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OUR FOREIGN POLICY

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**OUR
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foreword



TO MY FELLOW-AMERICANS:

At a time when the duties of citizenship fall heavily on thousands of young Americans, there is a duty that all of us can and should impose on ourselves: to be well informed about the problems that face our country; to weigh the facts, to understand the issues, and to form our own opinions and judgments.

This is not an easy undertaking. But it is necessary if we Americans, as a people, are to exert our full influence for peace and freedom and justice.

The following brief survey of American aims and policies was prepared at my suggestion. I think it is sometimes useful to sum up and set down as simply and clearly as possible what we are after in our relations with other governments and their peoples.

It is not possible, of course, to tell the whole story of American foreign relations in these few pages. But if the part of the story that is told here contributes something to your understanding, if it leads you to other sources of information, and if it helps you to form sound judgments, then it will have served its purpose.

Harry Truman



our foreign policy

ITS ROOTS

THERE is no longer any real distinction between "domestic" and "foreign" affairs.

Practically everything we do, the way we tax and spend our national income, the way we run our public and private business, the way we settle the differences among ourselves and with other nations, what we say in our newspapers, over the air and on public platforms, our attitudes toward each other and toward other peoples—all these things affect not only our security and well-being at home, but also our influence abroad.

All these things go into the making of the character, the personality and the reputation of the United States. Out of all these things grow the foreign policies of the United States.

Policies are an expression of the national interests.

That is a way of saying that our policies reflect what we are and what we want.

During the 175 years since we became a nation, our national interests have changed in some ways, but their general character has remained constant. Here are some of the values that have persisted all through our history:

We are an independent nation and we want to keep our independence.

We attach the highest importance to individual freedom, and we mean to keep our freedom.

We are a peaceful people, and we want to get rid of wars and the threat of wars.

We have a comparatively high standard of living. We want to raise the standard so that everyone in the United States will eventually have a chance to earn a decent and secure living.

We are a friendly people. We have no traditional "enemies," and we want to be on good terms with every other people.

These are the things on which Americans, with all their different points of view, are most likely to agree.

It is the job of the Government, as the agent of the people, to promote these national interests.

The Federal Government, as the agent of the people, continually has hard choices to make. It is the job of the Government, as the agent of *all* the people, to try to harmonize group and sectional interests on the one hand with national interests on the other.

There has never been a time in our history when we could go about the business of promoting our national interests free from the threat of destructive forces. Some of these forces are inside the country. They stem from groups that oppose the national interests. Some Americans have a view of life that conflicts with the basic propositions on which our democracy was founded. Some try to profit at the expense of the freedom or well-being of others.

Some hostile forces have been outside our country.

action. A great deal more needs to be done. Succeeding chapters will discuss what has been done and what needs to be done in concrete terms.

The policy of creating situations of strength happens to be the best response to the problem of Soviet expansion. But it is much more than that.

It is part of a broad new policy that grew out of the experience of the American people in the second World War. That experience destroyed the last comfortable illusion of geographical security. It discredited, once and for all, the doctrine of isolationism.

In the light of that experience, Americans made a radical adjustment in their thinking. They came gradually to realize and to accept the fact that far-off events could affect their safety and well-being. A crop failure in India, a famine or flood in China, an election in Finland, a murder in Bosnia—all kinds of events and trends, good or bad, might eventually come to roost on the American housetop. Americans, they knew at last, live and will continue to live in an exposed position.

Having made that radical adjustment in their thinking, the American people began to consider in earnest this problem: how to make their exposed position comfortable and safe for their free society. To that end, they began to plan and build an international community in which people could live in peace, under the protection of law.

The building of such a community is the most ambitious, the most difficult, the most hopeful and the most exciting enterprise on which the American people have

ever embarked. It is big enough and hard enough to engage all our energies. If it were not for the threat of aggression we could concentrate all our energies on that job. We could say that it was, in fact, the substance of our foreign policy.

But unfortunately that is not possible. The Soviet power drive has cut across the course that we and other peace-minded peoples had charted for ourselves as a hurricane cuts across the path of a ship. It has blown us all miles off our course. It has been a tragic interruption to our progress, a wasteful diversion of our energies.

Nevertheless, we are plowing ahead, breasting the hurricane as we go, holding to our main purposes.

What does it mean to build an international community?

It means, first, organizing the members to deal collectively with their problems, and to defend themselves collectively against anyone who may threaten the peace and tranquillity of the community. So we took the lead in organizing the United Nations and its various specialized agencies.

It means, second, repairing the damage of war, so that members in good standing can play their full part in the life of the community. To this end, we took the lead in organizing the Marshall Plan and the relief programs which preceded it.

It means, third, bringing the outlaws back into the community as decent, working members. So we undertook the occupation of Germany and Japan, and the education of their peoples in the ways of democracy.

It means, fourth, helping the people of the underdeveloped regions of the world to pull their standards of living up to a level that modern science and technology have brought within reach of all people. So we have embarked on the Point Four Program of technical cooperation with people who want and can profit by our aid.

It means, fifth, developing a sensible system of trade, so that all members of the community can expect that their work will contribute to a healthy and expanding economic life for themselves.

To this end, we have helped to write an international charter of fair trade practices, and to create an International Trade Organization, where the nations can settle their disputes across a conference table. Through reciprocal trade and tariff agreements, we are gradually opening up the channels of world trade that have been clogged for a generation.

All this is only the bare outline of an international community. Nobody can predict where the experiment will lead or how long it will take. It may, in time, lead to the international control of all armament, which is essential. It may lead eventually to a form of world government, which is a possibility that excites the imagination of some adventurous people.

For the immediate future, at least, we must reconcile ourselves to the need to divert a large part of our thought and our resources to the defense of the free world. We must give our attention to meeting and preventing aggression by creating situations of strength. As we go

about this immediate and urgent job, we find ourselves doing many things that we would have to be doing even if there were no aggressors in the world. We find ourselves doing many things that contribute to the larger objective of building a community of nations.

This is not to suggest that the threat of tyranny is a blessing in disguise. Far from it. It is an evil thing and its evil effects will remain to plague the world long after the threat of Soviet power is past.

No nation can go through an ordeal of this kind unscathed. But we, at least, can emerge from it self-disciplined and more deeply aware of our national interests in freedom and peace.

In that context, let us consider the method by which we arrive at our foreign policies.

WHO MAKES IT

MANY people would like to know how and where foreign policy is made.

Is it made in the White House? In the State Department? In the Congress? In Middletown, Iowa? Or does it, like Topsy, just grow?

The answer to all these questions is "Yes."

This is not as confusing as it seems.

The Constitution gives the President of the United States full authority for making foreign policies and carrying them out. As the elected representative of the

people, he has the responsibility of translating the will of the people into foreign policy and of promoting the national interests in terms of foreign policies.

The Constitution gives the Senate the job of approving or rejecting treaties and major appointments made by the President. Both Houses of Congress hold the purse strings, which gives them considerable power over foreign policies, for which they also are directly responsible to the people.

The Congress may also give the President advice about foreign policies through joint resolutions.

In 1789 President Washington appointed the first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, as his agent and adviser in carrying out foreign policies. And today the Secretary of State and the Department of State are still the right arm of the President in the conduct of international relations.

In practice, most of the agencies of the Federal Government—43 at the last count—are now concerned, in one way or another, with foreign relations. These agencies work together through some 33 joint committees with 142 subcommittees that study and advise on foreign policy matters.

Secretary Acheson once described the situation in these words: "The President lays down what the policy shall be. In many cases the Congress lays down what the policy shall be. The President may propose and the Congress disposes, but the State Department has the job of foreseeing a problem before it arises. It gets all the other agencies in the Executive Branch together to make

a proposal. It gets the President's approval, or modification, and then takes it up with the Congress through the House and Senate Committees, and moves it forward to some final action in the Government. Therefore, the State Department is a sort of activator in the center of the Government."

The State Department, with its 300 missions in 75 countries, is also the eyes and ears of the Government. Reports coming in regularly from the trained observers in these missions help the State Department and other agencies to foresee problems and make plans to meet them.

Where does Middletown, Iowa, come into the picture? Our policies reflect what we are and what we want. But at first glance, it might seem almost impossible that a country as large as ours, with a population as numerous and as varied as ours could give a clear-cut, understandable idea of what it is and what it wants. Most foreigners find it hard to make sense out of what sounds to them like a babel of voices, what looks to them like a scene of headlong confusion in the United States. As they come to know us, the sound tends to become a voice, the confusion takes on a certain order.

Actually, the American people are better equipped than most other people to form and express their ideas and to arrive at something approximating a national purpose. That is because our lines of communication are many and strong. It is also because the atmosphere of the American community—a legacy of the New England town meeting—encourages everyone to have an opinion and to speak his mind freely.



The American people speak their minds daily in a thousand ways. They communicate directly with their Government by letters and telegrams. They communicate indirectly through the press, the radio, and through the leaders of their churches, clubs, labor unions and other organizations.

The lines of communication are good, but they could be even better. In recent years, the Government has made a prodigious effort to establish closer relations with the people, to develop a two-way traffic of facts and ideas. Examples of this effort showed up in the preparation of the United Nations and the Marshall Plan. Here were two major policy decisions in the making of which the people and the Government really cooperated with some success.

Both decisions precipitated great national discussions. Both involved long public hearings before the committees of the Congress to which citizens came and presented

their ideas. Both led to the creation of citizens' committees which studied the problem and reported.

There is no simple prescription for the making of a democratic foreign policy. Because of the great size and diversity of our country, our policies will always be a blend of many ideas and interests. The blend will grow richer and stronger as the people and their Government become more deeply conscious of their responsibilities toward each other, and toward the democratic principles which have made us strong and free.

toward national security

EVERY government has a primary responsibility for the security of the people it serves. Every people has a duty to protect itself and to prepare a secure future for its children.

But in our natural and necessary concern with security, it is important to know and agree on what we are after. This chapter will explore the needs of American security, and take a look at what we are doing to meet them.

We talk about "American security," realizing that there is no definition of the word "security" that would satisfy all nations. Each people looks out on the world from its own window and therefore calculates the needs of its own security from its own point of view.

Like "democracy" the word "security" has been used and misused for many purposes to justify a variety of national policies. Terrible crimes have been committed in its name. Hitler annexed Austria and Czechoslovakia and invaded Poland in the name of German "security." Stalin forged a ring of satellite puppets, claiming that the Soviet Union needs "friendly" neighbors to be safe from invasion:

After the experience of two German invasions, France built a Maginot Line and manned it with a large standing army.

Both Hitler and Stalin wanted, in the name of "security," to divide the world into two spheres of influence. Let's draw a line, they said. On our side of the line we'll do as we like, and on your side of the line you can have complete freedom of action. There are, in fact, some people who still believe that kind of "settlement" would contribute to American security.

The American idea of security has little or nothing in common with any of these traditional uses of power. We find it fantastic to think—as Hitler apparently thought—that invasion and conquest can enhance the security of any nation, including the conqueror.

The desire of the Russian people, the victims of Hitler's invasion, for friendly neighbors is not hard to understand. But the Soviet system of puppet satellites built around a master nation offers little hope of security to anyone—least of all the people who live under that system.

We made a costly escape, via Pearl Harbor, from our own brand of Maginot Line mentality—the belief that two broad oceans could save us from "foreign" wars. Most Americans now know that the modern world offers no complete immunity from accident, disaster, and the mistakes of human beings. We are aware also that security is not the same thing as superior military power or the possession of a super weapon.

Finally, we have never been interested in the suggestion that a world divided into spheres of influence offers us security. We find that suggestion impractical, unrealistic, and morally indefensible.

The idea of two great powers sitting down together

in the year 1950 to carve up the world between them, casually disposing of the fate of other free peoples, may be something for cartoonists to play with. It is not an idea that democratic governments and peoples can seriously consider. The mere suggestion brings home to us the fact that there is a price no decent, freedom-loving people will pay for security, or the false promise of it.

To understand the American approach to security, we have to consider the problem on two levels: first, the kind and degree of security we can create now in the kind of world we now inhabit and, second, the security we must start to build now if we want a safer, more livable world for our children. As we go along, we will see the relation of every one of our policies to either the short-term or long-term effort to build security.

The short-term problem, in plain and brutal terms, is to survive as a free nation in a pioneer world society. Our situation today is something like that of the early settler of the West. In those days, before law and order were established, before families enjoyed the community safeguards that we now take for granted, every settler had to carry arms to protect himself and his family against marauders.

Today, each nation has to arm itself, and the lone nation is often at the mercy of an unscrupulous outlaw.

In self-defense, the orderly and far-sighted men among the early settlers joined forces for common protection. A rough system of law and order developed in which each settler could get on with his job of clear-

ing the land and plowing it, but always with one ear cocked for danger.

So today, the peaceful nations have organized for a degree of security, without giving up their basic individual sovereignty. In the present phase of pioneer international society, nations have to live with the danger that an outlaw may precipitate war by accident or design. For the past 35 years, we Americans have been feeling the effects of that danger in our personal lives.

We have watched international criminals at work. We have seen peoples pushed around, humiliated, terrorized, undermined and finally attacked, one by one, in Europe and Asia. We have learned some simple rules for survival in a society that permits criminals to defy the law.

We learned that there are no longer any "foreign" wars. There are no more side lines for a nation to sit on. We learned that the only way to avoid being drawn into war is to prevent war. We learned, further, that you cannot prevent war in a pioneer society by agreeing to disarm, since the peaceful nations honor their agreements, and those that are planning aggression ignore them. We became convinced that, for the present, peaceful nations can best serve themselves and their society by arming well, and joining forces for common defense.

These lessons, the product of bitter and costly experience, shape the new American attitude toward national security. A conviction that the earth was round sent

Columbus on his westward adventure. Our conviction that the peoples of the earth were interdependent sent us on an equally bold adventure—an adventure in *collective security*.

We had always been ready to help peaceful nations. But we had never, except in time of war, been willing to team up with them. Now we are ready and willing to do both, and we are doing both because we know that our national interest demands it.

THE LONG-RANGE PROBLEM

To transform the pioneer international society of today into an orderly community of free nations: that is our long-range purpose. The community idea is thousands of years old in the mind of man, but it is just being born in the minds of nations. To bring an international community into existence may be the work of generations. But we have made a beginning. Sheer necessity might hurry up the process.

A community has to have both a political and an economic basis. Even more important, it has to have a moral basis. Certain fundamental standards of decency and behavior have to be understood and accepted by the majority of its members before you can have a successful community. The majority must not only uphold those standards but insist upon their being upheld. What has been called "a consensus of moral judgment" is the

foundation of law and order and the beginning of real community life.

Five years ago, we helped to create a great testing ground for the community idea: the United Nations.

THE UNITED NATIONS

The American people took the lead in demanding and creating a United Nations and thereby reversed a traditional attitude. They had become convinced that all nations were interdependent. They saw no prospect of future peace and security except through international cooperation.



Security was uppermost in the minds of those who wrote the Charter of the United Nations. "To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" was the universal hope of the 51 peoples represented at the San Francisco Conference. All of them were engaged in a terrible war. They centered their hope for peace in a United Nations.

Because the world is not at peace, because the threat of war is still very much with us, the United Nations is

blamed for not doing its job of maintaining the peace and security of its members.

The 5-year record of the United Nations shows that it can discourage aggression. It can promote peaceful relations. But its power to prevent war and impose peace is still seriously limited.

The United Nations has no lawmaking powers. It has no enforcement powers. The Charter did not contemplate an international police force, but it did provide that the Security Council should have military forces in the form of national contingents at its disposal. All United Nations members, said the Charter, were to contribute contingents, by agreement with the Security Council. Air power was to be ready to go into immediate action against an aggressor, on instruction from the Council.

These provisions of the Charter were not carried out because the Soviet Union blocked every attempt to get agreement on the size, composition, and location of the forces.

The story of the United Nations plan for effective control of atomic energy and its rejection by the Soviet bloc will be told in a later section. Against this background of failure to arm the Security Council and failure to control the most deadly of all weapons, it is not surprising that the United Nations has made no real progress toward regulating other kinds of military weapons and forces known as "conventional armaments."

These failures to carry out the provisions of the Charter have handicapped the work of the Security

Council and damaged the prestige of the United Nations.

But far more damaging to the United Nations has been the open, repeated violation of the letter and spirit of the Charter by one of its most powerful members, the Soviet Union. Every nation that signed the Charter promised solemnly to refrain "from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." With that pledge ringing in its ears, the United Nations has watched more than 500 million free people lose their political independence through the "threat or use of force." Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, Eastern Germany and finally Czechoslovakia became puppet police states. The same Soviet purpose is at work in China.

The United Nations has helped other nations resist that threat: Iran, Turkey, and Greece. And it is witnessing Yugoslavia's struggle to remain alive within the communist family.

Finally the United Nations stood by while the Soviet Union shook off its Charter obligations and walked out of almost every United Nations meeting because it could not impose its will to seat communist China.

The United Nations was not built to withstand the attacks of a Great Power. In fact, its members knew from the beginning that its peace-keeping machinery could not work successfully unless the Great Powers made a sincere and responsible effort to cooperate. Yet the United Nations survives and in surviving has shown that what power it has lies in that very "consensus of moral judgment" which is the basis of a community.

It is that massed moral force of world opinion which accounts for every United Nations victory. The power of world opinion deflected the Soviet threat from Iran in 1946. It was an important factor in maintaining the independence of Greece. It played a considerable part in helping Korea, Indonesia, and Israel to establish their national independence.

In all these difficult tests of its strength, the United Nations has been fortified by the full, consistent support of the United States. It has enjoyed the solid moral backing of American public opinion.

However, American backing has been only one of the plus factors. On every clear issue a solid phalanx of public opinion of the whole free world has stood by the United Nations. The Soviet propaganda engine interprets this as proof that the capitalist world is in league against the communist "democracies." The truth is that the free peoples are against aggression. They are against the use of threat and terror. They are against the old power game.

The "moral consensus" rose to a new level of power with the reaction of the United Nations to the invasion of South Korea in June 1950. Within 24 hours of the communist attack, the Security Council had called upon the North Koreans to cease hostilities and withdraw their forces.

Within 3 days, the Security Council had recommended that United Nations members help South Korea repel the attack.

Within 2 weeks of the communist attack, 47 member

nations and 2 nonmembers had declared their full support of United Nations action against the aggressor. In the same period, 7 nations came forward with military contingents to make the fighting force in Korea a United Nations force, under a United Nations flag.

Within 2 months, offers of concrete help had come from 30 nations. In some cases, these offers represented a hard and courageous choice. It meant that small nations living in the shadow of Soviet power decided to stand up and be counted for the rule of law.

In the light of all this experience, with all its discouraging and sobering aspects, the United States continues to put its long-range hopes for a peaceful and secure world order in the United Nations.

We center our hopes in the United Nations not only because its social and economic bodies are doing valuable pioneer work in international cooperation; not only because its related agencies, such as the World Health and the Food and Agriculture Organizations, have a tremendous humanitarian job to do; not only because we are interested in promoting human rights and freedom of information. The United States supports the United Nations for all these reasons and also for practical security reasons.

We realize that our security consists in a combination of many things. It consists in having superior military and economic power on the side of law and order. It depends on strong and free allies. And it depends also on the good will, the respect, the confidence and the moral support of decent people everywhere.

We know of no better way of informing world opinion, of arousing and mobilizing it in defense of peace, than through the United Nations. That is why the United Nations is necessary to our security, just as our support is necessary to its healthy development.


THE PROBLEM OF THE ATOM

The Charter of the United Nations was signed on June 26, 1945. Hardly 6 weeks later something happened that created an urgent need for new patterns of international cooperation—a need that the signers of the Charter did not and could not have taken into account.

The atomic bomb exploded on Hiroshima. The full meaning of that event was not understood at the time and is still not universally realized.

The bomb was not the first weapon of mass destruction—or the last. It did not change the basic facts of life in a pioneer international society. It did not make war either more or less probable, but it made the effects of war more terrible. Therefore, those who thought deeply and calmly about the meaning of the bomb came to two simple conclusions: prevent war and find an effective way to outlaw the bomb and develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

Ever since 1945, American policy has proceeded from these two conclusions. To prevent war was already our major interest and concern. The use of atomic energy presented us with a new and baffling problem. Let us consider the nature of the problem.



The technical details of atomic energy and of the weapons we have developed from its devastating power are very complex indeed, but the principle of the atomic bomb is very simple. All you have to do to blow a city off the map is to get together enough plutonium or a rare form of uranium in one lump. There is nothing more to it than that—a lump of metal of a certain size. Anyone can do it if he has a way of getting the stuff, knows how to protect himself against the poisonous radiations, and can delay the explosion until he is ready for it. The principle of the hydrogen bomb is also simple enough; whether it can in fact be developed is not yet known. All you will need is a very high degree of heat, a degree so high that probably only a uranium or plutonium bomb could supply it. The

horror of this situation is that literally anyone with access to the refined materials could bring about an atomic explosion. What other course is there but to keep this dangerous stuff away from irresponsible men and nations?

Within a year after the bomb exploded on Hiroshima, the United States had devised plans and proposals for doing just that: keeping the dangerous stuff out of irresponsible hands. We decided to put domestic control and development of atomic energy under the authority of a civilian commission. This decision became law on August 1, 1946, when the President signed the McMahon Bill.

We decided to put the problem of international control of atomic energy squarely up to the United Nations. Canada, China, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed to this plan, and in January 1946 the first General Assembly of the United Nations created a Commission on Atomic Energy with instructions to work out a plan of effective international control.

By June 1946 the United States was ready with preliminary proposals for such a plan, and Bernard Baruch, the American representative, put them before the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations. The proposals were based on the report of a group appointed by the President, early in January, to study the problem of atomic control from the point of view of national security and international peace. The report of this group, known as the Acheson-Lilienthal Committee, came to the following conclusions:

that effective workable international control *was possible*;

that international inspection of national atomic activities was not, by itself, good enough to safeguard the security of individual nations;

that, therefore, a new kind of international authority had to be created which would itself own all the raw materials and carry on all the "dangerous" operations in the field of atomic development. The nondangerous aspects of development could be in national hands, but these national activities would have to be licensed and inspected by the international authority.

The United States offered to give up its monopoly of atomic weapons and turn over its technical knowledge for an effective international system of this kind. When such an adequate system of control had been approved and had come into effect step by step, then, we proposed, the manufacture of atomic bombs would stop; existing bombs would be disposed of by agreement; and a world-wide Atomic Authority would be in possession of all information about the production of atomic energy for both peaceful and military purposes.

These are the main provisions of the United Nations plan which was approved by an overwhelming vote of the General Assembly in 1948. It is an honest plan, aimed at genuine control and promising a high degree of security to all nations. No other method has yet been found that offers genuine control or security.

This plan has been rejected and fought by the Soviet Union and its satellites. The Soviet Union stands on

In the spring of 1950, on the third anniversary of the Truman Doctrine, the American people had before them a very different picture. The guerrillas had been beaten and had vanished from Greece; the country was at peace and on the way to recovery. Almost all the 700,000 war refugees had gone back to their homes. Railroads were operating, highways were passable, bridges had been restored. Forty thousand new houses had been built. Agricultural production was above the prewar level, and thousands of acres of new land were under cultivation. Malaria cases had dropped from more than a million to less than 50,000 a year.

Three years of military assistance had also put Turkey in a much stronger position. Modern equipment and training produced a much more effective military establishment from the point of view of combat capability and at the same time made possible a very considerable cut in the armed forces.

During 1950, the people of Greece and Turkey held free elections and voted new governments into office. The Turkish election made history in that it brought to an end the one-party political system that had ruled the country for 27 years.

What had the program cost in the first 3 years? In round figures, the sum total of American aid to Greece and Turkey, both civilian and military, was about 1.8 billion dollars—somewhat less than one percent of the American national income in the year 1950. Americans could judge whether the Truman Doctrine had been a good investment in peace and security.

THE RIO PACT

In coming to the aid of Greece and Turkey, the United States had to act quickly and alone to deal with a threat to the peace. Our action was effective. But we knew that it was not a satisfactory substitute for collective action, or the ultimate solution of the problem of threats to the peace.

Even as the Greek-Turkish aid program was getting under way, we continued our search for a better way—a collective way to meet the kind of situation that had arisen in Greece and Turkey.

The United Nations Charter had suggested one means in the form of *regional arrangements* for settling local disputes under the general authority of the Security Council. The American Republics had laid the foundation for such a regional arrangement in 1945 in the Act of Chapultepec. In the summer of 1947, they embodied it in an inter-American treaty of mutual assistance, known as the Rio pact. This pact made history, for it set up the first machinery for collective action in case of an attack on an American state from either inside or outside the Western Hemisphere.

Nearly 2 years were to pass before the nations of the North Atlantic were to agree on a collective defense arrangement of the same general kind. Meanwhile, Soviet pressure on Western Europe was mounting.

NORTH ATLANTIC DEFENSE

In September 1947, the Soviet bloc declared that it would fight the Marshall Plan and established the Cominform as a sort of general staff to master-mind and

situation, an additional 4 billion dollars was asked. The communist forces had shown that they were ready to embark on reckless adventures in military invasion. There was no telling where they might strike next.

* * *

In general, the pattern of military aid is similar to economic aid. As in the European Recovery Program, the United States made a separate agreement with each country receiving aid. Each agreement reflected the needs of the particular country, what it could do for itself and what was necessary in the way of help from the United States. In every case we reserved the right to make the final decision.

Following the economic-aid pattern, military assistance is based on a coordinated European plan. Part of our aid is in the form of finished weapons; some of it consists in raw materials which can be manufactured by the receiving countries.

The Mutual Defense Assistance Program is designed to supply a major "missing component" for successful defense of the North Atlantic community. Moreover, successful defense does not contemplate the "liberation" of Europe after conquest and occupation by an aggressor. No one—least of all the European people—would consider that a "successful defense." The collective strength of the North Atlantic community is designed to protect every member of that community from invasion. We are now engaged in a prodigious cooperative effort to build that kind of defense.

NATIONAL DEFENSE

The defense establishment is a major support of the President's foreign policy. In our democratic system, military power backs up, but does not shape, our policies. The responsibility for maintaining adequate military forces is put, by law, in the hands of a Secretary of Defense. But in practice it is often the Congress that shapes our defense by granting or denying the money to pay for it, and by limiting its appropriations to certain specific purposes.

Since the war our commitments abroad and the troubled state of the world have made it necessary for us to support the largest defense force and the largest military budget in our peacetime history.

One of our commitments is to occupy Germany and Japan until satisfactory peace treaties can be made. Another is to man the bases we would need in time of war and to maintain the lines of communication with our men overseas.


General Bradley explained our approach to the defense problem when he said:

"Our basic military structure consists of two main elements, the forces in being, and the mobilization base. Because the United States will not make war of its own volition, a fact as apparent to any aggressor as it is to us, our forces in being are maintained at a strength which can prevent disaster in the event we are attacked, and which can strike a retaliatory blow that will be strong enough to slow down the aggressor while we mobilize. It would be economically foolhardy and politically incon-

sistent for us to maintain forces in being sufficient to win a major war.

"Our mobilization base must provide the educational, training and logistical facilities that will assure us of a quick expansion of the Armed Forces in order that we can eventually bring the full might of this nation, in conjunction with allied nations, to bear upon the enemy."

In June 1950 not quite four months after General Bradley had spoken these words, communist forces invaded South Korea—an act of raw, unprovoked aggression. Under the authority of the Security Council, American Armed Forces went into action from their nearest bases in Japan, more than a hundred miles away.



American military forces "in being" prevented the disaster of a quick communist victory in South Korea. They were able, in the face of appalling difficulties, to strike a retaliatory blow and, although greatly outnumbered, to slow down the aggressor, while we mobilized.

Meanwhile, our "mobilization base" was providing a quick expansion of our Armed Forces. On July 19, the President proposed an immediate expansion of our military establishment. In a message to the Congress he said, "The fact that communist forces have invaded Korea is a warning that there may be similar acts of aggression in other parts of the world. The free nations must be on their guard, more than ever before, against this kind of sneak attack."

The President's program involved the drafting of new manpower, the calling up of reserves. It involved doubling the defense budget so that by June 1951 we would be spending at the rate of 30 billion dollars a year. It meant raising at least 5 billion dollars more in taxes.

The President asked the Congress for authority to impose a system of allocations and priorities so as to direct the flow of commodities into military production.

Thus the leading democratic member of the United Nations showed that it could move rapidly and smoothly into a new situation requiring police action under the United Nations Charter. For the American people, and particularly for the men in the field of battle, it was a hard and bitter experience. Once again, we would have to be on the alert for a reckless and ruthless aggressor.

But the national defense was doing its immediate job of checking the aggressor.

toward economic well-being

THE policies of the United States reveal a growing recognition of the world-wide economic forces that affect our peace and security.

In recent years, we have become more conscious and more firmly convinced of the fact that poverty—besides being an evil in itself—has evil consequences for all peace-loving peoples. Poverty, we have learned, is the breeding ground for totalitarian governments which entrench themselves by police-state methods. And police states are apt to be irresponsible and reckless members of the international community.

Poverty, with all its evil byproducts, is the problem that two-thirds of the world's people live with today. Yet the industrial and scientific advances of the past hundred years have put the solution of this problem into the realm of the possible. It can now be attacked with rational hope of success. And we Americans must lead the attack if we are to build a decent and secure life for ourselves.

The measures the United States Government has taken and is taking to stimulate world production and trade, to help raise standards of living abroad with the aid of technical skills and capital, and to promote co-operation among nations for these purposes are what

we call our "economic foreign policy." Obviously, that policy has broad political as well as economic goals.

The first United Nations agencies to get under way were aimed primarily at economic cooperation: the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Bank, the Monetary Fund, and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), which began its great work of relief and reconstruction among the newly liberated peoples even before the war had been won.

The United States, as the only great power physically untouched by war, has had to take the initiative both in and outside the United Nations. The war expanded and strengthened our capacity to produce. In spite of wartime dislocations, the American people emerged from their ordeal better housed, better fed and clothed, more healthy and vigorous than they had ever been in their history.

In 1945, a prosperous, strong, and healthy United States looked out on a world in poverty and chaos. The situation we saw had been aggravated, but not caused, by war. The years between the two world wars were years of depression and bitter economic warfare among nations—including our own. In those years Europe was able to balance its trading accounts only with the help of its foreign investments and because the world prices of the raw materials on which its existence depended were abnormally and unhealthily low. Already in those years the systems of empire which had contributed so much to Europe's wealth and to the flow

of world trade were beginning to shift uneasily on their foundations. The impoverished people of Asia were already in ferment.

And so the problem of the postwar world of 1945, with its hungry and homeless and jobless millions, was not so much to restore an old economic order as to create and build a new and better system which would offer a more decent livelihood and a more secure future to the people of the world.

The design of this new and better international economy has now begun to take shape. Its outlines can be seen in the foreign economic policies of the United States. These policies have three broad purposes: first, to help rebuild the great European workshop on more modern lines; second, to help create new workshops, new sources of wealth, in the "underdeveloped" areas of the world; and, third, to open up the channels of world trade so that the fruits of production can be more widely distributed and enjoyed.

EUROPEAN RECONSTRUCTION

Eighteen months before the war ended in Europe, plans for reconstruction were already under way. In November 1943, 44 nations joined in establishing UNRRA, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. UNRRA's mission was to go with the Allied armies into liberated areas, help to relieve hunger, curb disease, revive agriculture and industry, and restore transportation, power, and communications.

Between 1944 and 1947, the United States financed

about 70 percent of UNRRA's work. In addition, we furnished direct aid to our European allies, through a series of relief programs, known as interim aid. By 1947, postwar European aid had already cost the United States 11 billion dollars.^o American food and materials had prevented starvation and staved off revolution in Europe; but they had not produced genuine recovery or the prospect of it.

Because our aid had been granted piecemeal, it had made no dent on the jungle of European trade barriers. It had not gone hand in hand with necessary tax, land, and currency reforms. Each European nation was struggling to recover within its own economic strait jacket.

Moreover, continuous communist agitation weakened the European governments and discouraged reforms. The Iron Curtain had cut off supplies of food and markets on which Western Europe had always depended.

The terrible winter of 1946-47, which blanketed Europe with snow and ice, brought the life of the Continent almost to a standstill. As the people struggled against cold, hunger, and darkness, new plans were taking shape in the United States.

On June 5, 1947, the American Secretary of State, General Marshall, in his famous speech at Harvard, suggested a different approach to the problems of Europe. He declared an end of stop-gap measures. He said, "Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative." He urged the European nations to draw up a joint plan

for recovery, and he pledged solid American backing for an all-out effort by the European nations to rise together.

The response was immediate. On July 12, 16 European nations gathered around a conference table and began to prepare a cooperative recovery program to submit to the United States. It became a Western European program only because the Soviet Union had walked out of initial meetings and refused to allow any of her satellites to take part.

The 10 months that followed Secretary Marshall's proposal were months of intensive planning on both sides of the Atlantic. Rarely has an American policy been so carefully studied or so widely debated by the people and the Congress. The Harriman committee of prominent citizens, headed by the Secretary of Commerce, studied Europe's needs and America's ability to meet them. The Krug committee of Government specialists studied the effects of the plan on American resources. The President's Council of Economic Advisers studied its impact on the United States economy. The Congress considered all these findings, held extensive public hearings, and made additional studies of its own. On April 3 the President approved the "Economic Cooperation Act of 1948."

This act authorized a 4-year program of aid to 16 European countries, Western Germany, and the Free Territory of Trieste. It declared that "The restoration or maintenance in European countries of principles of individual liberty, free institutions, and genuine independence rests largely upon the establishment of sound

economic conditions, stable international economic relationships, and the achievement by the countries of Europe of a healthy economy independent of extraordinary outside assistance." It called for a European Recovery plan, "based upon a strong production effort, the expansion of foreign trade, the creation and maintenance of internal financial stability, and the development of economic cooperation, including all possible steps to establish and maintain equitable rates of exchange and to bring about the progressive elimination of trade barriers."

The Europeans declared the same purposes in setting up their own joint organization to plan and direct recovery, the OEEC, or Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

In the first 2 years of their recovery program, the people of Europe faced many difficulties and achieved what General Marshall called a "near-miracle" of work and production. Agricultural production came back to the prewar level; industrial production rose to one-fifth above that level. But statistics tell only part of the story. Family life, community life, returned to something like normal. The people began to look ahead with new hope and new confidence in their free institutions.



But destruction of their cities and farms was perhaps the least of the problems the Europeans had to face. There was also the fact of a larger population to support, clothe, feed, and house. There was the fact of continual strikes and riots, most of them communist-inspired. There was the fact that, in order to become self-supporting, they had to produce and sell abroad far more than before the war, to offset the loss of foreign investments, shipping, and other services.

Most challenging of all, and most difficult for Americans to appreciate, was the problem of abandoning old habits of producing and trading—the problem of shedding the economic strait jackets of commercial and currency restrictions by which each nation had sought to protect itself.

Paul Hoffman, head of the Economic Cooperation Administration (Eca), emphasized the need to shape Western Europe into a single market, like that of the United States, in which goods, people, and money could circulate freely. But only the Europeans themselves could accomplish this declared purpose.

During 1949 and 1950 there was slow but steady progress in the direction of creating a single European market. This progress reflected the growth of economic stability and confidence in Europe. Governments were beginning to consider trade concessions and reforms that would have seemed impossible two years earlier.

The OEEC called on its members to abolish, of their own accord, as many of their quantitative import restrictions (quotas) as possible. The first response was disap-

pointing, but it was hoped that by the end of 1950 at least half of these restrictions would have disappeared.

In September 1949 Great Britain revalued its currency in relation to the dollar, and the other Marshall Plan countries followed suit. The effect was to cut the prices of European goods in dollar markets and to improve the European export position.

But it was recognized that the log-jam of intra-European trade would not be broken until a way had been found to make European currencies freely interchangeable. A plan for doing this was finally approved in July 1950 and a European Payments Union was established. The EPU is, in effect, a clearing house for inter-country payments and claims arising out of Western European trade and financial transactions. It was hailed on both sides of the Atlantic as a long step toward European integration.

Paul Hoffman maintains that European recovery has not cost the American taxpayer a nickel. He bases this statement on the conviction that, but for the economic and political revival of free Europe, the United States would have had to spend many billions more on armament. In short, American aid has saved Europe not only from economic collapse but also from communist domination.

The dollar cost of the recovery program, in its first 3 years, was expected to be around 11.5 billion dollars. The return on this investment is in terms of a strong, free Western Europe, physically and psychologically prepared to assume a large share of the burden of its own

Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The British Government had decided to adopt a "wait and see" policy, since they were unwilling to commit themselves to what was still a relatively abstract proposal.

An idea as bold and radical as this was bound to run into criticism. The dread word "cartel" was raised, with its suggestion of monopoly, concentration of power, restricted production, and high prices. But advocates of the plan pointed out that a cartel can be a benevolent organization if its purposes are to expand production, broaden markets, and bring down prices. These are the declared purposes of the Schuman Plan. To see that they are carried out, an international authority would be created to oversee the plan, and to report its progress to the United Nations.

The United States Government gave the idea warm approval and support, for it saw great promise in the proposal. The promise was that Germany and her European neighbors might, by merging their major industries, evolve a relationship so close and a community of interest so strong that a war between them would become not only unthinkable, but impossible. The generous and enlightened French proposal might, indeed, mark the end of an ancient hostility and the beginning of a new area in Western Europe.

THE PROMISE OF POINT FOUR

Man has only begun to scratch the surface of the earth's wealth. In great areas of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, millions of people are living in poverty because

they have not had a chance to apply modern methods of tilling their soil, mining their minerals, and processing the resources they have at hand. The burden of poverty, disease, and ignorance in these areas has become a danger to all free, democratic people, because it invites all kinds of totalitarian controls, including communism.

For many generations, Americans have gone out to work with the people of the underdeveloped parts of the world, to study their ways of life, and to share American skills and knowledge with them. American private capital has gone out, also, to finance the development of oil, rubber, tin, bauxite, and many other resources of these areas. For the past 10 years the United States Government has been authorized by Congress to send technical missions abroad, chiefly to Latin America, and to bring technicians from the less developed countries to the United States for training.

In his inaugural address of January 1949, President Truman proposed to raise these traditional American activities and interests to the level of a major national policy and a major enterprise of the American people and their Government. Because this proposal was the fourth point of the President's declaration of foreign policy, it has become known as Point Four.

"We must embark," said Mr. Truman, "on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas . . . we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in co-

operation with other free nations, we should foster capital investment in areas needing development

“Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens.”

The Point Four undertaking, as the President conceived it, has two distinct, but closely related, elements. One is “technical cooperation,” which means the use of skills and scientific knowledge to help people raise their standards of living. This part of the program costs relatively small amounts of money for the salaries of technicians and the equipment they use.

The other element is large-scale development, requiring sizable amounts of money in the form of investment capital. The underdeveloped areas themselves can supply some, but not all, of the necessary capital. Foreign capital is needed, and it can come from three sources: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and from private banks and investors.

Because of uncertainties and tensions in the world, and because of conditions in the underdeveloped areas, private investors have not been eager to risk sending their capital abroad in large amounts. The United States Government is trying in various ways to reduce some of the risks.

For example, the State Department is negotiating new treaties with foreign governments, guaranteeing certain kinds of protection to American investors, so that they

will not be discriminated against but will receive the same treatment as nationals of the country. New laws are being considered which would allow the Export-Import Bank to sell an investor certain kinds of insurance specifically against expropriation, confiscation, and seizure, and against inability to convert local currencies—meaning inability to take profits out of the country.

But even with this kind of protection, it is not likely that large amounts of private investment capital will flow to the underdeveloped areas in the near future.

Fortunately, the work of technical cooperation can go forward without delay, and it can, in fact, help to create the kind of world climate and, more particularly, the kinds of local conditions which encourage investment. For experience shows that certain basic services like public health, sanitation, literacy, good communications, and good public administration are usually the necessary forerunners of large-scale development projects. These are among the services that the technical cooperation program helps to create or improve.

Congress put its approval on the program in April 1950 and gave the State Department the job of directing the work of technical cooperation. Many agencies of the Government and many private organizations are already carrying on this kind of work.

Under the new program, the work will be broader and more closely coordinated, so that it can become in time a major national effort.

For the first year's budget, the Congress appropriated 34.5 million dollars. Roughly a third of this budget is

pledged to the support of a United Nations technical cooperation program.

Americans have never claimed a monopoly of technical skills. Our experts are, in fact, quick to recognize the pre-eminence of other nations in certain fields; for example, the Norwegians in the science of fishery, the British in some aspects of tropical medicine. The specialized agencies of the United Nations, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization, are in a position to draw on the skills of many nations—as well as their financial support. At a special meeting of the United Nations in June 1950, 50 nations pledged 20 million dollars for the first year of the United Nations program. Some of the pledges came from nations on the receiving end of technical aid.

Technical cooperation is not something to which you can apply a set of rules. But certain basic principles can and should guide the work. One of these is the principle of self-help. The United States offers its skills only where they are plainly wanted and only where people have shown that they are ready to help themselves. When this readiness exists—and it usually involves breaking with old habits and traditions—then technical cooperation brings good, and often quick, results.

Another guiding principle of this work is to start where people are; to help them solve their own problems in their own way, and not to impose ideas or methods which are alien to their character and their own desires.

Americans have always been interested in dealing with other people, as people, not as pawns in some inter-

national game of power politics. All through the history of our international relations runs the thread of a consistent attitude and purpose: to work with others, to cooperate but not to dominate. This is the paramount principle which guides the Point Four Program.

The character of the program has sometimes been misunderstood. It has been called a “big money” program, a means of scattering dollars around the world. Obviously it is not that, but a means of spreading ideas and skills. It has been called a “welfare” program. Obviously, it is that—in the best sense of the word.

Some people have asked, “Why should we help the people of these ‘underdeveloped’ areas to raise their standard of living when we have plenty of Americans who need that kind of help?” The answer, of course, is that we can do both, and we are, in fact, doing both. Many Point Four projects are patterned on, for example, the work we are doing right here at home in soil conservation, irrigation, and public health. All such programs, both at home and abroad, enlarge our experience and our knowledge. The exchange in ideas and skills is a two-way traffic.

Some people have asked, “What has Point Four got to do with stopping communism? Is this the time to be helping people on the other side of the world to raise better crops and stamp out malaria?” The answer is that this is the very time; that most of the people we are working with are less interested in abstract principles of communism and democracy than in solving their ur-

gent problems of hunger, disease, and the difficulty of scratching for a bare living.

The communists offer them quick remedies for all their ills. We have a chance to prove to them in practical and concrete ways that a free society can promote both human well-being and human dignity.

WORLD TRADE AND WORLD PEACE

The European Recovery Program has lifted the great European workshop back to its feet and has put millions of highly skilled people back into productive work. The Point Four Program will, in time, create new centers of production and will help millions of people in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle and Far East to develop their skills and resources. Both these programs are designed to raise standards of living through production.

But production is never an end in itself. Goods are useful only if they can be bought, sold, and consumed. The peace and well-being of the world depends on trade—on a healthy, expanding trade by which wealth can circulate freely to the widest possible extent and create a demand for new wealth.


International trade, therefore, is a second major concern of our economic policy. As with European recovery, the problem is not to restore an old system but to develop a new and better one.

The United States has a strong interest in helping to build a healthy international trading system which will act as a preventive to depressions and economic warfare.

During the past 36 years we have become a great creditor

nation. In that period the value of our exports has exceeded the value of our imports by about 100 billion dollars. This is called a "favorable" balance of trade, but, even by strictly economic standards, it is not favorable at all, since the 100-billion-dollar gap has had to be financed by the American people through direct taxation and government loans, interest on which comes from taxes. But this export surplus has been necessary to our national security, for it reinforced our allies in two world wars and contributed to their recovery in the post-war years.

The problem of today is to develop a sound, balanced system of world trade. The American reciprocal trade-



agreements program has taken us a long step in that direction. It reversed the high-tariff policy of the 1920's and set us firmly on the road toward a more enlightened policy of opening up the channels of world trade.

Under the authority of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, the United States joined with 22 other major trading nations at Geneva in 1947 in the greatest tariff bargaining meeting in history. The result of that meeting was a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which reduced tariff rates sharply and affected half the world's imports. The same bargaining process was repeated at Annecy, France, in 1949, with 11 more countries present. And this conference led, in turn, to a third round of tariff-cutting negotiations at Torquay, England, in 1950. Every country got and made concessions, and every concession that was made to one country immediately applied to all those present. Thus the free nations made an unprecedented, all-out attack on one of the most serious obstacles to the flow of trade.

But even more stubborn obstacles remain to be overcome. Today anyone who tries to buy or sell across national boundaries can still become entangled in a jungle of government controls in the form of quotas, customs regulations, and currency restrictions. To get rid of this tangle of restrictions will require time and a spirit of give-and-take, for no nation is willing to discard its economic armor while the rest remain armed.

The ultimate answer to this difficult problem is in the general acceptance of a code of fair trade practices. Fifty-four nations have agreed on such a code and embodied

it in the charter for an International Trade Organization. The charter sets the minimum rules of the game, on which all 54 nations are now willing to agree. They are not ideal rules by any means, but they can be improved as the nations get experience in cooperation and gain confidence in each other.

The charter also provides for an organization, within the family of the United Nations, a place where the members can meet and settle their trade problems across a conference table. There has never before been such a place. The organization and the charter offer at least a rational hope that economic warfare can be ended in the not too distant future. The Iro charter is now before the American Congress for approval. Other nations are waiting to see whether the United States will live up to its enlightened economic principles.

Those who support the Iro believe that it will pave the way for closer political as well as economic cooperation among the free nations and thus contribute to the security of the United States.



This American attitude has an ethical as well as a political background. For, as Secretary Acheson has said, the "truth is that just as no man and no government is wise enough or disinterested enough to direct the thinking and the action of another individual, so no nation and no people are wise enough and disinterested enough very long to assume the responsibility for another people or to control another people's opportunities."

Some Americans have been troubled by the fact that the nations whose independence we have helped to establish and maintain have not all had representative governments or practiced democracy as we understand it. This raises the question of what we mean when we speak of "free" nations and "free" peoples. It is worth clearing up this question which has caused a good deal of confusion about American policy.

A "free" country is one that does not have to take orders from a foreign government. Believing as we do that national independence is a stepping stone to popular government and personal liberty, we set a high value on the independence even of those nations which cannot by any stretch of the imagination be called democracies.

The fact that we help a country to be free of foreign domination does not mean that we support the particular government it happens to have at any particular time. It means that we want the kind of international community in which each nation is free to manage its own affairs, subject, of course, to its pledges and responsibilities under the United Nations Charter. Within the broad area of the Charter, there is plenty of room for people

to experiment and to change their forms of government, if they wish—plenty of room for progress toward democracy.

In recent years the United States has had a chance to prove that it is still the traditional friend of young nations, still the champion of peoples seeking their independence. Since the end of the second World War more than 500 million people have gained their independence. Eight new nations have been born. The United States has assisted at the birth of these nations, as far as it could. It has vigorously supported their membership in the United Nations.

In the Philippines we had our best opportunity to demonstrate that American policy means what it says. The 20 million citizens of those islands celebrated their independence on July 4, 1946, as a result of a promise we made and kept. Moreover, we not only welcomed them into the community of nations but helped them to organize and finance their free society.

To India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon we are giving our strong and friendly support. The people of Israel have had America's moral and material backing since the beginning of their struggle for nationhood.

Americans can take pride in their contribution to the creation of the Republic of Indonesia. During the long and difficult negotiations between the Indonesian and Netherland Governments, American diplomacy played an important and sometimes a decisive part in bringing the parties together and in helping them, finally, to work out a satisfactory agreement.

strong collective action by the decent, law-abiding members of the community.

The United Nations took such action. Fifty-three of its members responded quickly and freely in upholding the Charter. They responded to a recommendation—not a command—of the Security Council.

When, on June 27, 1950, President Truman ordered United States military forces to go into action in Korea, he also directed the Seventh Fleet to prevent an attack on the island of Formosa. This island sheltered Chinese Nationalist leaders and the remnants of their armed forces. As a former Chinese possession, it was coveted by the Chinese communists who had, in fact, publicly proclaimed their intention of invading and capturing it.

Our action in neutralizing Formosa, said the President, was a matter of elementary security. Our purpose was to prevent a communist attack on the island which, as the President explained to the Congress on July 19, "would have enlarged the Korean crisis, thereby rendering much more difficult the carrying out of our obligations to the United Nations in Korea."

Soviet and Chinese communists charged the United States with "aggression" in Formosa and brought the matter before the Security Council. The United States welcomed a United Nations investigation and, in fact, suggested that a United Nations commission be sent to Formosa to observe and report the facts.

So that American policy would be clearly understood both at home and abroad, the President summarized our aims and our hopes in a radio talk on September 1, 1950:

"First: We believe in the United Nations. When we ratified its Charter, we pledged ourselves to seek peace and security through this world organization. We kept our word when we went to the support of the United Nations in Korea 2 months ago. We shall never go back on that pledge.

"Second: We believe the Koreans have a right to be free, independent, and united—as they want to be. Under the direction and guidance of the United Nations, we, with others, will do our part to help them enjoy that right. The United States has no other aim in Korea.

"Third: We do not want the fighting in Korea to expand into a general war. It will not spread unless communist imperialism draws other armies and governments into the fight of the aggressors against the United Nations.

"Fourth: We hope in particular that the people of China will not be misled or forced into fighting against the United Nations and against the American people, who have always been and still are their friends. Only the communist imperialism, which has already started to dismember China, could gain from China's involvement in war.

"Fifth: We do not want Formosa or any part of Asia for ourselves. We believe that the future of Formosa, like that of any other territory in dispute, should be settled peacefully. We believe that it should be settled by international action and not by the decision of the United States or of any other state alone. The mission

of the Seventh Fleet is to keep Formosa out of the conflict. Our purpose is peace, not conquest.

"Sixth: We believe in freedom for all the nations of the Far East. That is one of the reasons why we are fighting under the United Nations for the freedom of Korea. We helped the Philippines become independent, and we have supported the national aspirations to independence of other Asian countries. Russia has never voluntarily given up any territory it has acquired in the Far East; it has never given independence to any people who have fallen under its control. We not only want freedom for the peoples of Asia but we also want to help them secure for themselves better health, more food, better clothes and homes, and the chance to live their own lives in peace. The things we want for the people of Asia are the same things we want for the people of the rest of the world.

"Seventh: We do not believe in aggressive or preventive war. Such war is the weapon of dictators, not of free democratic countries like the United States. We are arming only for defense against aggression. Even though communist imperialism does not believe in peace, it can be discouraged from new aggression if we and other free peoples are strong, determined, and united.

"Eighth: We want peace and we shall achieve it. Our men are fighting for peace today in Korea. We are working for peace constantly in the United Nations and in all the capitals of the world. Our workers, our farm-

ers, our businessmen, all our vast resources, are helping now to create the strength which will make peace secure."

THE RIGHTS OF MAN

The United Nations Charter pledged all its signers to respect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms. But it did not define those rights and freedoms. One of the first tasks of the United Nations, therefore, was to get general agreement among its members on what those words meant. To be realistic, such an agreement would have to express the honest beliefs and aims of all the nations that put their names to it. It must, in short, be a common denominator of conviction rather than a pious hope.

The United States worked hard for such an agreement. American organizations gave it vigorous support. And our American chairman, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, guided its progress through the Human Rights Commission. In 1948 the General Assembly approved the first international Declaration of Human Rights.

The next step is to get the principles affirmed in the declaration accepted in practice, as part of the constitutions and laws of nations. This is a work of many years, but the Economic and Social Council has already undertaken the drafting of human-rights treaties, or "covenants," which will bind the nations that sign them to guarantee certain basic rights to their citizens. Each covenant will have to take into consideration the particu-

lar problems of a particular nation, its legal system and its method of dealing with violations.


The drafting of human-rights covenants is one of the boldest as well as one of the most difficult projects ever conceived by a group of nations. In the judgment of history, this quiet and generally unsung work may rank as one of the great revolutionary enterprises of the United Nations.

Another is the outlawing, by the United Nations, of genocide, or mass murder of whole groups of people, such as Nazi Germany officially practiced. In 1948 the General Assembly unanimously approved a convention pledging its members to treat genocide as a crime and to punish it accordingly. This treaty is now up for ratification.

Our interest in human rights is not confined to the making of treaties and declarations. We are working for such concrete things as the free gathering of news, the free movement of peoples, and the free exchange of knowledge. The United Nations, through the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and other specialized agencies, offers many channels for concrete progress along these lines.

There is no need to create a ferment of ideas in the world. It already exists. The need—and this the United Nations can meet—is to translate the ideas of

freedom and progress into practical terms of better health, better nutrition, better homes, and schools—in short, the chance to work for a better life.



The American nation began life with a Declaration of Independence. We held and still hold these truths to be self-evident: "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these rights are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed"

Today the foreign policy of the United States is a declaration of the interdependence of men and nations. We now know, as Woodrow Wilson told us 34 years ago, that "we are participants, whether we would or not,

1948-1949


1948-1949

1948-1949

1948-1949

in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of Europe and Asia.”

These twin propositions of independence and interdependence explain what we are and why we have become—and will remain—free.



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