



**PEACEMAKING,
PEACEKEEPING and
COALITION WARFARE:**

THE FUTURE ROLE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS



Edited by: Fariborz L. Mokhtari

Relevance Corporation
320 E. Maple Rd. Suite 297
Birmingham, MI 48009-9894

**Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and
Coalition Warfare:
The Future Role
of the United Nations**

*Proceedings of a Conference Cosponsored by
National Defense University and
Norwich University*

Edited by

Fariborz L. Mokhtari

1994

**National Defense University
Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington, DC 20319**

The Evolution of Regional Security Apparatuses for the "Gray Domain": Enforcing International Law and Order

Leonard Sullivan, Jr.

Introduction

THIS PAPER SUGGESTS THAT EVOLVING global security efforts should focus on the unique "gray domain" between high-intensity "warfighting" in the archaic NATO sense and "peacekeeping" in the classic UN sense of lightly armed, virtually unopposed "cops on the beat." It argues that neither unilateral American forces nor ragtag volunteer UN forces can provide the *regional security* necessary to encourage political and economic prosperity. It is my fourth pass at this important subject¹. I do not believe we can evolve an appropriate global post-Cold War security structure without better understanding the nature of the central threats the world now faces.

New Disorders Do Not Match Old Orders

The disorders afflicting the world in the aftermath of the oppressive global cold war require the serious, long-term attention of the civilized world. Virtually every region of the world is experiencing some form of disorder which detracts from inter- and intra-regional stability and diminishes aspirations for both personal and collective prosperity. These disorders simply cannot be dealt with effectively by security systems designed primarily to perpetuate and petrify a tense equilibrium between two antithetical, but supposedly equally legitimate, approaches to politics and economics².

Cold war concepts of superpowers, superpower blocs, competing intra-regional

military alliances, rigid "vital interests," nuclear deterrence, and bi-lateral arms control, have lost their relevance. Such well-ingrained distinctions as "the West" ³as a meaningful entity with its "special relationships," and the blind sanctity of "internal affairs" as an excuse for ignoring inhumanity, have lost their credibility. In fact, cold war notions of "peace" and "war" now seem hopeless oversimplifications of our "real-world" problems. Prompt evolutionary change is essential to deal with the new forms of danger which now challenge the more generally accepted rules of human behavior.

There has probably never been a period when more *governments* on Earth have codified what is right and what is wrong, *or* when there were more organizations operating beyond those established norms and standards. These improprieties run the gamut from humanitarian, ethnic, military, and political, to economic, trafficking, and environmental. Limits of acceptable conduct are defined extensively by various government-ratified covenants, treaties and agreements adopted through various formally recognized organizations either global (UN, World Bank, etc.), functional (OECD, GATT, IAEA, etc.) or regional (NATO, CSCE, APEC, ASEAN, etc.)⁴ Absent a clear-cut "red-blue" superpower ideological contest, however, the world is ill-prepared and uncertain how to react to conflicts between civility and incivility, conformity and nonconformity, morality and legality, majorities and minorities: Bosnia is but the most obvious and shameful case in point.⁵

Controlling Crimes Versus Winning Wars or Peacekeeping

Existing Forces Mismatch

Most new world disorders do not relate well to the current capabilities of the world's military forces—designed to fight each other in huge set piece battles backed up by thousands of nuclear weapons. In fact, many current disorders would be better handled by paramilitary or non-military forces. Many are really extensions on a larger scale of previously domestic disorders: they are—or started out as—"crimes" deserving legally accepted police actions rather than the more macho but impersonal wars between military forces.

Unchecked, some of these crimes have clearly grown out of control and do not honor the extensive codes of professional military conduct (which outlaw rape, torture, starvation, civilian attack, hostage-taking, etc..) They are now clearly beyond the capabilities of typical police forces. Although the UN has recruited thousands of civilian policemen ("CIVPOL") for duty in Cambodia, Namibia, and elsewhere⁶, they are simply useless in areas where well-armed criminal elements are bent on pursuing their illegal activities.

In resolving many of these disorders, the objective clearly cannot be to "defeat" the criminal element or "stop the killing," but only to "control" the level of violence and destruction to some level of international social tolerance. We cannot "stop the war" or "restore peace"; the terms are irrelevant. Ethnic/religious strife appears to be as endemic to the new world as are American casualties due to drunk driving, street crime, and drug use.⁷ The issue is whether it can be contained within "tolerable" levels—such as the decades of Irish and Palestinian violence—or whether it is allowed to escalate to levels that arouse the international conscience, such as genocide in Cambodia, displacement of the Kurds, three-way mayhem in the former Yugoslavia, or the wanton generation of refugees in Lebanon.

Perpetrators and Victims

The level of authority responsible for these organized transgressions is frequently ambiguous. Nations and/or allies tend to declare and conduct war against other nations and/or alliances on a government-to-government basis. That is how Webster defines war.⁸ Today's disorders *may* be government-directed (Saddam Hussein vs. the Kurds, or Yugoslavian Serbs vs. Bosnian Muslims), but they are as often sub-national extremists (the Hezbollah vs Israel, or the Irish Republican Army vs. the United Kingdom); or renegade multi-national "corporations" (Latin American drug cartels, or BCCI-like banks.)

Furthermore, the "victim" is also generally not a nation or government, but some other societal or ethnic category. Current security arrangements and forces are ill-equipped to deal with non-governmental crime, and to shift focus from being anti-national to being pro-victim. Our current experiences in Somalia typify these problems. Concepts of the inviolability of "internal affairs" are slowly giving way to concepts of "enforced humanitarianism" not only at the national level (protection of minorities, child labor laws, etc.) but at the family level as well (e.g., marital rape and children's rights.)

The "battlefields" are far more likely to be urban/suburban/industrial areas rather than deserts, jungles, or hedge rows, and the "targets" are more likely to be gangs, governmental functions or industrial facilities than military formations. Understanding, influencing, or if necessary, controlling the urban/industrial "anatomy" (infrastructure) will be far more important than pinpointing and blasting enemy units in the field. Urban expertise surely does not match the rural terrain skills developed, say, to defend against a Warsaw Pact invasion across the "inner-German border" of yesteryear.⁹

Controlling Arms Proliferation

Even arms control has clearly outgrown the

initial concepts of limiting nuclear arms and balancing the size of opposing superpower conventional forces in Europe. There are residual concerns over the possible mishandling of the major nuclear arms inventories in the remnants of the Soviet Union, and discussions concerning their re-targeting are underway. However, the focus of concern has now shifted to the "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" throughout the less developed world¹⁰. The old arms control treaty framework is irrelevant here, as are the highly formalistic verification regimes. Moreover, the signatories to the START and CFE treaties bear little relation to the new "players" (donors or recipients) in global arms proliferation, such as China. It is also unclear in some instances whether the suppliers' governments are tacitly or actively involved in the transfers.

Furthermore, the cold-war definitions of "proliferation" and "weapons of mass destruction" are inadequate. Rockets and artillery used against defenseless civilian populations in places like Beirut, Sarajevo, and South Lebanon should also qualify as mass destroyers, even though they did not recently proliferate from some opportunistic supplier, and even though the destruction took months rather than minutes to inflict. The wanton use of large caliber and automatic weapons in the pursuit of clearly illegal political activities is as unacceptable as the excessive use of firearms (and semi-automatic weapons!) in petty crimes and drug trafficking. International standards of conduct are being set, and international inspection and enforcement must follow. That is another domain which is neither warfighting nor peacekeeping.

One is reminded of the origins of the colloquial term "rule of thumb." In eighteenth century America, it was deemed by the courts unacceptable to thrash one's wife with a cane larger in diameter than one's thumb.¹¹ This was clearly an early, but not unique, effort at arms control, if not peacekeeping. Perhaps the civilized world should now deem it unacceptable to slay one's enemies with a firearm of caliber greater than one's thumb. Controlling the

trafficking, possession, and use of arms exceeding that rule could become a major responsibility for emerging security forces. In this way, we might keep disorders from exceeding our tolerance threshold.

Crime and Punishment

The costs to both the "criminal" and the enforcers must reflect the severity of the misdemeanor or felony. Often, the "punishment"—or coercion—may simply be fines or other sanctions to express displeasure but not exacerbate the recklessness of the violator. Policies and procedures for deterring, ameliorating or terminating unacceptable behavior will certainly have to be "legal," not wanton. The "guilt" will have to be correctly "balanced" between government and non-government instigators, (or, say, between the supplier, the deliverer, and the demander in drug or arms trafficking.) And both the breadth and severity of the "crime" will have to be viewed through the culture, and resolved through the languages, of the afflicted region.

Additionally, use of excessive force "brutality" against persons or property will have to be avoided: neutralization and incapacitation will replace death and destruction. Deliberate, swaggering overreaction (the Israeli model) needs to be discouraged. While U.S. warfighters have long sought to limit "collateral damage" where possible, crime-fighters follow much more stringent limits on damage and casualties to "innocent bystanders."¹²

The military preoccupation with target destruction rather than target "arraignment" presents a serious obstacle in their conversion to law-enforcers. The "enemy" (criminals) will generally be protected by citizens' "rights," and their offenses are as likely to be illegal businesses (drug/arms trafficking) as violent crimes (hostage taking.) Security forces will have to operate within legal limits even though the offenders recognize no such constraints.

The offenses are not likely to be eliminated, only reduced to tolerable levels.

Environment and Economics

In a different regime, there is certain to be increasing international concern for environmental transgressions most of which are indifferent to arbitrary national boundaries. Sooner or later, physical international responses will become justified to control some form of atmospheric pollution (such as Chernobyl-like fall-out, ozone depletion, or acid rain) or resource-abuse (such as pre-emption of river waters or overkill of protected species), or even the spread of communicable diseases (in humans, animals and insects.)

Violations of economic agreements will continue to precipitate armed struggles as well, from product dumping (e.g., China's opium wars) to fishing rights (e.g., Iceland's fishing fleet vs the British Navy in the '70s.) As economic "interdependence" continues to grow, and economic competition replaces ideological competition as a central national focus, the "book of rules" is bound to grow, and so will the temptations to circumvent it. The OECD is only now defining "corrupt practices" in international commerce.¹³ "Trade wars" may break out again, and violence over the abuse and exploitation of workers may arise. Illegal trafficking in various commodities from drugs and arms to workers and babies already preoccupies law enforcement agencies worldwide.

In a world fascinated by remarkable new opportunities for greater prosperity, these disorders will have to be discouraged and controlled by mechanisms unlike any already extant: new authorities, new formations, new training, and new equipment. New "rules of engagement" will be needed to prevent the hesitant application of force that can turn *any* operation into "another Vietnam quagmire," and to avoid reliance on U.S. leadership and participation.

Unfortunately, the emphasis will remain on

"control" rather than "discouragement"—i.e., crime punishment rather than crime prevention. The efforts of the IAEA to enforce the UN's nuclear non-proliferation treaty through mandatory inspections are a rare exception, and their difficulties are evident in Iraq and North Korea. However, this approach is only valid where the host government controls the suspect operation, and one cannot imagine an International Illegal Drugs Agency conducting inspections of drug-producing facilities in Colombia or Burma.

New Collective Security Mechanisms Will Evolve

Upward Drift in Sovereignty: Globalization

Following the cold war the upward drift in sovereignty is accelerating.¹⁴ More and more proud national prerogatives—from traffic signs and passport design to area codes and interest rates—are being assumed by international or global bodies. The shrinking, more interdependent world is accepting greater standardization and regulation of behavior and practices as means of sharing increased humanity, security, and prosperity.¹⁵ Progress in the European Community,¹⁶ APEC and ASEAN cannot be ignored. At the same time, there is more virulent and desperate resistance from groups wishing to reject homogenization and return to the supremacy of local cultures. The fractionalizing of Eastern Europe is surely cause for concern, although the CSCE framework limits the vulnerability of the smaller states. The struggle between "good" and "bad" often appears now as a conflict between supra and sub-nationalism.

"Globalization" trends in trade, finance, and business are further eroding national sovereignty.¹⁷ International banks and corporations—as well as the International Labor Organization—clearly recognize few national boundaries. Collectively, they provide a major stimulus for development and homogenization of

the global work force. Adoption of international work and quality standards has changed the nature of manufacturing and hastened the internationalizing of technology development and application. Many major products no longer have a meaningful "country of origin"—as highlighted in the global automobile and electronics industries, and in (unwise) U.S. attempts to "punish" Chinese business practices without harming Hong Kong and Taiwan. International relations are no longer dictated primarily by dainty intergovernmental dealings, but by lesser organizations of equal legitimacy but far less accountability.

Globalization of Crime

These global business and finance trends have not been overlooked by the criminal elements which have themselves internationalized. They freely pursue transborder illegal activities, from bank fraud and money laundering to illegal trafficking in drugs and arms, benefiting from the lack of standardization of criminal law or its enforcement.¹⁸ Individual nations cannot deal with international crimes beyond their borders, but the UN cannot cope with dozens of warfighting infractions and numerous other ongoing lesser crimes simultaneously either.¹⁹

History may well record the collapse of the cold war as the beginning of the end of the supremacy of the nation-state as the key structure in political, economic, or societal development and stability. Some larger nations have begun to crumble in Eastern Europe and Asia, while some of the arbitrarily divided states (Germany, Vietnam, Yemen, and soon Korea) are reunifying. Furthermore, as state power declines relative to the influence of some of its illegal operators, national governments cannot be held responsible for the crimes committed within their legal boundaries. Current examples include the major drug cartels in Colombia²⁰, and the usurpation of Southern Lebanon by Hezbollah elements supported from Syria and Iran. Law enforcement must operate against criminal

elements, not just "rogue" governments.

Internationalism and interdependence are clearly on the rise, accelerating the virtual shrinkage of our planet. The notion of one (or two) superpower(s) with catholic interests and concerns is no longer credible. There will be no Great White Policeman of the World.²¹ The acceptability of unilateral interventional and permanent sub-regional blocs is declining. Yet there is a growing and inescapable demand to enforce globally-adopted codes of individual and group conduct and behavior. The new world must pursue universal human interests guided by universal human values.

Clearly, nations will have to learn to act together to preserve their agreed common values. The egocentric cold war concept of committing national resources only to support "vital national (self-)interests" is being supplanted by a concept of "obligatory community service" to support global values and enhance assurance of regional stability and prosperity. Such global values may flow from both supra- and sub-national organizations as well as from classic national governments. International business conglomerates and relief agencies have special demands at one end of the spectrum. Various exploited minorities and the several nationless tribes (Kurds, Palestinians, Montegnards, etc.) require protection at the other.

Current Security Institutions Dated

The somewhat elitist cold war NATO alliance will surely either transfigure itself or gradually disintegrate since its current biases are no longer justifiable. The double standard of reinforcing friends but ignoring or patronizing the rest of Europe is declining as the more democratic influence of the UN rises, and new institutions emerge.²² NATO's awkward half-hearted responses to the rape of Bosnia is a stark tribute to the inadequacy of today's institutions to deal with today's problems until it is "too late."²³

Similarly, the concept of interlocking

regional U.S. military commands covering most of the world seems anachronistic in a world without superpower struggle and with vastly reduced military budgets. Nothing could better reinforce the empirical notion of "policeman of the world" than to have permanent unilateral "precinct stations" all over the world. The U.S. unified commands for the Southern Hemisphere (SOUTHCOM), and for the entire Pacific and Indian Ocean regions (PACCOM) need to be restructured to better represent today's threats and today's divisions of responsibility.

In the bureaucratic areas of "division of labor" and "roles and missions" among U.S. security forces, this new "gray domain" presents additional legalistic problems. There will be growing ambiguities within the military between main force operations and special operating force (SOF) missions. There are obvious differences between military roles and those of the law enforcement agencies. There are more subtle differences between the use of military SOF units, and the conduct of covert operations by the intelligence services. On the more legalistic side, there will be difficulties differentiating war crimes and "peace crimes," war theaters and "crime theaters," declarations of war and "declarations of law enforcement," the applicability of the War Powers Act and "Presidential Findings." Many of the bureaucratic classifications and compartmentalizations of the Cold War era no longer obtain.

Furthermore, the elaborate agglomeration of American administrative and legislative foibles should not be transferred wholesale to international authorities. In fact, the solution to some of our self-imposed impedimenta may be to assign appropriately trained personnel and units to extra-national authorities with fewer idiosyncrasies. Alternatively, certain specialized operations may have to be assigned to less inhibited, preferably regional, operatives (KGB and MOSSAD come quickly to mind.)

Overloading the Role and Capacity of the UN

Many lesser conflicts are being addressed by UN peacekeeping forces *after* truces have been arranged. "Trucekeeping" might be more apt. Bigger violations have been handled by ad hoc arrangements, including the short-lived Suez War, the U.S.-led Vietnam War, and the response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Sometimes larger powers have dealt with the problems unilaterally (and quite awkwardly, i.e., Falklands, Grenada, Panama.) But there is growing resistance to the unilateral use of military force, particularly to enforce unilateral diktats, ambitions, or standards. Based on the newfound atmosphere of cooperation in the post cold war UN Security Council, authority is shifting towards global endorsement of ad hoc coalition responses for both prevention and punishment of breeches of worldwide standards of conduct.

The fact remains, however, that the UN is hopelessly miscast in the role of serious crime-fighting. It is as incapable of moving up the scale of conflict intensity as NATO appears in moving down the scale below main unit armored warfare. As high-intensity, high-tech NATO forces try to move down the scale, their clumsiness, lack of experience, and tendency towards military overkill become more obvious. However, when ad hoc volunteer ill-equipped, and ill-trained UN forces try to move up the scale, they are simply incompetent for the job. Similar asymmetries can be drawn between a ponderous slow-moving Cold-War-cautious NATO political and military command structure, and an almost totally non-existent, and thoroughly amateurish UN command structure. In between, the training, transport, logistics and communications infrastructures exist for NATO, but do not for the UN. Moreover, and equally serious, UN forces are generally *proscribed from gathering intelligence*, whereas NATO, albeit overly dependent on U.S. capabilities, understands its importance.²⁴

On the other hand, the UN clearly understands that it is a *global* organization trying

to deal with *collective security* while NATO has always fancied itself as a *sub-regional bloc* dealing with *collective defense* of a certain fixed territory. While NATO is trying gradually to change its stripes, its awkwardness is clearly evident in its limited willingness to reach out to—but not embrace—the insecure nations of Central and Eastern Europe. It is failing to offer collective security because it cannot visualize trying to extend its zone of collective defense. In fact, the Western European Union (WEU), a subset of NATO, has shown far greater willingness to undertake out-of-area collective security missions (twice in the Gulf region, twice around Bosnia), and to reach out towards the region-wide CSCE. One wonders if it is not time to reverse roles and make NATO a single-purpose subset of the WEU, while encouraging WEU to become the "security council" of the CSCE.²⁵

Global Gospel: Regional Enforcement

The notion of passing directly to the UN all aspects of international law enforcement requires a huge, unrealistic leap of faith. It is one thing for the UN to write the Global Code of Ethics. It is quite another matter to expect so large a political committee to provide the instruments for its implementation. There is no successful case of global management of any *single* highly complex operation (business, relief, military, etc.) without the use of divisional or regional implementers. Even the Catholic Church with its highly centralized rule-making depends on regional and sub-regional structures for "enforcing" its fiats. Manage dozens of diverse operations worldwide almost certainly requires *intermediate* levels of authority and accountability.

It seems to me inescapable that the world will gradually evolve a set of *regional security apparatuses* (RSAs), legitimately authorized to enforce broadly—if not globally—accepted laws and standards, while respecting the mores and peculiarities of the region(s) involved. This paper looks at some of the likely procedures,

characteristics, and authorities of RSAs tailored to the needs of the coming century. Management and control, operational procedures, and unit equipage of often ad hoc coalition forces will be very different than we had come to expect and train for in the NATO/Pact scenario. However, they might well evolve from the increasingly anachronistic regional unified command structure of U.S. military (PACCOM, SOUTHCOM, etc..)

RSAs, then, would be primarily charged with the *collective enforcement of international laws* and standards *within the community* (i.e., "behave or be penalized.") This is very different from the recent military alliances for collective defense (like NATO and Warsaw Pact) formed to deter or wage intra-regional wars with goals of "destroy or be destroyed." RSA actions would draw more from civil police work (or CIA/DEA "special operations") than from military missions like counter-aggression, deep strike, or anti-submarine warfare. RSAs would reflect growing notions of "regional sovereignty" over common, inseparable intra-regional infractions and disorders, providing mechanisms to assure "reasonable"—albeit certainly not total—compliance.

In this respect, RSA "forces" would be extensions of domestic peacetime law enforcement agencies. Using such forces would by no means be a "last resort" option as with military forces. Many of their functions would be continuously exercised to maintain inter-regional "law and order." Moreover, casualties would be inevitable and should become as accepted as losses "in the line of duty" among the LEAs. Questions about whether such operations are "worth dying for" (as now raised regarding Somalia) would be inappropriate.²⁶

RSA Procedures and Actions

Initial RSA responses might simply involve more pro-active diplomacy, followed by on-site inspections, and then by economic or political sanctions, if needed. More serious violations might draw boycotts, isolation, impoundage, or

property forfeiture. In more acute cases, population control, leadership "persuasion," arrests, or even "SWAT team" actions against specific targets might be authorized, once the offender has been legitimately "indicted."

There will frequently be a clear premium on acting swiftly before a situation becomes unmanageable. However, the procedures for instigating reactions are likely to be cumbersome at best and the context in which the disorder originated may be quite obscure at the outset. In any event, RSAs would per force be permanently staffed and should not require any awkward last-minute transfer of assignment or control (a la NATO.) They would be primarily supported, however, by units drawn on demand from participating members that have been cross-trained and equipped for RSA operations.

RSA actions would probably be authorized (like warrants) by some fully legitimate international body (or court), based on some "finding" (declaration of emergency) or "indictment" (viz, UN resolution) derived from some regional "prosecutor" (security council?). The initial alert might come through some crisis control center (a la CSCE), and confirmed by some sort of fact-finding procedure: either a cooperative inspection mission (like Red Cross in Azerbaijan or IAEA in Iraq), or a non-cooperative intelligence gathering program (such as "regional technical means" or on-site "witnesses.")

It is not inconceivable that future Balkan-type traumas might someday be handled by a pan-European regional security apparatus (ERSA) that might well evolve under the general control of a politically stronger CSCE of 60-odd nations (perhaps merged with the Council of Europe.) By then, the CSCE should have established its own security council, perhaps an outgrowth of the Western European Union (WEU) and/or the new Forum for Security Cooperation.²⁷ In this hypothetical world, NATO might have devolved into the "heavy metal" component of the WEU, and include the remnants of the U.S. military presence in Europe. In this construct, CSCE would be free to respond to lesser European security problems

without involving the U.S., but retain some U.S./NATO forces as a hedge against unexpected conflict escalation. This would be consistent with the NATO Summit agreement that European nations are encouraged to undertake certain measures without U.S. involvement.²⁸

RSA Command Structure and Operations

The RSA command structure should effectively support both one-time contingencies requiring specific and unique reactions, and continuous enforcement operations in which responses should be automatic and not require fresh political consensus. Just as a local fire department does not need a go-ahead from its local council to respond to a fire within its district, RSA activities should be internally generated in response to recurring disorders (e.g., drug trafficking, money laundering, or arms control violations.) Certain continuous enforcement/regulatory functions could gradually shift from national to supranational institutions: an EC customs service; an ASEAN coast guard; a CSCE conventional arms control service; or a Caribbean drug enforcement agency.

Command of each RSA would probably be civilian, not military, and rotate between major nations of the region as decided by some regional implementing charter or treaty. Deputies and "J-staff" would surely include both military and civil law enforcement groups adjusted to reflect the major current threats in that region. For instance, a European RSA under CSCE might be designed to focus on ethnic strife and forced migrations, whereas a Latin American RSA (perhaps an internationalized SOUTHCOM under an invigorated OAS) might focus on financial chicanery and drug trafficking. Clear "connectivity" to all regional governments, law enforcement agencies and military would be needed. The skills and prowess of the military in communications, transport and logistics, and intelligence would surely be essential.

The question of operational command of

composite military forces remains difficult at best. There is a natural reluctance to place major U.S. units under foreign control, and strong resistance to allowing command to drift upwards to inexperienced individuals or committees.²⁹ This argument was settled by firm U.S. leadership in the joint military reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and in the initial U.S. response to starvation in Somalia. However, the recent squabbles between NATO and the UN over the control of military operations into Bosnia, and the difficulties faced by the current UN control of military activities in Somalia indicate the impracticality of UN *operational* command. This is one sound reason for inserting RSAs as regional operational commands between the global arbiters of behavior, and the hands-on resolution of specific strife-prone disputes.

RSAs must include access to respected, seasoned regional military commanders with forces familiar with the territory and its inhabitants. Ideally, a high-ranking military deputy to the RSA director/commander would have some military units (possibly rotating) seconded to his operational control at all times, and would be responsible for their joint training, readiness, and logistic support. The NATO approach of individual country logistic support for joint forces would be unacceptable for forces really expected to fight. Logistic problems among ad hoc UN peacekeepers are, unfortunately, legendary.

More difficult issues about command flexibility center around the complexities inherent in commanding multi-function, high-tech forces. Very few non-American commanders, for instance, have extensive experience in synchronizing the efforts of "air-ground teams" (or sea-air teams) involving fast-moving armor (or surface combatants), stand-off weapons, armed and assault helicopters, and fixed wing tactical aircraft, all responding to real-time target intelligence from airborne and satellite detectors in dead of night! Like the reasons proffered for always having an American SACEUR in NATO (to handle the use of non-French nuclear weapons), arguments may soon extend to requiring command by the most technically proficient conventional force.

Each RSA could also provide a FEMA-like

mobilization core for assembling and deploying community responses to natural (earthquake) and manmade (reactor meltdown) disasters, environmental crises, or even plagues and pestilences. The apparatus should be authorized to commandeer relevant assets, such as transport and hospital facilities, and assure the necessary regional logistic access through overflight, landing, and docking rights. It should also be prepared to provide "cultural advisory units" to help incoming strangers cope with language and dialects, local mores and taboos, etc. (The British provided Middle East-wise NCOs to U.S. units deployed in DESERT SHIELD.)

RSA units might also augment inadequate national capabilities that threaten regional stability. In roles reminiscent of "strike-breaking," special units might, say, assume control of dysfunctional air traffic control centers, re-open shut down pipelines, or bolster local customs (anti-smuggling) capabilities. In rare incidents, illegitimate or rogue governments (viz, Iraq) may need to be deposed (an option certain to grow in acceptability through some regional impeachment process.) In others, the aim may be to re-establish a functioning government where anarchy holds sway (viz Somalia, or much earlier, the Dominican Republic.) The burden sharing of RSA costs could also involve trading "contributions in kind:" just as the U.S. provides LEA training, say, to many developing countries, those countries could provide translators for U.S. intelligence efforts.

Since RSA problems would run the gamut of civil law enforcement and disaster relief agencies, RSA "reaction forces" could well be mobilized from national civil agencies with reserve roles in RSA activities (such as the U.S. Coast Guard vis a vis our Navy.) This "dual-hatting" could well be extended to other federal agencies from Border Patrol and Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, to Federal Aviation Agency and Customs Service.³⁰ Mobilization would incur relaxation of various peacetime statutory limitations, and bring into play new command and control systems. One can conjure up endless combinations of French customs agents, British frogmen, Canadian Mounties, German submarine units, and U.S. ATF agents, say, to enforce CSCE-dictated economic

and arms sanctions against expanded Irish terrorism.

Military Functions

In some scenarios, the military roles might exclude combat forces but extensively engage intelligence, transport, and combat support personnel (from surveillance, communications and engineers, to civil affairs, medical, decontamination, and graves registration units.) It is not anomalous that military units sometimes respond to non-military crises, such as disaster relief, while some unauthorized military activities, such as Chinese missile exports, may be countered by non-military sanctions. Some U.S. military commanders still resist being distracted from their readiness to execute their "core missions" (like preparing for the re-birth of the Evil Empire?.) Others, more pragmatic, believe that "plowshare missions hone the sword" by providing otherwise unavailable training and experience, particularly in the joint arena.

Combat military units would range from infantry or military police for peacekeeping and truce-keeping activities, to elite helicopter units to recapture an airfield, neutralize a port, interdict smugglers, free prisoners, or shut down a telephone central. Likewise, night-capable, side-firing gunships can discourage urban artillery harassment or illegal re-supply of sanctioned commodities. Larger "enabling forces" might sometimes be needed to "kick open the door."

In most cases, "de-equipping" the offender's air and air-defense forces, navy, or main army units would be a relatively simple (or even clandestine) operation. Assurance of air supremacy would be key to conducting highly specialized military operations with low collateral damage. Elimination of ragtag submarine forces amongst Third World countries should be a matter for regional/global arms control initiatives, but could also be carried out expeditiously by RSA elements.

Over the longer haul, multinational manning of certain specific military units and functions should be feasible. Use of jointly manned units

in the U.S. forces defending the Republic of Korea might serve as the model: Korean "KATUSAs"³¹ are host-country military personnel serving in U.S.-led/manned units. As budgets tightened, U.S. forces assigned to NATO incorporated "host nation support" units and staff augmentation, and NATO-owned AWACs aircraft monitoring the air-exclusion zones over Bosnia are multinationally manned.

While certain combat units might better keep a national identity, there seems little reason to avoid multinational combat support and service support units. Base, depot and troop support, air defense, transport, medical, communications, equipment maintenance, fuel handling, and many other essential logistic tasks can clearly be shared with host countries' military and civil assets.

In addition, there is no inherent reason why some supposedly "unique" U.S. capabilities should not be manned internationally. U.S. amphibious ships could certainly carry other nations' marine forces. U.S. aircraft carriers could have several nations' existing carrier-based aircraft aboard³², and use multinational crews. U.S. airlift assets could include RSA-indigenous pilots, aircrews, and ground crews from countries with their own modern national airlines. Air traffic controllers are readily cross-trained into air defense units. Multi-national headquarters have been shown to work by NATO and WEU.

One essential characteristic of effective RSAs will be fully reliable, secure, multichannel, communications throughout their region to connect not only the military units, but the political infrastructure and the various law enforcement authorities. Existing U.S. unified and specified command structures as well as NATO have outstanding communications in place. These resources could surely adopt shared manning during non-crisis periods, and shared augmentation during high-crisis times.

Intelligence and Alerting Systems

Another particularly key aspect of RSAs would be their resident and augmentable intelligence capabilities.³³ The UN's refusal to conduct intel-

intelligence-gathering operations rules it out as a bona fide regional security command. RSAs must have continuous information on ongoing suspicious activities within their member states, generally supplied by internal law enforcement agencies and sometimes shared through international links such as Interpol. These efforts must clearly be augmentable with or without approval of the local jurisdiction harboring the potential disorder. Intelligence must be both sharable with, and collected independently by, the RSA members. U.S. intelligence could often make major contributions to the RSAs on demand. Holding supersecret and sacrosanct the relevant outputs from U.S. "national technical means" is an archaic and needless hangover from the cold war era.

Reliable and unambiguous early intelligence would be vital to sound collaborative RSA leadership and to its timely and authoritative response. An RSA could voice the alert, prepare the "indictment," assure swift and relevant responses, and set the rules of engagement. Early publicity on disorders and egregious violations of internationally accepted behavior can attract the spotlight of regional/global concern and possibly nip them in the bud, thus avoiding their uncontrollable expansion. Bosnia/Serbia and Somalia are relevant examples of woefully untimely joint reactions, based in part on the reluctance of some countries that should have shared the leadership role to do so.

Just as U.S. forces use a "DEFCON" (= defense condition) ladder to symbolize alert status (DEFCON 5 is "all quiet"; DEFCON 1 = "major attack imminent"), and our intelligence community uses "WATCHCONs" to prioritize focus on certain trouble spots, the RSAs might use a "SUSCON" (suspicion condition) ladder to mobilize various resources such as intelligence gathering in response to various alerting systems (from CNN to escaped prisoners.) "Big Brother" would then be authorized to watch closely only when suitably provoked, and then to perform on-site inspections if deemed appropriate.

Extra-Regional Support and U.S. Role

While most RSAs should be comprised of, and managed by, regional resources, "outside" contributions may be required on demand from the U.S. or other extraregional powers. Ancient animosities may make it impossible for some members to participate in rectifying their own regional disorders. Germans are not very welcome in Serbia; Egyptians are not very welcome in Somalia; and so on. Special capabilities not held by regional members might be needed, ranging from airlift to precision air strikes, or from extinguishing oil well fires to cleaning up nuclear fallout.

A hopefully diminishing role will be forthcoming for an overextended USA. The failure of Europeans to grasp the leadership of their own continent is a tragic psychic remnant of cold war expedience, exhibited yet again in the Balkan crisis. Latin American recalcitrance seems to have deeper roots. Only the Asians seem relatively undisturbed by a declining dependence on the United States. But on occasion, the imprimatur of U.S. assistance may be needed to assure regional action in any part of the world. Support of global civility by participating in regional security efforts—as a strong, honest broker—could well become a major factor in U.S. force planning and design.³⁴

Most important, albeit most elusive, is the continuing need for the U.S. to express its outspoken support for the ideal of global morality and the clear need to extend and enforce international law and order. U.S. political waffling on Bosnia (aided and abetted by British and other European negativism, to say nothing of U.S. military distaste) is a far from encouraging portent. The world still seems to need some sort of "secular pope" who personifies global standards of behavior, and like it or not, most of the civilized world looks to the U.S. to provide that function, even though presidential and legislative elections seldom relate to such qualifications. Unfortunately, when the U.S. drags its feet, much of the world, specially Europe, slows down.

New Operational Domains

There are some significant new technological opportunities that can be available to RSAs. Some capabilities are already fielded with special units and forces, others are in use by law enforcement agencies, some are awaiting a statement of need. They can be put together very effectively, in the hands of well-trained troops, to provide a new operational domain between hollow threats and passive declaratory policies on the one hand and full-scale ground force intervention or old-fashioned bombing on the other.

Nothing herein suggests that such operations would be without risk, casualties, collateral damage, or some innocent victims. Law enforcement and special forces operations are certainly not "immaculate warfare," although they are becoming far more discriminating. Nor would their results be immediate rather than cumulative. In fact, the goal cannot be to "win decisively" but rather to better balance and gradually reduce violence to levels apparently acceptable in other parts of the world, such as Ireland, Israel, South Africa, or Washington, DC.

The lower the intensity of the "war," and the more it approaches a "law enforcement" operation, the more the overall mission emphasis must change. Relatively greater focus must be placed on developing reliable, unambiguous intelligence and less on the immediate destruction of some convenient target set. More emphasis is needed on clearly identifying targets that should *not* be destroyed, from cultural symbols to friendly political elements. Ultimately, law enforcement operations involve presentation of irrefutable evidence of the crime committed and arrest of its perpetrators ("target acquisition"), while "target destruction" is replaced with the exercise of justice through the established court systems. This requires military and para-military forces to adopt new and different standards of discipline and conduct that are publicly judged (viz, the recent Rodney King police brutality case.) This operational domain includes several new objectives applicable to situations like the Gulf, Somalia, and the Balkans:

- Use (para-)military forces to enforce economic sanctions by all means;
- Cap the upper limit of destructive power of the weapons used (such as tanks and artillery); and
- Generate "*confidence destroying measures (CDMs)*" to persuade offenders and their followers that they are no longer in charge of their own future, and that their unacceptable goals are not achievable.

Concepts of Non-Lethal "Persuasion"

RSA operations could involve very innovative approaches to non-lethal "persuasion" to alter aberrant behavior patterns. The cold war catch word "deterrence" may have little application against tribal/ethnic zealotry, or the urge to accumulate arms. Terms "non-lethal warfare" (slippery foam?) and "psychological warfare" (surrender leaflets?) are generally disparaged. However, there is a potentially applicable nascent art form (popularized on the TV show "Mission Impossible") in which offenders are persuaded by unexpected and/or uncontrollable events to either mend their ways, lose their illegal holdings, or "self-destruct."

Such CDMs may become acceptable forms of persuasion at the national level as they are at the local level against hijackers, hostage-takers, etc. Their purpose is to reduce the assurance of the perpetrators or their followers that their actions or cause can produce the desired results. Against drug dealers, it might be to interfere with their financial transactions. Against terrorists, it might be to cause repeated premature detonation of their devices. Against arms smugglers, it might be repeated "accidental" loss of cargos at sea. Against violent sub-national movements, it might be dissention within the leadership caused by suspicions of disloyalty. Among aberrant national governments, it might be to convince their publics that their leaders can no longer keep their national infrastructure operating at tolerable levels.

In this regard, RSAs could eventually have to accept the use of very specialized high-tech covert activities—just as law enforcement agencies

do—and develop realistic procedures for their authorization. In particular, such operations could be instrumental in minimizing harm and inconvenience to "innocent bystanders" caught up in regional disorders. They could also differentiate between destruction and disabling of key facilities or "targets," thus hastening the restoration of normalcy and lowering the clean-up costs.

The ability to use "dirty tricks" could become a significant element in CDMs, and eventually approved in general by regional or global authorities. Disorders driven by greed, paranoia, fanaticism, and rivalry are all susceptible to exploitation. They can be exacerbated by ignorance, fear, and/or distrust of modern high-technologies. Fledgling Third World national infrastructures often depend, for instance, on foreign operation and/or support: an exploitable opportunity for non-lethal persuasion. Each RSA would benefit from having its own "Office of Strategic Services" (OSS), to resurrect a term and capability used successfully in World War II (and which was eventually transformed into the CIA.)

Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions and political exclusion—established forms of persuasion—have been generally unsuccessful as currently practiced. Little rigorous and professional analysis has been applied to improving their effectiveness or developing alternatives. Military practitioners understand the target sets that degrade the functioning of heavy weapon systems like artillery, barrage rockets, and tanks. But it is by no means clear that Western strategists have developed clear and rational taxonomies for enforcing economic sanctions. In fact, they seldom prosecute the providers or shippers as accomplices to the receivers of proscribed commodities.

Clearly, the gamut of economic infrastructure "targets" must extend beyond transportation equipment and facilities to civil communications and financial institutions,³⁵ and include interruptions of (or at least distrust for) seemingly essential domestic services and economic support systems like public media and news sources, urban

transport, etc. Many of these "target sets" are well suited to influence by modern technology, but generally have been of little military interest. Knowing the country and company of origin for such infrastructure equipment and its installation can substantially improve the chances of determining and exploiting its vulnerabilities on short notice.

Leadership Management

Various combinations of persuasions and sanctions are bound to give rise to renewed consideration of means for altering the leadership of rogue states and tribes short of the classic notions of "decapitation" (e.g., the abortive raid against Qaddafi.) It seems quite likely, for instance, that had a decision been made to arrest and remove (kidnap?) Noriega from power in Panama as a covert operation rather than a full-fledged military campaign, modern technology would have permitted it to be successfully carried out primarily by *non-military* forces, using military supporting assets.³⁶ Similar choices may have been available in the well-intended but clumsy Grenada caper. Such unconventional operations may become more politically acceptable as criminal elements expand the viciousness of their acts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues.

While fear of retaliation may continue to bar actions against national leaders (i.e., assassination), the same qualms probably do not prevent actions against other classes of "international criminals." It is certainly an option among domestic law enforcement agencies everywhere, once an "arrest warrant" has been obtained. Such parallels should be extended to regional security efforts, *if* they can be demonstrated to be practical and useful. The UN forces' bumbling and half-hearted pursuit of the Somalian "warlord" Aideed is a case in point. Not only were the U.S. "Delta Force" elements specially dispatched to Mogadishu unsuccessful over three months, but the command subsequently decided Aideed was no longer a criminal!³⁷

High-Tech Special Forces

Many RSA missions would still involve the relatively routine application of existing capabilities for peacekeeping, disaster relief, election monitoring, and the like. A variety of military and civil assets are available for their conduct. The more difficult scenarios involving more zealous and ardent criminal elements require the development of special new capabilities. Technology can make many of these practical [38].

The theme behind many of these developments is to allow the "enforcers" to shift away from "we can bomb you back into the Stone Age, with precision and from over the horizon" (or, as the Air Force likes to say: "reach out and touch someone, anytime, anywhere") something more like "we know what you're doing; you can run, but you can't hide." In essence, our forces must become *omniscient, not omnipotent*.

Technology can be applied in ways that certainly limit (but surely do not eliminate) the need for long-term commitment of vulnerable ground forces within the disordered zone. In particular, the effectiveness of internal/underground *resistance movements* can be magnified enormously—in many cases without arming them. Nowadays, it is virtually impossible to deny clandestine communications (via satellite) from within a beleaguered area. Covert insertion and extraction of people and things is routine in a benign air threat environment. Many high-tech "targets" can be rendered inoperable without destroying them. Other targets can be designated and pinpointed for very precise attack within minutes or hours by stand-off weapons launched from behind a hill or from hundreds of miles away. Very small beacons, remotely operated, can provide unambiguous aim points for very large homing weapons (or guided parachute drops.) It is not inconceivable that if these technologies had been available to various European resistance movements during WWII, many months of high intensity, high-casualty war could have been avoided.

Technology can also contribute to the successful enforcement of economic sanctions, an

essential instrument (and future deterrent) for RSAs. As violations of economic sanctions involve commodities of some sort, their providers and recipients, and various transfer links in between, a range of suitable actions can be developed against each. Twenty-first Century blockades and sieges may be crucial to restoring local law and order but little rigorous research or analysis is being conducted about them. How can we claim to field an effective "Star Wars" anti-missile system, when unable to stanch the illegal flow of usable fuel oil to Serbia (or of mass destruction warheads, for that matter) either at the source, in transit, or at intermediate and final destinations?

High technology can also help reduce the battering of urban areas and their populations which crippled Beirut and may yet destroy Sarajevo. Counter-battery radars can accurately pinpoint the launch site of artillery, rocket and mortar fire, and airborne surveillance can often track the subsequent retreat of the attackers to their defensive positions and storage sites. Remote sensors can provide excellent indicators when known firing sites are occupied.³⁹ A variety of very precise weapon systems operable at night and even in inclement weather can be used in a benign air environment to destroy such capabilities and force the attacker to use a lower level of harassment. In addition, high technology is the key to developing successful confidence destroying measures. Successful application of the above capabilities will require the formation and training of new kinds of high-tech (possibly covert) special units—military, paramilitary, or law enforcement agency—quite possibly multinational in the longer term. Designing, training, and equipping such units requires substantial creativity. The legal ramifications deserve substantial thought, and command and control of ad hoc multinational units needs special technical attention. In any event, the popular vision of "special forces" as snake-eating, swamp-swimming, throat-slitting renegades, will have to be replaced with (or at least expanded to include) a new generation of high-tech science fiction heroes capable of employing the full range of emerging technologies to defeat the persistent forces of evil.

International Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia

Every year, untoward events transpire that can be influenced by world, national, or local reactions to them. Every year, more depressing events happen because we did not react earlier when we should have. The decline in our own global, regional, and domestic quality of life reflects our indifference to its abuses early on. 1993 was no exception.

The massive failure of NATO to react to the horrendous crimes perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia, and primarily focused on the Bosnian people, is a global disgrace. The U.S. has declared itself the world's remaining superpower, and continues to covet a disproportionate role in European affairs. Therefore it must accept accountability for tolerating at least 200,000 deaths, mostly innocent civilians within a hundred miles or so (as the crow flies) of NATO territory. Insisting that humanitarian aid come first, and that we might become bogged down in "another Vietnam quagmire," are blatant excuses for doing nothing beyond posing hollow threats, and discouraging the NATO allies as well.

No one favors a huge permanent military presence throughout Yugoslavia. However, beyond question, the civilized world could have marshalled selective forces that could have significantly reduced the level of violence. We, the civilized, could have made it abundantly clear that we would not tolerate wanton savagery by bands of bloodthirsty irregulars goaded on by primitive ethnic feuds (and world indifference) that have no place in any contemporary society.

There are at least four areas where we could have—and still could—bring together specialized technical assets to: a) vastly lower the numbers of operational artillery pieces; b) vastly improve the capabilities of the defenders to protect themselves and guide friendly fire; c) vastly improve the ability to take in relief supplies and take out the wounded; and d) invoke a set of economic sanctions that would thoroughly isolate the perpetrators from the civilized world of finance, trade, communications, and transport. Would there be allied casualties? Of course.

Would there be American casualties? Of course. That is what crime prevention, and particularly military, personnel understand before they sign up.

Preparing the Scene for the Crimes in Kosovo and Macedonia

President Clinton has apparently informed the Serbian leadership that we would not sit still if ethnic cleansing spreads to the Southwest areas of Yugoslavia. Well and good. When the crimes begin and we stop sitting still, what will we do? Will we draw up a list of things to bomb and calculate how hard it is to move a heavy division into place? I submit many other *crime prevention* steps could be initiated to prepare for what seems almost a certainty, given our collective lack of stomach to provide for collective security in Bosnia. Let me outline a few:

The first step in reacting to another breach of collective security in that region should be to bring notice of serious violations before the Crisis Control Center of the CSCE. CSCE would presumably prepare documented proof and seek an indictment from the UN Security Council [40]. How do we collectively assure that all crimes are reported quickly (like we report traffic tie-ups every rush hour), and with sufficient documentation to satisfy the legalistic mind? Surely such assets and devices are available, from communications satellites and cellular phones to cameras and fax machines.

Another pre-crime step would be to "instrument" key approach routes to gain unambiguous indications of the arrival of the Serbs beloved artillery. Couldn't we collectively provide traffic-counting and magnetic sensors that would yield clues of unusual or covert movement of heavy items, or get visual coverage from remote TV cameras like those now used on Virginia highways?

This time we should know who is the criminal and who the victim. If we know whom to defend, then surely we can use this time to train them in modern technologies and weapons for self-defense. Modern devices, from homing

mortars and digital burst transmitters, to laser designators and offset beacons, can greatly magnify the effectiveness of the "resistance movement," as well as any supporting weapons fire from external security forces. Do we know who will surely support the resistance, how to contact them and how to train them? Do we know the likely collaborators and what would turn collaborators away from their crimes? Do we have the language skills to monitor their communications? Do we need "native guides?"

The Serbian Nationalists will almost certainly depend on indirect fire weapon systems since it takes so little courage and skill to use them. What are the likely targets? Can we provide each one with hardened mortar and artillery-locating systems so that we can tell which of the limited set of firing positions are being used? Can we quickly field some simple acoustic systems in these fixed locations and train the defenders to use them?

Many of the vehicles and installations required to support these Serbian actions are there now. Could we covertly install monitoring systems to tell when an empty barn is occupied, or a sympathizer's truck engine has been started? Our military may not have these devices but others do. If we want to increase the level and effectiveness of economic sanctions, do we understand the vulnerabilities of the economic and business infrastructure in the area? Do we know what keeps the local banks open, the local telephone system working, the buses running, and the mail delivered?

Many of the criminal acts will be perpetrated against cities and towns. Do we understand the anatomy of these urban areas?⁴¹ Do we know where certain ethnic groups are clustered? Do we know who and how to contact the key individuals we may need to help or spook? Can we set up a human or electronic monitoring system to detect activity at the most likely storage and/or firing sites for attackers laying siege to these towns?

Surely there will be need for resupply of hard-pressed localities, to say nothing of enhanced medical capabilities. Are we pre-positioning any of these things? Are we assuring our re-supply (and evacuation) capabilities? Do we need navigation beacons for improved airdrop accuracy? Conversely, do we know the likely targets for the resistance, and do they have the simple necessities for sabotage? None of these items would be difficult to provide, but neither the tiny U.S. force nor the Nordic battalion stationed in the area have any of them. Some of these specialized equipments—and knowledge—could make a big difference in both deterring these actions and mitigating their impact on the population. They may be "high-tech" in the eyes of Third World countries and UN peacekeeping administrators, but they are becoming the stock-in-trade of modern military and law enforcement units suggested herein.

Conclusion

Our collective failure to recognize the growth of international and domestic violence in this broadening domain between all-out war and all-out peace is seriously tarnishing the worldwide expectations for a real post-cold war "peace dividend." It is high time to acknowledge the need to seriously enforce global statutes for law and order, to apply the modern technologies that are capable of assisting well-trained units (and resistance elements), and to develop the regional security mechanisms needed to implement the solutions.

Notes

1. This paper combines parts of two versions of an earlier work entitled "The Evolution of Regional Security Apparatuses for the Enforcement of International Law and Order," published first as "Ridgway Viewpoints" No 93-8 by the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, fall 1993, and subsequently as a Special Report of the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, winter 1994, with the author's annual lecture to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, entitled "The Role of Flexible Mobilization in the Revolutions in Civil and Military Affairs," January, 1994.
2. This author first raised the need for post-Cold War institutional changes in an Atlantic Council Occasional Paper "Organizing for Change: An Essential Part of Comprehensive Security and Western Prosperity," March, 1989.
3. For challenges concerning the continued "legitimacy" of "the West," see Jerome Paolini, "Institutional Aspects of European Security After the Cold War: from Western Security Interlocking to Institutional Evolutionism," paper from Institut Francais des Relations Internationales before conference on Multilateralism and the Conduct of Western Diplomacy, December 2, 1992, by the Mathew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, University of Pittsburgh.
4. Frequently used abbreviations:
 - OECD = Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
 - IAEA = International Atomic Energy Agency
 - NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 - CSCE = Conference on Security and Cooperation, Europe
 - APEC = Asia/Pacific Economic Council
 - ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asia Nations
 - OAS = Organization of American States
 - WEU = Western European Union
 - GATT = General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
5. For others sharing this view in the Washington Post, see James Adams "NATO as Play-Doh," April 4, 1993, Jeane Kirkpatrick "Our First Great Post-Cold War Failure," June 27, 1993, and George Zarycky "Unparalleled International Cowardice," July 25, 1993.
6. The UN used thousands of civil policemen in its operations in Cambodia and Namibia: "Reform of UN Peacekeeping Operations: A Mandate for Change," Staff Report to Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, August 1993.
7. The United States apparently accepts an annual "peacetime" death rate of over 40,000 people in automobile accidents, half due to drunk drivers; 109,000 forcible rapes; and almost 24,000 murders and manslaughter (two-thirds by firearms). 58,000 people were treated for gunshot wounds at a cost of almost \$2 billion. Police agencies alone employ 750,000 uniformed and civilian personnel at a cost approaching \$4 billion. 127 policepersons died in the line of duty: statistics for 1992 from the *1994 World Almanac*.
8. war = "a state of usually open and declared armed conflict between states or nations": definition 1) in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1973.
9. In an interview with Rick Atkinson, Lt. Col. Lee Gore, commander of the U.S. 10th Mountain (!) Division's aviation task force, noted that "'in my manual, urban warfare is covered in a paragraph'. Pilots have learned that 'you cannot hunt individuals with a helicopter in the city': "U.S. to Leave Somalia with its Guard Up: Officers Say Lessons Learned in Perils of Urban Combat, Foreign Command," Washington Post, December 8, 1993. Such naivete must disgust seasoned U.S. law enforcement personnel.
10. For discussion of relevant new arms control issues, see "Summary of Proceedings of the Defense Nuclear Agency Conference on Arms Control and Verification Technology (ACT), 1-4 June 1992," published by Kaman Sciences Corporation, December, 1992.
11. from a discarded 1993 issue of TIME magazine, I am afraid.
12. No history buff, this author was intrigued to find reference to President George Washington's instructions to "Light Horse Harry" Lee to suppress an armed rebellion in Pennsylvania in 1794 "while 'preserving discipline among the troops', observing a 'scrupulous regard to the rights of persons and property', respecting 'authority of the civil magistrates', and restricting the duties of the troops to 'attacking and subduing armed opponents of the laws,'" "Army

Focus," September, 1993.

13. See summary of the fourth report of OECD's Financial Action Task Force on money laundering, "OECD Letter," Volume 2/8, October 1993. OECD policy recommendations on bribery in international trade and investment and on biotechnology development safety are also forthcoming.

14. The UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali agrees: "The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed..." *An Agenda for Peace*, June 17, 1992.

15. Recognition of this upward drift in sovereignty can be found in such diverse places as the open borders between the "five swans" of the Nordic Council, and in the new constitution of independent Tajikistan.

16. For an assessment of the "unstoppability" of European integration, see Anthony Morris, "Europe 2000, Union or Fragmentation," Occasional Paper No. 14 from the Jean Monet Council, George Washington University Forum in European Studies, July 1993.

17. Issues of diminished sovereignty have been highlighted by critics of both the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the globally more important General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Uruguay Round. One reasoned article on the dangers is by Clyde Prestowitz, "How America Could Give Away the Store in the Next Big Trade Treaty," in the *Washington Post* on November 28, 1993.

18. For a full discussion of the growing international drug trade, see Phil Williams, "The International Drug Trade: An Industry Analysis," *Ridgway Viewpoints* No 93-6, Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs.

19. The growing number of UN peacekeeping operations is summarized by CIA analyst Frederick H. Fleitz (EUR/UN) "Worldwide Peacekeeping Operations, 1993" (and notes thereto), 31 October, 1993.

20. For a good description of the successor to the Medellin Cartel, see Frank Smyth, "A New Kingdom of Cocaine," *Washington Post* December 26, 1993. It estimates the Cali cartel controls 85 percent of world cocaine trade.

21. See James Schlesinger, "American Arrogance," *Washington Post*, December 5, 1993.

22. For the latest half-hearted attempt for NATO to reach out to Eastern European countries, see Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's remarks to the Atlantic Council of the U.S., "Partnership for Peace," December 3, 1993.

23. For differing views on NATO's ability to cope with the change scene in Europe, see Senator Richard G. Lugar's speech at the Atlantic Council, "NATO's Near Abroad: New Membership, New Missions," December 9, 1993, and Senator Sam Nunn's *Washington Post* OpEd, "NATO and the Successors of the Soviet Empire," December 26, 1993.

24. See again "Reform of UN Peacekeeping Operations: A Mandate for Change;" Staff Report to Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, August 1993.

25. For the WEU Secretary General Dr. Willem Van Eekelen's latest thinking, see "WEU Prepares the Way for New Missions," *NATO Review*, October 1993.

26. Imagine how foolish it would seem if the Congress demanded that the President certify that eliminating crime in the District of Columbia was a "vital national interest," or if the City Council demanded that Mayor Kelly eliminate all serious crimes in the district by a date certain, or pull out all law enforcement personnel to avoid casualties.

27. See Victor-Yves Ghebali, "The CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation: the Opening Gambits," *NATO Review*, June 1993, p23.

28. See William Drozdiak "Summit Shows U.S. Easing Grip on NATO:" *Washington Post*, January 12, 1994

29. See transcript of speech by President Clinton at the United Nations General Assembly "U.S. Committed to Making UN Vision a Reality," September 17, 1993.

30. The stark differences between warfighting and crime fighting were first brought home to this author by the law enforcement agencies while chairing a year-long interagency Defense Science Board task force study on "Detection and Neutralization of Illegal Drugs and Terrorist Devices," 1987 (never declassified).

31. KATUSA = Korean Augmentation to U.S. Army

32. Other countries with aircraft carriers include the UK, France, Italy, Spain, Brazil and Australia.

33. In a remarkable rationalization, Caleb Baker explains that "the failure to snare an individual foe doesn't boil down to a lack of capability. Rather the SOF mission was limited by Executive Order, and complicated by inaccurate and untimely intelligence, a lack of clear command and control, and unfamiliarity with the foe's home turf." "Manhunt for Aided: Why Rangers Came Up Empty-Handed," *Armed Forces Journal International*, December 1993.

34. See transcript of speech by Madeleine Albright, U.S. permanent representative to the UN, "The United States

will Use Diplomacy When Possible, Force When Necessary," at the National War College, September 23, 1993.

35. It is interesting to note that the U.S. Defense Department's research and development directorate does not contain an office devoted to enhancing techniques for economic sanctions.

36. The long-overdue capture (and demise) of Colombian drug kingpin, Pablo Escobar, by Colombian authorities resulted from a successful trace of several phone calls using high-tech equipment provided by the DEA; Douglas Farah, "Escobar Killed in Medellin," Washington Post, December 3, 1993. An ideal case study for a Latin American RSA.

37. For an indication of the frustration of U.S. Rangers who failed to capture Aideed in Mogadishu, see Washington Post "Mission Incomplete, Rangers Pack Up," October 21, 1993. "We're not cops, and we're having to adopt warfighting technology for a fugitive hunt in a city of about one million," said one unnamed officer.

38. Ken York, "Army Special Operations Command Pushes the Technology Envelope," Armed Forces Journal International, November 1993, provides an interesting listing of USSOCOM's technology priorities--supporting several of this author's suggestions.

39. A broad range of ground sensors originally developed under a crash program for the Southeast war (under the cover of the "Defense Communications Planning Agency"--DCPG), were subsequently adapted and have been extensively used in Israeli border defenses for almost two decades.

40. CSCE took the lead in branding Yugoslav leaders as "war criminals."

41. The need for greater military focus on urban warfare has been repeatedly stressed in Defense Science Board studies in the '70s and '80s, and the issue surfaced again after both the JUST CAUSE operations in Panama, and the DESERT STORM operations in Kuwait and Iraq.

Mr. Leonard Sullivan is a Washington-based national security consultant. He was principal Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering in 1972-73, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) 1973-76. He joined the Defense Department in 1964 from the Grumman Corporation.

Dr. Michael Wheeler is a Senior Defense Analyst in the National Security Studies and Systems Group of Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). An Air Force Academy and National War College graduate. Dr. Wheeler spent 24 years in uniform before retiring as an Air Force Colonel in 1991. His tours in the Air Force included assignments in Tactical Air Command, Southeast Asia, Strategic Air Command, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, and the State Department. A former associate professor at the Air Force Academy, Dr. Wheeler also has served as an adjunct lecturer for the University of Maryland and the University of Colorado. He currently is a member of the Strategic Advisory Group to the United States Strategic Command.

Dr. Peter J. Wooley is an associate professor of political science at Fairleigh Dickinson University and specializes in international security affairs. His recent articles include: "Geography and the Limits of U.S. Military Intervention" in *Conflict Quarterly* (Vol. XI, No. 4) and "Japan's Security Policy: Into the Twenty-First Century" in *The Journal of East and West Studies* (Vol. 21, no. 2).