \$50,000 fee for that betrayal of the American taxpayer.

At the time Acheson was negotiating this loan for Communist Poland, Ambassador Lane cabled him as follows:

With the greatest earnestness of which I am capable, I beg the Department not to approve the extension of any credits at this time. When the terroristic activities of the security policy come to an end, when freedom of the press is restored, and when American citizens are released from Polish prisons—not until then should United States public funds be used to assist the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

But getting back to China, the White Paper further records, on page 136, that:

The National Government is convinced that the U. S. S. R. had obstructed the efforts of the National Government to assume control over Manchuria, in spite of the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 1945, and that the Chinese Communists were tools of the U. S. S. R.

And again, on page 147, allow me to submit this further evidence:

The entry of Chinese Government forces (into Manchuria) had . . . been seriously impeded by Russian refusal to permit

their use of Dairen as a port of entry . . . and by delay in Russian withdrawal. This delay also had the effect of giving the Chinese Communists time to build up their forces in Manchuria, which had apparently been reinforced by the movement of hastily organized or reinforced units from Chahar and Jehol provinces.

These movements were by way of Chihfeng and Dolun, cities about which we have heard.

What had the Russians done to implement their treaty of friendship and alliance with China? A treaty, mind you, to which we were a part, for, and I am reading from page 116 of the White Paper:

At the outset (of the T. V. Soong negotiations for the treaty in Moscow) the United States informed the participants that it expected to be consulted prior to the signing of any Sino-Soviet agreements in view of its role at Yalta.

Not only did we compel the Chinese to make this treaty, we declared, for that is what the diplomatic language means, that we were a party at interest in it—our role at Yalta.

What did the Russians do? First, they closed the principal port of Manchuria—Dairen—to the shipping of all nations, including the Chinese, whose sovereignty over it they had just sworn to uphold. Did we protest this flagrant violation of the treaty and our rights? The White Paper fails to record it if we did. Next they clamped a rigid control over the railroads, denying them as it pleased them to the forces of the Republic of China even though the ink was scarcely dry on their solemn word that the railroads were to be administered jointly by Russia and China.

#### CHINESE REDS MOVE INTO MANCHURIA

The Russians welcomed the Chinese Communists to Manchuria. They had enormous stores of arms surrendered by the Japanese, their ammunition dumps, their reserve weapons, etc. Those they gave to the Chinese Communists. They supplied staff direction, training officers and camps for the conscript of the Chinese Reds. They stiffened them with Japanese from the Kwantung armies and finally they turned them loose—a disciplined army, well armed and well led—to defeat the war-weary, under-supplied forces of the Chinese Republic.

That is the story. It is an old story, familiar to you all. Does anyone doubt it? On the 2d of November 1945, Chinese Reds, who had already seized the

port of Yingkow in Manchuria with Russian Red assistance, warned Vice Admiral Barbey, of the United States Navy, to withdraw his command from that port to avoid a collision. Barbey was also compelled to pull out of the Manchurian port of Hulutoo after Chinese Communist soldiers fired on his launch.

Did our State Department protest this unfriendly action? I remind you that at about the time the United States Navy was being humiliated in Manchurian waters, General Marshall was admonishing Chiang Kai-shek, that he could expect no diplomatic assistance from us vis-à-vis Russia. Protect Chinese interests? We would not even protect our own.

#### ATTEMPTS TO DECEIVE RUSSELL COMMITTEE

The other day Dean Acheson testified before the Russell committee. He uttered the time-honored and fraudulent version devised by him and Marshall of why we yielded to Russia at Yalta. He sought to palliate that shame by his shopworn excuse: Had we not bribed Russia into the war, she would have come anyway and then her behavior would have been even worse. I ask this question—I do not ask it of Dean Acheson; he is too far gone in mendacity and treason for his answer to carry any weight whatsoever—I ask it of the people whom we in this Senate collectively represent.

Given the immense strength the United States dispersed in the Far East in August 1945, do you believe the Soviet Union would have ventured to fight its way into Manchuria once we and our Chinese allies had accepted the surrender of the Kwantung army? The answer is self-evident.

If we had wanted to keep Russia out of Manchuria in August 1945, all hell couldn't have blasted her in. We didn't want to keep Russia out. We invited her in, and Acheson had the nerve the other day to insult the intelligence and the knowledge of two senior committees of the Senate of the United States by repeating that pernicious tissue of falsehood regarding Yalta.

What was the situation when General Marshall arrived? Economically, according to the White Paper, page 127, it was, and I quote, "despite the brutal and devastating effect of 8 years of war, surprisingly good and contained many elements of hope. In China proper, although there had been serious wartime

disruptions in certain sectors of the economy, the productive potential of agriculture, mining, and industry in most of the area taken from the Japanese was not substantially different from that of 1937. The expulsion of the Japanese from Manchuria and Formosa promised to increase several-fold the national industrial plant and to contribute to the achievement of national self-sufficiency in food."

The Chinese Republic, as we have seen, never got Manchuria. China had unprecedentedly large gold and United States dollar exchange, estimated at \$900,000,000, with half that much again in private hands. Politically, the prospect was equally promising, except for the rebellion. Civil rights had been restored, including the right to a free press, and Chiang Kai-shek was genuinely trying to implement the reforms which had been interrupted by the outbreak of the war with Japan in 1937.

As always, he was committed to the Sun Yat Sen program, which all parties, including the Communists, embraced in principle; being willing to go half way with the Reds on a new political regime which would end the one-party rule of the Kuomintang. He had shown his good faith—as he was to do again and again in the negotiations with the Yen-an Reds—in the matter of the political consultative conference.

I notice a curious aspect of the White Paper. I find nowhere in its hundreds of pages any reflection upon the character and integrity of Chiang Kai-shek. His character was proof against the busy justifiers who compiled that record under the editorial oversight of Philip Jessup. It is my opinion that when the historians of the future come to enumerate the foremost men of the age in which we live, they will place Chiang Kai-shek high on that roster. I say this, Mr. President, in spite of all the high-pitched screaming and squealing of the Lattimores, the Jessups, and the camp-following bleeding hearts of press and radio.

#### SABOTAGE BY COMMERCE AND STATE DEPARTMENTS

In a military sense, the Republic of China was in a position to meet any problem confronting it except the subversion of its will and the failure of supply from outside. Had China been Greece, had 1945 been 1947, there would have been no problem of pacification at all. I turn again to the White Paper,

page 311, for the story of the military situation, and I quote:

The Government . . . possessed an estimated 5 to 1 superiority in combat troops and rifles [over the Reds], practical monopoly of heavy equipment and transport, and an unopposed air arm.

General Wedemeyer had promptly ferried armies to Shanghai, Peiping, and Nanking by air from the west. He subsequently transported up to a half million troops to new positions. He finished equipping the 39 divisions which had been trained by the United States forces and supplied large quantities of military supplies earmarked under wartime lend-lease. This was the only material assistance given the Republic of China in any bulk after the war until the aid-to-China bill of 1948 began to operate—the operation which was thoroughly sabotaged by the Commerce and State Departments. It should have been more. Over the hump in India, the United States military authorities were detonating large stores of ammunition and dumping 120,000 tons of war supplies in the Bay of Bengal—much of it undelivered to China but charged to her wartime lend-lease account.

#### CHOU EN-LAI CONVERTS MARSHALL

The arrival of Marshall in Nanking was welcomed by all parties. Chiang Kai-shek, who, at the time, was unacquainted with Marshall, as many of us have been, and thought so well of him that he would have, the following fall, invited him to take supreme command of his armies, hoped that Marshall, if truly serving the interests of the United States, would soon perceive, after a personal experience of the realities, where those interests lay. The Communists, as Miss Utley reports on page 10 of *The China Story*, "Welcomed," and I quote, "General Marshall with open arms." Miss Utley is not a hostile witness for, while she dissects and condemns the China policy with merciless clarity, she is indulgent with General Marshall and considers that he was imposed upon by impossible orders. The Wedemeyer report of November 10 was not available to her when she wrote.

The Chinese Reds were fortunate, Miss Utley continues, in that their leading representative in Chungking was the handsome, intelligent, and charming Chou En-lai, now foreign minister of the Peiping government. Chou En-lai had for years shown a singular capacity

for converting American journalists to the belief that the Chinese Communist Party was composed of liberal agrarian reformers who should be backed against the despotic, reactionary government of Chiang Kai-shek. I continue to quote Miss Utley:

Soon it became apparent to those of us who were in Chungking at the time and were frequently invited to General Marshall's residence, that Chou En-lai had succeeded in captivating him. Any doubts General Marshall may originally have had as to the truths of the State Department thesis about the "progressive" Communists and the "reactionary" Nationalists had obviously been dispelled. The fascinating Chou En-lai had evidently finally convinced General Marshall that the Chinese were not "real" Communists, or that they could be detached from their Russian affiliation provided only that they were helped by America to bring "democracy" to China. Marshall had long since come under the influence of his old friend, General Stilwell, who believed in the liberal professions of the Chinese Communists. Chou En-lai merely completed his conversion.

I do not subscribe to Miss Utley's analysis of Marshall's state of mind. I do not regard him as the dupe of Chou En-lai.

#### RADICAL WRITER DESCRIBES MARSHALL

I call up another friendly witness to the happiness brought to the Communists by Marshall's arrival. This one is Robert Payne, the author of the seemingly authorized and certainly idolatrous biography entitled "Mao Tse-tung, Ruler of Red China." Writes Mr. Payne on page 207, and I quote him:

In the early days of 1946 there was a breathing spell for the Communists. Gen. George Marshall had been sent to replace General Hurlley. He was a man of an entirely different caliber. He made a serious effort to understand the opposing camps. He visited Yen-an and commented favorably upon the Communist's social policies, and he detested the servility (sic) of most of the Kuomintang officers he met. Urbane, polished, sensitive to social forces, he refused to accept the claims of either side in the quarrel, his preferences remaining with the liberal groups in the center, though for the most part these had long ago despaired of the reactionary policies of the Kuomintang.

I ask you to pause with me for a moment while we analyze the language of Payne. You will note the use of the term "reactionary" to describe the Kuomintang. That was a standard operating procedure for the Yen-an Reds as it was, and still is, for all those in America who

follow the Communist line on China. We shall meet with that epithet for the Kuomintang later in the language of the soldier-statesman who was sent to China presumably to work out a solution of the civil strife in that country, which would accord, first, with the international interests of the United States, and secondly, with the interests of the people of China. The job of George Marshall in China scarcely called upon him to pass upon the relative social reform program of the contending parties. Both were reformers, both claimed to be the heirs of Sun Yat Sen. A commission of social workers or practicing sociologists could have weighed those matters far more expertly than this old soldier. He was called upon at a critical stage of world history, with Russia looming down from Manchuria and with that country already visibly embarked upon its scheme of world conquest and consolidation to consider where the struggle in China fitted that larger picture and to extract from it something that suited his own country's welfare and security. I shall give you an example that is strictly to the point. Suppose Britain had sent to Austria in the days when the Nazis, the Dollfuss-Stehremberg party, and the Social Democrats were contending for mastery, a soldier with the mission of bringing about a peace that would serve England's European interests as against the rising Nazi power. Would he have troubled himself with questions of internal reform, or would he have sought to make a peace which would bring to power the forces most bent upon frustrating and defeating Nazi power?

The spectacle of General Marshall, ignoring the world interests involved in China, the menace of the Russia he had done more than any other man to seat in Manchuria, and solemnly inspecting the soup kitchens and nurseries of Yen-an would be laughable were it not so heavy with portent for the American people.

#### GUTTER INTELLECTUALS—WHETHER NAZI OR COMMUNIST, THE SAME

The point to dwell upon here is that Marshall showed throughout his stay in China that he accepted the party line for innocents, that the Communists are a party of social reform devoted to the well-being of the masses. In that light they had his sympathy. It is no wonder that the prevailing opinion of the Marshall mission has been that it was the

venture of a gullible man not yet apprised of what was a truism to students of politics and the world in 1946, namely, that communism was a drive for power by a disciplined minority with welfare as its cloak, precisely as nazism was an enterprise of gutter intellectuals to gain the power of a great state and then Europe in the guise to Germans of what its name meant: national socialism. That view of General Marshall does insufficient credit to his mentality and is far too pat. Reform was not, in my opinion, Marshall's prime consideration in China, although he sometimes made it appear so. Neither was peace. What it was we shall consider later when we have treated the evidence further.

#### MARSHALL'S COMMISSION

I shall not take the time to discuss Marshall's exploits in China in detail. I could speak for a week on that subject. It is unnecessary, I think, to follow the course of the endless, frustrating negotiations he conducted. He had commissioned himself to provide a political solution of the civil war "satisfactory to both sides." The specific solution was a new government which would include representation from the Communists and the minor parties, a government that could function with a parliament, courts, and the rest, but a government with two armies. For that was what allowing the Communists to have a part of the national army, to be stationed in areas under Communist political control, meant. As finally worked out but never, of course, put into practice, the Republic of China was to have 50 divisions, the Peoples Republic of Yen-an 10 divisions. I have only to state the solution which Marshall was bent upon imposing, to exhibit its absurdity. Such a proposal did not look to a permanent government in the western sense. It looked only to a truce in the struggle for all China. The Kuomintang wanted a stable government representing the consensus of all political opinion with a parliament affording a forum in which issues might be debated and resolved. The Communists wanted a participation in a national government with a private army and regional ascendancy on the side.

#### DISTORTION OF THE WHITE PAPER

I have studied the White Paper on this subject. In this address I am going to refer only to the White Paper concerning General Marshall's activities. Chap-

ter 5 of the White Paper deals, as you know, with the Marshall mission. It contains a footnote which says, "The bulk of the material for this chapter has been drawn from the files of General Marshall's mission."

The White Paper is obviously a highly prejudiced document. It is impossible to form a final opinion of China's sell-out from it alone because so much has been left out—so much of it is phrased and tailored to convey a certain viewpoint toward Marshall and his policy.

For example, where the editors needed to balance the recalcitrance of the Communists on some point which is tangible, they resort to intangible reports of what some unidentified officials of the Republic of China were saying, not doing, so that they may blame them also for the failures. This is in line with Acheson's bringing forth, at the Russell hearings, an anonymous document from an anonymous chamber of commerce in an anonymous town signed by anonymous men, setting forth all of the Communist Party line arguments against the Republic of China, and it was a fantastic sight to see a few Senators during the reading of this anonymous document, nodding their heads and smiling as though they were receiving some valuable information.

Where it became necessary to recount some Communist outrages against United States Marines in July, the authors of the White Paper first meticulously related an attack upon a peace delegation that went from Shanghai to Nanking, an attack which the White Paper says was committed by "an organized group of Kuomintang secret police." The information that they were Kuomintang secret police was from an anonymous source, of course. This is on page 171. Turn the page and you come to a paragraph describing as "part of Communist activities during this period" the kidnaping of seven Marines in East Hopei and, this I quote:

A deliberate Communist ambush of a United States Marine-escorted motor convoy bound from Tientsin to Peiping, during which 3 Americans were killed and 12 wounded.

That is surely a restrained treatment of that occurrence. Considerably greater emotion was displayed by the writers in describing the incident at Nanking. One gathers that, since the alleged assailants at Nanking were Kuomintang police, the

victims were Communists. You can be sure none of the Marine victims of the Communists were Communists. This is taken, may I remind you, from an American Government document printed at the expense of Americans. I find similarly biased matters throughout the White Paper, but it is General Marshall's own record of his mission, hence I quote from it hereafter.

**NATIONALIST VICTORIES SPEED UP MARSHALL'S DEMAND FOR CEASE-FIRE**

I related to you some time back how Marshall was able to arrange a cease-fire between the contending armies in January after compelling Chiang Kai-shek to give up the cities of Chihfeng and Dolun. That truce was in effect when General Marshall returned to the United States on March 11. It was generally observed by the forces of the Republic. On the 15th of April, however, there was a resounding breach when the Yen-an Reds laid siege to the important city of Changchun in Manchuria, which lies on the railway from Mukden to Harbin. Three days later the Reds had Chungchun. That day General Marshall returned to Nanking.

Chiang, finding the truce broken to his disadvantage, ordered his forces to recapture Changchun. A month later the Nationalist forces defeated the Reds in a battle south of Changchun, and with the Reds in flight to the northward, the Nationalists easily retook Changchun on the 23d of May.

At this time the advantage lay with the forces of the Republic. This was before, mind you, the Yen-an Reds had been able to train their conscripts with the new weapons handed them by the Russians. The Nationalists streamed north out of Changchun, headed for Harbin. It is possible, and the Nationalist generals so thought, that victory in Manchuria and the control of the railway lines as far as Harbin lay open to them.

**WHITE PAPER DESCRIBES MARSHALL'S FRENZY**

General Marshall had other plans. He had been busy since his return, seeking to restore the truce. With the Nationalist victory he redoubled his efforts until, as described in the White Paper, they mounted to something like a frenzy. The Reds were clamoring at his heels, demanding that he call off the enemy. Chiang went to Mukden and the wires were kept hot between Marshall and him.

At length, Chiang yielded, and on June 6 a new truce was put into effect. Several times extended, it lasted until early in July, but in the meanwhile no political issues could be settled. I want to be fair about this, I do not want to give you a hasty judgment, but throughout the Marshall mission the procession of events seems to have been this:

Marshall obtained concessions from Chiang to meet Red demands, whereupon having gained a point, the Reds levied new demands. It was the familiar technique of Petrograd in 1917. Whenever the Kerensky government yielded a point to the Bolsheviks in the Petrograd Soviet the Soviet presented a new demand more exorbitant than the preceding one. I think it is evident from a reading of the White Paper on these negotiations that the Yen-an Reds never appeared in good faith. They did not want agreement but disagreement.

They were playing for time in which to avail themselves of their resources in Manchuria, meanwhile conducting a barrage of insulting propaganda against the United States in the free press of Kuomintang China aimed at enfeebling the already feeble will of the Truman administration to help the Republic of China.

The June 6 truce was being steadily whittled away during July. Aggressive action was being taken, primarily by the Communists, and never for an instant did they cease the guerrilla activity, the destruction of the railway lines, the blowing up of dams and bridges, the damaging of mines and factories which were making a nightmare out of the efforts to reestablish the communications and the economy of China. By mid-July the forces of the Republic had gained control of many strategic points and the Reds increasingly were thrown back on hit-and-run activities. I shall not list the specific points taken by the Nationalists. The names of the cities are unfamiliar and difficult to pronounce and, in any case, of more significance to the Chinese than to us.

**CHINA REDS DENOUNCE UNITED STATES**

It was during July that the outrages I have mentioned, along with others less grievous, took place against the 50,000 Marines who were stationed at Tientsin and other points. It was during July that the shrill denunciations of the United States over the radio and in the

Red press reached a crescendo. On July 7 the Yen-an officials issued a manifesto denouncing the United States in bitter terms for giving assistance to the Chinese Republic. We were sending a military advisory staff to Nanking, the advisory service which you will recall the Joint Chiefs had advised General Wedemeyer they approved in November. The Government at Washington was negotiating with Nanking over the sale of surplus war materials left behind on the islands of the Pacific.

**ACHESON ASKS HOUSE COMMITTEE TO APPROVE TRAINING OF COMMUNIST ARMIES**

It was on the 21st of June that Chou En-lai suggested to Marshall that the United States undertake the training of Communist troops slated for the national army. You are familiar with this episode. Let me put it in the framework of the Marshall mission. The Reds were everywhere obdurate in the negotiations; they were violating the truce wherever it was profitable; they were attacking Americans and, apparently acting upon orders from Moscow, uttering the same billingsgate simultaneously in Shanghai, Nanking, Manchuria, and in the cities of America.

It was under those circumstances that on June 19, Marshall's faithful coconspirator, the Under Secretary of State, Acheson, appeared before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in behalf of that project. Already in China 69 American officers had been earmarked for the training program and 400 tons of equipment set aside to start the project. The hearings were being held on a bill submitted by the State Department as an aid-to-China bill, but which contained the joker relating to training the Communist forces. We are all indebted to the able and vigilant Congresswoman EDITH NOURSE ROGERS for bringing the crucial part of these hearings—which never were published—into the Record recently. "The Communist leaders have asked," Acheson testified, "and General Marshall has agreed that their integration with the other forces be preceded by a brief period of United States training and by the supply of minimum quantities of equipment."

Mrs. ROGERS reported that she sought unavailingly to find out who had written the bill. Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, who was also testifying for the bill, said that it came from the State Department. Acheson mentioned a

State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee, but Mrs. ROGERS found, upon consulting her Congressional Directory for 1946, no listing for such a committee. She did find a State Department coordinating committee mentioned—its chairman was Dean Acheson.

Among its members—

And I am quoting Mrs. ROGERS—were Alger Hiss and John Carter Vincent. Mr. Hiss also is listed as Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs. Mr. Vincent is listed as Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Both positions, as you know, had an important bearing on the matter before the committee at that time. I think my question, which was never answered, was pertinent then and that it is pertinent today in the light of the tragedy we are undergoing now in Korea.

Is the matter clearer now? There was a colloquy further in the hearings between Mrs. ROGERS and Acheson in which she pressed him as to what assurances we might have that the Chinese Communists would not use our arms against us. The Under Secretary referred to the United Nations as a guarantor of the peace, then said, and I quote:

I think we can rest assured that the Chinese will not do that.

The chairman rescued Acheson from the questioning, but he concluded:

I am sure we do not need to worry.

We probably owe it to Mrs. ROGERS and the grace of God that Americans are not being killed today by American-trained Chinese Reds.

**FOREIGN POLICY IN EUROPE CONTRADICTORY TO FOREIGN POLICY IN ASIA**

It was during this same period, with Marshall seeking to placate the Yen-an Reds while at the same time using his great power to wring concessions out of Chiang Kai-shek in the interest of a unified Chinese Government, that the State Department was taking quite another line in Europe. I turn to Sumner Welles' book, Seven Decisions That Shaped History, and I read you from page 217, where the author is expressing his view that the late President would never, in view of Moscow's tactics, and I am quoting "in imposing Communist governments on Poland and other countries in the autumn of 1945 and 1946," have continued the Marshall policy in China. I quote again:

He [Roosevelt] would never have permitted his representative in China to pave the way for a repetition of the same tactics in the Far East by trying to browbeat Chiang Kai-shek, as General Marshall did, into bringing representatives of the Chinese Communist Party into the Chinese Cabinet. It is, in fact—

And I am still quoting Mr. Welles—a strange anomaly that this Government in 1946 urged Prime Minister de Gasperi, of Italy, to oust the Communists who were then in the Italian Cabinet. De Gasperi's decision to take that step was in the highest degree salutary. It was probably the chief reason why a successful coup d'état in Italy that year was prevented. Yet in the autumn of that year General Marshall, as President Truman's special representative in China, was informing Chiang Kai-shek that all American assistance would be withdrawn unless he broadened his Government by appointing Communists as well as other liberal elements to the Cabinet.

What the former Under Secretary of State overlooked—it is doubtful if he knew it—was that Italy had been saved to the Anglo-American world over Marshall's strenuous objections.

What he likewise overlooked was that the same Marshall had provided at Yalta that Russia should have Manchuria and, furthermore, there was the Acheson doctrine announced at the Madison Square Garden rally with the Red Dean of Canterbury that we heartily endorsed Russia's demand for friendly neighbors.

#### MARSHALL'S INTERVENTION AND EMBARGO

Marshall's first Chinese intervention gave the Communists two titles by a species of fraud perpetrated by the Reds. His second checked the victory of the Nationalists at Chungchun, halting them in their tracks, and giving the Reds a chance to regroup, retrain, and to prepare for more decisive action later. His third intervention occurred in August. Its long-range effects were far more disastrous. It may not be wide of the mark to say that perhaps more than any other factor it made the victory of Russian imperialism in China inevitable.

I refer to the imposition by Marshall of an embargo on the sale and shipment of arms from the United States, an interdiction promptly seconded by the British, to the Republic of China. By this act and a further minor restriction on the Nationalists' ability to obtain ammunition, Marshall declared the United States neutral in the struggle of China to remain free of Russian domination. Using Marshall's own boastful language:

As Chief of Staff I armed 39 anti-Communist divisions, now with a stroke of the pen I disarm them.

And, while he was arbitrarily shutting off the flow of arms to one of the great Chinese contestants, the flow of arms, of men, of training, and moral support from Russia to the other continued unabated.

What occasioned this momentous decision by the man who had been sent to China presumably, as far as the American people knew, to conserve their interests in that quarter?

I take you again to the White Paper where, on page 181, Marshall's own files explain why he embargoes war supplies to China. I quote:

With respect to United States military aid programs, General Marshall was being placed in the untenable position on the one hand between the two Chinese groups while on the other the United States Government was continuing to supply arms and ammunition to one of the two groups, namely, the National Government.

The situation was obviously not only untenable but to General Marshall intolerable. The Republic of China was winning its campaigns to subdue the rebellion. Something obviously had to be done to keep the Republic of China from winning the civil war which the Yen'an Reds continued at all times to agitate by their aggressions. The Russians were providing for the Reds. That aspect of the situation was satisfactory. It was now necessary to pull the plug on the Republic of China. Otherwise Russia might not have a friendly neighbor and the United States and the west would have a progressive and prosperous China with a hopeful future as a powerful containing force against Russian imperialist aims in Asia. The prime author of the Yalta sell-out could not stand idly by and see that happen.

I ask again, supposing that Marshall was acting in good faith—which I deny—did he regard himself as an impartial arbiter of China's destiny with no responsibilities to his native land which had honored him extravagantly and was, to put the matter on its lowest terms, paying the bills for his venture into international politics?

I throw in also the reflection, which will at once strike home to those American liberals and leftists who eagerly besought sanctions in behalf of the Spanish Government in the late 1930's: The ground upon which they based their

argument was that the republican government at Madrid was the legal and recognized government and hence entitled to our assistance against the Franco rebels. Marshall's embargo in China was applauded by these same liberals and leftists. The shoe was on the other foot in China but the liberal-leftists unblushingly forgot the arguments they had used in the Spanish civil war. Their inconsistency is only apparent, however, not real. What you must look for with the gentry of the left is the hard line of consistency that runs to Moscow. They never deviate from what serves the cause of Soviet imperialism.

I invite you to give ear to the insincere, devious language with which Marshall recounted his embargo in the White Paper. That is on page 181, and it reads:

Action was therefore taken in August to suspend certain portions of these programs which might have a bearing on the continued prosecution of hostilities in China. Licenses were not granted for the export to China of combat type items of military equipment and in late September shipments of combat items from the Pacific area to China were temporarily suspended.

What is referred to in the first sentence is an order obtained from Truman by Marshall withholding combat items, such as ammunition, from the surplus supplies granted China from the stores left over from the war in the Pacific, stores rotting on Pacific islands. This order was another nail in the coffin of Chinese hope although, as it turned out, only a minute part of this surplus equipment could be used by the Nationalist forces and only a tiny part consisted of their greatest need: Small arms and small arms ammunition.

The language I quoted in the foregoing is the kind of language we have grown accustomed to from the State Department when they wished to conceal something. What Marshall did was to get from Truman an order forbidding export licenses in the sale of materials of war to China. He got also a similar order from the British Government. This left Nanking high and dry. There were no other markets into which they could enter. Does his language make that clear? I think not. This is the same sort of calculated deception that emanated from Marshall when he testified in the MacArthur hearings.

The embargo was put on in 1946—it lasted for a year, sufficient time to enable the Reds to launch their massive operations in 1947—and the White Paper came out in the summer of 1949. Times had changed. The people were uneasy over what had happened in China. They were coming to resent the fact that our ancient ally, China, was being overthrown by the Communists, with Russia standing by in Manchuria. They had begun to wonder if there was not something deeply sinister, perhaps treasonous, in what the American Government had been doing in China. And so the brief and ambiguous reference in the White Paper to what was the crown and seal of Marshall's destructive mission, his embargo, was followed by weasel words of reassurance. I quote:

This ban was imposed at a time when the National Government was gradually increasing the tempo of its military campaign and when its reserves of material were ample. The ban apparently had little effect, since it was not until November, when the National Government had reached the peak of its military holdings, that the National Government issued an order for the cessation of hostilities. By that time the Government's forces had occupied most of the areas covered by its demands to the Chinese Communists in June and during the later negotiations and had reached what turned out to be the highest point of its military position after VJ-day.

What Marshall and his editors here are saying is that the forces of the Republic of China were at a high tide of victory in August and the fall of 1946. That was true. It is possible that Marshall acted in the nick of time. Obviously, the choking off of supplies to the generalissimo's forces would not take effect at once. I interpolate a minor comment on the White Paper's objectivity. The official name, honored in all diplomatic documents, of the Government at Nanking was the Republic of China. Does the White Paper so describe Nanking? Only where it so appears in official papers. Republic of China is a plus phrase in the language of the semanticists. It has a favorable connotation to American ears; National Government is a less commendable phrase.

The aim of the words I quoted about the state of Nationalist affairs is obvious. It is to assure the readers of the White Paper that the embargo did not hurt

Chiang Kai-shek's cause and that it brought him to a cease-fire in November. That statement is false on two counts. The embargo stifled the cause of the Republic of China, and the cease-fire had no relationship whatever to it. We shall soon come to the ugly details and connotations of this cease-fire. The fact is that the Republican forces had arms in 1946. By 1947 they had fewer, a fact noted in a dispatch to the New York Times on June 22 from Manchuria, which reported that the barrels of some of the machine guns of the First Army were so worn out that—and I quote—"bullets fell through them to the ground." What the Republican forces needed most were small arms and ammunition, as we have said, and trucks.

#### VALUE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT SENT TO CHINA

I have recently talked to one of the officers in charge of the "roll up" of American surplus materials for shipment to China. He stated that Acheson's story about the amount of military material we have shipped to China would defy the abilities of Ananias, even when Ananias was operating at the pinnacle of his ability. For example, he pointed out that the tanks which we dumped into China had their guns spiked and the breeches blown. He stated further that when the President asked him about the value of the surplus material shipped to China about that time he told the President that he could best compare it to a situation in which he was asked to redecorate the White House, and he had, say, \$2,000,000 to do the task, and he spent all of that money for baby-grand pianos in which the wires were all cut and the keyboards destroyed, and then were to announce to the American people that the White House really was decorated because he had spent \$2,000,000 doing the job.

The enemies of the Republic of China have made much of the declining morale of its armies in late 1947 and 1948. The enemies of the Republic of China never ascribe the declining morale to the shortage of bullets, rifles, and machine guns. Much has been made of the capture by the Reds of Nationalist equipment. The legend has been spread that American supplies were sold by venal Chinese generals to the Reds. Some Nationalist generals did defect to the Reds as the war went along. A great deal of propaganda to-do has been made over the fact that when the victorious Red

armies, Russian-trained Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese, entered Peiping in 1949 they paraded in American trucks, they wore American parkas, and they exhibited guns made in the United States. Where did those items, none of them battle-stained come from? They were part of the 800,000 tons of equipment turned over to Russia as bribery for the Russian war in the Far East which did not eventuate.

The question of stopping the flow of combat items from the reserve dumps in the Pacific, raised in my quotations from the White Paper, brings to light a telltale piece of behavior upon Marshall's part. He acted, of course, in both instances—the embargo and the one under question—under pressure from Chou En-lai. If we want to put a polite term to it, we may say that Marshall's acts were appeasement of Chou En-lai. Marshall was under heavy abuse in Communist organs in China and America. His good faith and his integrity were being called into question. And so, in an attempt orally to appease Chou En-lai and to attest his fidelity to the impartiality of his course, Marshall prevaricated to his friend about the nature of the surplus stores. In this connection I read from page 180:

General Marshall had explained to General Chou En-lai the background of the negotiations [between Nanking and Washington] leading to the signing of this agreement . . . and had explained that the surplus property in question did not contain combat material but consisted of machinery, motor vehicles, communications equipment, rations, medical supplies, and various other items which would be of considerable value in the rehabilitation of the Chinese economy.

The prevarication in no way damaged the Communist cause of Chou En-lai because Marshall got an order from Truman barring the shipment to the Republic of China of any material other than what he had told Chou En-lai was in the stores. So while on the face of it he lied to Chou En-lai and justified the pressures upon him by the Communist press, actually he was only anticipating what he could get Truman to do.

#### THE NECESSITY FOR ANOTHER TRUCE

At this precise moment Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung were ordering a general mobilization, which meant the conscription of the farmers' lads throughout the areas controlled by their forces, the kind of conscription which fills their

ranks today in Korea. Did Marshall seek to discipline the Reds for that as he had just disciplined the generalissimo? Do not be absurd. He could not discipline the Reds, even had he wanted to, which I, of course, doubt. He had no leverage on the Reds. The only party to this quarrel which he could injure was the Chinese Republic. We have seen how he did so in his third major intervention.

We come to his fourth deadly blow at the friends of the United States in the republican government.

As the White Paper states, the forces of the generalissimo were rapidly expanding their gains during September. The Reds were alarmed. The propaganda machines at Shanghai, New York, and Moscow were busy spewing out abuse of the Americans in China and our Government's supposed assistance to China. The great objective of the Yen-an Reds at this moment, having won their campaign to stop American aid to China, was a truce. The generalissimo was pushing too hard. The great objective of the propaganda campaign being waged with great intensity in the United States was to get the Americans' military mission, which was idling its time away in Nanking performing no useful function, and the Marines out of China.

#### GET-OUT-OF-CHINA RALLIES

I shall remind you of the force and nature of the get-out-of-China drive of the American Communists by describing one major rally with which they were seeking to bring pressure upon Marshall in China, and upon the administration here in Washington. This one took place in San Francisco, beginning its 3-day sessions with a mass meeting on the 18th of October. Brigadier General Carlson, whom we have met before with Stilwell as a disciple of Agnes Smedley, presided. Paul Robeson was vice chairman. Among the celebrated participants in this rally were Harry Bridges, Bartley Crum, Joe Curran, Frederick Vanderbilt Field the self-proclaimed Communist, Guenther Stein the Soviet spy, and Harrison Forman the Soviet apologist, Congressman MARCANTONIO the Soviet mouthpiece, and his colleagues, de Lacy, and Ellis Patterson.

And likewise prominent on the platform were these leaders of the intellectual and political life of Hollywood: Edward G. Robinson, Paulette Goddard, and John Garfield. The rally passed

resolutions denouncing Chiang Kai-shek as a reactionary and demanding that this Government at once withdraw our forces from China.

#### THE OPENING OF KALGAN PASS

The Yen-an Reds had been besieging the city of Tatung in northern Shansi Province since August. Late in September the Generalissimo's forces began a retaliatory movement upon Kalgan, that city which is described in the White Paper as "one of the political and military centers of the Communist Party," had great strategic importance inasmuch as it commanded the Kalgan Pass through the mountains from China into Manchuria. The Reds had seized Kalgan with Marshall's blessing soon after VJ-day and it was through the Kalgan Pass that multiple thousands of Red soldiers and conscripts had marched into Manchuria, there to be outfitted and trained for the expected campaign from the north against the Republic of China. So valuable did Yen-an consider Kalgan, that Mao Tse-tung announced that he was lifting the siege of Tatung in the hope of deterring the Nationalist attack on Kalgan.

With the Generalissimo's forces pressing steadily north toward Kalgan, Chou En-lai began his supreme effort to bring about, through Marshall, a cease-fire. As a gesture of annoyance, Chou En-lai had quit Nanking for Shanghai in mid-September and Marshall had to communicate with him thereafter at long range, making, however, one visit to Shanghai to beseech the Red leader to yield on a point under discussion. At issue in these times was the whole impossible endeavor of Marshall to force an amalgamation of the party of the Republic and the Reds at Yen-an into a parliamentary system, an endeavor likened by General MacArthur to the generally accepted impossibility of making oil and water mix. The discussions centered upon Communist agreement to enter in good faith into the various agencies and organs that had been proposed under the Political Consultative Conference's terms of the preceding January, a council of state divided among the Kuomintang on the one side and all other parties on the other; a national assembly and a new executive yuan, or cabinet.

The heart of the issue was this: Chiang Kai-shek insisted that the Communists

nominate their representatives in these bodies and get ready to make them work before he called off hostilities. The Reds demanded the cease-fire first. Having found through long and distracting experience that the Reds, being true to their nature, never lived up to any agreements whatsoever, the Generalissimo felt that there must be some quid pro quo as an earnest act of good faith.

Chou En-lai steadily dinned into Marshall's ears his demand for a truce before the Nationalists took Kalgan. In support of his demands, Marshall threatened the Generalissimo that, without the truce, the Reds "would be driven to seek outside support such as Russian aid." I quote that from page 187 of the White Paper. Chiang Kai-shek, in general, replied that, and I quote from page 190:

It was absolutely essential to the national welfare that the Government gain control of Kalgan and that the occupation of that city by the Government would do much to prevent further military action by the Communists.

Meanwhile, 2 weeks earlier, Chou En-lai, at Shanghai, had threatened that unless Marshall brought about a meeting of the Consultative committee against Chiang Kai-shek's objections, he would, and I quote from page 186 of the White Paper, "be compelled to make public all the important documents in the negotiations since the June truce period." What that touch of blackmail hinted at I do not know. The White Paper omits any reference to what Chou En-lai had in his possession that might prove sufficiently damaging to spur Marshall on to greater efforts.

#### MARSHALL'S THREAT

So matters stood at the beginning of October. The Generalissimo could see daylight ahead through his military operations. The Reds were panicked. On the 4th of October Marshall saw the Generalissimo, urging him in the strongest terms to leave Kalgan to the Reds. When Chiang Kai-shek still insisted on some evidence of good faith from Yen-an, Marshall returned to his quarters resolved, as he put it in a message to Truman dated the next day, October 5, to play his ace. That consisted of his self-directed recall to America, a sign that the United States was not only abandoning its efforts to find a solution in China, but severing its tenuous link to the Republic of China.

Marshall wrote the President, and this may be found on page 192 of the White Paper—

That this is the only way to halt the military campaign and to dispel the evident belief of the Government generals that they can drag along the United States while carrying out their campaign of force.

In these controversial days he repeatedly lectured the President of China regarding what he called his campaign of force. There is no evidence in the White Paper that he ever sermonized Chou En-lai about the campaign of force which the Reds had been conducting wherever they could since the truce of June had been broken by them. The evidence of Marshall's partiality to the Reds infuses every page of the White Paper at this point.

In this connection let me read an incredible passage on page 205 of the White Paper:

General Marshall stated that he wished General Chou to determine formally from the Communist leaders at Yen-an whether specifically they wish him to continue in his mediation role and asked that the matter be viewed as a plain business proposition without regard to Chinese considerations of face since he was not interested in face. He explained that his sole interest was the question of whether he could render some service to China by way of mediation. General Chou stated that he sympathized with the request by General Marshall and that he would place the question before the appropriate Communist authorities at Yen-an.

I believe that in this revelatory passage we begin to have some insight into Marshall's true relations with the Communists in China and perhaps those at a far higher level.

Marshall did not so conduct himself with humility and a desire to please before the great adversary of the Reds, the President of China. To Chiang Kai-shek, Marshall prided himself upon speaking with direct and forceful candor. He never, so far as the White Paper discloses, asked the President of China, "How am I doing?" If his attitude toward the Yen-an Reds was that of a solicitous subordinate, toward Chiang Kai-shek it was one of master, with only one reservation: he could not as a rule expressly order the President of China to do his bidding.

Even that became possible after he dictated to Truman the order for his

recall, allowing Ambassador Leighton Stuart, his bewildered "Man Friday," to show the text to Chiang Kai-shek. The scheme worked. The Generalissimo, who, through thick-and-thin, resisted Japanese threats and blandishments and rejected during this period advances from Moscow for a common front against the Americans, remained as always steadfast in his friendship for the United States. I think it is not well understood that during this trying period the Russians had made and were to make further overtures to Chiang Kai-shek, offering his regime a full partnership in a great Sino-Russian state enterprise to exploit the riches of Manchuria and hinting that if he agreed he would have no further trouble with his domestic Reds. To join up with the Russians meant, however, trouble with America, because the proposed deal made permanent and legal hash of this country's desires for the open door in Manchuria. Perhaps Chiang Kai-shek, who viewed the Russians with a cautious eye on good and sufficient grounds, also feared getting into their clutches.

#### CHIANG SURRENDERS TO MARSHALL

In any case he surrendered to Marshall. The White Paper puts it this way, and I quote from page 192:

When word reached the Generalissimo through Ambassador Stuart of General Marshall's action, the Generalissimo expressed his willingness to stop military advances against Kalgan for a period of 5 days, perhaps even longer if the American mediators insisted, on condition that the Communist Party would immediately participate in meetings of both the five-man committee and the committee of three (these were agencies by which they had been trying to reach political understandings) and that Kalgan would be the first issue negotiated. The Generalissimo also requested that General Marshall and Dr. Stuart discuss the matter with him the following morning.

Marshall's ultimatum, suggestive of the get-out-of-China agitation stirring the American leftists and liberals at that moment, had worked. Although, the Communists, as could have been anticipated, rejected any and all proposals arising in the truce negotiations, Marshall now had the upper hand and nothing but an unconditional cease-fire by the Republic of China would satisfy him.

It was during these days that Marshall put the dignity of the United States in his pocket and went to Shanghai to implore Chou En-lai to make at least some

face-saving gesture. Chou En-lai, as you might suppose, refused to take his friend off the hook. Agreement, peace, and the welfare of China were far from the thought of Chou En-lai.

On October 13 Marshall laid down the law to the generalissimo, saying, according to page 197 of the White Paper, that, and I quote:

The important factor was the immediate cessation of hostilities and that—

And I ask you to mark these words carefully—

even if the Communists were forced to submit to various agreements by the pressure of government military action, there could be no healthy results from political negotiations and the reorganization of the government as the bitterness engendered thereby would be too deep and the spirit of revenge and distrust too great.

In other words, you have the Reds on the run, they have refused at all times and on all occasions to act in good faith concerning the future of China, but do not press them. If you do, they may get mad and will not play.

Three days earlier Kalgan had fallen to the Nationalists, Chihfeng also on the same day, there was talk of a new offensive in Manchuria, and the Nationalists were marching on Communist-held towns in the Province of Kiangsi. The situation grew urgent. In the last hours of his independence, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to lease a new base for negotiations, an 8-point tender which, had the Reds ever been willing to make terms, would have fetched them. Quite naturally, they flatly rejected it.

The military situation had by now grown so menacing to the Reds that party negotiators and agitators, who had been sheltered under Nationalist protection in Nanking, Shanghai, and Chungking, besought transportation from the United States authorities to Yen-an and were flown there in Army planes.

Marshall and Stuart handed the generalissimo a draft of a statement to be issued by him on November 7. As we have previously pointed out, this is the Stuart who was picked for the ambassadorship by Chou En-lai and approved by Marshall. This statement, whether the generalissimo knew it or not, was his last straw. In it the mediators, if such they may be called, put the generalissimo on record for an unconditional cease fire.

He protested, he made his last stand, saying, and I am quoting from page 205 of the White Paper:

That he could not support an unconditional termination of hostilities before his military and political leaders, and that he stood practically alone in the belief (among his associates) that matters could be settled by peaceful negotiations.

Yet Marshall was adamant. When the generalissimo asked him to reconsider his views with another draft in mind, Marshall replied, and this appears on page 205 also:

That he would need an opportunity to consider with Dr. Stuart the points of view expressed by the generalissimo as he was seriously concerned whether he should participate, as a representative of the United States Government, in the preparation of a paper in accordance with the points of view he had indicated, which were contrary to the views of General Marshall and those, he thought, of the United States Government.

He had scarcely bothered to glove the mailed fist. This was, of course, a threat. How different from Marshall's inquiry of Chou En-lai as to what the big boys at Yen-an thought of his exertions.

Chiang Kai-shek yielded the next day, issuing an unconditional cease-fire order to all his forces.

Did this humiliating capitulation save him and his Republic? You know the answer as well as I. Did it lift the embargo? Did it bring cooperation from Yen-an? You know quite well that it did not.

It did bring the Communist armies a much-needed respite, however—another breathing spell in the sense of the biographer of Mao Tse-tung. The legions he and the Russians were training in Manchuria with Japanese and American stores were not yet ready to march. That would come later. And what shall we say of the effect upon the morale of the fighting forces of the Republic? They had been stopped in their tracks after long, weary, bloody campaigns across the face of northern China and Manchuria with victory in sight. They could not but read in all this—coming on top of the embargo and the partiality of Marshall for the Yen-an Reds—the desertion of China by its ally, America.

The cause of the Republic of China reached its high-water mark at the time of the enforced truce. The generalissimo's armies would make some gains

thereafter, but the balance had been tipped and slowly, gradually, the advantage would come to lie with the armies of Yen-an and Moscow.

The United States had thrown its weight on the side of Moscow in the struggle for command of the allegiance and resources of China. That was the plain meaning of Marshall's fourth and last great and fateful intervention. That struggle, which might have been settled honestly by Chinamen in battle, would now have to be settled in battle by Americans as well as Chinamen but as we shall see to our sorrow later in this discourse the interventions of Marshall were not at an end.

#### MARSHALL'S ATTITUDE TOWARD YENAN

Marshall his mission completed, was to stay in China until early in January 1947. Chiang Kai-shek, carrying out his promises of political reform, convened the first national assembly on the 15th of November. The Yen-an Reds, of course, stayed away. They wanted no part of any democratic institutions unless they had full control and could subvert them to totalitarian purposes. Chou En-lai came to call on Marshall on the next day, the 16th, to ask for an American airplane ride to Yen-an:

He [Chou] expressed fear that the National Government would undertake offensive operations against Yen-an and said that if this occurred it would mean the end of all hopes for a negotiated peace.

I have quoted from page 208 of the White Paper. I have heard of idle threats all my life. Chou's threat to end all prospects of a negotiated peace if Yen-an were invaded strikes me as the choicest example I have ever heard of the idle threat.

General Marshall hastened to offer United States Army transportation for all Red personnel in Republic of China territory, adding, with a tender touch of solicitude—

That—

And I am quoting from the same page—

while he had no information of Government plans for an attack on Yen-an, he would deplore such action and oppose it strongly. He also said that if such an attack occurred he would consider that it terminated his mission.

Quite naturally, and the inference from the foregoing is that had he information that the Generalissimo intended

advancing upon Yen-an he would gladly disclose it. In summing up his impressions of the breach in negotiations represented by Chou's departure for Yen-an, Marshall thought the Nationalists obstructive because—

They were thoroughly convinced—

And I quote from page 209—  
that the Communists would not carry out any agreement reached . . . and that the Communists would merely disrupt any government in which they participated.

The experience of all Europe had by that time developed the hard and inmitigable fact that you could not do business with Communists in your government. The Kuomintang was, as we will all agree, entirely correct in its appraisal of the situation. Marshall explained the refusal of the Yen-an Reds to make a single concession toward accord and peace in very innocent terms.

The Communist Party had—

And I am quoting from page 210—  
defeated itself through its own suspicions.  
MARSHALL'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE REPUBLIC  
OF CHINA

Upon the subject of the Chinese Government's shortcomings, Marshall was all but rabid. The White Paper quoted, page 210, Marshall's reply to a high-ranking Government official who was asking for American financial assistance.

The general was "very emphatic in stating to him that it was useless to expect the United States to pour money into the vacuum being created by the Government military leaders in their determination to settle matters by force and that it was also useless to expect the United States to pour money into a government dominated by a completely reactionary clique bent on exclusive control of governmental power."

When another Chinese official asked why the Export-Import Bank had rejected loans for the purpose of rehabilitating the Canton-Hankow Railroad and for a Yellow River bridge in Honan—

General Marshall pointed out—

And I am quoting—  
that it was the open corruption of the Government as well as its military policy which entered into consideration.

On the 1st of December, Marshall, in a talk with Chiang Kai-shek, briefly but firmly warned the Generalissimo that he could not expect to subdue the Yen-an

Reds because they were too strong, and that, therefore, it was imperative, and his words are taken from page 212 of the White Paper, "that efforts be made to bring them into the Government." Three days later Marshall heard from Chou En-lai at Yen-an. The Red leader who is, I believe, the Foreign Minister at Peking at this moment, imposed utterly impossible terms for reopening negotiations. Says the White Paper:

General Chou En-lai's message made no reply to General Marshall's request for an indication by the Communist Party of its attitude toward his mediation effort and posed conditions which the National Government obviously could not be expected to accept. It appeared that the Communist Party had, in effect, rejected American mediation.

The terms called for the dissolution of the National Assembly, which was, at the moment, adopting what the White Paper was to call with some reservation "on its face a democratic document." They called also for the relocating of all Chinese troops to where they stood in the preceding January when the Reds had certain advantages.

We have heard much of the necessity of reform in China. Although a bit grudgingly, the White Paper did have to pay tribute to Chiang Kai-shek's progressive endeavors in the Assembly. I quote:

He did exercise a determined personal leadership, assisted by almost all other groups and individuals in the Assembly, in opposing the extreme right-wing group. The Assembly adjourned on December 25 with the Generalissimo in full and confident control of the situation, having demonstrated his ability to override the Kuomintang reactionaries and having restored his prestige through his action in securing the adoption of a constitution of a democratic nature.

That was not good enough for Marshall.

The passage of the constitution was only the beginning—

Reads the White Paper, page 215—  
and the only guaranty of an honest reorganization of the Government and a genuine enforcement of the constitution lay in the development of a truly liberal group in China.

In his farewell statement, made January 7, 1947, when Marshall departed for his reward in the Secretaryship of State back home, he spoke approvingly of the liberals in the Chinese Communist Party.

It has appeared to me—

And I am quoting from Marshall's statement on page 687 of the White Paper—

that there is a definite liberal group among the Communists, especially of young men who have turned to the Communists in disgust at the corruption evident in the local governments—men who put the interest of the Chinese people above ruthless measures to establish a Communist ideology in the immediate future.

Here is truly the real Marshall speaker. In connection with this I ask a question. How could Hiss, Gromyko, or Stalin himself disagree with this?

I see what you mean, General Marshall, as I follow the dispatches from within the Chinese iron curtain and the news of the "human waves" of Chinese peasants attacking our positions in Korea.

#### MARSHALL VIEWS THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

The January 7 statement of General Marshall's must be read in one of two ways. It is, in my opinion, the most fantastic utterance ever to come from an American in an exalted position. If it is read as a propaganda document in behalf of Communist world objectives, it makes sense. It is in that case a highly intelligent, effective piece of work, calculated to confuse the American people concerning the situation in China but to fill them at the same time with a warm reassurance that things are coming all right once the liberals in the Communist Party and the other liberals obtain control of affairs from the dominant reactionary group in the Government. How dominant they were we have just seen in the results of the national assembly. If, on the other hand, you try to understand the statement as the report of an American who was sent to China to advance his country's interests and the interests of the free world and to arrest the advance of Communist terror and Russian imperialism, you will be dumbfounded. You will then have to fall back upon the origin of this mission, the well disclosed intentions of Marshall, the author of his own directives; and the climate in the Department of State with Acheson, Vincent, and Hiss managing Far Eastern policy.

I urge that you reread this statement in the White Paper.

There is nowhere in it a phrase suggesting that the United States has a stake in what happens to China. There is no indication of any special interest

on the part of the country whose representative Marshall presumably was. There is, mark my words, no suggestion that the Chinese Communists were anything more than a political party, wholly Chinese in character, working toward a Communist regime in China, it is true, but first, and I quote, "advancing through the medium of a democratic form of government of the American or British type."

That is the subtlest, most disarming of all the adroit passages in the statement. In an attempt to establish his fairness, Marshall condemns Communist propaganda in harsh terms, but reports that the Government publicity agency misrepresented him also although those misrepresentations "were not," and I am quoting, "of the vicious nature of the Communist propaganda." The new constitution, he concedes is "in all major respects in accordance with the principles laid down by the all-party Political Consultative Conference of last January." He continues, "it is unfortunate that the Communists did not see fit to participate in the Assembly since the constitution seems to include every major point that they wanted."

To the careless reader that would appear to make the Communist Party neglectful of its own true interests in refusing to sit in the Assembly. How far off base can you get?

Nowhere in this remarkable letter is there any hint that the Reds of Yenan belonged to a worldwide imperialistic system, that they were in league with and under command of the Kremlin; that in Manchuria, ceded at Yalta, Russia was supplying the strategic direction, the training and the supplies so that these "liberals" could take over all China and thus add it as another vast and teeming province to the dominions of Moscow. Nowhere is there any reproach to Russia for having broken its good faith in Manchuria over and over, for having prevented the China with which it was bound in the treaty of August 1945 from exercising its sovereignty over Manchuria.

As I say, if you read this letter as coming from an American emissary, loyal to his country and his institutions, you are first puzzled, then indignant, and you finally conclude that its author is the greatest incompetent ever sent abroad by this or any other country. If you read it as a propaganda document in behalf of other interests, another country

and civilization, you will be struck by its persuasiveness and force, and the brilliance of its author.

The utter silence of Marshall's letter regarding the rampant Bolshevik conspiracy to rule the world is deafening. Had the letter been written in the early 1940's it might have been put down to innocence of Russia's lethal intentions. Coming in January of 1947, after Marshall had been cheek-by-jowl with Russian imperialism in Manchuria for 13 months, after every other informed man in the non-Communist world had scanned the darkening skies and read therein the outline of Soviet expansion, the letter admits of one of two conclusions—you name them.

A sober, measured epitaph was written on the Marshall mission by General Chennault, who observed, in the foreword to Way of a Fighter, and I quote him:

The net result of Marshall's mission to China was much the same as Stilwell's earlier experience. The trend of a gradually stronger central government was reversed and the military balance shifted again in favor of the Chinese Communists.

#### MARSHALL COMES HOME

So Marshall, with Acheson and Vincent at his elbow, having created the China policy, having executed it in China, was returned to the State Department where he could administer it in line with his will and desires.

I have often wondered what prompted President Truman to replace Byrnes, a man of politics, who seemed steadily to be learning more about his job and understanding more deeply the single, all-encompassing issue of these years, Russia, with a professional soldier—a soldier turned diplomat who had, moreover, just sold China out to the Communists—a fact which, I suspect, was, however, among the multitude of things that Truman did not know. But he had much company in this. Our attention, among other things, was on Greece during the early weeks of 1947 and Marshall's prestige among the liberals who control the avenues of communication with the people was towering by then.

Jonathan Daniels gives us a satisfactory clue in the Man from Independence, where, on page 316, he reflects and I quote, that—

Truman had, when he appointed him and afterwards as well, more confidence in Marshall than in anybody in the Government and probably anybody in the world. Some-

times, indeed he acted when some members of his staff thought that Marshall was being a little stuffy, as if Marshall were his walking equivalent of George Washington and Robert E. Lee.

Elsewhere—page 320—Daniels has more of the same and I quote him:

Even if he did not always please Truman's political advisers, so far as Truman himself was concerned, Marshall was the Secretary of State he had been seeking and needing from the beginning. He had a soldier's distaste for politics. But he had magnificent presence, great prestige, and a deep loyalty to Truman.

The subject of Marshall's loyalties is a challenging one as we have seen and shall see further.

I have some curiosity that goes deeper than the passages I have just quoted. Whence did that adoration spring? What hidden and undisclosed forces were at work around the President so to shape his emotions and his will that he would appoint Marshall Secretary of State? Some future memoirs may enlighten us or information may come to the surface in other ways.

In any event, Marshall apparently discovered the same thing that Acheson also had learned so well—namely, that if you were to hold any degree of hypnotic influence over Truman you must at all times cater to his ego, convince him that he was a great man, and if you could convince him of your loyalty to him personally, then the Nation be damned.

Whatever dark forces lay behind Marshall's appointment to the head of our foreign relations, it did bring him into even closer contact with Dean Acheson. I have studied Acheson's public utterances sidewise, slantwise, hindwise, and frontwise; I have watched the demeanor of this glib, supercilious, and guilty man on the witness stand; I have reflected upon his career, and I come to only one conclusion; his primary loyalty in international affairs seems to run to the British labor government, his secondary allegiance is to the Kremlin, with none left over for the country of his birth. The only trouble Acheson ever encounters is where Socialist-British and Russian-Communist policy diverge, which, in Asia at least, has been seldom. Then he reluctantly follows the lead from Socialist London. That was so in the matter of the Greek and Turkish aid policy to which we shall soon come. On the question of China he has no difficulty:

Socialist London and Communist Moscow are as one there.

Where, you may ask, does Truman fit into this picture? I do not believe that the President's staunchest advocate will claim that he understands these questions. They are beyond the capacity he has demonstrated to the country both as to scope and detail. We have noted his idolatry of Marshall through the testimony of his friend and former press secretary, Jonathan Daniels. I think it is clear that, in these great matters of life and death, Truman is in the custody of Marshall and Acheson.

So we find that from January of 1947 onward Marshall and Acheson were linked in intimate, day-to-day endeavors in the State and Defense Departments. Their relationship before that time is not documented, but it was close.

The question of China was never absent from the forefront of American concern during the 2 years Marshall passed as Secretary of State. The matter of supplying the Republic of China frequently recurred. We had brushes with Russia over the open door in Manchuria. Twice during 1947, we are informed by the White Paper, this Government protested Russia's appropriation of the free port of Darien, a port whose freedom was guaranteed in the treaty of August 1945 between Moscow and China. Each time the State Department was rebuffed and let the matter drop. The Russian pretext was that the treaty allowed Russia to close the port in time of war with Japan. Were we at war with Japan? Technically, yes. No peace treaty had ended that war and Russia was a party to that war because of Marshall's exertions before and at Yalta. As you might suppose, the Secretary of State refused to get exercised over Russian effrontery and impudence in this matter.

There were a number of other situations affecting China which we shall consider in their proper place. Through his incumbency at the State Department, Marshall remained the sworn and implacable enemy of the Republic of China, as we shall see. Such enmity, of course, was in the interest of the Yanan Reds and their masters in Moscow.

#### MARSHALL GOES TO MOSCOW

Other major aspects of the struggle with Russia over the shape of the peace-world intruded in the spring of 1947. Marshall had scarcely warmed his

office chair before he went to Moscow for one of those fruitless, ill-natured conferences with the commissars through which we have expiated the original sin of getting on friendly terms with the Bolshevik empire. This conference was to consider a peace treaty with Germany. Before he departed for Moscow on March 7, the Secretary of State ordered home the last of the United States Marines who had afforded some measure of stability to north China. This removed, as the American Communists had long been urging, the last visible assurance to the Chinese that American power was friendly to them. On April 2, in Moscow, Marshall was able to report to Molotov that the Marines were coming home "as rapidly as shipping becomes available." Did he tie this great concession to the Yanan Reds, to American leftist and liberal agitation and to Moscow, to anything we wanted from the Kremlin? Not that we know of.

The Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow was a perfunctory exhibition of Russian intransigence. Nothing of any moment was accomplished. Marshall had been unprepared and had to be briefed daily on the rudiments of the problems of Germany and Austria. The plain-speaking Mark Clark was there on those of Germany. As Clark recalled the matter in his book, *Calculated Risk*, and I quote him from page 486:

I felt that it must have taken a great deal of courage for Marshall to step into the job of Secretary of State and then leave almost immediately for Moscow to deal with many intricate problems before he had had time to familiarize himself with the essential details.

I was amazed, however—

And I am still quoting General Clark—when we met in Berlin (on the way to Moscow) to discover that we didn't have a definite program of action. On the eve of the most important conference since Potsdam everybody was still discussing what we should do in Moscow.

I want to interrupt the main stream of our review of General Marshall's public career to deal with a minor and collateral matter treated by Clark in his book. It bears upon the infinite ramifications of the problem that confronts us. Clark had been in London acting as Secretary Byrnes' deputy at a meeting of deputy foreign ministers at work on a treaty for Austria. When assigned

there by Byrnes, he had advised the State Department that he was taking his own staff of experts on Austria with him from Vienna. Back came a quick reply from Washington, saying that his staff would be furnished by the State Department and he should take only a personal secretary. General Clark is not a man to be lightly brushed aside, however, so he took his Vienna staff, finding thereafter at London that he had two staffs.

The principal issue at London was the definition of German assets in Austria. The Russians were claiming as German assets everything that had passed into German possession during the virtual occupation of Austria by the Nazis. The western powers had maintained that assets seized, appropriated, or extorted from the Austrian Government and Austrian nationals by the Nazis should be restored to their rightful owners and not go to Russia. In making the treaties with the Russian satellite countries, hasty instruments drawn up in the full tide of western appeasement, the Russians had been able to make good such illicit claims as they were now pressing upon Austria. I have rephrased the explanation of this matter as it appears in Clark's book in the interest of brevity. At London, Clark found that the State Department contingent of his staff, as he noted on page 483 of his book, seemed intent on putting Austria "in about the same position as the satellite countries"—Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I am quoting Clark:

There was an inclination to make the same kind of treaty and, in many instances, to use the same clauses; in other words, we must get a treaty at almost any cost. One of the main difficulties . . . was the Russian demand that we accept their definition of German assets in order to legalize their looting of Austria . . . It was already apparent that in making treaties with the Russian satellite countries we had agreed to too much that the Russians wanted . . . we more or less had sold those countries "down the Danube." We had not fully understood . . . what the Russians were trying to do or the manner in which they were seeking to gain complete domination over central Europe. . . . Austria was an entirely different matter, and I was determined to do all that I could to guarantee its independence, based on a sound national economic set-up rather than on one controlled by Soviet interests.

Clark's difficulties at London would have been enormously magnified, as we may imagine, had he heeded the State

Department injunction and left his own staff in Vienna.

In passing I should note that it is refreshing to come across evidence that the United States commands the loyalty of such soldiers as Mark Clark, Lucius Clay, Albert Wedemeyer, and Douglas MacArthur.

The atmosphere of Moscow should have been congenial to Marshall. On several occasions, as we have seen, Marshal Stalin had gone out of his way to make commendatory remarks about the American—the only such remarks that appear in the exhaustive annals of Robert Sherwood concerning the conferences of those days. At a dinner given by Molotov, Marshall wore his Order of Suvorov on his dinner jacket. He had a talk with Stalin. Usually, perhaps without exception, foreigners who have words with Stalin find some way to acquaint the public with the whole conversation between them and the Autocrat of all the Russians. Not so with Marshall. He did say in a radio broadcast noting the conference's failure, that, in this conversation, Stalin had called the conference negotiations "only the first skirmishes and brushes of reconnaissance forces on this question." The question was the kind of self-government Germany should have. This broadcast took place on April 28 upon Marshall's return to Washington. The obstacle to agreement on this issue, he said, was that "the Soviet government insisted upon proposals which would have established in Germany a centralized government adapted to the seizure of absolute control." He concluded, "the patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate."

It may be gathered that one subject of Marshall's private talk with Stalin was the Russian demand, first heard when Hopkins was in Moscow in the preceding June for a reinstatement of some of the items of the fourth lend-lease protocol which was, as you will recall, canceled at the end of hostilities in Europe but later given some modification under the fiction that Russia was going to fight in the united interest of the Allies in the Far East. All lend-lease had, of course, been terminated with the end of the war with Japan.

#### MARSHALL COMES HOME

A few days after Marshall's return to Washington he conferred here on the Hill with the chairman of the Appropriations Committee of this Chamber, the Senator

from New Hampshire, Mr. BRIDGES, and with his opposite number from the other House, Mr. TABER. The Congress, as some of us at least will recall with nostalgia, possessed in those days a Republican majority.

Marshall came to see those gentlemen in behalf of a project which he very much desired, namely, the restoration of some \$40,000,000 worth of lend-lease which the Russians claimed due them by some distortion of logic. The Secretary of State announced that he approached the gentlemen of the Congress as personal friends to plead in that capacity for this appropriation. "We must," he said, and I am relying upon the memory of my colleague, "in our relations with Soviet Russia be, like Caesar's wife, above reproach. We must give them no reason whatever to feel that we have not lived up to every commitment we have made." The Secretary was asked if he knew what the forty million dollars represented in the way of goods. He said that he did not, not having the schedules with him. Whereupon he was told that, among other things, the schedules in question called for two plants, earmarked for Siberia, for the purpose of converting gasoline into high octane fuel for aviation purposes. Marshall failed to win his case.

The principal advantage to the United States, as I look back over it, of the Moscow conference was that it took Marshall out of Washington while the policy of aid to Greece and Turkey was being hurriedly formed. Given his militant aversion to anything which would adversely effect Communist interest in the Mediterranean, which we have seen, and subsequent manifestations which are yet to come, we can scarcely believe that he would have been a genuine advocate of the Forrester plan in the eastern Mediterranean. I regard the assistance we voted to Greece and Turkey the most statesmanlike approach made by the Truman administration to the whole postwar problem of the containment of Russia. The so-called Truman doctrine for Greece and Turkey, which should be rightly named the Forrester doctrine, is perhaps the only statesmanlike enterprise which has come out of the administration.

#### THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE VERSUS THE MARSHALL PLAN

With the Truman doctrine, Marshall had nothing to do. He was the author

of the Marshall plan. Between the two concepts and programs there is the difference of night and day, although they have become inseparably united in the public mind under the impact of administration propaganda. It is no doubt generally supposed that, as Jonathan Daniels puts it on page 321 of his book, *The Man of Independence*, the Truman doctrine, the Marshall plan, and the Atlantic Pact "all were steps in one plan and parts of the policy of one man." He is referring to the main from Independence. Nothing could be more misleading.

I take it you are all familiar with the rapid events which in March of 1947 brought our quick acceptance of the British burden of support for Greece and Turkey. Its chief supporter in the highest administration circles was the late James V. Forrester, a complex, gifted statesman, who saw with as much clarity as any American the drift of events toward Russian expansion. Because of his strong services rendered in this cause, Forrester was marked for destruction by the Soviet apparatus in this country.

#### THE ASSASSINATION OF A GREAT AMERICAN

The character assassination of Jim Forrester was carefully planned by the Communist apparatus and led by Drew Pearson, that master of sildery and venom, who operates in the dark, smelly corridors of half-truths. How much Forrester's derangement and eventual tragic death came as the result of the campaign by Pearson and the other Communist camp followers to injure his faith and credit and reflect upon his gallantry and courage, I do not know. I can only say that their task was to destroy him.

This seems to be the one time in all of Acheson's history in which he supported a plan adverse to Communist Russia's interests, which seems to indicate that Acheson's first loyalty is to Socialist Britain, with Communist Russia a close runner-up for his loyalty and affection. Marshall had no part whatever in the discussions of the Forrester program for Greece and Turkey. In this respect, I am relying in the matter of the personalities involved upon the recollections of a man who was at the time high in the confidence of the White House.

The situation at the time seemed to those around the President most urgent. He, therefore, cut short a vacation to

hurry home, and on March 12 asked Congress to support an aid program for those countries to preserve them from Communist aggressions, actual and feared. The President asked for \$400,000,000 for Greece and \$150,000,000 for Turkey. What were these sums for? Primarily, to strengthen the military forces of the countries, only secondarily to assist them economically, and emphasis was put on the rebuilding of harbor installations and railways in Greece for military purposes. This was a policy that made sense from the point of view of America's world politics. It served the interest of the United States and the west—not the Kremlin. The Congress passed it by overwhelming majorities in both Houses.

The staunch Americans who, like Forrester, believed that the steady encroachment of Soviet imperial purposes must be confronted by evidences of America's will to resist were enormously encouraged. That they were momentarily in the ascendant at the White House was seen when the President went on to put the policy into a larger frame.

The enlargement of the Forrester Greek-Turkish aid measure into the Truman doctrine came on May 8. On that date Dean Acheson, reading the President's speech, addressed an audience in Cleveland, Ohio. Because Truman was staying close to the White House telephone for word from the sick room of his aged mother in Grandview, Mo., he had seen fit not to deliver the speech prepared for him at Cleveland and had deputized Acheson to substitute for him. It was an important speech. So muddled has been the thinking on this subject that it is generally held to have been a prior enunciation of the Marshall plan, which was born in a speech by Secretary of State Marshall at Harvard University nearly a month later, on June the fifth.

#### NO LIKENESS BETWEEN FORRESTAL AND MARSHALL PLANS

Actually, the only similarity between the Cleveland speech and the Cambridge speech is that they both envisaged the enormous transfer of money from the pockets of the American taxpayers to those of other lands.

At Cleveland, Acheson said, and I quote:

Since world demand exceeds our ability to supply, we are going to have to concentrate our emergency assistance in areas where it will be most effective in building

world political and economic stability, in promoting human freedom and democratic institutions, in fostering liberal trading policies, and in strengthening the authority of the United Nations.

How would the United States Government determine where its assistance would be sent? I quote the answer given by Acheson at Cleveland:

Free peoples who are seeking to preserve their independence and democratic institutions and human freedoms against totalitarian pressures, either internal or external, will receive top priority for American reconstruction aid. This is no more than frank recognition as President Truman said, "Totalitarian regimes imposed on free people, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States."

Keep in mind this was not Acheson speaking; this was Truman's speech. He had been given it to read—a speech drafted under Forrester's thinking and not the thinking of Acheson and Marshall. It must have deeply pained Acheson to give this speech, but he had instructions to follow the text. As we may well suppose this speech found little favor in the Kremlin. The prospect of the United States pouring out its limitless treasure to support the enemies of Soviet aggression, direct or indirect, could not be welcome to the masters of Russian policy. The means test, the test which signified that only countries prepared to resist Russian world policy could qualify, must have been especially irksome. It could easily have been clear to Stalin that such a policy, strengthening the political and military resources of lands in the path of Soviet ambition, and followed as a logical corollary by an effective military alliance among the free nations, would be infinitely troublesome to their plans.

So rested the matter when the President, on May 17, flew to Kansas City to be at the bedside of his dying mother. He was absent from Washington until after she died on June 26, transacting the Government's business in his penthouse suite atop the Hotel Muehlbach in Kansas City. In his absence, Secretary Marshall and his advisers—I wish we knew who all of them were—wrote the speech that launched the Marshall plan. I wonder if the President, harassed as he was by grief, attending his mother several hours a day, ever passed upon that speech or whether it was represented to him as it has been steadily represented

to the country ever since, as a complement to, a fulfillment, of the Truman doctrine, and hence something he need not see and study. Certainly Acheson's heart must have sung with joy as he passed on this speech.

What Marshall said at Cambridge, after depicting the disorganization of European economies, the hunger and scarcities obtaining there, was this:

It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace.

Was there to be any discrimination in the assistance envisaged by the Secretary of State, any means test based on resistance to Soviet encroachments and machinations? No, indeed. He went on, and I quote him:

Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop [a direct hit at the Greek-Turkish aid program]. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a palliative.

Who is to get the assistance? I again quote:

Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.

Need I point out to you that the Marshall plan made mincemeat of the Truman-Forrestal doctrine? The last sentences I quoted were, of course, window dressing, a restatement of the Truman-Forrestal doctrine in innocuous weasel words with no point whatsoever. Their insincerity was plainly shown when the benefits of the Marshall plan were promptly offered to Russia and her satellites. Need I elaborate the point that, whereas the Truman-Forrestal doctrine offered to give our wealth to like minded countries, striving to combat communism, externally and internally, the Marshall plan neatly eradicates that

purpose? Need I say that the one bade fair to forge the free world into a great and vital instrument with which to confront Soviet imperialism, the other reduced the whole splendid concept of Acheson speaking Forrestal's mind at Cleveland into a mere charity enterprise, without political content and without use of the United States in the major crisis of these times. What Marshall did, to borrow the facetious language of some opponents of his plan, was to put Europe on the WPA.

The Forrestal plan would have strengthened us in the conflict with Russia. The result of using the Marshall plan instead of the Forrestal plan in Europe has been to make us the patsy of the modern world, to arouse the contempt and suspicion of Europe and to leave us in the summer of 1951, heavily engaged in Asia, and with no willing, reliable allies in all Europe among the beneficiaries of our bounty except Greece and Turkey and, a country that had no seat at the table at all, Spain, plus Western Germany whose resources we cannot use in the struggle against international communism because her 48,000,000 people according to the State Department are not peace loving.

The Truman-Forrestal doctrine's means test would have included Spain. The Marshall plan excluded Spain, although it included Russia in its intent.

I do not think that this monstrous perversion of sound and understandable national policy was accidental. I think it was an evil hoax on the generosity, good will and carelessness of the American people. I think that it was the product of a will and intention hostile to this free society.

The Marshall plan was received with a clamorous acclaim from the leftist, liberal intellectuals and the superficial, knowing gentlemen who write so many of our columns and advise us on the air. Those who spoke against it, who sought to point out the dire discrepancy between it and the Truman doctrine, were howled down as ungenerous reactionaries. There was point to this hubbub, which raised Marshall to the highest levels of liberal esteem, although the point was not apparent, I must assume, to most of those who in the press, the pulpit and the universities contributed most to it. I voted for the Marshall plan. As I said at that time, I voted for the Marshall plan because it had some good aspects; for example, the feeding of the starving

people of Europe. I strongly maintained then that the food and clothing which we were giving should be on the basis of need of the people themselves rather than a gift to the government involved, which sold it to the starving people on the basis of ability to pay. Another point which I maintained at that time was that the money for the rehabilitation of industry should have been loaned directly to the industry in question, taking back what security that industry had to offer regardless of how valueless the security might be, instead of funneling the money through tottering, corrupt, and socialistic governments as the Marshall plan proposed to do.

Nevertheless, in the end I voted for it because it was a case of Marshall plan aid for Europe or nothing. I am not too sure today that nothing might not have been better.

Of all Marshall's significant endeavors since the early months of World War II, the derricking of the Forrestal plan ranks next, I should judge, to the Marshall policy for China in its massive helpfulness to the world ambitions of the Kremlin. That judgment is in no way impaired by the fact that Russia declined and forbade its satellites to share in the Marshall plan's bounty.

There were good and sufficient reasons for that attitude from the Russian viewpoint. Two will immediately occur to anyone who thinks of it. To accept it meant to disparage in the eyes of the world the industrial magnitude, the might and prestige of the great rival of the United States, Russia. The acceptance of this assistance would likewise have meant the intrusion of United States representatives in the affairs of the satellites—although, given the political nature of so many of the men and women who have represented this country abroad under UNRRA and ECA, that could not have been the major disability that it no doubt seemed to the Kremlin—and a certain interference with their economies. The Kremlin could not, it is patent to me, have allowed to arise among the millions of its unwilling vassals sentiments of gratitude for this free country.

#### ORIGIN OF MARSHALL PLAN

I have often wondered whence came the inspiration for the Marshall plan in the mind of its author. Why should he conceive that we needed another plan when we already had the Truman-For-

restal plan? What called for his intervention in this matter? The country was content with the Truman doctrine. There were no objections from abroad save from the Kremlin alone. Who prompted Marshall? I hope that some among my colleagues are better instructed on this point than I am.

I have found one clue that offers some promise. I have here a book by Earl Browder entitled *Tehran—Our Path in War and Peace*. It is a highly informative book that deserves a wider reading among those who would like to make sense and order out of our national policies in recent years. In his book, Browder gives us the true significance of *Tehran* from the viewpoint of Russia, finding great cause for rejoicing in the solidarity of American and Russian interest at that conference. There is more to the book than that. I find in it almost textually exact the blueprint for unlimited indiscriminate benevolence abroad comprehended in the Marshall plan. In fact, in 1945 Browder in his book gave almost a complete blueprint of the Marshall plan and of the administration's Point 4 program.

Let us again briefly compare at this time the Forrestal plan—erroneously named the Truman plan—for Greece and Turkey with the Acheson-Marshall plan for Europe.

The Forrestal plan—which Truman fortunately adopted for Greece and Turkey—provided for all the necessary military aid to people who themselves were willing to fight communism—enough military aid to make them strong enough to withstand international communism. While sufficient economic aid was given to make the military aid effective and workable, the emphasis at all times was to be on military aid. The Forrestal plan proved very successful.

The Acheson-Marshall plan for all of Western Europe was directly opposite to the Forrestal plan for Greece and Turkey. It consisted of giving the maximum economic aid with no thought whatsoever of any military defense of Western Europe. In fact, the over-all purpose was to build up the area economically and keep it defenseless from a military standpoint. The Acheson-Marshall plan fitted perfectly with Communist Russia's desire for a power vacuum in all of Western Europe. The recommendations of Washington in the

summer of 1947 were something like this:

Hundreds of millions for Greece and Turkey to help preserve them from being engulfed by the tide of Soviet imperialism—billions for economic aid for Europe—not one cent for the Republic of China.

The Secretary of State, having opened the Treasury gates for his massive and unrewarding boondoggle throughout Europe, made no mention whatsoever of aid to China. It was only after the Eightieth Congress indicated that they would look with disfavor on aid to Europe unless aid to China were included in the plan that the State Department proposed a similar nonmilitary grant to China. It called for \$570,000,000 over a 15-month period. Marshall stipulated in the bill he sent to Congress that the money should go alike to his friends, the Yenans Reds and our friends, the Republic of China.

#### CAMPAIGN OF DECEPTION

I must at this time deal with the extraordinary campaign of deception which has been practiced upon this Congress regarding aid to China. Acheson's testimony before the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees early this month was a piece of organized fabrication on so vast a scale as to have excited the envy of the prince of liars, Ananias.

Acheson had the triple-distilled brass to repeat the assertion that this Government between VJ-day and 1949 gave China \$2,000,000,000 in grants and credit. He has used that figure before, and so great is his persuasiveness, that he cozened the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee into accepting it and repeating it on this floor.

He scraped the bottom of the barrel to arrive at that figure. It includes lend-lease left over from the war to the tune of several hundred millions. It includes nearly a half million estimated to be the United States share of UNRRA for China—our friends and the Yenans Reds alike sharing in this. It includes about \$600,000,000 for "services," the principal part of which was the cost of transporting the Republic of China's armies into northern and eastern China and Manchuria to accept the surrender of the Japanese—as much our job as theirs. It includes perhaps a hundred million in loan for internal reconstruction. If you were to believe Acheson, the unbe-

lievable, half of the two billions was "military aid." That is the most preposterous aspect of his great deception. I invite you to study the record. You will find, as I have found, that the only military aid given the Republic of China, either as grants or credits, from VJ-day to 1949 consisted of this:

The balance of lend-lease with which Wedemeyer finished equipping and munitioning the Nationalist forces in the fall of 1945; the \$125,000,000 voted by this Congress in the spring of 1948, an appropriation which was maliciously sabotaged by State Department and Commerce Department mendacity; a tiny residue found in the surplus war materials sold the Republic of China on credit in 1946 before Marshall, in deference to his friend, Chou En-lai, procured a Presidential order forbidding any combat items to be included.

Why do Marshall and Acheson seek to deceive you about this? The record is open. Not only did we fail to assist the Republic of China in its war with world communism, represented by the Yenans Reds; it was the declared and consistent policy of this administration to refuse to assist our only friends, the only friends of free men and the west that could be found in the political framework of China—Chiang Kai-shek and the Republic of China. I refer you to the directive of December 15, 1945, of Truman to Marshall, written by Marshall, in which it is said—and I quote:

A China disunited and torn by civil strife could not be considered, realistically, as a proper place for American assistance along the lines (including military assistance) enumerated.

I refer you to the State Department bulletin of the day following, December 16, outlining the Marshall China policy to our representatives abroad, a document produced no doubt by the collaboration of Acheson, Service, and Hiss, which spelled it out—and I quote:

United States support will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife.

And adding that only when China moves toward peace and unity will we be prepared to assist the National Government of China. I refer you finally to Truman's statement of policy of December 18, 1946, where, with unflagging zeal on an evil course, after all the evi-

dence of Russian intentions to dominate all governments in which they were allowed to enter had been thoroughly disseminated through the Western World, he demands in stern tones that Chiang Kai-shek accept the recalcitrant Yenans Reds on pain of incurring his displeasure. I want particularly to stress Truman's apologetic reference to the surplus stores, supplies which Acheson would have you believe assisted in China—and I quote the President's words:

China agreed to buy all surplus property owned by the United States in China and on 17 Pacific islands and bases . . . especially in view of the rapid deterioration of the material in open storage under tropical conditions and the urgent need for the partial alleviation of the acute economic distress of the Chinese people . . . Aircraft, all nondemilitarized combat material, and fixed installations outside of China were excluded. [This was done at Marshall's insistence upon the urging of the Yenans Reds when the Nationalists were winning the civil war.] Thus, no weapons which could be used in fighting a civil war were made available through this agreement.

#### TOO EARLY OR TOO LATE?

I have submitted enough evidence to prove beyond any doubt whatsoever that, instead of lending assistance to the Republic of China, as Acheson claims, it was our studied policy to do nothing of the sort. And so when Acheson said in the foreword to the White Paper that "the second objective of assisting the National Government . . . we pursued vigorously from 1945 to 1949" he is deliberately attempting to deceive. Not only did we not assist them affirmatively, but Marshall shut off what they had coming to them by his embargo and in the surplus stores. I shall offer one final proof of Acheson's moral turpitude in this matter.

First I read from testimony of Acheson before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House on March 20, 1947, when he opposed military advice and supplies to China, saying:

The Chinese Government is not in the position at the present time that the Greek Government is in. It is not approaching collapse. It is not threatened by defeat by the Communists. The war with the Communists is going on much as it has for the last 20 years.

Next I read from the White Paper letter of transmittal where Acheson said that the action which he was against in 1947, because it was unnecessary then, was too late to do any good in 1949. I quote:

The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the Government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it.

I hope that I never have to face an angry God with a lie of that enormity and that fatefulness to the history of China, this country and the world upon my conscience. The plain fact is, and I am confident that when I have finished this analysis you must agree with my conclusions, that we not only did not assist the Republic of China to avoid "the ominous result of the civil war in China" but we did everything we could, short of arming and leading the Yenans Reds to give the decision to them. And for this result two men are more responsible than any other Americans, and their names, as you have guessed, are George Catlett Marshall and Dean Gooderham Acheson.

What occasioned Acheson's duplicity in the White Paper, his continuing duplicity before the Russell committee?

I say it is fear of their being found out, exposed and taken out of control of our foreign policy before the betrayal is completely done. It is one thing to betray China and the United States and the free world in secret and by the lofty language of diplomatic doubletalk when the attention of the people is otherwise directed. It is another to face the plain, bare, and ugly record in light of day and be forced to "give an account of thy stewardship."

#### THE WEDEMEYER REPORT

And so we come to another attempt to hide, to prevaricate, and deceive. This concerns the Wedemeyer mission to China. Already in 1947 the public was stirring in curiosity over the deplorable and dangerous trend of events in China. Already, the friends of China were asking why, if we could so munificently assume the British burden, we could not take care of our equally important interest in China? So Wedemeyer, originally a protégé of Marshall until later events awakened this man of vision and fractured their friendship, was sent to China in the summer of 1947.

He returned in September and rendered to the President his report, a report which I cannot commend too highly for objectivity, for candor and, above

all, for its sound realization that Russia was on the march in China to our potential disaster. The Republic of China still had, you will remember, the upper hand militarily when Wedemeyer was there, although the problem of supply was growing more acute day by day and he recommended measures to relieve it.

The Wedemeyer report utterly displeased General Marshall for reasons we shall come to later. At first, he thought it might be modified and doctored up so that it would suit his long-range purpose—the defeat of the Republic of China. A crew of State Department officials was put to the task of rewriting the report. I would like to know if it included Hiss and Vincent. Wedemeyer declined to sign a distorted report. And so Marshall pocketed the whole thing, keeping it suppressed for nearly 2 years until selected parts of it were inserted among the annexes of the White Paper.

Why did Marshall bottle up the Wedemeyer report? The true answer is found in the nature and language of that report, which is a plain repudiation of the intent of his policy and mission. Two pretexts were put forward by Marshall. One, which was given to satisfy a request for publication by our late and lamented colleague, the Senator from Michigan, who was then chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was utterly and in toto false. The second answer was ambiguous but indicative of the goal and purpose of Marshall's China policy.

I have in my hand photostatic copies of two letters addressed by Senator Vandenberg to Alfred Kohlberg a staunch American, without whose indefatigable efforts to expose the truth we might already have been totally lost in Asia. The first Vandenberg letter, dated November 24, 1947, said, and I read it:

It is my opinion that there is nothing to be gained for China by its [the Wedemeyer report's] publication—and I think I speak as a proven friend of China. I give you one example—confidentially. The report is replete with quotations of many prominent people (both Chinese and Americans) whose opinions were obtained under the seal of confidence. I am advised on what I consider to be unimpeachable authority that this is the fact.

Kohlberg replied, expressing his fears that "a conspiratorial group in the State Department, and possibly in the administrative office of the President, and pos-

sibly in the Bureau of the Budget, have objectives in the Far East that conflict with our proclaimed open-door policy," and further stated that he was under the impression that "the so-called bipartisan foreign policy is being used as a shield to cover objectives which are hidden from the Republicans, like yourself, concerned with that policy."

On December 31, 1947, Senator Vandenberg again wrote Kohlberg in reassurance concerning the Wedemeyer report, referring to his previous letter and saying, and I quote:

My statement to you in my letter of November 24 regarding the Wedemeyer report was based upon a direct and specific statement to me by Secretary of State Marshall. This, however, is a confidential comment to you because I do not care to be involved in any controversy on a point of this nature.

But the Wedemeyer report finally saw the light of day despite Marshall's and Acheson's opposition. You all have read it and are thus in a position to bear witness concerning it. Did you find in it any confidential statements ascribed to any Chinese or Americans such as the first Vandenberg letter relates? Certainly not, because there are none. What can you make of this clear and explicit declaration from beyond the grave? Only this, that Marshall manufactured this excuse out of whole cloth. That, in short, he lied; as he lied on the witness stand in September 1950 about the authorship of the China policy; as he lied about his whereabouts on the morning of Pearl Harbor Day, saying first that he was horseback riding, then that he was at home at Fort Myer, when, in Arthur Upham Pope's book on Litvinov, Marshall's name appears as one of those Americans who met the Russian Ambassador when he arrived by plane in Washington on that morning. This latter incident I have already placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Whether he was with a horse, his wife, or Litvinov, I do not know. But it is an interesting speculation about a morning upon which every American knew exactly where he was and what he was doing when he heard that the bombs were falling.

What can we make of this succession of blatant untruths? What of the character of their author? There was a time when the word of an officer of the United States Army or Navy was as good as his bond. Veracity was bred in the bone

and fiber of our officer corps, at their academies and throughout their careers. We honored them for it and took pride in their honor. What has become of the code of the officer and gentleman, and I say this without the sneer that usually accompanies this phrase on the lips of the leftist-phony "liberals"? I ask this in all seriousness. General Marshall is at the head of our Armed Services. Quite apart from the destructive nature of his public acts since the beginning of World War II, I ask in all gravity, whether a man so steeped in falsehood, who has recourse to the lie whenever it suits his convenience, is fit to hold so exalted a place, a place where he must be a model to the officers and men and women of our Armed Services?

How can we believe General Marshall under oath or otherwise? On this ground alone what value can his counsel have to us regarding our public course? I leave this consideration to the Congress and the people of the United States for prayerful meditation on the degeneration of public figures if they would maintain favor with and position in this administration.

The second reason given for suppressing the Wedemeyer report was that in it Wedemeyer recommended a trusteeship for Manchuria as a cure for the intolerable bloodshed and turbulence that grew, originally, out of Yalta. It is true that Wedemeyer does so recommend. The implication of this excuse was that its publication would have been offensive to the Republic of China. The disingenuousness of that excuse is at once apparent if we refer to China's position in 1947, with its continued possession of Manchuria touch and go in any case, and to the brusque and contemptuous treatment which had been meted to Chiang Kai-shek by Truman and Marshall since December of 1945. Since when were we considering the feelings of the Republic of China? You need not seek far to find the real reason lurking behind this avowed one. Who would such a proposal really offend? Not China, but Russia—the Russia which had, as a result of the Yalta deal, a hammerlock on Manchuria which it proposed not to relax, sharing it, if at all, nominally only, with its creatures of Yenan.

So we see that the excuse based upon the trusteeship proposal was a species of deceit also. The genuine reason fits perfectly into the whole pattern of the

China policy, being part and parcel of the scheme hatched in the fall of 1945 with Marshall as its chief exponent to deliver China, and with it all Asia, to the Soviet empire.

We come to the bona fide reason for the suppression of the Wedemeyer report in the fall of 1947, when, I bid you note, China still had a chance to fight off the Red imperialists with our assistance. By 1949, when the report found its way into public attention, that hope had vanished and the Marshall plan for China was, to all intents and purposes, crowned with success. The overwhelming reason for the suppression was that the Wedemeyer report in almost every line, directly and indirectly, repudiated the Marshall policy.

Wedemeyer did point out need for reform in the Chinese Government, but the need for reform in the Chinese Government was infinitely less than the need for reform within our own Government, as evidenced by the odorous 5-percent investigation, the deep freezes, the mink coats, the fixes in criminal cases and in RFC loans, the combine of gamblers and Government officials. No one in this Nation has urged, as Marshall did in China, that because this Government is corrupt, we should turn it over to the Communists. Incidentally, Acheson, before the Russell committee, dealt almost exclusively with the small section of the Wedemeyer report dealing with corruption in China.

Why was the Wedemeyer report really suppressed?

Marshall wholly ignored the question of Russia, omitting any reference to it in his valedictory.

The whole of Wedemeyer's general statement to the President is instinct with the urgency of that question. I shall quote passages illustrating this point, resisting the temptation to quote all. I read from the Wedemeyer report:

The goals and the lofty aims of freedom-loving peoples are jeopardized today by forces as sinister as those that operated in Europe and Asia during the 10 years leading to World War II. The pattern is familiar—employment of subversive agents; infiltration tactics; incitement to disorder, and chaos to disrupt normal economy and thereby to undermine popular confidence in government and leaders; seizure of authority without reference to the will of the people—all the techniques skillfully designed and ruthlessly implemented in order to create favorable conditions for the imposition of totalitarian

ideologies. This pattern is present in the Far East, particularly in the areas contiguous to Siberia.

In other words, Manchuria.

Why did Wedemeyer propose a trusteeship for Manchuria? Was it against the interest of China? I quote further from his report:

The situation in Manchuria has deteriorated to such a degree that prompt action is necessary to prevent that area becoming a Soviet satellite. . . . This would create a difficult situation for China, the United States, and the United Nations. Ultimately it could lead to a Communist-dominated China.

Do you now see why Marshall suppressed that for 2 years?

What can be done in general to meet the threat to the peace contained in Soviet imperialism?

Events of the past 2 years demonstrate the futility of appeasement based on the hope that the strongly consolidated forces of the Soviet Union will adopt either a conciliatory or a cooperative attitude except as tactical expedients. Soviet practice in the countries already occupied or dominated completes the mosaic of aggressive expansion through ruthless secret-police methods and through an increasing political and economic enslavement of peoples. Soviet literature, confirmed repeatedly by Communist leaders, reveals a definite plan for expansion far exceeding that of nazism in its ambitious scope and dangerous implications.

Therefore in attempting a solution to the problem presented in the Far East . . . every possible opportunity must be used to seize the initiative in order to create bulwarks of freedom.

How did our difficulties arise in the Far East?

Indirectly the United States facilitated the Soviet program in the Far East by agreeing at the Yalta Conference to Russian reentry into Manchuria and later by withholding aid from the Nationalist Government.

Marshall read Wedemeyer's eloquent indictment of Soviet imperialism, although denying it to the people, who paid for the Wedemeyer mission. Wedemeyer proposed after a moving and sincere statement of the case of China, which I do earnestly bid you study anew, that we make a fresh start there advising Nanking, and I quote from page 774:

That the United States is favorably disposed to continue aid designed to protect China's territorial integrity and to facilitate her recovery.

He proposed that the whole problem be referred to the United Nations; that

the United Nations set up a trusteeship over Manchuria; that China give continuing evidence of a will to reform her governmental structure; and that, to put it in language different from Wedemeyer's but continuing the same meaning, the United States supply official advisers, military and civilian, to assist China in those reforms.

What evidence does General Wedemeyer's report offer on whether or not we supplied China? In his testimony of June 4, before the Russell committee, Dean Acheson said, and I quote:

Although his [Wedemeyer's] actual recommendations do not call for a grant of military aid, it is possible to read that in.

Although in September 1947 the forces of the Republic of China had invaded and captured Yanan, the situation in Manchuria had reached a point where, said Wedemeyer on page 808 of the White Paper, "prompt action is necessary to prevent Manchuria from becoming a Soviet satellite." Elsewhere the Nationalist forces faced severe stringencies and suffered from poor strategical leadership. Said Wedemeyer:

It is doubtful if Gen. Chen Cheng [the new Nationalist commander in Manchuria] can weld a strong unified force in view of the continued serious shortages of both supplies and capable subordinates.

The Yanan Reds had no shortages of supplies and trained captains, both being furnished by Russia.

What did Wedemeyer think of the importance of China to the American position in the Far East? I quote from page 809 of the White Paper:

Any further spread of Soviet influence and power would be inimical to United States strategic interests. In time of war the existence of an unfriendly China would result in denying us important air bases for use as staging areas for bombing attacks as well as important naval bases along the Chinese coast. Its control by the Soviet Union or a regime friendly to the Soviet Union would make available for hostile use a number of warm-water ports and air bases. Our own air and naval bases in Japan, [the] Ryukyus and the Philippines would be subject to relatively short range neutralizing air attacks. Furthermore, industrial and military developments of Siberia east of Lake Baikal would probably make the Manchurian area more or less self-sufficient.

On the other hand, a unified China friendly or allied to the United States would not only provide important air and naval bases, but also from the standpoint of its size and manpower, be an important ally to the United States.

These strategic lessons are elementary to any consideration of the relationship of the United States to the Far East. Recognizing them, Wedemeyer's advice, explicit and implicit, is that we hold and preserve China as an ally. If General Wedemeyer understood matters in this sense, were they not understandable also to General Marshall? No one ever has described him as a dunce. He, like Wedemeyer, is a professional soldier, trained to the understanding of strategy.

What did Wedemeyer recommend that we do in detail to bolster China in its civil war on the Yanan Reds? He had a six-point program.

First, China had 16,000 motor vehicles which it could not use, chiefly trucks, because of the lack of spare parts which we had agreed to supply but hadn't.

The United States—

Said Wedemeyer—  
is morally obligated to complete this program.

Secondly, the United States should enable the Chinese to buy military equipment. He said, and I quote from page 811:

Since completion of the 39-division program nearly 2 years ago very little has been supplied. Thus there are many shortages in military equipment which react to the disadvantage of Nationalist military efforts. Credits should be established for China to purchase the necessary military equipment needed to effect a supervised revitalization of her ground and air forces. Without such aid American equipment purchased during and subsequent to the war is, or soon will be, valueless since maintenance parts will not be available to keep the equipment in use.

What does that do to the unusual story of Acheson concerning the billion dollars in military aid furnished China between VJ-day and 1949? What a monstrous deception that has been. The Secretary of State has repeatedly declared that the Republic of China lost no battles because of a lack of equipment and ammunition. What did Wedemeyer say bearing upon the future of the civil war in September 1947? I read:

In July the Navy abandoned 336 tons of ammunition in Tsingtao, which was recovered by Nationalists. However, Nationalist armies continue to complain of shortages of ammunition of all types and calibers. There will be severe shortages in the near future unless replenishment from foreign sources is accomplished.

There is an implied moral obligation to assist the Chinese Government to obtain ammunition.

What did Marshall do about this moral obligation? That fall 1947 he recommended a grant of \$570,000,000 to China—not one cent for military supplies. We shall see later what he did to forestall and delay any military supply to China.

In conclusion, Wedemeyer recommended, and I read from page 814:

That the United States provide as early as practicable moral, advisory, and material support to China in order to prevent Manchuria from becoming a Soviet satellite, to bolster opposition to Communist expansion, and to contribute to the gradual development of stability in China.

Could you ask for a more forthrightly American program? Can you wonder that Marshall, bent on other aims, suppressed this report?

Did Marshall act upon Wedemeyer's advice? Did he reverse himself? You know the answer.

#### CONFUSION COMPOUNDED

Six months later, on March 10, 1948, months during which the situation in China had gone, from the American viewpoint, from bad to worse, Marshall was asked at a press conference whether the directive of December 1945, demanding a unified government of China, was still our policy. He said that it was, an answer which threw the State Department into a dither. No one but Marshall was openly supporting that policy by the spring of 1948. So the Department sought to extricate him, issuing a statement the next day which made it appear that Marshall had been confused. They said that he had thought the question had to do with the President's statement of December 15, 1945, which it, of course, did. Supplier minds in the Department of State then edited what the Secretary had said to make it appear that what he really said was that the Communists being in open rebellion in China, the matter of their inclusion in the Government was for the Chinese, not the American Government, to decide.

The President, too, was utterly confused at this point. On March 11, at a White House press conference, he was asked the same question, "Do you still insist upon Communists in the Chinese Government?" The statement of De-

ember 15, 1945, "still stood," replied Truman. He confounded his American interviewers by adding the contradictory explanation that, however, "we did not want Communists in the Government of China or anywhere else if we could help it." The Tass correspondent was perhaps not confused at all.

The questions of March 10th and 11th had been prompted by public discussion to aid to China. Such demands were rising. We were then in the Eightieth Congress. The friends of China had friends in this court. And so, the Congress, rejecting Marshall's nonmilitary \$780,000,000 bill, appropriated \$275,000,000 for economic aid and \$125,000,000 for arms to help Chiang Kai-shek at that late hour stand against Soviet imperialism. This sum, inadequate though it was, might have been effective had it been immediately translated into the ammunition for lack of which the armies of the Republic of China were being beaten, were defecting, or fading away.

#### SABOTAGING THE WILL OF CONGRESS

What ensued is one of the most shocking subversions of the will of the Congress by an administration that our history will show. If proof were needed that the State Department, under Marshall and Acheson, and sheltered by a wholly uncomprehending and pliant President, were intent upon delivering China to Russia, that proof was afforded by their administration of the China-aid bill of 1948.

Nothing was done for 2 months. The Chinese Ambassador had been pleading in vain for implementation. On June 2 the Senator from New Hampshire, having sent a strong note to the White House concerning this delay, the President wrote the State and Treasury Departments, in effect, authorizing them to move. But the President, relying upon his State Department advisers, had gummed up the works. I am sure this was intentional on their part. He had authorized the executive agencies to buy only military supplies from commercial suppliers. No supplies were available from those sources. Not until July 28, 4 months after the act was passed, was the Defense Department empowered to issue material from its own stocks.

Not until November 9, more than 7 months after Congress spoke, did the first shipment clear from Seattle for China. China was finally lost during those months. This is not the end of

this wretched story. Not only was the will of Congress frustrated for more than half a year, but China got only half as much in the way of military supplies as Congress had supposed she would. The prices fixed upon the supplies by the Army were exorbitant. Congress had expected China to be treated as had all other countries which drew from our stores, that is, that she would be charged the cheap, surplus price charged the others. Instead of that, and I am taking the figures from Miss Utley's book, *The China Story*, China paid for bazookas \$182 apiece, the surplus price being \$3.65; for .30-caliber rifles she paid \$51 each, the surplus price being \$5.10; for thousand rounds of rifle ammunition \$85, the surplus price being \$4.55; and for machine-gun ammunition per thousand rounds \$95, the surplus price being \$4.58. These figures appear in Miss Utley's book. I have not myself checked them; therefore, I ask the Department of the Army to come forward and submit to the appropriate committee of this House the price lists that it charged the Chinese.

I shall not take more of your time to dwell on this appalling chapter in the betrayal of China. As it demonstrates, Marshall was still implacably against the Republic of China. He has never relented even up to this moment. Only a few weeks before he resigned as Secretary of State, Marshall was attending the Assembly of the United Nations in Paris. There he was approached by Dr. T. F. Tsiang, the Chinese delegate, who, and I find this on page 887 of the *White Paper*, implored Marshall for assistance. Tsiang asked that the United States recognize the need for expert military leadership by sending United States officers to actual command of the republican armies; that the United States expedite the supply of munitions, and he asked Marshall's advice about laying China's plight before the United Nations, as Wedemeyer had proposed.

In his report on the incident to Under Secretary Lovett at Washington, Marshall said, and I quote:

I did not offer encouragement beyond present efforts.

Respecting Tsiang's United Nations inquiry, Marshal reported:

I said I would have to consult my colleagues of the United States delegation to develop various possibilities; that offhand I thought it an inadvisable procedure and discussed possible Soviet moves to take advantage rather than to counter such a move.

The sense of the foregoing is difficult to arrive at. What can be easily gathered is that Marshall was, as usual, sensitive to Russia's plans, aims, and prospects.

"LET THEM FALL BUT DON'T LET APPEAR WE PUSHED THEM"

The final, definitive word was given on the Marshall China policy in July of 1949. By then the friends of the Yen-an Reds, who are, of course, by definition, the enemies of America and the West, were jubilant. Marshall's policy was a success. There remained the task of explaining to the faithful how it had been accomplished. There remained a bit of crowing to do over the corpse of China and the decline of America's position in the Far East. This task was assumed by, or delegated to, Owen Lattimore. There has been a controversy over whether Owen Lattimore is a conscious agent of Soviet imperialism. I know that he is and I know that in the fullness of time that fact will be established for all to see and hear.

I have here a photostatic copy of the editorial page of the *Sunday Compass* of New York, dated July 17, 1949. Displayed thereon is an article by Owen Lattimore, with the exultant, and I hope, premature heading, "South Korea—another China." In the body of the article, Lattimore is discussing the proposals, then before Congress, for a grant to South Korea of \$150,000,000. Dean Acheson had made what Lattimore called a "strong appeal" for that appropriation before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Lattimore went on to point out that at this same time we were withdrawing our troops from South Korea. The conjunction of these events was to Lattimore, and he was so explaining them to the faithful who read the *Compass*, a demonstration of the Communist-planned duplicity of American policy, a policy which he said "is now conducted under rules of protocol which have become as rigid as tribal taboos." If we may paraphrase Lattimore's words, the United States was then pursuing one policy with two contradictory horns. Upon the one horn, we were appearing to be standing in friendly sponsorship of South Korea; on the other we were preparing to let her fall into the maw of Russian imperialism. I shall let him describe George Marshall's part in this conspiracy in Lattimore's own words, quoting him—

There is logic in the course of action advocated by Secretary Acheson. It is, moreover, a perfectly convincing logic. \* \* \*

For the logic we must go back to the sad precedent of China. The truth is that Gen. George C. Marshall, on his mission to China in 1946 \* \* \* became convinced of several unpleasant things which, because of the state of political opinion in America, could not be stated out loud.

I invite you to note that Lattimore is interpreting the secret mind of George Marshall as one having authority. I read:

First, he was convinced that the Kuomintang would not be able to triumph over the Chinese Communists unless it took American advice. Second, he was convinced that politically and militarily America could not handle the situation in China by taking the Kuomintang by the scruff of the neck and the seat of the pants and making it behave. Yet he could not, as a statesman, advise what seemed sensible to him as a general—that the United States simply pull out and abandon an untenable position.

I come to the operative part of this astounding recital of the problem of China, reading:

As a compromise, American policy took a course of relative inaction, but not complete inaction. As it became more and more obvious that Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang were doomed, the conduct of American policy became increasingly delicate. The problem—

And here we have reached the inner chamber, the arcanum, of the Marshall plan for China—

was how to allow them to fall without making it look as if the United States had pushed them. Such a policy never succeeds completely [that is, it cannot be wholly concealed] and critics have done their best to make the public believe that the United States did push Chiang and the Kuomintang over the cliff.

There you have the complete, sinister, treacherous, traitorous picture—here is the modus operandi written to instruct the Communists and Communist sympathizers which, alone, read the *Compass*. This is a secret communication, in effect, letting the faithful in on the secret of how the Marshall policy worked.

Can anyone in this Chamber doubt, after the lengthy documentation from the pens of Marshall's own friends, that Lattimore was speaking the truth?

So, he went on, it was to be with Korea.

The thing to do—

And I am reading from Lattimore—therefore, is to let South Korea fall—but not to let it look as though we pushed it. Hence, the recommendation of a parting grant of \$150,000,000.

Can you doubt the veracity of that explanation of our Korean policy until Truman ordered Korea defended?

It was so true. I am grateful to Lattimore for his graphic exposition.

The next appearance of Marshall in a position of supreme influence over our affairs came only last September. It was a black day for America when this Senate voted to set aside a law it had passed to guard against lesser calamities to allow Marshall to become Secretary of Defense. We were not on guard; we were not vigilant. We fell short on that day and I accept my share of the blame with sorrow and repentance. I was recorded against the bill but opposition was hopeless then because Marshall was still wearing the false halo placed upon his head by the alchemy of false propaganda.

I wondered then why this venerable soldier, who had received the world's honors, who had served as the first man in the President's Cabinet, should be willing to return to the wars. I no longer wonder.

#### AMERICAN STRATEGY

What is our strategy now?

Is it to fight a pointless war in Korea, hoping against hope that the enemy in Peking and Moscow will sue for peace so that we may ignominiously yield and depart, leaving them to enjoy peaceably what the Marshall policy gave them?

Is it to abandon American interests in the Far East, surrendering Formosa to the grasp of a United Nations strewn with our enemies and wanting nothing so much, under the leadership of the temporary Socialist Government of Great Britain and the Communist-loving present Government of India, as to thrust the United States out of the Far East?

It is because he differed with that policy that General MacArthur was recalled from the Far East. He stood as a barrier to the final fulfillment of the Marshall-Acheson policy for China. That is why, when Marshall took office, Eisenhower was rushed to Europe and the great debate over the extent of our participation in the defense of Europe was provoked. That was the diversion-

ary trick of a carnival prestidigitator. What had changed in Europe during last summer and early fall? What sign was there that we faced attack from Russia in that quarter? The whole procedure was without meaning in any realistic sense, yet it had meaning in the mind of the man referred to by the Democrats at Denver as "a master of global strategy."

In order to more completely round out the history of Marshall over the past decade, let me cite three unconnected documented examples of his activities all of which follow the same pattern as those given: The Senate will recall that Russia was given the plates so they might print allied currency. On page 16 of the hearings held in June 1947 before the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Banking and Currency, the following testimony of Mr. Howard Peterson, Assistant Secretary of War, is found:

On April 18, 1944, the Soviet Ambassador was furnished with glass negatives and positives of plates for the use of the Soviet Government in the printing of allied military marks, together with technical information on inks.

On pages 20 and 21, Senator Tydings is questioning the Assistant Secretary of War to find out who approved the plan to give Russia our currency plates. The following questions and answers are significant in that respect:

Senator TYDINGS. It did clear the Joint Chiefs of Staff before it reached the civilian branches of our Government?

Mr. PETERSON. That is correct.

Senator TYDINGS. And ostensibly, I suppose it is fair to ask that they approved it before it went to these others, otherwise, it would never have gone any further?

Mr. PETERSON. I certainly would assume so, Senator.

The hearings also quote from a letter written by Marshall on April 13, 1944, in which he advises when the plates should be made available to Russia.

Much has been said in the past about the assistance which Marshall gave to China in furnishing Chiang a 1,500-man military mission. In that connection, it is important to have some picture of the type of military mission Marshall furnished Chiang. On pages 41 and 42 of Freda Utley's book, *The China Story*, the following is found:

As his authority for the statement that the Chinese Nationalist forces did not lose a battle in 1948 through lack of adequate

arms, Mr. Acheson cited our military observers on the spot. But our military observers, meaning the United States military mission, were not in fact on the spot; they were sitting in Nanking, thanks to Mr. Acheson.

On August 24, 1949, in a statement to the press, he said that United States military advisers in China were not permitted to give advice in the field because Congress refused to include the Greek-Turkey proviso in the 1948 China Aid Act. In fact, however, it was the State Department which caused this proviso to be removed from the act. The House had included it, but the Senate removed it at the State Department's request, and upon assurances given by the State Department that the act would in fact be implemented as if the Greek-Turkey proviso were included.

Having induced the Senate to withdraw the House proviso for diplomatic reasons, but with the promise that military advice would nevertheless be given to the Chinese Nationalist forces, the State Department proceeded to act within the limits set by the letter of the law, thus ignoring its promise to the Senate. In the fall of 1948, William C. Bullitt, on his return from a visit to China, reported that the so-called mission sent to aid Chiang had been instructed not to advise him with regard to the operation of his forces.

The former Ambassador and confidant of Franklin D. Roosevelt further stated that "nearly half of the 1,500-man military mission was composed of fellow travelers and Communist sympathizers."

Whatever the exact figures, it would seem that the military mission to China was never intended to be more than window dressing to satisfy the opposition in Congress. Since it was forbidden to give strategic or tactical advice to the Nationalist forces, it had no valid function.

Another document which also sheds some light upon the activities of Marshall and Acheson is a confidential report from a Senate Appropriations Committee to Secretary of State Marshall, dated June 10, 1947. I quote parts of that document:

It becomes necessary due to the gravity of the situation to call your attention to a condition that developed and still flourishes in the State Department under the administration of Dean Acheson.

It is evident that there is a deliberate, calculated program being carried out not only to protect Communist personnel in high places but to reduce security and intelligence protection to a nullity.

Regarding the much-publicized Marzani case, the evidence brought out at his trial was well known to State Department officers, who ignored it and refused to act for a full year.

Marzani and several other Department officials, with full knowledge of the State Department, and with Government time and money, promoted a scheme called Presentations, Inc., which contracted with a Communist-dominated organization to disseminate propaganda.

Security objections to these and other even more dangerous developments were rebuffed by high administrative officials, and there followed the substitution of unqualified men for these competent, highly respected personnel who theretofore held the intelligence and security assignments in the Department. The new chief of controls is a man utterly devoid of background and experience for the job, who is, and at the time of his appointment was known to those who appointed him to be, a cousin and close associate of a suspected Soviet espionage agent.

On the file in the Department is a copy of a preliminary report of the FBI on Soviet espionage activities in the United States, which involves a large number of State Department employees, some in high official positions. This report has been challenged and ignored by those charged with the responsibility of administering the Department with the apparent tacit approval of Mr. Acheson. Should this case break before the State Department acts, it will be a national disgrace.

Voluminous files are on hand in the Department proving the connection of the State Department employees and officials with this Soviet espionage ring. Despite this, only two persons, one of whom is Marzani, were released under the McCarran rider because of their subversive activity. [I omit the names] are only a few of the hundreds now employed in varying capacities who are protected and allowed to remain despite the fact that their presence is an obvious hazard to national security. There is also the extensive employment in highly classified positions of admitted homosexuals, who are historically known to be security risks.

The War and Navy Departments have been thwarted for a year in their efforts to carry out the German scientist program. They are blocked by one man in the State Department, a protégé of Acheson [I omit the name] who is also the chief instrument in the subverting of the over-all security program.

This deplorable condition runs all the way up and down the line. Assistant Secretary Braden also surrounded himself with men like . . . and with . . . who has a notorious international reputation. The network also extends into the office of Assistant Secretary Benton.

(Signed) SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE.

This report to Marshall was completely ignored and I understand not even answered by him.

## PLANNED DISASTER FOR EUROPE

But let us explain Marshall's strategy in Europe. I realize that some of my good friends feel that the problem there can be settled merely by the decision of whether we shall send an additional 6 or 8 or 10 American divisions to Western Europe. Would that it were that simple. Keep in mind that the group which is doing the planning for Western Europe is the identical group which has been doing the disastrous planning for Asia—the same group that did the planning for the sell-out of Poland and China. Let us look at the unquestioned facts in that area. Those facts speak for themselves. The planning has been disastrous for America and good for Soviet Russia.

The Senate will recall that when General Eisenhower appeared before the joint session of the Congress, he said he was unable to discuss the use of German manpower until the politics of the situation were cleared up by the diplomats. And for 5 years those diplomats have done nothing to clear up the situation. Periodically, our State Department has talked of rearming Western Germany to counter the powerful "peoples" army built up by the Russians in East Germany. But it is nothing but talk—words apparently planted to lull the American people into a sense of security that we are going to do something in West Germany to counter the threat of what Russia has been doing in East Germany. Clever administration of sleeping tablets, if you please.

When Eisenhower went to Europe to plan the defense of Western Europe, he was not even allowed to visit the greatest potential source of manpower for a Western European army—a country that has long been dedicated to fighting communism—Spain. I am not going to argue that Spain has or has not the kind of government of which we should approve. The point is we cannot make over the Spanish Government. I am not going to argue that we should or should not love the 48,000,000 people of Western Germany. But it takes no argument, it follows as the night follows the day, that there is no way on God's earth to defend the richest prize for which Communist Russia is aiming—the industrial heart of Europe—unless we use those two great wells of tough anti-Communist manpower, Western Germany and Spain. The talk of doing otherwise is either the talk of those who know not what

they say or the talk of traitors planning a phony defense.

When I hear administration spokesmen urging that the solution to the whole problem lies in drafting and sending to Europe another 6, 8, or 10 American divisions, there is called vividly to my mind an article which I just discussed which appeared in the *Compass* on July 17, 1949, in which the State Department adviser said:

The problem is to let them [our allies] fall but don't let it appear that we pushed them.

## PLANNED DEFEAT IN EUROPE

Why have we apparently adopted the suicidal strategy of opposing American and Allied flesh to the Russian on the undefended plains of central Europe? Are we inviting defeat there as well as in Asia? Why has our strategy, under Marshall, ignored the Mediterranean theater, as he scorned it in World War II; an area where we alone have potential bastions that can be held and from which we can launch counter attacks by air and land against Russia? Why have we slighted the two nations in Europe—one with an organized and effective army that is on our side; the other with a vast potential army. Spain has an organized army. The warlike quality of the Spanish is not challenged.

They have 35 divisions which they would throw into the pool. France has a half dozen at most, and who could rely completely upon French conscripts in a war against the Communist motherland? The British have no more. The loyalty of the Spanish to the cause we serve cannot be questioned. Why have we shunned Spain? Why have we shunned organizing any army from Western Germany's 48,000,000 anti-Communist people? Why have we slighted heroic Greece and the Turks whose valor in Korea has won our respect and forged ties of gratitude which should last as long as this Republic itself?

## IN WHOSE NAME DOES ACHESON MAKE PROMISES?

We have embraced Yugoslavia. Dean Acheson has served notice upon the Kremlin that an attack upon Communist Yugoslavia will mean war with us. At whose bidding and by whose authority did Acheson speak—Acheson so meek in the Far East, so willing to surrender Formosa, to make peace on the thirty-eighth parallel and admit Communist China into the United Nations? Whose bidding was he following? Was it the

British Socialist Government which, pursuing what Winston Churchill has called a sectarian and isolationist policy, has sought to strengthen all left-wing governments this side of the iron curtain and weaken all others? Acheson's friends in London have steadfastly opposed the strategy of a united Europe since they came to power in 1945. They have sought to put themselves at the head of what their leftist apologists call a third force, a Socialist force, between the massive weight of Russia on the one hand and the United States on the other. Their behavior has insulted the long-standing, unexpressed, and unwritten alliance between the English-speaking powers which has ranged them for generations against all others arising from the outside. Was it the British Labor Party's desire for a socialized Europe that prompted Acheson to give his guaranty to Tito?

## THE PATH OF APPEASEMENT AGAIN

The policy of the United States with reference to the global pressures of Russia was ambiguous enough even before Marshall reentered the picture last September. With Marshall again at Acheson's side, their captive President between them, there has been little doubt that we were treading the old path of appeasement of Russia.

Marshall's old friends, the liberals of Yen-an, shouldered their way into the war in Korea last December. In January this Government agreed to the most abject poltroonery, the cease-fire offer to Peking which, had it been accepted, would have resulted in our departure from Korea, the seating of the Chinese Reds in the United Nations and placing the disposition of Formosa at the hazard of a commission weighted three to one against us. What saved us then I do not know. I can only thank God for our salvation.

Our escape was, however, only temporary.

## ANOTHER SELL-OUT

Acheson testified the other day that he is ready to make peace now on the basis of the thirty-eighth parallel. I awake each morning in the fear that overnight, in some secret chamber of the United Nations, the enemies of the United States, with Britain and India at their head, have made a secret deal—a new Yalta—to do us out of the last vestige of our position in the Far East, to dishonor the dead we shall have to

leave in Korea, and to advance the world-wide interests of Russia. They are capable of it on their record.

The point that I want to make with all emphasis is this: Since Marshall resumed his place as mayor of the palace last September, with Acheson as captain of the palace guard and that weak, fitful, bad-tempered, and usable Merovingian in their custody, the outlines of the defeat they meditate have grown plainer. The weakness of the United States in relation to the growing power of Soviet imperialism has become clearer. Our weakness has become plain to the simplest citizen, the farthest removed from the seat of Government in Washington, and would have been evident even without the shameless doubts of the President that we could win a war with Russia and the self-satisfied shocking revelations of Marshall and his palace men, in their testimony before the Russell committee.

The feeling of America's weakness is in the very air we breathe in Washington. It derives not only from the moral debility of the highest echelons of the administration, from the flabbiness and lack of resolve upon the part of the palace guard and their minions. It comes from the objective facts of the situation.

## FROM THE MOST POWERFUL NATION TO A NATION THAT CRINGES IN FEAR

Six years ago this summer America stood at what Churchill described as the "highest pinnacle of her power and fame." The President and the man who is now Secretary of Defense commanded the greatest military instrumentality on land, sea, and in the air that the world had ever seen. Our forces had fought victoriously on every continent except the American—in Africa, in Europe, in Asia, and above, on and over the seven seas. The Soviet empire, which would have fallen before the Nazis but for our assistance, was nursing its wounds, but glowering, self-confident and on the march from its own weakness. Britain had declined into the incompetent, self-righteous and doctrinaire hands of its Labor Party. Britain was economically prostrated, its empire was dwindling and was to dwindle further.

Only the United States among the great powers found its economic strength undiminished, its territories uninvaded and unswept by war, its full powers still unflexed. Everywhere America had

friends, everywhere its power suggested friendship to others. In terms of the division of the world into spheres of interest, the United States, at the head of the coalition of the West, exercised friendly influence over nearly all the masses of the earth. The Soviet Union's own people and the few millions in the bordering satellites upon which it was already laying its hands constituted a small minority of the earth's peoples.

What do we find in the summer of 1951? The writs of Moscow run to lands which, with its own, number upward of 900 millions of people—a good 40 percent of all men living. The fear of Russia or the subservience that power inspires inclines many hundreds of other millions, as in India, toward Moscow. The fear of Russia, plus other reasons, the chief of which is the supine and treacherous folly of our own policies, places other hundreds of millions in a twilight zone between the great poles of Moscow and Washington.

#### THE UNITED STATES STANDS ALONE

The United States stands today virtually alone as it faces its greatest trials. Where have we loyal allies? In Britain? I would not stake a shilling on the reliability of a Government which, while enjoying billions in American munificence, rushed to the recognition of the Chinese Red regime, traded exorbitantly with the enemy through Hong Kong and has sought to frustrate American interest in the Far east at every turn. Let us not blame our long-time friends, the British people. They have their Attlee and Morrison directing their foreign policy. We have our Acheson. Or perhaps, I should say, their Acheson. They will survive their curse even as we will ours.

The case of Australia and New Zealand is a brighter story. Their ox is gored, like ours, by the Peking Reds.

What of Western Europe generally? Have we a constant friend in that quarter? The Marshall plan has mystified and alienated while it enriched them; the Marshall strategy, which threatens to turn Western Europe into another devastated Korea, has rightfully terrified them and encouraged among them a neutralism, which sees the coming world struggle as one between two reeling giants, Russia and the United States, in which they have little or no part.

In Europe we have snubbed our friends, the heroic Greeks and Turks

and the thoroughly indoctrinated anti-Communists of Spain; and because of our servility toward Russia in Eastern Europe we have discouraged the gallant souls behind the iron curtain who might have waited upon our deliverance of them, as the peoples oppressed by the Nazis did only to find themselves betrayed to an equal tyranny by our appeasement. What do we find in Asia? Our former enemies, the Japanese, are our friends, but they are disarmed friends, and the State Department says they must stay disarmed and defenseless. We reject the friendship of the free Chinese of Formosa and the millions on the mainland struggling to be free of the monstrous usurpation that overwhelms them. The Government of India, like the Socialist Government of Britain, is in alliance with the crimson clique at the head of our affairs who want to deprive us of our strategic interests in the western Pacific. They are not in alliance with the American people.

The will to resist Russia here at home is vitiated. Gone is the zeal with which we marched forth in 1941 to crush the dictatorship. The leftist-liberals who preached a holy war against Hitler and Tojo are today seeking accommodation with the senior totalitarianism of Moscow. Is this because we are today arrayed against, to recall, the phrase of General Bradley, "the wrong enemy" in the "wrong war"? We were on Russia's side in the last war—our strategy after the first Quebec conference might as well have been dictated in the Kremlin and teletyped to the Pentagon—and is that why the Marshall who prosecuted World War II with bloodthirsty zeal, eager to order Americans to storm fortified shores, is sitting this one out?

General Vandenberg, who added no luster to an illustrious name thereby, proclaimed to the world that we lacked the air force to execute the moderate and minimum strategic recommendations of General MacArthur. The Congress voted a 70-group air force 3 years ago. Truman cut it down to 48. Who was the mayor of the palace then? The same as now: Marshall.

Where have the billions gone that the Congress poured into the armed services between VJ-day and the outbreak of the war in Korea? Marshall told us that when the North Koreans attacked we had one battle-ready division in the United States. What has the Department of

Defense done to put us since then in a posture of defense? Of that, Mr. President, we know very little. We are told in *Life* magazine of last week that our airplane industry is still on a one-shift basis. We hear alarming reports from industry that the overwhelming emphasis in procurement is upon building new plants which will be ready 2 or 3 years from now to turn out what? Even when ready they will turn out not munitions but chemicals and yarn and steel sheets, all valuable materials but not in themselves fighting weapons. What of the strategic materials stockpiles? Is the State Department still maintaining, as in the case of the sands embargoed by India, that it would be ungentlemanly to insist upon requiring what we need in those categories in exchange for the bounty we have poured by the hundreds of shiploads upon alien shores?

#### THE GOSPEL OF FEAR

During all this time the administration preaches a gospel of fear and Acheson and Marshall expound a foreign policy in the East based upon craven, whimpering appeasement. The President and his palace guard go on a Nation-wide broadcast and threaten the American people with Russian-made atomic bombs. What is the purpose of such craven actions and utterances? Is it to condition us to defeat in the Far East, to soften us up so that we shall accept a peace upon the Soviet empire's terms in Korea; a peace which would put the enemy one step nearer to Alaska? And how, may I ask, did Russia acquire the technical secrets, the blueprints, the know-how to make the bombs with which the administration seeks to terrify us? I have yet to hear a single administration spokesman raise his voice against the policy of suppression, deceit, and false witness with which this administration has protected the Soviet agents who have abstracted those secrets from us.

#### THEY PLANNED IT THAT WAY

The people, Mr. President, recognize the weakness with which the administration has replaced what was so recently our great strength. They are troubled by it. And they do not think it accidental. They do not believe that the decline in our strength from 1945 to 1951 just happened. They are coming to believe that it was brought about, step by step, by will and intention. They are beginning to believe that the surrender of China to Russia, the administration's

indecently hasty desire to turn Formosa over to the enemy and arrive at a cease-fire in Korea instead of following the manly, American course prescribed by MacArthur, point to something more than ineptitude and folly. They witness the conviction of Hiss, which would not have happened had he not brought a private suit for damages against Whittaker Chambers; they followed the revelations in the Remington case, the Marzani case, and the others which have disclosed at the heart of Government active Soviet agents influencing policy and pilfering secrets; they note the policy of retreat before Soviet assertion from Yalta to this day, and they say: This is not because these men are incompetents; there is a deeper reason.

#### INFAMY SO BLACK

How can we account for our present situation unless we believe that men high in this Government are concerting to deliver us to disaster? This must be the product of a great conspiracy, a conspiracy on a scale so immense as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man. A conspiracy of infamy so black that, when it is finally exposed, its principals shall be forever deserving of the maledictions of all honest men.

Who constitutes the highest circles of this conspiracy? About that we cannot be sure. We are convinced that Dean Acheson, who steadfastly serves the interests of nations other than his own, the friend of Alger Hiss, who supported him in his hour of retribution, who contributed to his defense fund, must be high on the roster. The President? He is their captive. I have wondered, as have you, why he did not dispense with so great a liability as Acheson to his own and his party's interests. It is now clear to me. In the relationship of master and man, did you ever hear of man firing master? Truman is a satisfactory front. He is only dimly aware of what is going on.

I do not believe that Mr. Truman is a conscious party to the great conspiracy, although it is being conducted in his name. I believe that if Mr. Truman had the ability to associate good Americans around him, he would have behaved as a good American in this most dire of all our crises.

#### REVIEW OF MARSHALL'S ACTIVITIES

It is when we return to an examination of General Marshall's record since the spring of 1942 that we approach an

explanation of the carefully planned retreat from victory. Let us again review the Marshall record, as I have disclosed it from all the sources available and all of them friendly. This grim and solitary man it was who, early in World War II, determined to put his impress upon our global strategy, political and military.

It was Marshall who, amid the din for a "second front now" from every voice of Soviet inspiration, sought to compel the British to invade across the Channel in the fall of 1942 upon penalty of our quitting the war in Europe.

It was Marshall who, after North Africa had been secured, took the strategic direction of the war out of Roosevelt's hands and who fought the British desire, shared by Mark Clark, to advance from Italy into the eastern plains of Europe ahead of the Russians.

It was a Marshall-sponsored memorandum, advising appeasement of Russia in Europe and the enticement of Russia into the far eastern war, circulated at Quebec, which foreshadowed our whole course at Tehran, at Yalta, and until now in the Far East.

It was Marshall who, at Tehran, made common cause with Stalin on the strategy of the war in Europe and marched side by side with him thereafter.

It was Marshall who enjoined his chief of military mission in Moscow under no circumstances to "irritate" the Russians by asking them questions about their forces, their weapons, and their plans, while at the same time opening our schools, factories, and gradually our secrets to them in this country.

It was Marshall who, as Hanson Baldwin asserts, himself referring only to the "military authorities," prevented us having a corridor to Berlin. So it was with the capture and occupation of Berlin and Prague ahead of the Russians.

It was Marshall who sent Deane to Moscow to collaborate with Harriman in drafting the terms of the wholly unnecessary bribe paid to Stalin at Yalta. It was Marshall, with Hiss at his elbow and doing the physical drafting of agreements at Yalta, who ignored the contrary advice of his senior, Admiral Leahy, of MacArthur and Nimitz; manipulated intelligence reports, brushed aside the potentials of the A-bomb and finally induced Roosevelt to reinstate Russia in its pre-1904, imperialistic position in Manchuria; an act which, in ef-

fect, signed the death warrant of the Republic of China.

It was Marshall, with Acheson and Vincent eagerly assisting, who created the China policy which, destroying China, robbed us of a great and friendly ally, a buffer against the Soviet imperialism with which we are now at war.

It was Marshall, who, after long conferences with Acheson and Vincent, went to China to execute the criminal folly of the disastrous Marshall mission.

It was Marshall who, upon returning from a diplomatic defeat for the United States at Moscow, besought the reinstatement of forty millions in lend-lease for Russia.

It was Marshall who, for 2 years suppressed General Wedemeyer's report, which is a direct and comprehensive repudiation of the Marshall policy.

It was Marshall who, disregarding Wedemeyer's advices on the urgent need for military supplies, the likelihood of China's defeat without ammunition and equipment, and our "moral obligation" to furnish them, proposed instead a relief bill bare of military support.

It was the State Department under Marshall, with the wholehearted support of Michael Lee and Remington in the Commerce Department, that sabotaged the \$125,000,000 military-aid bill to China in 1948.

It was Marshall who fixed the dividing line for Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel, a line historically chosen by Russia to make its sphere of interest in Korea.

It is Marshall's strategy for Korea which has turned that war into a pointless slaughter, reversing the dictum of Von Clausewitz and every military theorist since him that the object of a war is not merely to kill but to impose your will on the enemy.

It is Marshall-Acheson strategy for Europe to build the defense of Europe solely around the Atlantic Pact nations, excluding the two great wells of anti-Communist manpower in Western Germany and Spain and spurning the organized armies of Greece and Turkey—another case of following the Lattimore advice of "let them fall but don't let it appear that we pushed them."

It is Marshall who, advocating timidity as a policy so as not to annoy the forces of Soviet imperialism in Asia, had admittedly put a brake on the preparations to fight, rationalizing his reluctance on

the ground that the people are fickle and if war does not come, will hold him to account for excessive zeal.

What can be made of this unbroken series of decisions and acts contributing to the strategy of defeat? They cannot be attributed to incompetence. If Marshall were merely stupid, the laws of probability would dictate that part of his decisions would serve this country's interest. If Marshall is innocent of guilty intention, how could he be trusted to guide the defense of this country further? We have declined so precipitously in relation to the Soviet Union in the last 6 years. How much swifter may be our fall into disaster with Marshall at the helm? Where will all this stop? That is not a rhetorical question: Ours is not a rhetorical danger. Where next will Marshall carry us? It is useless to suppose that his nominal superior will ask him to resign. He cannot even dispense with Acheson.

#### GREAT CONSPIRACY

What is the objective of the great conspiracy? I think it is clear from what has occurred and is now occurring; to diminish the United States in world affairs, to weaken us militarily, to confuse our spirit with talk of surrender in the Far East and to impair our will to resist evil. To what end? To the end that we shall be contained, frustrated and finally fall victim to Soviet intrigue from within and Russian military might from without. Is that farfetched? There have been many examples in history of rich and powerful states which have been corrupted from within, enfeebled and deceived until they were unable to resist aggression.

The United States first ventured into world affairs a bare half century ago. Its rise to world leadership was almost unprecedentedly sudden. We call this a young country. It is in terms of the tenure of the settlement by Europeans on these lands. It is also in terms of the spirit and daring of its people. Yet the United States belongs to, is the last great example of, the farthest projection of an old culture. The vast and complicated culture of the west, which bloomed with the spread of the Gothic cathedrals and the universities which has carried science and technology and art and the human values to lengths nowhere else dreamed of and whose sway covered the earth only a few years ago, is in manifest decay. We see the symptoms of

decay in Western Europe. We find evidences of it here.

There is a rising power, not yet a culture; a power barbarous to us which has attracted many followers and devotees in the heart of the west. Why these men and women of the west are so attracted lies outside our interest at this moment. We know that these enemies of the west are here, we know they are at work among us, burrowing, mining, sapping ceaselessly; seeking to destroy our civilization. We know principally because we see the results of their work. We cannot always detect them at it. That is not an easy task as we have seen with the notorious case of Alger Hiss.

The enemies of our civilization, whether alien or native, whether of high or low degree, work in the dark. They are that way more effective. It is easy to single out, identify and isolate a frank and open Communist. The Communists openly among us are scarcely a problem at all. They have the aversion and contempt of all honest Americans. It is the clandestine enemy which taxes our ingenuity.

#### THE KREMLIN'S EXECUTIONERS

It is the great crime of the Truman administration that it has refused to undertake the job of ferreting the enemy from its ranks. I once puzzled over that refusal. The President, I said, is a loyal American; why does he not lead in this enterprise? I think that I know why he does not. The President is not master in our own house. Those who are master there not only have a desire to protect the sappers and miners—they could not do otherwise. They themselves are not free. They belong to a larger conspiracy, the world-wide web of which has been spun from Moscow. It was Moscow, for example, which decreed that the United States should execute its loyal friend, the Republic of China. The executioners were that well-identified group headed by Acheson and George Catlett Marshall.

How, if they would, can they break these ties, how return to simple allegiance to their native land? Can men sullied by their long and dreadful record afford us leadership in the world struggle with the enemy? How can a man whose every important act for years had contributed to the prosperity of the enemy reverse himself? The reasons for his past actions are immaterial. Regardless of why he has done what he did,

he has done it and the momentum of that course bears him onward. This is his plight:

I am in blood,  
Stepped in so far, that should I wade no more,

Returning were as tedious as go o'er.

Can we foretell the next move on the timetable of the great conspiracy? It seems clearly indicated. Dean Acheson foreshadowed it the other day before the Russell committee when he expressed his desire to have a cease-fire negotiated with the Peking Reds on the basis of the thirty-eighth parallel. A cease-fire leaving the enemy in command of Korea north of that imaginary line that has occasioned the spilling of so much blood. And then, after the cease-fire, to have our friends on Formosa delivered behind the iron curtain by a jury stacked with the friends of international communism and then have the question of the admission of Red China decided by the United Nations. While Acheson publicly proclaims he is opposed to the sell-out, but privately continues to encourage our "friends" in the United Nations to prepare not only to bury the Republic of China, but to heap refuse on its grave. If that is the best that the perfidious Red Dean can offer us, I say let him come again. After all, we need not take what he or the mayor of the palace or the weak Merovingian himself brings us.

The time has come to halt this tepid, milk-and-water acquiescence which a discredited administration, ruled by disloyalty, sends down to us. The American may belong to an old culture, he may be beset by enemies here and abroad, he may be distracted by the many words of counsel that assail him by day and night, but he is nobody's fool. The time has come for us to realize that the people who sent us here expect more than time-serving from us. The American who has never known defeat in war, does not expect to be again sold down the river in Asia. He does not want that kind of betrayal. He has had betrayal enough. He has never failed to fight for his liberties since George Washington rode to Boston in 1775 to put himself at the head of a band of rebels unversed in war. He is fighting tonight, fighting gloriously in a war on a distant American frontier made inglorious by the men he can no longer trust at the head of our affairs.

The America that I know, and that other Senators know, this vast and teeming and beautiful land, this hopeful society where the poor share the table of the rich as never before in history, where men of all colors, of all faiths, are brothers as never before in history, where great deeds have been done and great deeds are yet to do, that America deserves to be led not to humiliation or defeat, but to victory.

The Congress of the United States is the people's last hope, a free and open forum of the people's representatives. We felt the pulse of the people's response to the return of MacArthur. We know what it meant. The people, no longer trusting their executive, turn to us, asking that we reassert the constitutional prerogative of the Congress to declare the policy for the United States.

The time has come to reassert that prerogative, to oversee the conduct of this war, to declare that this body must have the final word on the disposition of Formosa and Korea. They fell from the grasp of the Japanese empire through our military endeavors, pursuant to a declaration of war made by the Congress of the United States on December 8, 1941. If the Senate speaks, as is its right, the disposal of Korea and Formosa can be made only by a treaty which must be ratified by this body. Should the administration dare to defy such a declaration, the Congress has abundant resources which I need not spell out.

#### SOURCE MATERIAL

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Adm. William Leahy, *I Was There*.  
Cordell Hull, *Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, volume II.  
Henry L. Stimson, *On Active Service*.  
James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*.  
Sumner Welles, *Seven Decisions That Shaped History*.  
Edward Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians*.  
Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*.  
Hanson Baldwin, *Great Mistakes of the War*.  
Gen. H. H. Arnold, *Global Mission*.  
Gen. Claire Chennault, *Way of a Fighter*.  
Gen. Lucius Clay, *Decision in Germany*.  
Gen. Mark Clark, *Calculated Risk*.  
Gen. John R. Deane, *Strange Alliance*.  
Gen. Omar Bradley, *The War America Fought*, Life magazine, April 30, 1951.  
George Morgenstern, *Pearl Harbor*.  
Edward Ansel Mowrer, *The Nightmare of American Foreign Policy*.  
Jonathan Daniels, *The Man of Independence*.

Freda Utley, *The China Story*.  
Henry Wallace, *Soviet Asia Mission*.  
Robert Payne, *Mao Tse-tung—Ruler of Red China*.  
Arthur Upham Pope, *Litvinoff*.  
United States Relations With China (State Department White Paper).

Hearings before Senate Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Banking and Currency, June 17, 1947.  
Hearings before subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Tydings committee), April 27, 1950.  
William C. Bullitt, Gen. Patrick Hurley, and others, as quoted in above books.

AUGUST 9, 1951

## Explanation of Why Names Were Made Public; Statement on Suspended State Department Officials Under Investigation Being Allowed Access to Secret Files

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, last year I gave the Senate the names of 81 individuals whom I considered dangerous to this country if allowed to remain in positions of power. At the time that was done there were constant demands upon the floor of the Senate, many of them made by the then majority leader, former Senator Lucas, who is no longer a Member of the Senate, that I make the names public on the Senate floor. As I have stated, the majority leader was joined in this demand by a number of other Senators. At that time I refused to comply with the request, and explained why. I told the Senate I felt that of the 81 cases given the Senate, some were marginal cases, in which the parties might well prove themselves to be neither bad security risks nor disloyal, and that for that reason I felt that the names should be given to the committee which was to be appointed, and should be given to it in private, and that then, after the committee had completed its investigation, it should decide which names were to be made public.

In that connection, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD, at this point, statements by the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER] and myself, explaining how it happened that certain names were made public.

There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

### EXCERPTS FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD EXPLAINING WHY NAMES WERE MADE PUBLIC

1. Remarks of Senator HICKENLOOPER, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, April 5, 1950, pages 4957, 4958.

"As a member of the subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations now engaged in the inquiry into the charges of the Senator from Wisconsin, I should like to say that on the day on which the Senator from Wisconsin made his speech at some length on the floor of the Senate, in which he referred to certain cases by number, and so forth—I think it was the 20th of February—at that time the Senator from Wisconsin repeatedly stated and re-

stated on the floor of the Senate that he did not want to make names public, that he would not tell the names to the Senate in public; and, time after time, the Senator from Illinois, the majority leader, rose to demand that he give the names in public, so the whole country would know who the people were that were suspected.

"The Senator from Wisconsin repeatedly said, 'No; I will not make them public.' The Senator from Kentucky, Mr. WITHERS, rose and said he wanted to see the list of names. The Senator from Wisconsin said, 'Come to my office in the morning and I will show you the names.' The Senator from Kentucky said, 'Can I make them public? I intend to make them public if I see them.' The Senator from Wisconsin said, 'No; if you are going to make them public, I shall not give you the names.'

"The CONGRESSIONAL RECORD is replete with such statements on the question of the publicity of the names.

"It is a matter of fact also that the junior Senator from Massachusetts and I, both at the first executive meeting of the subcommittee, suggested and proposed the procedure, that the subcommittee meet in executive session, call the Senator from Wisconsin before it, and ask him to disclose the names in private, together with whatever information he had in connection with the names; but the majority of the subcommittee said 'No, this must be brought out in public.' So they held their first hearing, requiring the Senator from Wisconsin to come, in public, to name the names. I tell the Senator that, if he is not familiar with it, merely to keep the factual history of the publicity of these names accurate.

"I should like to say also that so far as I am concerned, while we did not have the machinery to set up a court of inquiry such as the Canadian spy-ring case called for, we did propose and urge that an inquiry in secrecy without naming names be made with the facts collected. But we were overruled, and the Senator from Wisconsin was required, or requested, to come before the committee in public hearing, with klieg lights, television, and all the rest of the fanfare of such an emotional occasion, there to bring out his cases, name names, and produce facts."

Remarks of Senator McCARTHY, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, March 30, 1950, pages 4434, 4435.

"There has been considerable criticism by a number of well-meaning people of the naming of names in public before the individuals have an opportunity to be heard.

"It might be well, therefore, to briefly cite the record as to why names have been named in public rather than in private. On the 20th of February, as the Senate will recall, I gave to the Senate in some detail 81 cases of individuals whom I stated the files indicated ranged all the way from being bad security risks to very dangerous individuals.

"At that time I pointed out that perhaps some of these individuals would be able to produce facts to offset the effect of the material in the files and show that they were actually loyal employees. I stated in effect—and while I have not had an opportunity to check the number of times in the RECORD, my office tells me that I did so over a dozen times—that I would consider it extremely improper and unfair to name names in public before the individuals had a chance to appear in executive session.

"The leader of the Democratic Party, Mr. Lucas, however, on five separate occasions, demanded that the names be publicly named. His first demand was on page 2043 of the RECORD. Again, on page 2046, he had this to say:

"I want to remain here until he names them. That is what I am interested in."

"Again, on page 2049, he said:

"Will the Senator tell us the name of the man for the RECORD. We are entitled to know who he is. I say this in all seriousness."

"Again, on page 2053, he said:

"The Senator should name names before that committee."

"Again, on page 2063, he said:

"Why does the Senator refuse to divulge names before the Senate?"

"Mr. Withers, also, on almost countless occasions heckled me for the names, stating, on page 2063:

"Does the Senator realize that I, like all others, am curious to know the names? When the Senator gives the cases the people and the country at large are entitled to know who they are."

"At that time I, in answer to the urging of the Senator from Illinois and the Senator from Kentucky, stated that I would not give the names in public unless a majority of the Senate demanded that they be made public, and this is all a matter of record.

"After the committee had been appointed and Senator Tydings made chairman, he saw me on the floor of the Senate and stated that a public hearing had been scheduled and asked if I would be ready to appear and testify. At that time I urged that the hearings be in executive session and reminded him of the statements which I made on the Senate floor.

"He informed me that the first hearings would be public and that later we would go into executive session. Later I was informed by the press that Mr. Tydings had made

a statement that I could present my cases as I saw fit.

"I again contacted him and told him that, if such were the case, I thought the names should be given in executive session, but was again informed that the first hearings would be public.

"I then contacted my colleague, Senator HICKENLOOPER, and told him that while I thought this might be good politics for the majority members of the committee because of the position in which it would place me, that it was so unfair to some of the individuals who might be able to produce evidence giving them a clean bill of health something should be done.

"Senator HICKENLOOPER informed me there was nothing that he or Senator LODGE could do because Senator Tydings had made the announcement that the first hearings would be open and it was not even brought to a vote, inasmuch as Senator McMAHON and Senator GREEN so obviously went along with him.

"At the time of the first public hearing, after I had begun to testify, and had already passed out to the members of the press the first case covering Judge Kenyon, Senator Tydings then told me that if I cared to, we would go into executive session.

"He, of course, knew full well that to go into executive session, so far as the Kenyon case was concerned, would be meaningless after I had commenced the case and handed the evidence thereon to the press.

"I had tried to make it clear that the Kenyon case was presented as one of a sequence which I had hoped to present the first morning, if I had been allowed to proceed. I felt that it was important, not so much from the standpoint of Judge Kenyon, but rather as a typical case to show the complete incompetence of the Loyalty Board for the reason that in this case the files contained more than 28 documents showing membership in organizations listed as subversive or Communist-front—that regardless of this, the Loyalty Board never even went through the motions of asking the judge for an explanation as to why she joined these organizations, which the Secretary of State himself had stated were evidence that an employee was a bad security risk.

"After being held to the Kenyon case by petty bickering for 2 days during which, according to my staff, I occupied approximately 5 percent of the time, the committee adjourned over the week end and stated that Judge Kenyon would be called as a witness.

"The chairman of the committee then magnanimously offered that the other cases which I was prepared to present the first day be given in executive session. I do not condemn or criticize the chairman for this maneuver. Politically, it was extremely clever. However, after presenting one case to show how the Loyalty Board worked, a case which happened to be a woman, it

would seem unusual in the extreme that the committee retire into executive session to consider the cases of these prominent State Department officials in whose activities the public was so vitally interested.

"I might say that while at the time I felt that the Senator from Illinois was wholly wrong in demanding the names be made public and while I originally was very much disturbed by Senator Tydings' very clever maneuvering of the names into public print, I am not too sure that perhaps some good has not been accomplished.

"After all, an individual who takes a high Government position must realize that for the good of the country his actions and motives should be subjected to the closest scrutiny. After all, the aims and objectives of the group who have been formulating a rather disastrous far eastern policy should be subjected publicly to a cold and searching light. Therefore, I am not too sure that the Senate majority leader and the chairman of the committee may not have performed a service to the country when one insisted that the names be made public and the other maneuvered those names into the public press."

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, as was pointed out so clearly by the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER], former Senator Tydings, then chairman of the subcommittee making the investigation, who is no longer with us, insisted that the first sessions be held in public, and consequently about 9 or 10 of the 81 names were made public. Since that time I have been trying to follow the progress of the individual cases which were given to the Tydings committee, 81 in number, plus 25 additional names which were developed during the hearings. I found that a considerable number had been cleared by the State Department—28, to be exact; and, at a later time, I intend to read into the RECORD the dates of their clearance. Another list of 29 names is still pending before the Loyalty Security Board. As to the remainder, nothing was done.

In the 29 cases, what is known as "letters of charges" have been filed. Those letters of charges were not filed by McCARTHY; they were not filed by anyone outside the Department. They were filed as the result of adverse information developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or by some of the State Department investigators. How to describe "letters of charges" best, I do not know, except to say that the best analogy perhaps would be that of information filed by a district attorney, or perhaps an

indictment returned by a grand jury. The fact that letters of charges have been filed against these 29 individuals does not necessarily mean that all of them are guilty of the charges. Some of them may well be able to prove their innocence.

Incidentally, Mr. President, there is no doubt that they will all be cleared. The State Department's Loyalty Board has a very unusual record. In 4 years of operation, with hundreds and hundreds of cases coming before the Board, cases which came before the Board as the result of investigations conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the State Department's Loyalty Board has not found a single man unfit for Government service.

The Commerce Department comes next. The Commerce Department has found somewhat less than 7 percent of the cases which came before its Loyalty Board unfit for Government service. However, that record is not so bad as it may look because Secretary Sawyer, upon his own authority, discharged a number of questionable characters before their cases even came before the Loyalty Board.

I think we can safely say that all these individuals will be cleared, as they were cleared by the Tydings committee last year.

Upon learning that these individuals were formally charged, Mr. President, I wrote to former Senator Ilham Bingham, who succeeded Seth Richardson as Chairman of the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board, and asked him whether he would confirm the information which I already had as to which cases were pending. Under date of June 13 he wrote me confirming the information which I had. This letter is available to any Senator who indicates a desire to see it.

I then found that all these individuals, even though they had been formally charged with communistic activities, still, as of this moment, have access to top secret and other classified material in the State Department. I accordingly wrote the State Department and made a very, very reasonable request. I wrote them under date of July 23, 1951. I ask that this letter be printed in the body of the RECORD at this point in my remarks, omitting the list of names contained in the letter.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JULY 23, 1951.

MR. DEAN ACHESON,  
Secretary of State,  
Washington D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I would appreciate receiving information as to the status of the following 29 cases which I understand are pending before the State Department's loyalty board:

I would also appreciate knowing—

1. Whether the above individuals have access to classified material while their cases are pending;

2. Whether letters of charges have been filed in all of the above cases.

A short time ago when it was announced that the cases of John Paton Davies and Oliver Clubb had been reopened and they had been suspended, the State Department announced that, under the law, suspension was mandatory. I thereupon wrote the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission Loyalty Board and asked him why others whose cases were pending before the Loyalty Board, such as John Carter Vincent and Phillip Jessup, and so forth, were not also suspended. The Chairman wrote me under date of July 16, stating that the law does not make suspension mandatory, but leaves the question of suspension entirely within the discretion of the Secretary of State. Do you so understand the law?

If steps have been taken to deny individuals such as Vincent, Jessup, and others whom I have named above, access to secret and other classified State Department material I would appreciate being so informed. If no such steps have been taken, I would appreciate receiving your comments as to whether you consider it safe practice to give individuals being investigated for Communist activities free access to State Department material of such a secret nature that it is not available to Members of the Congress.

Unless I receive your immediate assurance that steps will be taken to deny access to secret material to those whose cases are pending before your loyalty board and those who have been formally charged with Communist activities, I shall feel forced to bring the individual cases to the attention of the public with the hope that public opinion may force sensible action on your part.

Sincerely yours,

JOE McCARTHY.

Mr. McCARTHY. In that letter, I called to the Secretary of State's attention the very dangerous practice of giving these individuals access to secret material after they had been charged with communistic activity. To my mind, it is like a man who is indicted

for embezzlement having completely free access to the funds of the bank while he is being tried.

I told the Secretary of State that unless he would assure me that these persons would be denied access to secret material until his own loyalty board would clear them, I felt I had no choice but to bring the cases to the attention of the Senate and give the Senate a résumé of the "letters of charges" filed against them, hoping that action by the Senate or perhaps public opinion would make the Secretary change his policy and adopt a sensible, safe attitude.

I received from the Secretary's office, under date of July 25, a very arrogant letter, in which he indicated that he thought it was no business of the Senate, that the State Department is his own little private kingdom where he can do what he pleases, and he refused to assure me that these men would be denied access to secret material.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter be inserted in the body of the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,  
Washington, July 25, 1951.

The Honorable JOSEPH R. McCARTHY,  
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARTHY: As the officer in charge of the operation of the loyalty and security program of the Department of State, I am answering your letter to the Secretary of July 23.

You begin your letter by stating that it is your understanding that the 29 individuals whom you list are "cases . . . pending before the State Department's Loyalty Board." Your understanding is incorrect. The 29 individuals—all of whom you have cited, of course, in your former lists—fall into varying categories. Like your previous lists, this one also includes the names of persons who are not employees of the Department of State, employees who have been cleared by the Department's Loyalty Security Board, as well as individuals in process through the loyalty program. Your indiscriminate lumping together of names and the threat to make them public is tantamount to holding hostage the reputation and rights of those employees who have been or may be cleared of the allegations against them. The President's directive of March 13, 1948 (Federal Register, March 16, 1948), precludes me from furnishing any reports, records, or files relative to the loyalty of employees. Disclosure of such information would be prejudicial both to these people as individuals and to the Government's ability

to conduct a sound, just, and honorable loyalty security program.

Let me once again remind you that the Department of State is operating under the loyalty program laid down by the President in Executive Order No. 9835, as amended by Executive Order No. 10241. This Executive order, which anyone interested in our national security safeguards should feel duty-bound to study, prescribes a loyalty system which even the most critical have endorsed. This system offers as much protection to the Government as any ethical and American system which could be devised. That it is subject to attack for purely political reasons without regard for the facts is unfortunate.

The Department of State, operating under the authorities of the so-called McCarran security rider and Public Law 733, carries out a total security program. When I say total, I mean total. If an individual is found to be a security risk, he is separated from the Department.

Now, the following points with regard to the Department's loyalty and security program have been said many times, but I will repeat them again for your benefit as simply and as briefly as possible:

1. Both the loyalty and security programs of the Department are under my immediate supervision, and they are being carried out honestly and effectively. We are and will continue to operate a program to assure (1) maximum protection to the Government and (2) due regard for the rights of the individual.

2. Under this program, all departmental and Foreign Service officers receive complete security investigations. These investigations are exhaustive and are made by trained investigators, operating under the direct supervision of a former FBI agent, Mr. Donald Nicholson.

3. The Department does not permit any employee to have access to secret material when it has determined that such access might constitute a danger to the security of the United States. To do otherwise would be contrary to the established security principles of the Department.

4. Questions as to the loyalty of any employee of this Department or the Foreign Service result in an up-to-date and full-scale investigation of the individual employee by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The evaluation of this investigation is made by a competent Loyalty Security Board which operates under the chairmanship of Gen. Conrad E. Snow, an experienced and able lawyer of distinguished reputation and unquestioned integrity.

5. This Board is made up of men of such high qualifications and unquestioned loyalty that I doubt that even the most suspicious person could be able to challenge their credentials.

6. The work of the Board is reviewed administratively by my immediate office and by the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil

Service Commission. Mr. Seth Richardson, a former Assistant Attorney General under ex-President Herbert Hoover, was formerly chairman of the Loyalty Review Board. He was succeeded by the present chairman, ex-Republican Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Hiram Bingham.

7. In the more than 4 years of operation under this procedure, the Loyalty Review Board has never reversed the Department's adjudication of a case.

8. In conducting this program, the Department has uncovered some employees who did not meet its high security standards, and these employees have been separated.

As should be perfectly clear from the foregoing, the conduct of the Department's loyalty and security programs are predicated on thoroughly tried and proven American principles. We will continue to operate this program in the same straightforward manner in the future, confident that we are taking every reasonable step to assure a completely loyal and trustworthy group of employees. But we will not abandon adherence to those concepts so carefully and deliberately laid down in the President's loyalty program, and we will not compromise our legal and ethical responsibilities under pressure of political strategem or threat.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I find an interesting passage on page 3 of the letter, which reads as follows:

In the more than 4 years of operation under this procedure, the Loyalty Review Board has never reversed the Department's adjudication of a case.

In other words, Mr. Acheson's man is telling how good their board is because it has never been reversed. In view of the fact that they have never found an individual unfit for service, there could never have been an appeal to the Loyalty Review Board. Therefore, since there was never an appeal, there could not have been a reversal.

However, the Review Board has the power to take up a case on post audit and indicate dissatisfaction with the case. That has been done time and time again—even though the Secretary says this is not a reversal. As an example of such a case I invite the attention of the Senate to the case of John Stewart Service. I informed the late unlamented Tydings committee that the Service case had been postaudited, sent back to the Loyalty Board, and that the Review Board said it was handled so badly that it wanted to call in an entirely new board and also asked that Service be brought

back from a key spot in India. The State Department immediately issued a press release or called a press conference, I do not recall which, and announced that this was untrue; that McCARTHY was lying and that Service's case had not been ordered reopened. I called the Department and told them unless they would issue a true statement of the facts, I would make public the photostats of the Review Board's ruling. Within a half an hour the State Department mysteriously found that the Service case had been ordered reopened and so announced.

I merely mention it because it sheds light on how much credit we can give to the official statements from the State Department. It would seem officials of the Department, who are, like Members of the Senate, servants of the people, would have the decency and honesty to tell the American people the truth.

So much for that.

I should like to make it very clear as I refer to the loyalty board of the State Department that I am not referring to the Civil Service Commission's Loyalty Review Board. That Board, as we all know, was doing an extremely foul job until its head, Seth Richardson, was promoted, and his place was taken over by former Senator Bingham, of Connecticut. I think Senator Bingham is doing the best job anyone could do under the circumstances.

I hesitate praising Senator Bingham because I know any words of praise from me for any Government official certainly endangers that person's job.

Mr. President, I very much dislike bringing in the names of these individuals, but I frankly do not think I have any other choice. I think, so long as they are being given access to secret material and have been officially charged, that they have no more right to have their names remain secret than would someone who might be charged with reckless driving, embezzlement, or with any other crime or misdemeanor.

I shall briefly run through the cases, Mr. President. The first case is that of an individual well known to all of us, John Carter Vincent. Please keep in mind that these "letters of charges" were not prepared by me; they were prepared as the result of investigations by the FBI or State Department investigators.

Vincent is charged with being a member of the Communist Party, and to the

best of my knowledge he is also charged with espionage activities while in Switzerland.

I would suggest to the McCarran committee that if they can obtain the correspondence between the Central Intelligence Agency and Dean Acheson's office they will find the correspondence very revealing. I doubt if they will be able to get it, in view of what happened in the committee this morning. A very fantastic thing occurred before the McCarran committee this morning. General Willoughby was before the committee and was asked to give information on the communistic activities of certain Government employees, and he read into the record an order which he received from the Army saying to him, "General, you must not give the Senate committee any information about any employee of this Government."

Inconceivable? Yes. But it is true. It is part of the record.

So, Mr. President, I am not too hopeful that the McCarran committee will be able to get that correspondence.

One of the members of the Loyalty Board informs us that Acheson has assured them that the Department will not call Vincent back from Africa.

Some of the additional information is not contained in the letter of charges, which I commend to the attention of the McCarran committee. I refer to the activities of George Otlik who has been working hand in glove with Vincent in Switzerland. Otlik represented the short-lived Hungarian Communist regime of Bela Kun. He was stationed in Berne, Switzerland.

While he was Director of the Far Eastern Division in 1945 Vincent wrote a memorandum, which is in his State Department file, strongly urging that General Hodge establish a coalition government between North Korea and South Korea. He objected strenuously to Syngman Rhee and urged that the State Department assist a Moscow-trained Communist by the name of Kem Koosok to get the presidency of South Korea. As we also know, Vincent has been a very close associate of Owen Lattimore. Lattimore has been named by two witnesses as a Communist and as an agent of the Soviet Secret Police, respectively.

On page 172 of Wallace's book it is pointed out that in 1944 a high official of the Soviet Government proposed a

toast to Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent

He proposed a toast, which was quoted by Wallace as follows:

To Owen—

Here we have the top representative of the Soviet, and here is his toast, as quoted by Wallace—

To Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China on whom rests great responsibility for China's future.

That is to be found on page 177 of Wallace's book. So much for John Carter Vincent.

The next case is the case of William T. Stone. Stone's Communist activities are legion, and I will not attempt to describe all of them. It is of some interest to note that he was one of the co-editors of Amerasia. Amerasia has been described by the FBI as a "tool of Soviet espionage." He was also one of the high officers in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Prior to the formation of the present Loyalty Board in the State Department there was a board—I believe it was referred to as the Security Board—and there were some good men on that board but, of course, they are no longer in the Department. In 1946 that Board recommended as follows with regard to this man Stone:

In behalf of the above-mentioned it is recommended that action be instituted to terminate his services with the State Department immediately.

The date of that, incidentally, was March 22, 1946. I continue to quote from the Security Board report:

It is suggested to achieve this purpose that an appropriate officer of the Department should inform Mr. Stone that his continued employment in the Department is embarrassing to the Department, and he should be given an opportunity to resign. If he should not resign voluntarily, action should be immediately instituted under Civil Service Rule No. 3 to terminate his services with the Department.

That was ignored by Acheson, who was then Under Secretary of State, and ignored by Stone's immediate superior, who was a man from Connecticut by the name of WILLIAM BENTON. Stone was working immediately under BENTON. As to some of Stone's additional activities—incidentally he formed a Washington branch of the Institute of Pacific Relations together with Esther Brun-

auer, whose husband resigned from the Navy while his loyalty case was pending, and who has been suspended, I understand, from the State Department.

Stone was also involved in innumerable Communist-front activities. It perhaps should also be mentioned that William Stone was the man who succeeded in keeping George Shaw Wheeler on in an important position in the State Department. Wheeler had been ordered discharged from a key position in the State Department on the ground that he was an active and important member of the Communist Party. William T. Stone, however, intervened in Wheeler's behalf and succeeded in keeping him in his position. Stone labeled Wheeler as the ideal State Department employee. As the Senators will recall, Wheeler left the United States and went behind the iron curtain, at which time he issued a statement viciously condemning everything America stands for and applauding communism.

On August 4, 1948—this is a matter of interest which is not in the letter of charges, but I call it to the attention of the Senate—on August 4, 1948, Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, the exposed Communist spy, testified under oath that William T. Stone gave him naval-intelligence records. At that time, Stone was Assistant Director of the Board of Economic Warfare. Stone, of course, will be cleared by Acheson's loyalty board. There is no question about that.

Apparently the reason why one of my colleagues [Mr. BENTON] has been squealing so loudly about McCARTHY's attacks on Communists is that some of his friends, such as William T. Stone, are going to be exposed. Stone's name has already cropped up in the McCarran hearings. As I said, the immediate superior of Stone in the State Department is the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. BENTON].

The next case, Mr. President, is the case of Herbert Fierst. Herbert Fierst is a foreign-affairs specialist in the Department of State. A memorandum of August 2, 1946, by Mr. Bannerman, one of the security officers in the Department of State, is to the effect that physical surveillance showed that this man Fierst was in constant contact with members of an espionage group and that he recommended Communists for State Department employment, and was engaged in a number of other Communist activities.

Incidentally the Loyalty Review Board which post-audited the Fierst case about 2½ years ago, after he had been cleared and ordered back to the State Department said, "We are not satisfied with this. This man is obviously either a Communist or following the line. We cannot approve having a man handling top secret material who is chumming with espionage agents."

What do you think happened to the case? The State Department said, "The case is closed."

Another is Marcia Ruth Harrison, divisional assistant, Department of State. I will not read all the charges. One is that she belonged to a vast number of Communist fronts, plus a Communist organization; that she belonged to the Young Communists League, was a paid-up member of it.

Next is Robert Ross, radio information specialist, Department of State.

Mr. President, I am not going to read the letters of charges in all these cases, but I will give a few typical cases.

The next is Ella M. Montague. She was born in Russia in 1896. She worked for the Amtorg Trading Corp. The testimony before 3 different committees is that only top members of the Communist Party could work for Amtorg. The Senate will recall that 5 or 6 of the officers of Amtorg were picked up about a year ago and charged with espionage. Under pressure from the State Department they were allowed to return to Russia.

Next is the case of Olga V. Osnatch. At the time of our original investigation she was not yet a citizen of the United States. She may have gotten her papers since, but I do not know. She worked for the Russian Embassy in Turkey for 3 years. Then with the Russian Welfare Society, and so forth. One of the significant things here, of course, is that the Russians do not hire people in their embassies unless they are Communists.

Another is Stella Gordon, also known as Estella Gordon, correspondent and research clerk, Department of State. Incidentally, Mr. President, I know that after I have given these cases and the summary of the letter of charges against some, there will be the usual high-pitched screaming and squealing that McCarthy has done this under senatorial immunity. I thought that charge should be laid to rest once and for all, so the other night before I went on a television broadcast I offered to name these individuals. The

sponsors' lawyers said, "No, we do not want you to do that"—and I do not blame them. I think it was good legal advice which they gave because, as Louis Budenz and some of the other top former Communists have testified, up to 1945 the orders of the party to members were "Don't under any circumstances sue. We do not want to bring the party into prominence in that way."

In 1945, according to the sworn testimony of reputable witnesses like Budenz, the party line changed, and Communists have standing orders to sue in every case in which anyone was accused of Communist activity. They were told, "Sue, even though you have no chance of winning. If you can bring 5 or 10 or 15 suits against a man you can bleed him white while he is defending them, and take up all his time, and he can spend no time in the fight against communism."

A good example was William Remington. The Senate will recall that Remington was named on a radio broadcast—Meet the Press, I believe—as a member of the Communist Party. He promptly filed suit. The radio chain and the insurance company, of course, had no access to Remington's files. They could not prove that he was the Communist he was, so they paid him \$10,000. The Senate knows that since that time Remington has been convicted. He was indicted by a New York grand jury and then convicted by a New York jury. The conviction was upheld by a court. It was a conviction based upon perjury, when he said that he was not a Communist. In other words, he was found to be a member of the Communist Party.

I mention that to show that I do not at all blame the sponsor for not wanting me to name these people on his program.

Some members of the press have been shouting that McCARTHY has been giving this information under immunity, so I notified the three press services that if they would have representatives at my office at 10 o'clock the next morning I would give them all the information about these individuals, and give them their names, if I could have some assurance that they wanted to print them, knowing, of course, that they would not, because all of us have had the experience of members of the press telling us that they cannot use certain information because it might subject

their papers to suits for libel or slander. Again, I do not blame them, because if 10 or 15 or 20 Communists started libel and slander actions against the newspapers it would cost them a fortune, and they would be busy defending lawsuits.

The three press services said, "No; we will take the names, but we will give you no assurance that we will print them." I was assured by one of the men that he knew that under no circumstances would they print them unless I used the names on the floor of the Senate.

Some members of the press also asked if their newspapers could get the information. I said, "Yes; if your editor will simply tell me that he wants to use the names, he can have them." I received no calls from any editors.

That should, I hope, lay at rest once and for all the silly, asinine claim that a Senator can expose corruption or communism somewhere other than on the Senate floor or before a committee. If he went off the Senate floor and exposed it, no one would hear about it except those within the range of his voice. If we are to have a housecleaning, the people from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from New Orleans to St. Paul, should have the information about these dangerous characters.

The next one is Daniel F. Margolies, one of the top security men in the State Department. Originally the appointment of this man was disapproved on the ground that he was a bad loyalty and security risk. He was hired anyway.

The next name is that of Robert Warren Barnett. This is one of the men who was brought into the State Department on the recommendation of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Edward Carter testified to that the other day. He has been active in the Institute for a number of years.

The letters of charges against the Barnettts—both Robert Warren Barnett and his wife, Mrs. Robert Warren Barnett—charge them with close association and constant contact with known Soviet espionage activity.

The next is Sylvia Schimmel, an administrative analyst in the Department of State. The letter of charges in her case is briefer, but substantially the same as that in the case of the Barnettts.

The next is Philip Raine, a regional specialist in the Department of State.

He is tied up, in the letter of charges, very closely with Robert T. Miller, who has been identified under oath several times as a Russian espionage agent.

The next is Gertrude Cameron, information and editorial specialist in the Department of State. I recommend this case especially to the McCarran committee.

The next is Paul A. Lifantieff-Lee, an economist in the Department of State. He was born in Russia. His file in the Navy Department, which was transmitted to the State Department, shows that he took secret State Department documents, which were found in his room and picked up by naval intelligence. That is shown by the naval intelligence report.

The next name is Franz Leopold Neumann, a consultant in the Department of State.

The next is John Tipton Fishburn, labor economist in the Department of State.

The next is Victor Myron Hunt, in the Office of Educational Exchange, Department of State.

The next is Arpad Erdos. He is an information specialist in the Department of State. For some time this man was with the Voice of America, but he was promoted, and now had a higher-paid job.

The next is an editor-writer by the name of Frances M. Tuchscher.

The next is Nelson Chipchin, a radio information specialist. This is another case that I recommend especially to the McCarran committee.

The next is Esther Less, also known as Esther Less Kopelewich, an announcer in the Department of State.

The next is Esther Caukin Brunauer, United States representative to the Preparatory Commission of UNESCO, Department of State.

The next is John Paton Davies. Incidentally, since I wrote the State Department, Davies has been cleared, despite the vast amount of information on his communistic activities. I understand he is being promoted and sent to Berlin to act as adviser to McCloy.

One final phase, the prize of them all, against whom charges are now pending, is Philip C. Jessup. The history of this man Jessup is so unusual that I assume some day we shall look back and say: "No; it is impossible. The State Department certainly would not have given this man the top job that he had

over in Paris, negotiating with the Russians even as Hiss in a less important capacity did the negotiating at Yalta."

I am not going to take much of the Senate's time on this case. I wish briefly to go through some of the material I have in my hand. Testimony was given by Jessup on two different occasions, the occasion of the first trial of Alger Hiss, and the second trial.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. I notice on the list read by the Senator the name of Esther Caukin Brunauer. It seems to me that I recall reading in the newspaper that she had been removed, along with her husband, from Government employment. Am I correct in my recollection?

Mr. McCARTHY. I understand that two of the individuals were suspended. They are Brunauer and Val R. Lorwin, the economist in the State Department. The information is to the effect that they are still on the payroll of the State Department, pending inquiry. Mrs. Brunauer's husband, Stephen Brunauer, was employed in the Navy Department as head of the High Explosive Section. He was named before the Tydings committee last year. The Senator will remember that I asked the Tydings committee to go into executive session and take up his case. They refused to do so. They said, "No, Brunauer has been cleared by the Loyalty Board, and we will not let you smear him."

Former Secretary Matthews did a pretty good job in the case. He took all the evidence against Brunauer and suspended Brunauer. Brunauer would not wait until his case had been decided, but resigned.

I may say, Mr. President, that Brunauer was a very close friend of Noel Field, who, since the Tydings hearing of last year, has disappeared behind the iron curtain. How many of our secrets he has taken with him behind the iron curtain, I do not know. I am giving to the Senate a list of 26 names. Of the 26 I understand 2 have been suspended, but the State Department will neither admit nor deny it. My letter of June 23 gave the State Department a list of 29 names. Of the 29, 2 have resigned, and they are no longer with the State Department. The third individual, who holds an important position in the Point 4 program, has been cleared. Today I am not giving the names of any

of the individuals who have been cleared. Twenty-eight of the one hundred and five have been cleared. I am not giving their names to the Senate, but instead am giving them to the McCarran committee.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SMITH of North Carolina in the chair). Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from South Dakota?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. Were those cases passed upon by the new Loyalty Board under former Senator Bingham?

Mr. McCARTHY. Oh, no. I may say to the Senator from South Dakota that if the cases of the individuals involved had been before the Bingham Board, and if former Senator Bingham had the power to deny them access to secret material, I would not have to get up on the floor of the Senate to give this information. If the case were before the Bingham Board it would certainly not be necessary to give this information. Senator Bingham's Board has no jurisdiction whatever over these cases until the State Department finds a man unfit for service. In that case the individual involved can appeal to the Bingham Board. If they do not find him unfit for Government service, his case does not come before the Bingham Board. After the State Department clears an individual the Bingham Board can, however, pick up that case on what is called a post-audit and send it back to the State Department, saying, "We want this case reheard." If the State Department again clears the individual the Bingham Board I understand takes the position—which is the opposite from the position taken by the Richardson Board—that it can take up the case again and order the man removed if that Board finds him unfit. Whether he has the power to do so under the law, I am not certain. However, I am glad to hear that he is adopting that position. None of the cases covered today have been cleared by the Bingham Board.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Former Senator Bingham has publicly announced, however, that he has reversed the policy of the Richardson Board, which Board said that when there was any doubt as to

whether or not a man was actually a Communist spy or a good American, and they could not resolve the evidence definitely one way or another, that it was their policy to give the benefit of the doubt to the individual, and let him continue to hold his security position. Former Senator Bingham announced immediately when he took over the post that in his opinion such procedure was an utterly indefensible attitude to take, either in a time of war or in a time like this, and he announced that if his board was unable to resolve definitely the question of whether or not a man was actually a Communist spy working for the Government, or a good citizen, and there was no conclusive proof either way, his board would give the benefit of the doubt to the Government and to the 130,000,000 good patriotic Americans, whose interest and future is jeopardized when Communist spies are permitted to remain in the Government service. Is that correct?

Mr. McCARTHY. I believe the Senator from South Dakota has stated the situation very correctly. The Richardson Board apparently took the opposite position. They took the position that unless they could find a man had committed an overt act of disloyalty, they would not recommend his discharge.

Mr. MUNDT. Unless they could find a Communist membership card in his pocket with a stamp on it showing that the dues had been paid currently, they would not consider him a security risk?

Mr. McCARTHY. Not even then, I will say to the Senator from South Dakota. They would not consider that an overt act. For example Remington was proven to have been a member of the Communist Party. Seth Richardson took the position that in view of the fact that it could not be proved that Remington was a member of the Communist Party as of the moment the Board was holding its hearings, they could not discharge him.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words, he was behind in his dues.

Mr. McCARTHY. It is never possible to prove a man is a Communist at any one particular moment. He can always say that he quit the party yesterday or the day before. I may say that the Board under Richardson met on April 20, 1950. President Truman had sent to the Board the list of names that I had given to the Tydings committee.

The Richardson Board met in secret session. I shall be glad to show the Senator from South Dakota a copy of the discussion by the Board in its secret hearing. It will show why so many unusual characters are still employed in the State Department. The discussion runs over approximately 20 pages. At first they argued whether or not they could make a finding against any of the individuals if they found he was a bad security risk, or whether they had to find that he had committed an overt act of disloyalty. Then there were some arguments as to what an overt act was. They contacted President Truman and they contacted either the Secretary of State or the Attorney General. I do not recall which one it was. In any event they asked for advice, and they were advised that they were not to check into the past of any man's character dealing with the point of whether or not a man was a bad security risk.

The Senator will be surprised to find that while some Members argued that the information should be put in the file, they finally decided against doing it on the ground that if they checked on a man as to whether or not he was a bad security risk and put that information in the file, McCARTHY or someone else might find out that they had labeled a man a bad security risk and would bring the fact to the attention of the Senate. Therefore they decided not to make such a check. Happily the new chairman of the Board, former Senator Bingham, has to a great extent reversed that procedure, although he is working under a tremendous handicap in that department.

Mr. MUNDT. I thank the Senator for the explanation. I merely wished to point out that fact, so that the country could have confidence in the new Board, and know that the Board had completely reversed the Richardson philosophy. In other words, it is no longer necessary to catch a man with a bomb in his hand or with a Communist membership card in his pocket. The new Board feels that whenever there is a reasonable doubt about a man's character, and it is unable to determine whether he is a loyal American or a Communist spy, and they cannot make a positive affirmation one way or another, the new Board gives the benefit of the doubt to the Government and to the 130,000,000 Americans, whose life and future are entirely in the hands

of any disloyal elements that may get into important strategic positions of the Government, whether it be in Defense, State, or any other key spot in Government.

Mr. McCARTHY. I think one of the cases demonstrates very well what the Senator is talking about, namely, the case of John S. Service. That case also shows the weakness of the Loyalty Board structure and its proceedings. The Service case is presently being held before the State Department's Loyalty Board, and apparently will be held there indefinitely. Some of the members of the Review Board are concerned about that, because they do not have jurisdiction until the State Department and its Loyalty Board have made their decision. The State Department thus can hold up a case for 2 or 3 years, and while it is pending, the Review Board has no power to make a post-audit or anything else of it.

To recall some of the facts in the Service case, the Senator from South Dakota will remember that representatives of the FBI testified under oath before the Tydings subcommittee that when Service was in this country, they followed him from the State Department, which he left with large brown envelopes under his arm, to the hotel room of Phillip Jaffe, who long has been known as a Communist, and was named as a Communist spy, and later was convicted. The representatives of the FBI said they trailed Service to Jaffe's hotel room; and trailed him away without those envelopes. They testified that they put microphones in Jaffe's room, and over the microphones they heard conversations going on in that room, and over the microphones they heard Service discuss top-secret military information with that Communist spy—information which he was giving that Communist spy. The Senator understands that I am now referring to testimony by representatives of the FBI.

As we recall, the Tydings subcommittee met and said, in effect, "Isn't it awful the way McCARTHY smeared this poor Mr. Service?" The State Department's Loyalty Board met and said that Service was an ideal public servant.

However, his case has been reopened, and I am rather interested in seeing what happens when that case goes before Senator Bingham's board.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, it seems to me that the case of William K. Rem-

ington is an even more startling illustration of how utterly futile and ineffective the Richardson Board was.

The junior Senator from Michigan has just entered the Chamber, let me say. I recall attending hearings when the Remington case was brought into the picture. I know that when I was a member of the House Committee on Un-American Activities we ventilated the Remington case. By that time the Loyalty Board was in operation and it had authority to make examinations. It sat and held sessions. Despite the fact that Remington has since then been removed from office and convicted, and I suppose is now in a Federal penitentiary, where he should be, to this late hour the Loyalty Board has never found Remington to be a loyalty risk; and, according to the records of the Loyalty Board, Remington is a good and faithful public servant. So, obviously, that kind of Loyalty Board is worse than nothing because it gives a false sense of security to the people, and makes them think that the traitors and the reasonable characters will be weeded out of the Government service.

Mr. McCARTHY. Also I should like to say that the Remington case was one of the cases I called to the attention of the Tydings subcommittee, and I pointed out that, although technically Remington was not on the State Department's payroll, but was on the payroll of the Department of Commerce—

Mr. MUNDT. Yes; Remington had, interestingly enough, the strategic job of determining what kind of military exports would be sent to Russia.

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct. Of course, as the Senator from South Dakota recalls, Secretary Sawyer ordered Remington discharged. However, Remington appealed to the Richardson Board, and that Board ordered him reinstated. While Remington was serving in the Department of Commerce, that Department did a good job of keeping him away from strategic information. However, later he very cleverly got into the State Department and got hold of such information in that way.

Elizabeth Bentley testified before the committee that Remington was one of the couriers for her and for other Communist spies. However, the Tydings subcommittee refused to consider her testimony seriously, and the Loyalty Board found Remington to be a good American.

Incidentally, I may say that next week there will be issued a report which will damn McCARTHY from hell to breakfast for going into Maryland and telling the Maryland voters about the tremendous whitewash job Senator Tydings did. Of course, Mr. President, if Senator Tydings did not do a whitewash job, then I treated him very unfairly, and then I should not have helped to let the people know what a whitewash job he did do. On the other hand, if Tydings did a whitewash job and if I did not expose that to the people of Maryland, I would be almost as guilty as Tydings.

Of course one spy in the Government service is too many. In a case of this sort, when the chairman of the committee is told, "Here is a man who is a Communist spy, and here are the witnesses. Please call them," then when the chairman of the committee says, "Oh, no; I won't," it is rather difficult for me to understand why my friends criticize me for exposing Mr. Tydings. In fact, I understand that one Senator would like to see the Senator from Wisconsin expelled from the Senate because he exposed our friend, Millard Tydings.

Mr. HENDRICKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. HENDRICKSON. In fairness to the other members of the committee, inasmuch as the Senator from Wisconsin has mentioned one of them who would like to see the Senator from Wisconsin removed, I think it is proper and in order for the Senator from Wisconsin to mention the Senator in question.

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. BENTON] submitted the resolution. I certainly was not referring to the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. HENDRICKSON].

Mr. President, I call the attention of the Senator from South Dakota to the secret workings and secret minutes of the Loyalty Board, under Seth Richardson, which met in April 1950. The Senator will see in the minutes that present at that time were George W. Alger, John H. Amen, Harry W. Blair, John Kirkland Clark, Clem W. Collins, Meta Glass, Paul M. Herbert, Garrett S. Hoag, Wilber LaRoe, Jr., Brunson MacChesney, Arthur W. Macmahon, Henry I. Shattuck, Andrew Steers, Elliot Wadsworth, Leonard D. White, and Chairman Richardson was presiding. In fairness to those who were present, I should say

that some of them, as the Senator from South Dakota will note, made a strong argument to the effect that they should investigate those individuals completely and thoroughly, regardless of whether the matters involved dealt with loyalty, security, or anything else which would make such persons unfit to serve. The Senator will also note that they then contacted the President and asked him whether they should make the examination, and received word to the effect that they should not, but should check only on overt acts of disloyalty—which resulted in clearance of every one of those persons, because they could not find them lighting a fuze to an H-bomb.

Mr. President, I believe I have covered all the cases now, except one, namely, the case of Philip C. Jessup.

First, let me say that if the Senator from South Dakota would care to see what has happened to a number of the other individuals whom I named last year, I shall be glad to let him examine the information which has come from the Review Board. I wish he would not give the names of any of the persons who have been cleared, however.

Mr. President, I hold in my hand the testimony of Jessup in the Hiss case. Jessup was unable to be present at the trial; he was out of the country. Accordingly, he made out affidavits.

It is not too difficult to understand how someone might have testified in favor of Hiss at the first trial. However, after all the evidence was brought to the attention of the public, so that men high in the Government service certainly knew that Hiss was a Communist spy, it is rather difficult then to understand how they would come to the defense of Hiss.

Here is the testimony of Jessup during Hiss' second trial:

Question. Mr. Jessup, do you know the reputation of Alger Hiss for loyalty, integrity, and veracity?

Answer. Yes; I do.

Question. What is that reputation? What do you think of it?

Answer. Outstanding.

That is only a minor part of his record. The head of the FBI, during his testimony before one of the committees, was asked whether it was significant that an individual belonged to a Communist-front organization. He pointed out that it might or might not be. He pointed out that many fine individuals were

duped into joining Communist-front organizations. Of course, that was the aim of the Communist Party, to try to get some good, loyal Americans on their lists, so they could use them to deceive people. But, as he said, "If you find that a man belongs to four, five, or six of these organizations, who have been named as fronts doing the work of the Communist Party, they are either so naive that they are dangerous to this Nation in a high Government job, or you can be sure that they are loyal to the Communist Party." That is not a verbatim quote, but as best as I can remember it.

One of the other men who was testifying was asked the same question, and he said this: "Well, let us put it this way. If you find that a man belongs to the Lutheran Young Men's Society, you can assume that he is most likely loyal to the principles of the Lutheran Church. If you find that he belongs to the Holy Name Society, you can assume that perhaps he is a Catholic; and," he said, "if you find that he belongs to organizations which are fronts for the Communist Party, then you can assume that he is either a Communist or that he certainly is loyal to the Communist Party."

Mr. Jessup, our Ambassador at Large, was affiliated with not one, not two, not three, not four, but with five organizations officially named as fronts for and doing the work of the Communist Party. Here are photostats of official letterheads which show his affiliations.

That is not all. Mr. Jessup exercised editorial control of the publication "Far East Survey," a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which has been named by a legislative committee as a Communist front. While he had that editorial control, and while that publication was following the Communist line down to the last period, who do you think was supporting it? When Frederick Field, a man who proclaims himself to be one of America's leading Communists, was on the stand last year he was asked whether he had contributed to Jessup's publication. His answer was, "I refuse to answer on the ground that it might incriminate me." With some difficulty we dug up the checks covering Communist money—believe it or not—over a short period of time, totaling \$6,000, used for the purpose of supporting the Communist-front publication run by our ambassador at large, a publication which, according to sworn testimony, employed

many Communist writers. When this evidence was brought to the attention of the Tydings Committee, the State Department had to have a press conference, at which they said, "Now, here is another example of this nasty McCarthyism." They said, "Just because poor Mr. Jessup took some Communist money, McCARTHY is trying to indicate that that is why he followed the Communist line in his publication"—their theory being, apparently, that Mr. Jessup was so naive that he did not know why the Communists were paying him and were supporting that publication. We can be certain that if Mr. Jessup was that naive, the Communists were not so naive. They knew they were getting a dollar's worth, and more, for every dollar they spent. The committee refused to go into the matter, but when I, with my limited staff, could dig up checks totaling \$6,000, representing Communist money, we can be very certain that there were many more thousands of dollars which Jessup received.

Let us keep in mind, as we read the photostat I have in my hand now, that we are talking about the man who represented the United States in the Big Four Conference in Paris, in the fight, if you please, against communism, and if it is possible to find a better analogy than Hiss at Yalta, I do not know where it would be.

I have in my hand a photostat of a petition which appeared in the New York Times on February 13, 1946. The Senate will recall that, at that time, the Communist Party line was that, if only the United States would destroy all its atomic bombs, if we would tear down our atomic facilities, we would then convince Russia that we were peace-loving and the result would be that there would be no danger of war. That was, of course, while Russia was obtaining our secrets and frantically trying to build her own atomic bombs. It was not too surprising to find the Daily Worker saying that—but one would hardly expect that our Ambassador at Large would say it. But I have in my hand this petition, signed by Jessup, which was published in the New York Times on February 13, 1946. Let me refer to two lines, in which this petition asks "that the United States at once stop the production of atomic bombs and atomic material, and that all the material which has been produced be destroyed by appro-

priate means, such as dumping it into the ocean." That is Philip Jessup.

Some interesting information has been developed before the McCarran Committee, of course, about Jessup. For example, they produced a letter at the hearing, which the Senate may or may not have seen. A letter which Jessup wrote to E. C. Carter, talking about Frederick Field, the top Communist, saying, "We have got to help Freddie all we can"—that was when he was about to head a Communist organization—"I suggest a press release as follows." Then Jessup wrote the press release and sent it to Field, a press release which was identical, almost to the last comma, with the Daily Worker's description of this Communist front.

Last year, when we were trying to dig some of the Communists out of Government, the President made a speech. As I recall, it was made over a Nationwide hookup. In it he said it was a great mistake to do what I was doing, that we were endangering national unity. He said, "Now, if McCARTHY or anyone else has any information about Communists or anyone who is bad for this country, let him send the information to me, Harry S. Truman." He said, "I will take action. You should not do it the way McCARTHY is doing it."

Mr. President, when we got this material regarding Jessup, I decided I would call the President's bluff so we sent all of it to him. We sent him copies of the magazine which Jessup was publishing which contained articles which followed the Communist line right down to the last period. One would think it was the Cominform's official program and rightly so because the articles were being written by men who have been identified under oath as Communists. We sent him photostats of the checks, showing that the Communists were supporting Jessup's publication. We sent him a copy of the petition of Jessup, saying "Let us destroy our atomic bomb." We sent him copies of Jessup's testimony praising Alger Hiss. We sent him photostats showing that Mr. Jessup was affiliated with five organizations which had been officially named as fronts for and doing the work for the Communist Party.

I said, "Now, Mr. President, take action. Here is some evidence. Certainly you cannot say this man is good for America. He has been found at every

time and place where disaster has struck America and success has come to Soviet Russia."

The President took action. What do Senators think the President's action was? It consisted of giving Philip C. Jessup top secret clearance to all atomic and hydrogen-bomb information. Of all the stupidly stubborn and stubbornly stupid examples of playing with the lives of American boys, I think that tops them all.

Mr. President, in closing, let me say, again, that I very much dislike having to name these individuals who are under charges of Communist activities. I begged the Secretary of State to deny them access to secret material, and told him if he did not do so I would have to name them. He refused. Some of them may be able to prove that they are neither security nor loyalty risks. If so, they have been hurt by this publicity, and I regret it. But if an individual is accused of reckless driving, jumping a stop sign, or embezzling from a bank, the American people get that information. So why should not the American people be informed when their servants are accused of Communist activities as a result of FBI investigations?

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I regret that I find it necessary to address the Senate of the United States this afternoon. It is regrettable because the majority leader should not have to make any remarks dealing with the responsibility of a Member of this great body; it is regrettable that any Member must be reminded of the tradition of service in this body which requires the highest degree of integrity in the performance of his duty.

Mr. President, for over a century and a half the Senate has been known as a body of integrity, of honor, and of dignity. It was because of what we read when we were in school about those who preceded us that some of us had the inspiration to make membership in the United States Senate our goal; we felt it would be a distinguished honor to serve in this body.

To be a Member of the United States Senate imposes on one certain responsibilities to his fellow men, to his Government, and to his Nation. If any Senator has evidence that any man has committed a high crime, or if he has evidence that any man serving in the Government is disloyal, he has the solemn duty to

place that evidence before a proper tribunal. If a court of justice does not act, he has of course the responsibility of placing the evidence before his colleagues. Mr. President, our forefathers, when they wrote the Constitution of the United States, granted us certain immunity on the floor of the Senate. Why? Because it was their opinion that the Members of this body could always be relied upon never to charge any individual unfairly or unjustly, never tear down his character, or hurt his good name unless compelling evidence against him was in their possession.

Mr. President, just as it is the duty of a Member of the Senate to lay before the proper tribunal or to lay before a court or before this body evidence, he has a like responsibility never to say one word against the good name of an individual unless he has the evidence to support the charge. If he has such evidence, it is his duty to lay it before the Senate at the time he makes the charge against the individual.

When I was a small boy my mother taught me that when one takes from an individual his good name, that individual has been stripped of his most valuable possession.

I have sat on the floor of the Senate and heard men charged, by innuendo and inference, with disloyalty, and even with high crimes of misdemeanors, without any substantial evidence of the charge being laid before the Senate of the United States.

Mr. President, I have sat on this floor and heard one Senator, by innuendo and insinuation, charge a high official of this Government, a man who had served his country for a lifetime with distinction and honor, with being a traitor or a near traitor. Tragically there seems to be no easy way to cope with a situation like that, since to attempt to refute such charges merely dignifies the assertion. There is only one way to meet that kind of conduct and it is to remind Members of their duty and responsibility.

The distinguished junior Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH] is on the floor. I want to congratulate her on a statement which she made in the Senate on June 18, 1951, a statement we all may take to heart. I should like to read the last few paragraphs of her remarks:

As an American I am shocked at the way Republicans and Democrats alike are playing directly into the Communist design of confuse, divide, and conquer.

As an American I do not want a Democratic administration whitewash or cover-up any more than I want a Republican smear or witch hunt.

As an American I condemn a Republican Fascist just as much as I condemn a Democrat Communist. I condemn a Democrat Fascist just as much as I condemn a Republican Communist. They are equally dangerous to you and me and to our country.

As an American I want to see our Nation recapture the strength and unity it once had when we fought the enemy instead of ourselves.

Mr. President, I emphasize that when a man's good name is taken away by insinuations and innuendoes he has been done a great injustice. I desire to add, Mr. President—

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McFARLAND. No; I do not yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. I did not think the Senator would. [Laughter in the galleries.]

Mr. McFARLAND. I desire to emphasize, Mr. President, that when one is unjustly accused of disloyalty to his country an equally great injustice is being done our country and our free institutions. Ah, Mr. President, our enemy, the Kremlin, would like very much to have those charged with responsibility for our Government unjustly brought under suspicion and distrust, to have us distrust each other and fight among ourselves and accuse each other. When we do that we serve their purpose just as effectively as one of their paid agents.

Mr. President, it is beneath the dignity of Members of the Senate to smear any individual. It behooves us to have valid and substantial evidence when an individual is mentioned by us as being disloyal to his country. No Senator should become a character assassin.

I suggest, Mr. President, that when the name of any Member of the Senate becomes an adjective for mud slinging, we have come a far way from the tradition of those great men who preceded us here; we have torn down the dignity and standing and respect that this body should enjoy; we have come to a time when a halt must be called.

I hope we may reexamine the speech of the junior Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH], and that we will abide by the principles which that distinguished Senator enunciated.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President—

Mr. McCARTHY rose.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SMITH of North Carolina in the chair). The Chair recognizes the Senator from New York.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President—  
Mr. LEHMAN. Once more the Senate is hearing—

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry. Does not the present occupant of the chair feel that inasmuch as the majority leader has made a speech of the kind we have just heard, in all fairness the Senator from Wisconsin should be recognized to respond to the speech? He was on his feet, and I think he is entitled to recognition at this point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will recognize him. The Chair understands that the Senator from New York will be through in a moment. The Chair will recognize the Senator from Wisconsin. The Chair did not see the Senator from Wisconsin rise.

Mr. WHERRY. I thank the Chair. I hope the majority leader will remain on the floor.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I did not catch the ruling of the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair ruled that the Senator from New York has the floor. He is the Senator the Chair first recognized.

Mr. LEHMAN. I thank the Presiding Officer.

Once more the Senate is hearing the names of several persons mentioned and the irresponsible charge made that they are disloyal to the United States or even traitors to their country.

I do not know anything about many of the individuals who have been named here today. I do know that the process of making charges in public against the loyalty of certain persons under the protection of congressional immunity is a form of character assassination which all of us must abhor and condemn. I shall have more to say on this subject, as we all should, at a later date.

One of the names bandied about today is that of Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, and one of the most distinguished public servants in our Government. One of the most skillful and effective spokesmen of the United States in international affairs, Philip Jessup, whom I know well, has ably served his country during the past few years in exposing, in the forums of the United Nations, the devious purposes and hypocrisy of the Soviet leaders.

He deserves much better of his fellow citizens than the shabby and dastardly treatment which is accorded him here today—

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I make the point of order that the Senator from New York is out of order.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I withdraw the word "dastardly" and I substitute—

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I ask that the rule be enforced.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I withdraw the word "dastardly" and I substitute therefor the word "cowardly."

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I raise the point of order that the Senator from New York is out of order, and I ask that the rule be enforced.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York, under the rule, will take his seat.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I move that the Senator from New York be permitted to proceed in order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, is the motion debatable?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair understands it is not.

Mr. WHERRY. That is all right. I will vote to permit the Senator to proceed in order if he will do so in order. If the Senator from New York is not acquainted with rule XIX I will tell him what it provides. It does not make any difference what the Senator thinks of the Senator from Wisconsin; under rule XIX he cannot in any way, directly or indirectly, impute improper motives to him.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I have a right to speak.

Mr. McFARLAND. The motion is not debatable.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion is not debatable as the Chair understands.

As the Chair understood the Senator from New York did not refer by name specifically to any Senator. Apparently the Chair did not hear clearly what the Senator from New York said.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, inasmuch as the distinguished occupant of the chair has made mention of what he heard—

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I call for the regular order.

Mr. WHERRY. I ask unanimous consent that I may be given 5 minutes to answer the statement made by the distinguished Senator.

Mr. McFARLAND. I call for the regular order.

Mr. WHERRY. I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona has called for the regular order. The question is on the motion of the Senator from Arizona that the Senator from New York proceed in order. [Putting the question.] The "ayes" have it, and the Senator from New York may proceed.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I wish only on this occasion to offer for insertion into the RECORD at this point statements by three of the greatest Americans of our day. These statements say more than I can about the character and patriotism of Philip Jessup. These statements are not new, but neither are the charges that have been made here. The men whose testimony I now call upon to bear witness to the character of Mr. Philip Jessup, a citizen of the State of New York, are Gen. George C. Marshall, one of the noblest men who have ever lived, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, to whom we owe an unpayable debt of gratitude, and the late venerated Henry L. Stimson, respected by every American citizen. The statements by Generals Marshall and Eisenhower are in the form of letters addressed to Ambassador Jessup. The statement by the late Secretary Henry L. Stimson is in the form of a letter to the editor of the New York Times.

I wish merely to quote the last paragraph of the letter. He writes:

This is no time to let the noisy antics of a few upset the steady purpose of our country or distract our leaders from their proper tasks. This is rather a time for stern rebuke of such antics and outspoken support of the distinguished public servants against whom they are directed.

Mr. President, I not only fully agree with the words of that great statesman, that great Secretary of War and Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, but I go further and say that the time is long overdue when we should have rebuked the authors of antics reflecting on men, without supporting the charges with any real evidence.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letters to which I have re-

ferred be printed in the body of the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MARCH 17, 1950.

MY DEAR MR. JESSUP: I am shocked and distressed by the attack on your integrity as a public servant.

Throughout your intimate service with me while I was Secretary of State you were clearly outstanding as a representative of the Government both as to your masterful presentations and the firmness of your opposition to all Soviet or Communist attacks or pressures. This was conspicuously the case during your handling on the Security Council of the Berlin blockade issue.

Both the Under Secretary, Mr. Lovett, and I counted you as a great source of strength to the State Department during those critical days.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL.

MARCH 18, 1950.

MY DEAR MR. JESSUP: I am writing to tell you how much your university deprecates the association of your name with the current loyalty investigation in the United States Senate.

Your long and distinguished record as a scholar and a public servant has won for you the respect of your colleagues and of the American people as well. No one who has known you can for a moment question the depth or sincerity of your devotion to the principles of Americanism. Your university associates and I are confident that any impression to the contrary will be quickly dispelled as the facts become known.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

LOYALTY IN WASHINGTON—METHODS AND MOTIVES OF ATTACK ON STATE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONED

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

The present charges against the Department of State have not in my view deserved much attention. But the very widespread notice they have received prompts me to make certain comments.

First, this is most emphatically not the proper way in which to insure loyalty of Government employees. If that had been the real purpose of the accuser, he would have used the fully developed and tested procedure of the executive branch of the Government, under which charges are investigated and weighed by men of both parties and unimpeachable integrity. Any constructive result which may eventuate from the present charges would have been achieved far more surely and effectively by use of the existing procedures. The fact that the accuser has wholly ignored this well-

established method indicates that his interest is of a different character.

Second, no matter what else may occur, the present charges have already spattered mud upon individuals of the highest integrity, and in the present state of the world the denial cannot always overtake the accusation. It should by now be wholly clear that indiscriminate accusations of this sort are doubly offensive; they damage the innocent, and they help protect the guilty. For if the accuser is so stupid as to connect a man like Ambassador Jessup with communism, are not all such accusations made suspect?

REACTIONS ABROAD

Third, and more important by far, the method of the present charges directly and dangerously impedes the conduct of the foreign affairs of our Government. It creates abroad a feeling that we are frightened and suspicious of each other; it diverts our attention, at home, from the genuine and pressing problems of our foreign affairs; it requires of many high officials that they desert their proper duties in order to prepare and deliver such extensive replies as that of Mr. Jessup. Not one of these effects would have resulted from a disinterested study of the loyalty of any suspected State Department employees; each of them is the direct result of the manner in which these charges have been made.

Fourth, it seems to me quite clear that the real motive of the accuser in this case is to cast discredit upon the Secretary of State of the United States. This man is not trying to get rid of known Communists in the State Department; he is hoping against hope that he will find some. Fortunately, the Secretary of State needs no defense from me. No one who knows his extraordinary record of able and disinterested public service can believe that he is in any danger from these little men. It is already obvious that in any test of personal confidence the men of honor, in both parties, will choose to stand with the Secretary.

But there is more at stake in this matter than the rise or fall of individuals. What is at stake is the effective conduct of our foreign policy.

RESPONSIBILITY OF OFFICE

Every Secretary of State, second only to his President, and alone among appointive officers of the Government, stands before the world as the representative of the United States of America. No man who holds this office can fail to feel the extraordinary responsibility he carries for service to the country and its peace. No man has a greater right to ask the sympathetic support and the cooperation of his fellow citizens, and none is more properly exempt from the ordinary trials of politics. The man who seeks to gain political advantage from personal attack on a Secretary of State is a man who seeks political advantage from damage to his country.

The American Government, led by the President and the Secretary of State, is currently engaged in a major effort to give leadership to the country in a time of changing international conditions and grave world tension. This effort will require as part of our democratic process widespread and earnest public consideration of the great problems now before us, so that the ultimate decision will surely reflect the basic steadiness and faith of our people. In such public consideration there is always room for honest differences, but now, as for many years past, the formulation of foreign policy most urgently demands an adjournment of mere partisanship.

This is no time to let the noisy antics of a few upset the steady purpose of our country or distract our leaders from their proper tasks. This is rather a time for stern rebuke of such antics and outspoken support of the distinguished public servants against whom they are directed.

HENRY L. STIMSON,

HUNTINGTON, LONG ISLAND, March 24, 1950.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks a resolution adopted by the Utica post of the American Legion, of Utica, N. Y., in tribute to Mr. Philip C. Jessup, and in his defense against the unfounded charges which have been leveled against him. This resolution pays tribute to the man who is a past commander of that post, the same Philip C. Jessup.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ATTACK UPON PAST COMMANDER PHILIP C. JESSUP ADOPTED AT A REGULAR MEETING OF UTICA POST, No. 229, AMERICAN LEGION, HELD ON APRIL 6, 1950

Whereas, Utica Post, No. 229, American Legion is proud to number among the list of its past commanders a distinguished comrade, friend, and charter member, Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, whose record of patriotic devotion and continued helpfulness to our country over a period of many years is a source of great satisfaction, pride, and distinction to Utica post and to its entire membership; and

Whereas the sterling character, splendid reputation, and unquestionable loyalty and patriotism of Past Commander Philip C. Jessup, both privately and in his public capacity as United States Ambassador at Large, have recently been subjected to scurrilous, unprincipled, and wholly unjustifiable attack by one JOSEPH MCCARTHY, who in so doing has sullied the office of United States Senator which he presently holds: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That Utica Post No. 229, American Legion, and its entire membership shall and do strongly resent, condemn, and decry the unprincipled, unjustified, unsportsmanlike, un-American, and intolerable conduct of Senator JOSEPH McCARTHY in his wanton attempt without proof or reason to smear and destroy the good reputation and high standing of so devoted and patriotic a citizen as our esteemed and valued friend and comrade, the Honorable Philip C. Jessup, United States Ambassador at Large; and be it further

*Resolved*, That Utica Post, No. 229, American Legion, and its members in meeting duly assembled feel privileged at this time to reaffirm their continued trust and confidence in, their esteem and devotion to, and their lasting friendship for a distinguished public servant, a loyal patriot, and a great citizen, the Honorable Philip C. Jessup, a past commander on this post; and be it further

*Resolved*, That this resolution be inscribed upon the minutes of this meeting, that a copy thereof be delivered to our comrade, Ambassador Jessup; that a second copy be delivered to the public press; and that a third copy be mailed to Senator McCARTHY with the admonition that his reckless and despicable conduct in this instance cannot be condoned by any right-thinking American and should never be repeated if he hopes to retain a shred of public respect.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, Philip Jessup is a great American who has served, and is serving, his country with unsurpassed devotion, unselfishness, and loyalty. By character, by patriotism, by ability, and by useful service he belongs in the galaxy of those other outstanding American statesmen—Cordell Hull, Warren Austin, George C. Marshall, Henry L. Stimson, Averell Harriman, and John G. Winant.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I am very sorry that the majority leader surrendered the floor before I could ask him any questions.

This is a very serious matter. The majority leader has a very important position. I am sure that he does not want to do what so many in his party have been doing—that is, labeling a once great party as a party which stands for the protection of Communists and crooks in Government.

I ask unanimous consent that, without losing the floor, I may direct some questions to the majority leader. I think perhaps we can use his advice in this—

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President—

Mr. McCARTHY. I am sure that the majority leader is not afraid to answer questions.

Mr. McFARLAND. I am not going to be goaded into a colloquy with the junior Senator from Wisconsin. I have been discussing a principle of conduct for gentlemen. I did not mention any Senator by name in my remarks. Evidently the Senator from Wisconsin must have taken the facts as stated by me to fit him or he would not have replied.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I am rather surprised at the majority leader. In view of the fact that he is the leader of the Democratic Party, I should like to ask him now if he thinks it was terribly unfair to have "smeared" Mr. Remington last year. Last year I rose on the floor of the Senate and cited the case of William Remington. We offered the witnesses in that case. The Tydings committee said, "No; we will not hear them. He has been cleared by the Loyalty Board. Let us leave Mr. Remington in a position of importance." Thank God we had a good grand jury in New York. They considered the evidence against Remington and indicted him. Thank God there was a good jury and a good judge to try him. They found that man guilty.

From what the majority leader says today, apparently he feels that it was very unfair to name Remington. Some of the other individuals whom we are naming will also be convicted, even as Remington was.

I should like to ask the majority leader another question. The question is: What would he do if he saw the "letters of charges" against these individuals, charging them with Communist activities, one of them being charged with being an espionage agent? What would he do if he knew they had access to top-secret material? What would he do if he had Naval Intelligence reports showing that certain individuals are stealing secret documents? But the majority leader refuses to make answer.

We wrote to the Secretary of State and said, "Mr. Secretary, the least you can do, if you are interested in this country, is to deny those people access to secret material while they are under charges." He wrote back and said, "No; we will not do that."

I am surprised to think that the majority leader feels that it is unfair of me to try to force the Secretary of State to do what any loyal American would do. I suggest that the majority leader, together with members of his party who

did considerable crying about the smearing of Owen Lattimore, go over and listen to the testimony given before the McCarran committee.

I suggest also that my friends on the other side of the aisle who are doing everything possible to label their party as a party of Communists and crooks, go over and see some good Democrats sitting on the McCarran committee, men who are American first and Democrats second.

Today on the floor of the Senate I saw the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN], who was celebrating his seventy-fifth birthday, a really star-spanned American and a credit to any party. I am sure he represents the loyal Democrats of this Nation rather than those who get up and scream to high heaven and say, "JOE McCARTHY, you are smearing these poor, innocent Communists." [Manifestations of applause from galleries.]

NOVEMBER 14, 1951

### Statement on Time Magazine

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the following articles at this time: A letter to Mr. Henry Luce, publisher of Time, Life, and Fortune magazines, and documents Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The documents which I am inserting in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD today conclusively prove that in the name of Time magazine, deliberate, degenerate lying marches on.

I want to make it clear that I do not endorse all the statements made in the enclosed material. The Time memorandum goes far beyond anything I have ever stated about Gustavo Duran. For example, I deleted a sizable number of lines from the Time memorandum because I knew of no evidence other than hearsay to justify the claims against him therein being publicly made.

I repeat, the extent of my charges against Duran was that, first, he was regional head of SIM and second, that SIM was the Communist-controlled secret police of Spain and a counterpart of the Russian GPU.

There being no objection, the matter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

UNITED STATES SENATE.

Mr. HENRY R. LUCE,  
Publisher, Time, Life, and Fortune,  
Time, Life, and Fortune Building,  
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. LUCE: I wrote, calling your attention to the fact that a feature story carried by Time on JOE McCARTHY consisted of a sizable number of deliberate misstatements. As you know, prior to the writing of that story, one of your reporters accompanied me on a speaking tour through the Middle West and West. He reported back to your office that the evidence which I gave my audiences on Duran was a convincing and damning link in the picture of Communist infiltration. His report on this point apparently led the staff of Time, Life, and Fortune to the conclusion that this story had to be discredited if the American people were to be lulled into believing, as Life recently stated, that "Communist infiltration of Government is no longer a legitimate worry." Time, thereupon, set about the task of discrediting the Duran story at all cost.

I call your attention to the Duran case not because it was the most flagrant example

of lying in Time's story, but rather because the complete and deliberate falsity of this phase of the story could be proven by information in your own files, and for the additional reason that Time uses the Duran case as exhibit 1 to show that McCARTHY is a liar.

In your answer to my letter, you state: "Time, after examining the available evidence in this case, came to the conclusion that there was not sufficient documentation to support the charge that Duran was a Communist agent."

In view of this statement, I would suggest that if you will reread your own story on Gustavo Duran, you will find that it does not state that I call Duran a "Communist agent." Your story states that I made two principal allegations concerning Duran: (1) That Duran was regional head of the SIM, and (2) that the SIM was Communist-controlled. Your story then proceeds to ridicule both assertions and states: "Duran never a Red, was definitely and clearly anti-Communist." Let us, therefore, view the written record of the Duran case from your own files.

On Thursday, March 13, 1947, Congressman O'KONSKI, of Wisconsin, had the following to say about Gustavo Duran (p. A1073 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD):

"What I will say to you today is so fantastic that it will be difficult to believe. If I told you that a man born across the seas, migrated to the United States in May of 1940, and in February of 1943 was appointed Auxiliary Foreign Service Officer in our State Department at Habana, Cuba, was then stationed in Buenos Aires and finally returned to Washington, D. C., at a salary of \$8,000 per annum, as assistant to Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, you would lend me a courteous ear and not forget the entire affair. Yet, this is precisely what happened. And this is precisely how the United States was knifed out of South America to make way for the Moscow stooges.

"If he were a loyal and trusted alien this might have been fine. But this particular alien is one of the world's most notorious Communists, skilled and trained in betrayal by Moscow agents during the Spanish civil war.

"Who is this notorious Communist who rose to such heights in our State Department? Who is this notorious Communist who directed Latin American relations? Who is this notorious Communist who has driven American good will out of Latin America and substituted in its place Moscow good will? He is none other than Gustavo Duran."

Subsequent to O'Konski's speech on Duran, your staff (on Time Magazine) made the following report which is still in your files:

"APRIL 26, 1947.

"To: David Hulburd.  
"From: Jim Shepley, Washington—R. T. E.  
"Duran and \* \* \* —I—NA—INTL—LA.

"The speech of ALVIN O'KONSKI, page A1073 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, March 13, 1947, is based largely on material available in the files of United States investigatory agencies. The facts—i. e., dates, names, places—are correct insofar as Latin-American counterintelligence agents have been able to confirm them. Some of the material is source-rated A-1, some of it as low as C-3.

"For better understanding of the O'Konski arguments, we background the case of Gustavo Duran.

"Duran's own story of his past, which Braden accepts, hook, line, and sinker, is substantially the biography O'Konski got from the State Department. He claims that he is the scion of an old and respectable Spanish family, lived most of his early life in Madrid, studied music in Paris, joined the Spanish republican army as a buck private and worked his way up to lieutenant colonel, covering himself with glory in the defense of Valencia. He commanded a division in 1937, an army corps in 1938, escaped the Fascists on March 30, 1939—with the help of United States and British consular officials, married an American national in England on December 4, 1939, etc. He is, according to Cuba's Bel Tan, an extremely personable guy with a wide knowledge of music, arts, etc. He also is a shrewd manager of people.

"The other Gustavo Duran, whom O'Konski describes, is, according to Duran, two other guys. He has clung tenaciously to his story of mistaken identity. Nevertheless, when the story of the 'other Gustavo Duran' began to circulate Washington, he quietly got out of the State Department. DOS claims it was a year ago and somehow the record seems to have been falsified. Actually, he left the payroll early this year.

"Beyond the story in O'Konski's speech, the files piece together a chain of movements of Gustavo Duran which seems to have enough similarity to Duran's own version to make mistaken identity unlikely.

"The record picks up Duran in the early 1920's on arrival in Madrid from the Canaries with a friend known as Nestor.

(Nine lines deleted.)

"Sometime in this period he is reputed to have come to the attention of the GPU which became interested enough in him to test him on a few practice missions. He turns up next crossing the Spanish frontier in the early thirties as the reputed representative of Paramount pictures. Some sources indicate that by now he was a tested and 'live' agent of the GPU. DOS bio says he

was employed by Paramount in Paris in 1933 and 1934, worked for a motion-picture company in Madrid in 1934 and 1936.

"The file shows him crossing into Spain, however, in 1931 as a provocateur of the Spanish Republican Revolution, working on GPU orders.

"All sources, including Duran, agree that he signed up with the Republican army after the Falangist uprising. The file reports his first act in behalf of the cause was to commandeer the convent of Siervas de Maria in the old Plazo Chamberi, and convert it to a Cheka for the detention of Falangist agitators. He is reported variously to have lived at Santa Engracia, 104 or 106, and at Hermosilla, Threes. He is reported to have been a leading light in the pre-civil-war days in the Juventudes Comunistas y Socialistas.

"In August 1936 he had a bout with typhoid, but eventually got back to his job of running the political prison. He became a fast friend of Serrano Poncela, chief of the Communist-dominated Republican political police. Prieto reports in a published document from which O'Konski quotes that he appointed Duran chief of SIM for the Madrid zone.

"There is little doubt that Gustavo was an able soldier. He grew close to the Red Brigade commanders Lister and Modesto, who are supposed to have fought World War II as general officers of the Red Army. He was a member of the general staff which executed the brilliant withdrawals from Talvera de la Reina, Maqueda, and Toledo.

"The last days of Col. Gustavo Duran, according to the file, were spent in the Red Brigade headquarters at Taroncon. From here, following his escape, some sources say he went to Paris, then to Moscow. The DOS bio says he went to London.

(Seventeen lines deleted.)

"Both Duran and \* \* \* are considered flatly to be MVD secret agents. Remember that counterintelligence operations do not involve proof of assumptions. They are made on a working basis for the purposes of neutralizing foreign espionage and on occasion for disseminating false information. Please in no way associate any of the information in this research with any Federal agency."

In preparing this report, your staff had full access to the attached documents, numbered 1 through 5, from intelligence files.

In addition to the above material, I call your attention to the fact that Duran (p. 1868, Tydings hearings) himself admits his membership in SIM. Prieto, Spanish Minister of Defense, also confirms this fact (p. 1547, Tydings hearings). Prieto, as well as every other authority quoted either in your files or the Army Intelligence files, confirms the fact that SIM was Communist-controlled.

With your files, Army Intelligence, and Duran confirming the fact that he was a member of SIM, all of which was known

to Time, it is difficult to find any honest reason why you should ridicule my statement to that effect and use it as the prime example of McCarthy's lying.

On page 24 of your article, you state: "There are never any circumstances which justify the reckless imputation of treason or other moral guilt to individuals in or out of office," and also, "Experience proves, however, that what the anti-Communist fight needs is truth, carefully arrived at and presented with all the scrupulous regard for decency and the rights of man of which the democratic world is capable." I had hoped, Mr. Luce, that you would be willing to apply the same rules to the fight against McCarthy.

In case there is any doubt in your mind as to what honest readers, who know the facts, think about Time's article, I quote the following telegram sent to you by William Loeb, publisher, Union Leader Corp., Manchester, N. H.:

"OCTOBER 18, 1951.

"Having respect for Time and yourself heightens the shock at your McCarthy piece which for filthy innuendo outdoes anything McCarthy's worst enemies have ever accused him of doing. MCCARTHY just here as this paper's guest Tuesday night which makes contrast between Time article and facts all the more vivid. You are aware that Communists' No. 1 target in United States is to destroy McCarthy. Perhaps a more clever job than you realize has been done to poison your mind against a man who if not the perfect champion fights effectively for a cause that we should all be interested in. This newspaper has strong editorial opinions but confines them to the editorial page and doesn't prostitute its news columns as you have done."

Sincerely yours,

JOE MCCARTHY.

P. S.—If you care to do so, I shall be glad to meet with you in Washington and point out the many other deliberate and vicious misstatements made in this story.

#### DOCUMENT No. 1

##### INDALECIO PRIETO ON GUSTAVO DURAN

Indalecio Prieto, Minister for the National Defense in May 1937, encountered in his way a considerable amount of difficulties, many of which came from the tenacious infiltration of Russian Communists and their Spanish stooges into the administrative organism of the army.

Mr. Prieto gave way at last and resigned his post in the Government. The 9th of August 1938, Mr. Prieto appeared before the national committee of the Spanish Socialist Party, and made on this matter a very important report, which later was printed in Paris (Imprimerie Nouvelle-Association Ouvriere, 53 Quai de la Seine, 1939).

From this report we take the following paragraphs:

"It is true that I had some incidents with the Russians—and this part of my report

might be kept secret for the time it would be convenient. The first, and perhaps the real origin of the campaign against me, arises out of the SIM.

"Certain Russian technicians proposed to me, in Valencia, the formation of a service of military investigation. I confess to have made some opposition to the project. 'Why did I?' Even though I believed the service was necessary, I feared that, as it happened recently in the Direccion de Seguridad, some elements—uncontrolled by the Government—might take in hand such a delicate lever and take undue advantage of it to the prejudice of the Republic, as it happened scandalously in some cases that I need not mention. I was very much worried with the appointment of a chief of such an organization. When the question of designating local chiefs of the SIM arose, the sponsors of the project proposed to me a certain Duran for the region of Madrid. I knew that he was a Communist but, nevertheless, I appointed him. In the decree creating the SIM, which I worded myself in order to avoid the slavish way suggested in the project submitted to me, there is an article by means of which every appointment of agents of the SIM should be made exclusively by the Minister for National Defense. This was a foreseen guaranty I wanted to establish. Every agent of the SIM should be in possession of a 'carnet' with the signature, in duplicate, of the Minister himself. As soon as Duran was appointed chief of the Demarcacion del Ejercito del Centro he appointed, all by himself and without any right to do so, scores of other agents under his orders—several hundreds of these were Communists, only four or five Socialists, excluding the Socialists provisionally appointed by the Minister of the Interior for a similar function. I found that was intolerable; and since we lacked commanding officers in the army—I noticed this lack and some deficiencies in the operations near Belchite—I ordered that all army officers who did not act in exclusively military charges, should go back to their former positions."

This was why Major Duran had to go back to his former military position. Soon afterward a Russian technician, expert on this sort of service, called on me and said:

"Question. I come to speak about the dismissal of Duran; what happened?

"Answer. Nothing special; I am in need of commanding officer in the army and ordered him to go back to his former position.

"Question. No; you dismissed him because he has appointed some Communists as agents in Madrid.

"Answer. That is also a very good reason, since Duran has no power whatever to make such appointments.

"Question. Why couldn't he appoint agents?

"Answer. Because, by virtue of the decree creating the SIM this faculty is reserved exclusively for the minister."

I read the decree, and in presence of the evident obviousness of my assertions, my visitor added:

"Question. Duran could be entitled to make provisional appointments.

"Answer. Neither provisional nor permanent. Besides, here in Spain the provisional becomes permanent.

"Question. In any case, I come here to ask you to reinstate Major Duran as Chief of the SIM in Madrid.

"Answer. I am very sorry, but I can't.

"Question. If you don't agree to the reinstatement of Duran we break all relations with you.

"Answer. I regret it, Major Duran will stay as head of a division and will not be back in the SIM. Your attitude is unjustified and I cannot bend to it.

"I do not consent, and my relations with the Russian technicians were, on his initiative, totally severed. After this scene in Valencia, I never saw him again."

Translated from the book titled, "How and Why I Left the Ministry of National Defense—Intrigues of the Russians in Spain."—Stenographic text of the report given on August 9, 1938, before the National Committee of the Spanish Socialist Party, by Indalecio Prieto, Minister of the Red Government in Spain. Published in Paris, Imprimerie Nouvelle (Association Ouvriere) 63, Quai de la Seine, 1939.

## DOCUMENT NO. 2

[Translation]

## THE TREASON OF STALIN—HOW THE WAR IN SPAIN CAME TO AN END

(By J. Garcia Pradas, ex-director of the "CNT," of Madrid; introduction by Marcelino Garcia; edited by Cultura Proletaria, New York (1939))

(Page 108) \* \* \* "The Communist rebellion obliged us to change the commands, Lieutenant Colonel Ardid \* \* \* though they called him very 'bolshshevik' and notwithstanding that he did not fight against us, resulted dangerous in the command of the fortifications, and he was dismissed. \* \* \* From the very different places all dubious people were fired. As to the Communist military commands, it resulted impossible to substitute all of them because the Communist Party of Spain held the greater part of the army in its hands. \* \* \* Toral and Carton, for instance, remained in the command of their divisions of Extremadura. Clutat, Duran, Yglesias, and others continued to stay on their posts of the Levante."

(NOTE.—Pradas and Garcia are two prominent Spanish Anarchists. They were the chief editor of trade-union newspaper CNT in Madrid and the secretary of the Anarchists Trade-Unions. Both participated in the civil war on the side of so-called Republican army. When Colonel Sigismundo Casado made his putsch against Negrin in March 1939, the Anarchists supported him.

The reason was their hate against the Communists who killed thousands of Anarchists at a presumed revolution in Barcelona (1937). The Communist "Tcheka" also kidnaped Andres Nin, the famous leader of the Anarchists in Barcelona, brought him to Madrid where he was tortured and finally disappeared. The Anarchists have after the civil war always attacked and criticized in a furious way the Communists whom they always call Stalinists. Neither Casado in his book, The Last Days of the Spanish Republic, nor Garcia Pradas in his Treason of Stalin, where they give a very detailed description of all the facts of their putsch against Negrin and where they mention everybody who was with them, never mention Duran as one of them. On the contrary, the remark of Garcia Pradas above shows clearly that Duran was considered by him as a prominent Communist leader. He was not dismissed though his attitude was very doubtful, because Casado had not got enough reliable military people to replace Duran and the other Communist gang.)

## DOCUMENT NO. 3

[Translation]

## "MEN OF LOYAL SPAIN" (HOMBRES DE LA ESPAÑA LEAL)

Aguirre, Duran, Companys, Campesino, Bergamin, del Vayo, Mijaja, Robeson, Hernandez, Modesto, Candon, Pasionaria, Lister, Domingo.

By Juan Marinello and Nicolas Guillen, La Habana; Edicion "Facetas," 1942 (p. 49)

## CHAT WITH THE COMMANDER DURAN

One night in Madrid I saw enter in "La Alianza de Intelectuales Antifascistas" a young man, blonde, of medium height, and distinguished manners. He wore the uniform of a commander of the people's army. The noble expression of his lively face was matched by his well-formed head. His presence was greeted by a joyful acclamation. He talked some moments to writers, painters, and people from the theater, then he sat down at the piano. In a very clean and gracious execution he started to play melodies of the old Germany. Without any pause he was playing songs from foreign countries—French, Russian, and English. Between them he played some Spanish folklores. He spent so large hours. It was 2 o'clock in the morning and the visitor without getting tired went on with his particular repertoire. He had fled from his environment into a lyrical frenzy which was growing with every moment.

When they told me the name of this musical military man I understood well his insatiable thirst. The name of Gustavo Duran told me many things. He gave me the definition of a very singular case. I know of his brave execution at the head-office division just as well as of his talent and of his artistic culture. Between the great chiefs of the Republican Army—Campeano, Lister,

Modesto, Paco Galan \* \* \* between the most beloved leaders of the work of the Spanish liberation, Duran is counted as one of the foremost. But he is distinguished from all the others by his origin, his education, his mentality. He is not as the others a man of the masses, of a humanity radically popular. He was born in a very refined atmosphere of culture, owner of a clear and perspicacious mentality. Therefore, he had since boyhood an inclination to the arts. His excellent preparation gave him wide perspectives. His numerous travels procured him a rare universal sense and understanding. Very Spanish with a little bit of all the different Iberian bloods—Cathian, Castellano, Canarian Islands—he exalted his particular qualities in the large years he spent in Paris. As a musician, a composer, and executive artist of pictures (movies) he never turned away from literature, nor did he lose his interest in politics. His capacities just as well as his native virtue to command took him to a delicate, difficult and magnificently refined work. The rebellion of Franco surprised him when he was directing the "doblage," that is arranging in Spanish the voices of the actors in one of the most important American movies companies. From the studio he went without delay to the barracks. In little less than 1 year this artist who did not know the difference between a brigade and a company, became the commander of a division. This man of lectures and meditation is occupying now a charge of the most grave responsibility in the Spanish hour: chief of the SIM (Service Investigation Militar) of the service of investigation of the people's army. He is without any doubt one of the most elevating young figures of the moment.

Very soon—we became good comrades with Gustavo Duran. His visits to the Alianza became more frequent; before he sat down at the piano we talked about Cuba and Spain. One night after the dinner with the comrades was over, who were always there—Rafael Alberti, Maria Teresa Leon, Nicholas Guillen, Langston Hughes, Juan Jabas, Daniela Diaz, Antonio Aparicio, Ontanon, Rosario del Olmo, Xavier Farias—we put the chief of the division, Duran, in a real journalistic "Seige." As a good strategist he defended himself in a masterly way. At last he accepted the battle. Our dialogue was this:

MARINELLO. "I want to talk to you about your case. It seems very significant. A pure artist become a military chief."

DURAN. "I believe you are mistaken. I was never an artist only. Therefore, from a certain point of view my life did not suffer an important change. When you understand the intellectual work as vital as a service, the artist goes into action—the courts, the barracks, the clinic—without great spiritual commotion. He just goes on serving. \* \* \*

MARINELLO. "Yes. But it seems natural to me that the artist serves the revolution with the pen and not with the pistol. I don't know whether there are many artists who

are commanders of divisions. \* \* \*

DURAN. "I don't think that that is very important. Everybody must serve the revolution as he best can. I believe that Alberti or Guillen do with their verses a work, an action just as adequate as mine. The day when \* \* \* the revolution of Franco began, I didn't know how I should lend my help in the best way. They told me in the studio that the reactionary military men had made a rebellion. I took my leave from the actors without telling them where I would go. I presented myself to my party, the Communist, to receive orders. They gave me a strictly military assignment and a little rare one: Organize a group of motorcyclists without motor bikes. I don't know where the machines appeared, but the group was formed and was very useful. Since that time I have been going on working, fighting, and being promoted. From a private to a chief of a division. I won't deny that when they entrusted me with works of this type they knew that I had special qualities which I used before when I made a living. \* \* \*

MARINELLO. "But if you used so efficiently your capacities since the very first moment you need without any doubt a clear political definition which gave you such an enthusiasm that you would never recede before any type of action. \* \* \*

DURAN. "Sure, my evolution and my conviction were already formed. As every individual with a bourgeois background I had to suffer a large process of experience and superation. \* \* \* I knew the bourgeoisie in Spain. This was the people with whom we had to clash some day. They are our natural enemies. The possessing class. My repulsion for their work was turned one day into a decided attack. \* \* \* In my movie studio where I worked one day a strike was declared. It seemed to me that it was my duty to join the strike. And by my condition as a director of the studio, I was considered as the responsible of the movement. We won the strike but a short time afterward I was dismissed. \* \* \* I wasn't worried about this notice. On many other opportunities I had received tentative offers of the most important rival enterprise. It would be very easy to find another job. I offered my services. But everywhere I received pretexts and evasive answers. \* \* \* I went to Paris. The same things happened there. \* \* \* It was then and there that I felt myself as a worker, and that I united myself in a strong way with the proletarians of my country. Today I serve them with the arms. \* \* \*

NOTE.—Gustavo Duran is called by Marinello "uno de los prestigiosos jefes del ejercito republicano" (one of the most renowned chiefs of the republican army). Among the names mentioned above (p. 2) are only two non-Communists (Aguirre and Companys). The others are the most famous Spanish Communists. That Duran is among them speaks for itself. Juan Marinello is a notorious Cuban Communist. He spent,

together with Nicolas Guillen, who is a mulatto from Cuba, some time in Madrid in 1937. Whereas Marinello made this interview with Duran, Guillen mentions Duran at another opportunity in the same book. In "una fiesta en la Alianza" (party in the Alianza de anti-Facist intellectuals) there was a multitude of well-known figures in the arts and letters. \* \* \* Ernest Hemingway, the great American author, author of *Death in the Afternoon*; Langston Hughes, the great poet of the play *Mulatto*; Ivan Kolzow, the American poetess Marta Gellborn, Duran \* \* \* Madrid, November 1937.

Rafael Alberti, whom Duran mentions in his interview with Marinello, is a notorious Spanish Communist who lives now in exile in Buenos Aires. Alberti is also a friend of Marinello. He published in Buenos Aires in 1942 a book with all his poetries. In this book he dedicates one poem: "El Monte de El Pardo" to Gustavo Duran. This poem goes together with other poems dedicated to the "international brigades," to the Communist Spanish generals, Kleber, Lister, and Modesto. All of them serve now under other names in the Russian Army. Duran is again on this strange "list of honor" of prominent Communist leaders. Juan Marinello is also linked with the American Communist group. He published in Havana in 1941 a book, "La Libertad de Browder Es Tambien Nuestra Causa" (The Liberty of Browder Is Our Cause, Too). He cooperated with the "Citizens Committee To Free Earl Browder," 1133 Broadway, New York. This committee was composed among others of the Negro singer, Paul Robeson, who also spent some time in Barcelona and Madrid with the Communist gang there, Congressman Vito Marcantonio, the Negro agitator; and the Chilean Communist, Salvador Ocampo, secretary of the Confederacion de Trabajo de Chile—the Communist-dominated trade union of Chile.

Rafael Alberti, same as Marinello, are both furious anti-Yankee. Alberti published in 1936 a very vile and vicious book against the United States of America called "13 Bandas y 48 Estrellas" (13 Stripes and 48 States)—poems of the Caribbean Sea. And these verses are dedicated to Juan Marinello, of Cuba. Alberti says among other sweet things:

"Negro de la mano al blanco.  
Blanco de la mano al Negro.  
Que Cuba no es del Cubano.  
Que es del Norteamericano.  
Los Yankee vienen volando  
Urracas asu-carreras  
Mano a mano  
Contra el Norteamericano."

[Translation]

"Negro give the hand to the white man.  
White man give the hand to the Negro.  
Cuba doesn't belong to the Cubans.  
It belongs to the North Americans.  
The Yankees come flying  
To fill their sugar bowls  
Hand in hand  
Against the North Americans."

And in another poem dedicated to Mexico he says bluntly, "Contra el gringo \* \* \* prepare tu fusil" (Against the gringo prepare your gun).

Langston Hughes who is mentioned as a comrade of Gustavo Duran in Madrid is an American Negro Communist. He was in Spain during the civil war from 1936 to 1937 as a correspondent of the "Afro-American of Baltimore." Hughes was also in Moskau in 1933-34 where he worked for Bolshevik pictures. He is a member of the "International Workers League" and has taken a prominent part in political cases of the United States of America as for instance "The Scottsborough Negro Boys Case" and in the fight for Browder. Ernest Hemingway who appears together with Duran in the "Alianza" in Madrid, also knew well the famous "Brigade 36" mentioned in the death tunnel case. Hemingway we quote—says "a famous brigade nicknamed the Moles of Usera, who took the trench of death, that dominated suburb and dug and mined their way forward until the Franco forces had to give up position on that front \* \* \* it was good to see the moles again. I had not been with them since early December 1937 and was envious to see how their morale was." (From *The Spanish War*, p. 70.)

Nicolas Guillen, who, together with Marinello wrote the book "Hombres de la Espana Leal" is a mulatto Communist from Cuba. He too is furiously anti-Yankee. In one of his poems, "El Esclavo" (slave) he says:

"Yo hi-jo de ti y de Africa \* \* \*  
Hoy esclavo de rojos yankees  
despreciativos y voraces."

[Translation]

I a son of you and Africa \* \* \*  
I am today the slave of  
Red-faced Yankees who are  
Disreputable and voracious.

Marinello, Alberti, and Guillen, among many others play a dominant part in the notorious Communist organization of "anti-Fascists poets, writers, painters, and artists," with its seat in Montevideo, Uruguay, which also played a very doubtful part in Argentina in 1945 when Rodolfo Ghioldi, secretary of the Argentine Communists and prominent member of the above mentioned organization, cooperated with Mr. Braden against the Argentine Government in the organization of demonstrations, strikes, and illegal actions of every kind.

DOCUMENT No. 4

GUSTAVO DURAN—STORY OF THE DEATH  
TUNNEL.

(Treinta y dos meses de guerra—32 months of war) by T. Blanco Nomdedeu, Director de la Patria, Madrid, 1940

"On November 6, 1937, left this house, the street of Viriato and of Dolores Espana, in Nunez de Balboa, Numero 15, Madrid, the first expedition organized by Don Ismael. There arrived a car of the Brigade 36 which

they mounted—my two sons, Laureano, 24, and Louis, 22, also the pilot aviator, Don Emilio Camps. In this car which belonged to the general staff was a captain of the medical corps who had to give the signals to the control posts and who had to explain if necessary that he took the people in this car to render service in the fortifications. Captain Cabrera (he is mentioned together with Duran as the instigator of the death tunnel crimes in the book *La Causa General*) and his "pal" told the expeditionaries that they were expected at 10 o'clock p. m. at Usera. At this time the guard of the tunnel would be changed by loyal soldiers and then they would pass through the mine to a house which was situated between the two lines, in no man's land. From there they could enter into the liberated zone (Franco) previous to the convened password.

The second expedition left in different cars on November 8.

What happened then to these expeditions? We don't know it in detail. We heard through the National Radio or through Radio Verdad the convened code words, Don Pedro and his people are well, and the cat and the she cat well; those of the staircase well. How could we have any doubt?

The terrible disappointment came later when my daughter Maria Teresa was evacuated by the Embassy of Rumania. Then they learned the terrible truth. None of the expeditions had arrived at its point of destination. When my daughter spoke to Gen. Quepo de Llano the sinister plot was discovered, and you can imagine the days of anguish we passed through. But without any doubt those wicked people acted on their own and we owe it to this fact that not all of us fell into the claws of the SIM.

(NOTE.—On p. 102: the author says that "Celestino Martin, a young student of medicine and a refugee in the Embassy at Paragay, left Madrid through the death tunnel the 14th of October 1937 with two friends;

on the 18th of October the priest Serafin Sanchez of the Provincial Hospital and his three nephews disappeared. Many other persons, among them six engineers and a lawyer, all known to the unhappy owner of the pension Ventura de la Vega, fell into the trap the 29th and 31st of October. And finally dona Nicolasa, the owner of this pension with her niece Natividad, also disappeared in the death tunnel." The author says: "You must consider that those bandits didn't ask money and that they frequently raised difficulties, pretending the imminent risk of being discovered by the Reds.")

DOCUMENT No. 5

GUSTAVO DURAN

Came to Habana, via Spain, via England and the United States of America. He met in Habana the former Spanish Minister of the Interior and Police (Ministro de defensa Nacional) Indalecio Prieto. In 1940 (?)—1941 Prieto recognized Gustavo Duran as a notorious Spanish Communist who in 1936-37 was chief of the SIM in Madrid and who he had to dismiss on behalf of the disobedience and of placing only Communist agents in the secret police. Prieto met Duran through the American Legation in Habana where at that time Spruille Braden was Ambassador. He asked Braden to send him a member of his Legation who knew Spanish because Prieto does not speak English. The man sent by Spruille Braden was Gustavo Duran who was recognized immediately by Prieto, his former superior in Madrid. See also statement of Indalecio Prieto in his book *Como y por que salí del Ministerio de Defensa Nacional—Ingrigas de los Rusos en Espana, Mexico DF, 1940—Impresos y Papeles, Calle Balsas (32), Mexico DF.*—Also see speech of the Honorable ALVIN O'KONSKI in Congress on March 13, 1947 (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 1947, pp. A1078-A1077).

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